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
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*Handbook of  
The European War*

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
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# Handbook of The European War





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# Handbook of The European War

Volume II

*Edited by*

ALFRED BINGHAM



THE H. W. WILSON COMPANY  
WHITE PLAINS, N. Y. AND NEW YORK CITY

1916



**Published January, 1916**

*It would be impossible for men to go through what men are going through on the battlefields of Europe and struggle through the present dark night of their terrible contest if it were not that they saw, or thought that they saw, the broadening of light where the morning should come up and believed that they were standing each on his side for some eternal principle of right.*

*Then all about them, all about us, there sits the silent, waiting tribunal which is going to utter the ultimate judgment upon this struggle, the great tribunal of the opinion of the world; and I fancy I see, I hope that I see, I pray that it may be that I do truly see, great spiritual forces lying waiting for the outcome of this war to assert themselves, which are, indeed, asserting themselves even now to enlighten our judgment and steady our spirits.*

*No man is wise enough to pronounce judgment, but we can all hold our spirits in readiness to accept the truth when it dawns on us and is revealed to us in the outcome of this titanic struggle.*

WOODROW WILSON <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> From an address of welcome, delivered at the Maryland Annual Conference of the Methodist Protestant Church, Washington, D. C., April 8, 1915. The President personally revised the proof of the above extract, and gave his express permission for its use in this place.





## PREFACE

Volume one of the Handbook of the European War deals largely with the events that led up to that struggle. This volume concerns itself more particularly with the effects of the war, as reflected by the speeches and writings of prominent statesmen and authors. The book has been divided into three sections: Germany and Her Allies, Great Britain and Her Allies, The United States and the War. These divisions are at best arbitrary because many of the articles reproduced might have been included in either or all of the sections. This explains the fact that but 43 pages are given to the first division of the book, while the second occupies more than 140 pages. As the book is intended primarily for American readers, articles on the effect of the war on the United States occupy a large part of its space.

The first aim of the editor has been to observe absolute neutrality in the choice of material for this book. In spite of all efforts, it is probable that extremists on either side will discern a bias one way or another. When the proof-sheets were shown to a prominent German sympathizer, he exclaimed: "What! You call this a neutral book. It is as neutral as all the American publications." On the other hand, an equally prominent English sympathizer felt that a strong leaning in favor of the Central Powers was shown in the selection of the articles and speeches for the volume.

Battles, incidents and events of the war have been practically ignored in making up the contents of this Handbook. While it might have been desirable to include accounts of some of the leading incidents, such as the sinking of the *Lusitania*, the Dumba affair or the Zeppelin raids, to have done so would have enlarged the volume far beyond the space allotted to it.

With a few exceptions, only the more moderate expressions of opinion and sentiment have been reproduced here. The more radical articles have been included in order to give full representation to the feelings of hatred and animadversion aroused by the greatest struggle in history. On the whole, however, the

sentiment of President Wilson, reproduced on the opening page of the book, that the underlying motive of all the combatants, however mistakenly manifested, is for good rather than evil, has been followed in the selection of material.

Acknowledgments and thanks are due to the various authors and publishers who so kindly gave permission for the reproduction of their material here.

No bibliography is included in this Handbook. The material available is too large to make it expedient to compile a complete one, and with the daily accretions to war literature any selected list of books would at best be fragmentary and unsatisfactory for permanent use. A later volume may include a selected bibliography of war literature and a complete index of the preceding volumes. It is the earnest hope of the editor that the next volume, to be published at an early date, will concern itself with the successful conclusion of peace treaties and the resumption of industrial activity and reestablishment of prosperity in the countries now unfortunately at war.

ALFRED BINGHAM.

November, 1915.

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## GERMANY AND HER ALLIES





# GERMANY

## REVIEW OF GERMANY'S POSITION<sup>1</sup>

Since our last parliamentary session great things have happened. The French, scorning death and spilling their blood like water, have endeavored to break through our western front, but all their gallant attempts have suffered shipwreck, so wonderful was the dogged resistance of our brave troops. Italy, our new foe, thought that she could easily conquer the coveted land of her neighbor, but so far her attacks have been splendidly repulsed despite her numerical superiority, and although she did not spare human lives, but sacrificed them to the fullest, yet all was in vain. Unshaken and impregnable stands also the Turkish host at the Dardanelles front.

Wherever we ourselves took the offensive we defeated and repelled the enemy. Shoulder to shoulder with our faithful allies we cleared nearly the whole of Galicia, Poland, Lithuania and Courland from the Russians. The fortresses of Ivangorod, Warsaw and Kovno have fallen. Our lines have everywhere advanced far into hostile territory where they stand firm like a wall. We can now release powerful armies for fresh blows elsewhere. Fearless and proud, with full confidence in our glorious troops, we can calmly view the future.

Our opponents are guilty of rivers of blood because they attempt to deceive their respective nations with regard to the actual state of affairs. Wherever they do not deny their defeats our victories stand them in good stead for piling up additional slander against us, their argument being that if we have been victorious in the first year of the war it was because we had prepared it long and treacherously, while they, innocent pacifists that they are, had not been ready.

Formerly a very different tune was heard. You remember the warlike articles which the Russian minister of war diffused

<sup>1</sup> Official translation of a speech delivered by Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, Imperial Chancellor of the German Empire, in the Reichstag on August 19, 1915. A few unimportant paragraphs and quotations from diplomatic correspondence readily available have been omitted.

throughout the press in the spring of 1914 praising the Russian army because, as he said, it was fully prepared for war. And you recollect the proud and often provocative language which France has used in later years. As often as she satisfied the Russian need of money she always stipulated that the greater part of the loan was to be used for military armaments.

And England! On August 3, 1914, Sir Edward Grey said in the House of Commons:

For us, with a powerful fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce and to protect our shores and to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.

A man who speaks with such an uncanny, businesslike tone on the eve of declaring war and who directs the policy of his own country and that of its friends accordingly can only do so in the knowledge that he and his allies are ready.

Of course we can all understand that our opponents are trying over and over again to wash their hands of the guilt of causing this war. When the hostilities broke out and again in December, 1914, I explained the whole *causal nexus* to this house. All further information that has become known since then merely corroborates my statements. The fiction that she was participating in the war only because of Belgium England herself has since given up as untenable. Do the smaller nations still believe that England and her allies are waging this war in order to protect the smaller nationalities, national liberty and civilization?

England is throttling neutral trade on the ocean to the best of her ability. Goods that are consigned to Germany may no longer be shipped even on neutral vessels which have to take English crews on board on the open sea and have to obey their orders. England occupies Greek islands simply because such high-handed action fits in with her military operations. And in order to drag Bulgaria over to her side England, together with her allies, is now trying to compel neutral Greece to cede parts of her territory.

And Russia, who, together with her allies, poses as a champion of the freedom of nations, is devastating the whole of Poland prior to the retreat of her armies. Villages are ablaze, cornfields are trampled down, and the population of towns and villages, both Jewish and gentile, are sent into exile to uninhabited parts. They perish in the mire of the Russian roads

and in windowless, locked-up freight cars. That is the freedom and civilization for which our opponents are fighting.

England solemnly poses as the protectress of smaller nationalities, but the world has a better memory than England thinks. You need only go a little more than ten years back to find examples of the true meaning of England's protection.

Early in 1902 the Boer republics were incorporated in the British empire. After that England cast her eyes on Egypt. In reality Egypt had long been in British power, but she was not formally annexed because the British government had solemnly promised the ultimate evacuation of Egypt. When we offered to guarantee to her the integrity of Belgium if she remained neutral England proudly replied that she could not treat her obligation regarding the Belgian neutrality as a business transaction. Yet in 1904 the same England did not hesitate to huckster to France the solemn obligation which she had undertaken toward the whole of Europe by concluding with France that famous treaty which was to give Egypt to England and Morocco to the republic.

In 1907 it was Asia's turn. A pact was made with Russia to the effect that the southern portion of Persia was to become an exclusively British sphere of interest, whereas northern Persia was handed over to the liberal rule of the Cossacks.

Such has been the policy of the English. Surely they have no right to lay lust of war and greed of land to the charge of a country which has preserved the peace of Europe for forty-four years and lived for its peaceful development while nearly all the other countries were waging wars and conquering lands. That is hypocrisy.

Ample evidence concerning the trend of British policy and concerning the origin of this war is contained, for those who do not yet believe, in the reports of the Belgian ministers. Why are those documents which I have had published kept secret as much as possible at London, Paris and Petersburg? Why does the hostile press evade them and try to minimize their significance by saying that they do not prove that Belgium had surrendered her neutrality? That proof has been given in another place.

The reports made by Belgian diplomats give a clear picture of the entente policy carried on during the last ten years. All attempts of the enemy to impute lust of war to us and love of

peace to themselves are light in the scale if compared to the testimony. Was German diplomacy ignorant of those events, or did it intentionally shut its eyes, ever seeking a compromise?

Neither the one nor the other was the case. I know very well that certain circles blame me for political shortsightedness because I always worked for an understanding with England. I thank God that I did it. I had small hopes each time I renewed the attempts, but it is evident that the fate of a world-wide manslaughter might have been averted on the basis of a sincere understanding with England—an understanding which had peace as its aim. Nobody in Europe would then have dared to make war. With such a goal before me, would it have been right for me to reject the work simply because it was hard and had always proved unsuccessful?

Where the most fateful world embracing questions are involved, where millions of human lives are at stake, I tell myself that all things are possible with God. I would rather fall in a fight than shirk it.

Let me briefly recall the events. King Edward regarded the personal furtherance of England's policy of encircling Germany as his life's foremost mission. After his death I hoped that the negotiations for an understanding which we had commenced as early as 1909 would make better progress. They dragged on without producing any result until the spring of 1911, when England's interference in our dispute with France in the Moroccan question proved clearly to everybody that England's policy and her claim to enforce her will on the whole world were threatening the world's peace.

At that time also the English people were not exactly informed about the dangerous policy of their government. When after the crisis the English nation realized how they had escaped a world conflagration by the breadth of a hair there was a widespread wish in the English nation to arrive at some understanding with us which would exclude warlike complications. The English felt that it was sufficient to have crossed the stormy waters once; hence Lord Haldane's mission in the spring of 1912.

Lord Haldane assured me that the British cabinet sincerely desired an understanding. Our new navy bill, which was then imminent, rather depressed him. I asked him whether an open understanding with us—an understanding which would not only

exclude an Anglo-German but any European war—was not worth more than a few German dreadnoughts more or less. His lordship personally seemed to be inclined to share my view. Yet he inquired whether Germany with her back free toward England would not pounce upon France and crush her.

My answer was that the pacific policy which Germany had pursued for over forty years really ought to exempt us from such a question. If predatory attacks had been in our minds, I said, the Boer war and Russo-Japanese conflict would have given us a splendid opportunity to display our bellicose spirit. But in those cases, as well as in the Moroccan policy and otherwise, we had done the contrary, always manifesting our love of peace. I told him that it was the sincere wish of Germany to live in peace with France and that she no more meant to invade France than any other country.

After Lord Haldane's departure from Berlin the negotiations were continued in London. Some weeks ago I caused the publication in the North German Gazette of the formulas for the understanding which both sides proposed during those negotiations. That publication also is worthy of the notice of our opponents. However, the English press has ignored it with but one exception as far as I know. I will therefore revert briefly to the matter here.

For the sake of permanent amicable relations with England, we proposed, to begin with, a mutual and unconditional promise of neutrality. When England rejected the proposal as going too far we next proposed to confine neutrality to wars in which the power who had been promised neutrality was not the aggressor. England declined that suggestion too.

In the meantime she herself had proposed the following formula:

England will make no unprovoked attack upon Germany and pursue no aggressive policy toward her. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject and forms no part of any treaty, understanding or combination to which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object.

In my opinion, it was quite impossible among civilized states to make unprovoked attacks on other powers or to join combinations that had such plans, and I thought, therefore, that a promise to refrain from such attacks could not very well constitute the subject of a solemn treaty.

However, the English cabinet held different views and thought it was meeting our representations by declaring its readiness to add the following preamble to its otherwise unchanged formula:

The two powers being mutually desirous of securing peace and friendship between them, England declares that she will neither make nor join in any unprovoked attack.

This addendum, in my opinion, could not in the slightest degree alter our opinion of the British offer, and nobody could have found fault with me if I had then broken off the negotiations. But I did not break them off. I wanted to do everything in my power to safeguard the peace of Europe and of the world. So I declared myself willing to discuss that English proposal, too, on the one condition that the following clause be added:

England will therefore, as a matter of course, observe benevolent neutrality should war be forced upon Germany.

Please mark the final words "should war be forced upon Germany." I shall revert to this point later on.

Sir Edward Grey rejected that supplementary clause point blank. He said that he could not go beyond his formula because he feared—as he declared to our ambassador, Metternich—lest the existing friendships with other powers be jeopardized. That was the end of the negotiations as far as we were concerned.

No comment is really needed. England regarded it as a sign of special friendship, to be ratified by solemn treaty, that she was not to fall upon us without any reason, but she wanted to keep her hands free in case her friends wished to pounce upon us.

The story has never been fully told in England, as far as I know, but only in fragments, and incorrectly at that.

In full knowledge of the anti-German trend of the English policy we had gone with the utmost patience to the extreme limits in our advance, yet we were given stones instead of bread, and then by an unparalleled distortion of facts we were to be put in the pillory and disgraced before the world.

It may be that our enemies will succeed in drawing these statements of mine also in the noise of battle and the undignified campaign of incitation conducted against us in all countries, but the day will come when history will give its final verdict.

At the time of which I speak the moment was at hand when England and Germany by a sincere understanding could have guaranteed the peace of the world. We were willing to do so, but England declined. From that guilt she will never be absolved for all eternity.

That was the end of the Haldane episode. Soon after Sir Edward Grey and M. Cambon, the French ambassador in London, exchanged those well known letters which amounted to an Anglo-French defensive alliance, but the agreements made, besides this, between the respective general staffs and admiralities changed the defensive alliance in effect to an aggressive one.

That is another fact which the British government has purposely withheld from the public. The English people were only informed about it on August 3, 1914, when the die had been cast. Until then the British ministers had constantly declared in Parliament that England was keeping her hand perfectly free in the event of a European conflict. That may have been the case according to the letter, but it was not so in reality, since by virtue of the agreements between the two admiralities the French north coast had been placed under the protection of England.

England pursued the same tactics in her naval negotiations with Russia in the spring of 1914, when a naval convention was initiated by which the Russian admiralty hoped to be enabled with the aid of British ships to bestow on us the blessings of a Russian invasion in our province of Pomerania.

Thus the entente ring, with its pronounced anti-German tendency, tightened more and more around us. The seed sown by King Edward had grown into fruition. We were compelled to meet the situation by the great army bill of 1913. I need hardly tell you that we fully realized the gravity of European conditions when we negotiated with England and that we therefore endeavored at the same time to improve our relations with Russia. I have frequently spoken about this in the Reichstag. I never have in the entire policy of the empire had anything to conceal from the representatives of the people, nor have I ever done so.

In my attitude toward Russia, whose policy has played a determining rôle in the decision of France, I was always guided by the conviction that friendly relations with the individual members of the entente might relieve the general tension and that every additional year of peace might at least offer a chance of



lessening the general danger of an explosion. In several questions we thus succeeded in arriving at a good understanding with Russia.

I only remind you of the Potsdam agreement. The relations between the two governments were not only correct, but based on mutual trust. Yet the general situation remained unremedied.

It was poisoned to the very roots, because the French ideas of revenge and the pan-Slavist plans of expansion in Russia were not only not calmed, but rather continually instigated and fed by the anti-German policy of the balance of power pursued by the cabinet of London. Thus the tension became acute to the breaking point.

Then came the summer of 1914. I told you of the various events on August 4. But as our opponents go on misrepresenting and attacking us I feel duty bound to deal here once more with some of the points in question. In England in particular the opinion has been expressed again and again of late that the whole war might have been averted if I had submitted to the proposals of Sir Edward Grey and taken part in a conference which was to settle the Austro-Russian dispute. What happened was this:

The English proposal of a conference was transmitted to us here through the ambassador on July 27. According to the British Blue Book, our foreign secretary in the interview with Sir Edward Goschen in which he declined the proposed measure as impractical, said he had news from Russia showing that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonof to exchange views with Count Berchtold.

He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result and that it would be best to await the outcome of this exchange of views. Sir Edward Goschen reported this to London and received the following telegraphic reply from Sir Edward Grey:

As long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely agree that it is the most preferable method of all.

Thus Sir Edward Grey at that time adopted the German point of view and expressly withdrew his proposal of a conference. But, while he merely had the platonic desire that Vienna and Petersburg might communicate directly, I did everything I could to induce the Russian and Austro-Hungarian governments to try

to find a solution by an exchange of views between their respective cabinets.

I have said in this house before that in our efforts at mediation, especially in Vienna, "we went to the last limit of that which was compatible with our relations toward our ally." As England continues to throw doubt on my activity as a mediator in the interests of peace, let me prove by facts how baseless those doubts are.

In the evening of July 29 I received the following message from the imperial ambassador at Petersburg:

M. Sazonof, who just asked me to call on him, informed me that the Vienna cabinet had categorically refused his wish to enter into direct conversations. Nothing remained, therefore, but to revert to Sir Edward Grey's proposal of holding a conversation of four.

Since in the meantime the Vienna government had declared its readiness to negotiate direct with Petersburg it was perfectly patent that there was some misunderstanding. I wired to Vienna and availed myself of the opportunity of expressing again and definitely my view of the general situation.

I instructed Herr von Tschirschky as follows:

The report of Count Pourtales is not in harmony with the account which your excellency has given of the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian government. There seems to be a misunderstanding, which I ask you to clear up. We cannot expect Austria-Hungary to negotiate with Serbia since she is in a state of war with that country. But it would be a grave mistake to refuse an exchange of opinions with Petersburg. We are prepared to fulfil our duty as allies, but we must decline to be drawn into a universal conflagration through a disregard of our advice on the part of Austria-Hungary. I ask your excellency at once to speak to Count Berchtold seriously and emphatically in this sense.

Thereupon Mr. von Tschirschky reported on July 30:

Count Berchtold remarked that there was indeed a misunderstanding, as your excellency assumes, and that the misunderstanding was on the part of Russia. Since Count Szapary, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador at Petersburg, had also informed him of the misunderstanding and since at the same time our urgent suggestion to enter in conversations with Russia had reached him he had at once given corresponding instructions to Count Szapary.

I made these events known in the English press shortly before the outbreak of hostilities, when excitement grew hot in England and serious doubts were being raised as to our endeavors for the preservation of peace. Now the English insinuate *ex post facto* that those events had not occurred at all and that the

instructions to Mr. von Tschirschky were feigned in order to mislead public opinion in England.

You will agree with me that this aspersion is not worthy of an answer. But at the same time I want to point to the Austro-Hungarian Red Book, which corroborates my statement and shows how after the misunderstanding was cleared up conversations between St. Petersburg and Vienna went on briskly until they were suddenly cut short by the mobilization of the Russian army.

I repeat that we most emphatically and successfully worked for a direct discussion between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

The assertion of our opponents that by declining the counter proposal of England we became guilty of causing this war is one of those slanders behind which our enemies want to hide their own guilt. Only the Russian mobilization made the war inevitable. That I want to state here again with all emphasis.

The longer this war lasts the more Europe will bleed from a thousand wounds. The new world arising from the ruins after the war will look different from that of which our enemies dream. Their endeavor is to restore the old Europe centering round an impotent Germany; a Germany where the foreigner's intrigues and desires shall find a happy hunting ground and where Europe's future battles can be fought; a Germany split up into feeble petty states at the beck and call of foreign powers; a Germany with shattered industries, with an insignificant trade confined to her home markets; a Germany without a navy to navigate the ocean by Britain's grace; a Germany that is a vassal of the Russian giant who rules the European southeast and east and unites all Slavs under the scepter of Moscow.

Such was the dream which at least in the beginning of the war was indulged in at London, Paris and Petersburg. No, this gigantic war which is rending the whole world asunder will not bring back the old conditions of the past.

A new order of things must come if Europe is ever to find rest. And that can only come about when Germany attains a firm and impregnable position. What preceded this war has taught us a hard lesson. For more than a decade it has been the only aim of all other powers to encircle and isolate Germany, to exclude her from cooperation in the affairs of this world. Such a policy was bound to lead to a bad end.

The English policy of the balance of power must disappear

forever, because it is, as the English poet Bernard Shaw recently remarked, the hotbed of wars. Very significant in this connection is a remark which Sir Edward Grey made when Prince Lichnowsky, our ambassador, took leave of him on August 4. Sir Edward, with some emphasis, observed that the war which had broken out between England and Germany would enable him to be of better service to Germany at the conclusion of peace than if England had remained neutral. Grey's vision, I presume, beheld a victorious Russia looming behind a defeated and enfeebled Germany, which would be good enough to serve as England's vassal and henchman.

Germany must build up and fortify her position so that the other powers can never again think of encircling her. For our own protection and for the welfare of all nations we must gain the freedom of the seas, not for the sake of being their sole ruler, as England wants to be, but so that the ocean may serve all nations equally. We want to be for all time protector of peace and of liberty for big nations as well as small.

## ENGLISH REPLY TO BETHMANN-HOLLWEG<sup>1</sup>

There are some points in the speech of the German Chancellor, which may, I think, be suitably dealt with in a letter to the press, pending the fuller review of the situation which may be appropriate to some other method and time.

1. The Belgian record of conversation with the British Military Attaché was published by Germany last autumn to prove that Belgium had trafficked her neutrality with us and was, in effect, in a plot with us against Germany.

The conversation of which most use has been made was never reported to the Foreign Office, nor, as far as records show, to the War Office at the time, and we saw a record of it for the first time when Germany published the Belgian record. But it bears on the face of it that it referred only to the contingency of Belgium being attacked, that the entry of the British into Belgium would take place only after the violation of Belgian territory by Germany, and that it did not commit the British

<sup>1</sup> Made by Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, of Great Britain, in a letter to the London Daily Telegraph, dated August 25, 1915.

government. No convention or agreement existed between the British and Belgian governments. Why does the German Chancellor mention these informal conversations of 1906 and ignore entirely that in April, 1913, I told the Belgian Minister most emphatically that what we desired in the case of Belgium, as in that of other neutral countries, was that their neutrality should be respected and that as long as it was not violated by any other power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory?

Let it be remembered that the first use made by Germany of the Belgian document was to charge Belgium with bad faith to Germany. What is the true story? On July 29, 1914, the German Chancellor tried to bribe us by a promise of future Belgian independence to become a party to the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany.

The violation of Belgian neutrality was therefore deliberate, although Germany had actually guaranteed that neutrality, and surely there has been nothing more despicably mean than the attempt to justify it *ex post facto* by bringing against the innocent and inoffensive Belgian government and people the totally false charge of having plotted against Germany. The German Chancellor does not emphasize in his latest speech that charge, which has been spread broadcast against Belgium. Is it withdrawn? And, if so, will Germany make reparation for the cruel wrong done to Belgium?

2. The negotiations for an Anglo-German agreement in 1912, referred to by the German Chancellor, were brought to a point at which it was clear that they could have no success unless we in effect gave a promise of absolute neutrality while Germany remained free under her alliances to take part in European war. This can, and shall, be explained by publishing an account of the negotiations, taken from the records in the Foreign Office.

3. The Chancellor quotes an isolated sentence from my speech of August 3, 1914, to prove that we were ready for war. In the very next sentence, which he might have quoted but does not quote, I said: "We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are in it or whether we stand aside." I leave it to any one outside Germany in any neutral country to settle for himself whether those are the words of a man who had desired and planned European war, or of one who had labored to avert it.

As to the other statement attributed to me; not even when we were perfectly free, when Japan, who was our ally, had not entered the war, and when we were not pledged to other allies as we are now by the agreement of September 5, 1914, did I say anything so ridiculous or untrue as that it was in the interest of Germany that we had gone to war and with the object of restraining Russia.

4. The war would have been avoided if a conference had been agreed to. Germany on the flimsiest pretext shut the door against it.

The German Chancellor, according to his speech, encouraged nothing except direct discussion between Vienna and Petrograd. But what chance had that of success when, as we heard afterward, the German Ambassador at Vienna was expressing the opinion that Russia would stand aside, and conveying to his colleagues the impression that he desired war from the first, and that his strong personal bias probably colored his action there?

It has become only too apparent that in the proposal of a conference which we made, which Russia, France, and Italy agreed to, and which Germany vetoed, lay the only hope of peace.

The refusal of a conference by Germany, though it did not decide British participation in the war, did, in fact, decide the question of peace or war for Europe and sign the death warrant of the many hundreds of thousands who have been killed in this war.

Nor must it be forgotten that the Emperor of Russia proposed to the German Emperor that the Austro-Serb dispute should be settled by The Hague Tribunal.

Is there one candid soul in Germany and Austria-Hungary who, looking back on the past year, does not regret that neither the British nor Russian proposal was accepted?

5. And what is the German program as we gather it from the speech of the Chancellor and public utterances in Germany now? Germany to control the destiny of all other nations; to be "the shield of peace and freedom of big and small nations"—those are the Chancellor's words—an iron peace and a freedom under a Prussian shield and under German supremacy. Germany supreme, Germany alone would be free—free to break international treaties; free to crush when it pleased her; free to refuse all mediation; free to go to war when it suited her; free,

when she did go to war, to break again all rules of civilization and humanity on land and at sea; and, while she may act thus, all her commerce at sea is to remain as free in time of war as all commerce is in time of peace. Freedom of the sea may be a very reasonable subject for discussion, definition, and agreement between nations after this war; but not by itself alone, not while there is no freedom and no security against war and German methods of war on land. If there are to be guarantees against future war, let them be equal, comprehensive, and effective guarantees that bind Germany as well as other nations, including ourselves.

Germany is to be supreme. The freedom of other nations is to be that which Germany metes out to them. Such is apparently the conclusion to be drawn from the German Chancellor's speech; and to this the German Minister of Finance adds that the heavy burden of thousands of millions must be borne through decades, not by Germany, but by those whom she is pleased to call the instigators of the war. In other words, for decades to come Germany claims that whole nations who have resisted her should labor to pay her tribute in the form of war indemnities.

Not on such terms can peace be concluded or the life of other nations than Germany be free, or even tolerable. The speeches of the German Chancellor and Finance Minister make it appear that Germany is fighting for supremacy and tribute. If that is so, and as long as it is so, our allies and we are fighting, and must fight, for the right to live, not under German supremacy, but in real freedom and safety.

## THE TRUE GERMANY<sup>1</sup>

Can there be any doubt that the spirit shown by the whole German people in the present war is a wonderful exhibition of strength put into the service of moral commands? I certainly do not wish to belittle the spirit of self-sacrifice manifested by other nations in this war. Who above all could fail to have the deepest sympathy with the Belgian people in their heroic defense of their homes and hearths? But none of the nations now fight-

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from an article by Prof. Kuno Francke, of Harvard, in the *Atlantic Monthly*, October, 1915, p. 550-60.

ing, I believe, is filled with the same joyous, jubilant exultancy of self-surrender, the same unswerving and undoubting obedience to the inner voice, the same unshakable conviction of fighting for the best that is in them, that the Germans have shown.

Germany in this conflict has had no need of calling for volunteers: two million of them, from boys of eighteen to gray-beards of sixty-five, offered themselves spontaneously without a call at the very proclamation of war. Germany has had no need of a spasmodic resort to prohibition legislation; her soldiers and her workmen are disciplined enough to keep in fit condition for the manufacture and the use of arms. Germany has had no need of scouring Asia and Africa for savage hirelings to wage her war: her own sons, thousands of business and professional men, flocked from all over China to the colors in besieged Kiaochao, with the absolute certainty of either death or capture, impelled by no other motive than to make good the truly Kantian cablegram sent by the commandant of the fortress to the Emperor: "Guarantee fulfilment of duty to the utmost." In military achievements, can any of the nations that are besetting Germany match her by such examples of trained intelligence, consummate skill, iron determination, persistent daring, unquestioning devotion—in short such examples of personalities steeled by obedience to the categorical imperative—as Germany has given in the captain and the crew of the *Emden*; in the career of the *Dresden* and the *Eitel Friedrich*; in the submarines that made their way from the North Sea, through the Straits of Gibraltar, into the Dardanelles; or in that living wall of millions of men that are steadily and relentlessly flinging back the assault upon her own frontiers by all the great powers of Europe?

The average German of today has a mental strenuousness and an emotional intensity such as is absent from the average European of other stock, not to mention the average American. A strange spectacle indeed, and an inspiring one: a people naturally slow and of phlegmatic temper stirred to its depths of intellectual and spiritual forces and thereby keyed up to an eagerness and swiftness of action which gives it easily the first place in the race for national self-improvement. What other people equals the German in the readiness to react upon stimuli from abroad, to adopt and incorporate ideas grown on foreign soil? Where have Sophocles, Dante, Shakespeare, Calderón, Ibsen exerted as truly popular and deeply penetrating an influence as in Germany?



Where have they become educational forces of equal momentum? Is there any other country where the knowledge of foreign languages is so widely spread? any other country where there is so much individual desire for solid learning? any other country where individual talent is as carefully and conscientiously cultivated? any other country where there is so much honest and serious effort to approach the great questions of existence from an individual angle, to restate them in personal terms, to find new answers and new vistas?

To the German, the drama is a sacred matter. He looks to it for inspiration, widening of sympathies, upheaval of emotions, cleansing of purpose, strengthening of the will. From Schiller on to Hauptmann and Schönherr, generation after generation of German dramatic writers has tried to live up to this ideal, not always with full artistic success. Always with nobility of aim. Even now, in the midst of the war, when in London the serious stage has given way to the noisy and sensational vaudeville show, the German theaters in all cities, large and small, maintain and emphasize the classic tradition and add their share to the ennobling of national character.

To the German, music is a sacred matter. Who could describe what Beethoven and Schubert and Schumann and Wagner have been to the German people throughout these past hundred years? Who could measure the wealth of comfort, delight, strength, elevation, which song—song giving wings to the feelings of an Uhland, Eichendorff, Heine, Lenau, Geibel—has showered upon countless German homes? And Beethoven, as well as folk-song, has accompanied the German nation into the war. Not a catchy and meaningless music-hall tune is what the German soldiers love to sing in the trenches, but "Es braust ein Ruf wie Donnerhall," or "In der Heimat, in der Heimat—da giebt's ein Wiedersehn!"

To the German, the enjoyment of nature is a sacred matter. A short time before his death, in his eightieth year, Ludwig Tieck declared that the greatest event in his whole life, the event which had influenced and shaped his character more than any other, had been a sunrise which he had watched as a youth of eighteen when he was tramping in the Thuringian mountains. That is German sentiment. That is what millions of Germans feel today. That is what makes the flowerpots bloom behind the windowpanes—kept so scrupulously clean—of German tenement houses;

what has transformed the public squares of German cities into parks and meadows; what makes Whitsuntide, with its joyful roaming through field and forest, with its bedecking of all houses with the young foliage, the most charming of all German holidays. That is what made the "field-gray" of the German troops marching into war last August disappear under such masses of roses as if all the German gardens had emptied themselves upon them.

The Germany of today is a normal and splendid outgrowth of national ideals that have been at work for more than a century—the ideals of training the will, of stimulating energy, and of cultivating the soul.

How is it possible that a people animated by such a spirit, a people which for a century has assiduously and devotedly labored to produce types of human personality as noble and enlightened as any people ever has brought forth—how is it possible that such a people should suddenly appear to large numbers of intelligent observers as an enemy of mankind, as a menace to the security and peace of the rest of the world? Much of the hostile criticism of Imperial Germany, of its alleged sinister craving for world-dominion, or its atrocious conduct of the war, is outright slander and wilful distortion. It is indeed a grim mockery to have the tentative and circumscribed efforts made by Germany during the past twenty-five years for colonial expansion denounced by the enemies of Germany as dangerous and intolerable aggression, when one remembers that during these same years England throttled the independence of the South African republics, established a protectorate over Egypt, partitioned Persia—together with Russia—into "spheres of influence," encouraged France to build up an immense colonial empire in Cochin China, Madagascar, Tunis, and Morocco, allowed Italy to conquer Tripoli, and helped Japan to tighten her grip upon China. As to the manner of the German conduct of war, here also a huge mass of extraordinary exaggerations and a vast amount of anonymous aspersions have been indulged in. For the rest, these accusations find their explanation in the fact that Germany thus far has in the main been able to ward off the enemy from her own soil and to transfer the deadly work of destruction into the enemy's country.

And yet, there is a residuum of truth in the assertion that Germany during the last generation has overreached herself. So

far as this is the case, she bears her part of the guilt of having conjured up the present world calamity. In saying this, I am not thinking of Germany's consistent policy of formidable armament. For I fail to see how Germany could have afforded not to prepare for war, so long as she found herself surrounded by neighbors every one of them anxious to curb her rising power. What I am thinking of is a spirit of superciliousness which, as a very natural concomitant of a century of extraordinary achievement, has developed, especially during the last twenty-five years, in the ruling classes of Germany.

The manifestations of this spirit have been many and varied. In German domestic conditions, it has led to the growth of a capitalistic class as snobbish and overbearing as it is resourceful and intelligent, counteracting by its uncompromising *Herrenmoral* the good effect of the wise and provident social legislation inaugurated by Bismarck. It had led to excesses of military rule and to assertions of autocratic power which have embittered German party politics and have driven large numbers of Liberal voters into the Socialist ranks, as the only party consistently and unswervingly upholding Parliamentary rights. In Germany's foreign relations, it has led to a policy which was meant to be firm but had an appearance of arrogance and aggressiveness and easily aroused suspicion. Suspicion of Germany led to her isolation. And her isolation has finally brought on the war.

It should, however, be said that these excesses of German vitality, so skilfully used by anti-German writers to discredit Germany's position in the present conflict, have not, as is asserted, been a serious danger to the rest of the world. Rather have they been an element of weakness to Germany herself.

THE KAISER'S PROCLAMATION<sup>1</sup>

One year has elapsed since I was obliged to call to arms the German people. An unprecedented time of bloodshed has befallen Europe and the world.

Before God and history my conscience is clear. I did not will the war.

After preparations for a whole decade the coalition powers, to whom Germany had become too great, believed that the moment had come to humiliate the empire, which loyally stood by her Austro-Hungarian ally in a just cause, or to crush it in an overwhelming circle. No lust for conquest, as I already announced a year ago, has driven us into the war.

When in the days of August all able-bodied men were rushed to the colors and troops were marched into a defensive war, every German on earth felt, in accordance with the unanimous example of the Reichstag, that it was a fight for the highest good of the nation, its life, its freedom. What awaited us if the enemy force succeeded in determining the fate of our people and of Europe has been shown in the hardship endured by my dear province, East Prussia.

The consciousness that the fight was forced upon us accomplished miracles. Political conflict of opinion became silent; old opponents began to understand and esteem each other; the spirit of true comradeship governed the entire people.

Full of gratitude, we can say today that God was with us. The enemy armies who boasted that they would enter Berlin in a few months are with heavy blows driven back far east and west. Numberless battlefields in various parts of Europe, and naval battles off near and distant coasts, testify what German anger in self-defense and German strategy can do. No violation of international law by our enemies will be able to shake the economic foundation of our conduct of the war.

The communities of agriculture, industry, commerce, science, and technical art have endeavored to soften the stress of war. Appreciating the necessity of measures for the free intercourse of goods, and wholly devoted to the care of their brethren in the field, the population at home has strained all its energies to parry the common danger.

<sup>1</sup> Manifesto issued by William II, Emperor of Germany, from army headquarters, on Sunday, August 1, 1915, the beginning of the second year of the struggle.

With deep gratitude the Fatherland today and always will remember its warriors—those who, defying death, show a bold front to the enemy; those who, wounded or ill, return; those, above all, who rest from battle on foreign soil or at the bottom of the sea. With mothers, widows, and orphans I feel grief for the beloved who have died for their Fatherland.

Internal strength and a unanimous national will in the spirit of the founders of the empire guarantee victory. The dikes they erected in anticipation that we once more should have to defend that which we gained in 1870 have defied the highest tide in the world's history.

After unexampled proofs of personal ability and national energy, I cherish the bright confidence that the German people, faithfully preserving the purification acquired through war, will vigorously proceed on the tried old ways and confidently enter the new.

Great trials make the nation reverent and firm of heart. In heroic action we suffer and work without wavering until peace comes; peace which offers us the necessary military and political economies and guarantees for a future which fulfils the conditions for the unhindered development of our producing energy at home and on the free seas.

Thus we shall emerge with honor from a war for Germany's right and freedom, however long the war may last, and be worthy of victory before God, who, we pray, may bless henceforth our arms.

## THE GERMAN EMPEROR<sup>1</sup>

Contrary to American public opinion, there is nothing pompous, nothing even pretentious in the bearing of William II. The Emperor's manner was the opposite of the ostentatious; it was plain, straightforward and frank. One's first impression is that of a strong man who is also a pleasant, simple mannered gentleman, with an agreeable personality, charged with that engaging quality called magnetism.

One's second impression, following so quickly upon the first

<sup>1</sup> From "What Is Back of the War," by Albert J. Beveridge. Copyright, 1915, by the Bobbs-Merrill Company, and reprinted here by permission of the publishers.

that the two were almost one, is that of immense vigor, abounding physical vitality and searchlight mental alertness. With it all, you are instantly put at your ease, although indeed the psychological atmosphere is not that of apprehension. There is in the Emperor's demeanor none of that stiff reserve with which so many public men cloak their own fear of themselves, not a vestige of that stilted manner so frequently used as a substitute for dignity.

His Majesty was within a little more than two weeks of his fifty-seventh birthday. He did not look older than his age suggests. The mustache was gray and the hair almost white; the gray-blue eye was clear, its expression intense and full of nervous force. I had been credibly informed that it is a mannerism of the Emperor to look at you piercingly for a space before speaking, but nothing of the kind occurred. The eye does have a penetrating quality but if this experience was a fair test, the staring stories are untrue.

The complexion was pale with a faint tinge of color; the lips were healthfully red. Under the eyes were wrinkles, but not more nor different than one sees on the faces of most active men of the Emperor's age. The features were not full, as shown by portraits of a year ago; still less were they haggard, as they appear in photographs taken soon after the war began. The face was lean, rugged, wholesome.

The voice was vibrant and strong, without the faintest trace or suggestion of weakness or nervous exhaustion. The step was firm, decided, but not over-rapid; and at no time was there the slightest indication of weariness. The carriage was erect, elastic, vigorous.

While physically as well as mentally the Emperor showed extraordinary animation, there was a calmness and steadiness that surprised because of the descriptions to the contrary so universally published in **America**.

Such was Wilhelm II, on the afternoon of January 11, 1915. Yet only a short time before I had read that he was broken down physically, that he was fatally ill, that he was a nervous wreck, and even that his mind was affected by the world catastrophe of which he is the central figure. I am, of course, not a medical observer; but from my youth I have seen hard worked men in every state from perfect fitness of body, nerve and mind, to a condition of physical exhaustion and nervous collapse.

From this experience in practical life, if I had to do with a man, as friend or foe, who looked, acted and talked as the German Emperor did on the occasion I have described, I should count such a man a powerful force, with physical resources unimpaired, with mental strength at its height.

The Emperor's personality is a composite of the engaging and impressive, the attractive and compelling. One instantly forgets the station he holds in one's interest in the man. The mind is brilliant and stored with an amazing fund of information on apparently every subject. His careful and extensive education, of which so much has been written, is evident; his trained intellect has explored surprisingly wide fields of knowledge. It is impossible to think of William II as ever being dull for an instant; and one cannot conceive of his being uninformed upon any matter of large statesmanship coming to his attention or likely to be brought before him. It is asserted by his admirers and sometimes conceded by his detractors, even in hostile countries, that the Emperor is the most thoroughly educated of all European statesmen.

Also, from personal contact one cannot honestly doubt the Emperor's sincerity. And the accounts of his deeply religious nature are so plainly true, that the impartial observer does not even question them. The impression of cleanliness in mind, character and conduct is irresistible and increasing. One cannot imagine this successor of the great Frederick as thinking basely himself, or tolerating it from another. One can conceive of his being impulsive, stern, dominant, aggressive, masterful, but never as being colorless, vapid, weak-kneed, hypocritical or cowardly.

And it was universally asserted in Germany by friend and former foe (for at this writing the Emperor has no opponents in his own country) that William II was devoted to peace above all things, except the safety of the German people. "There is no question that the Emperor did not want this war," said a German Socialist who in the past has bitterly opposed the Emperor and who even now agrees with William II only in carrying on the war until Germany wins. "I am fair enough," said he, "to concede that undoubtedly the Emperor's one great ambition was to close his reign without war. I believe that he wished to be known as the peace emperor."

In Germany itself, comparatively few, if any, can be found

who believe the contrary. Many say that the Emperor had three opportunities to wage successful wars against each of the countries now in arms against Germany.

However this may be, one who tries to hold the balance of judgment fair and true is inclined, from personal study of the Emperor, to think that his natural tendencies are strongly toward peace. But there can be no question that now that his hand has been set to the plow, he will not turn back until the furrow has been run. In this he faithfully reflects German feeling and purpose. When, at the outbreak of hostilities, the Emperor said, "To the last man and the last horse," he undoubtedly meant every word of it and he expressed in that now historic phrase the deliberate resolve of the German nation.

This sketch is to bring the German Emperor to the understanding of the American mind, and is put in terms of Americanism, just as if describing an American public man. Disagree with him if you will; but remember that if you were to meet the Emperor casually, without knowing who he is, you would like him immensely; and this liking would be a sure step to respecting his character and admiring his ability.

It will be useful to the American reader who thinks the coloring of this picture too pronounced, if he will reflect that to the German eye it will appear pale and unappreciative. To the Emperor's supporters, among the German people, and at the present moment this means the German nation, this estimate will seem small and cold. There are those in Germany who dislike the Emperor even now; but even these are with him to the uttermost in the terrific crisis now threatening Germany's life; and the masses of the people at the date of this writing, February, 1915, are devoted to him with a fervent and limitless loyalty and love.

These facts are mentioned in order that the American reader may be advised that what I have here set down is not an overstatement, but, on the contrary, reserved and guarded and far within the limits of the truth. When this is understood, it will be plain, even to the prejudiced, that much which has been written and spoken of this great man has been penned or uttered in ignorance or malice.



WHO WILL PAY THE COST?<sup>1</sup>

The cost and the damage caused by the war during the first six months have been estimated by authoritative writers at more than four thousand million pounds, apart from all private expenditure and losses, apart from the value to the nation of the dead and the mutilated, and apart from the labor lost to the State represented by the soldiers who are under arms. There can be no question of compensation being paid for these costs and losses of war by the defeated party to the conqueror—if, indeed, a victory of one side or the other is conceivable. In Germany, apart from the empire, the individual states and communes have also incurred millions of debts. Who is to pay these gigantic sums? Who is to labor and pay even the interest on them? "When I see princes and states fighting and quarrelling, it always brings to my mind a match of cudgel-playing fought in a china-shop" (Hume). The fellows with the cudgels are the belligerent nations; the china-shop is the economic organization of the world, and it will not be long before all the china in the world is broken into fragments.

*Quousque tandem?*

How is it to go on? How is it to end?

Every victory is a Pyrrhic victory. "One more such victory and I am lost." Among the sixty-seven millions of Germans is there not a single soul who will dare to brave the thunderbolts of Jupiter and exclaim, as Themistocles did to Eurybiades: "Strike, but listen!" Must subservient newspaper writers continue to let their scandalous reports run through the press,

—while outside on the snow-covered fields, in the damp earth-huts, the children of their country perish and bleed to death, while the widow and the fatherless pour forth a rising flood of tears?

<sup>1</sup> From "I Accuse!" (J'Accuse!), by "A German." Copyright, 1915, by George H. Doran Company and reprinted here by permission of the publishers. The blank spaces denote passages omitted owing to the condition of censorship.

How long will all this still go on? How is it to end? The nations are not advantaged if after peace the "right trusty cousins" fall into each other's arms in emotion, embrace each other, and once more assume each other's uniforms which they have discarded in the interval. The nation is not advantaged by solemn entrances through the Brandenburger Tor,

with crowns of laurel and the blare of trumpets.

It is peace the people want; peace they are craving for, peace for which they hunger and thirst. There are enough dead and mutilated; there is enough misery and ruin. The conscience of the world is stirring; the words now being raised in accusation will find the sword of fulfilment if the stern accents of the voice of the people remains unheard. *Vivos voco, mortuos plango, fulgura frango*; I call the living, I lament the dead, I defy the lightning—such is the call of the bell of the world's conscience to the mighty ones.

And on your head

Turns he the widows' tears, the orphans' cries,  
The dead men's blood, the pining maidens' groans  
For husbands, fathers and betrothed lovers,  
That shall be swallow'd in this controversy.

They have suffered enough, the Achaeans

The nations have never been enemies. From all letters written at the front it is clear that the feelings of hatred and of revenge are unknown in the trenches. These are the dragon's eggs which are hatched at home at the writing-tables in the coziness of editors' rooms. From trench to trench friendship and brotherhood are concluded. They visit each other, make each other small presents, and shake hands in friendship. And then they return to the trenches, and shoot at each other on commands from above. Is that not unspeakable, incredible?

If we had not known long ago that none of the belligerent nations desired war, that a few hundred, at the most a few thousand, criminal men had desired and engineered this murder of the nations, the fraternization between the trenches would prove that between the nations no enmity exists. But just because it proves this, just because it might be prejudicial to the energy of murder, and gradually make it clear to those who are

fighting that they are fighting for nothing which concerns them, that they are urged on against each other by higher powers who are pursuing their interests—for this reason, just as I am writing these lines, a strong prohibition against these scenes of fraternization has been issued by the supreme German Command. There must be no fraternization, no handshaking, there must be no pause in the firing, for God's sake, no! The task of murder must go on without loss of time. *Nulla dies sine linea*, there must be no day without murder and arson.

But all army commands will be of no avail. *La vérité est en marche*. Every hour, every day, brings the illumination nearer. And if they will not—the gentlemen behind the front—in the end they must.

Peace will come—soon, as quickly as possible, for it must come. Woe to the generals who still throw their sword into the balance—woe to those rulers who will still refuse to hear the subdued, forcibly restrained voice of the nations! Under the placid surface of internal peace the seething waters are in agitation, boiling and bubbling. Woe to those who refuse to hear the subterranean noises, and who still confide their bark to the treacherous waters. They will be devoured by the waves!—*Discite moniti!* Learn, you have been warned!

## THE BARBARIANS<sup>1</sup>

On August 3 this year bodies of soldiers in blue-grey uniforms began to cross the narrow river which marks the frontier between the German Empire and the little independent state of Belgium. For days they continued to pour across that line, mounted Uhlans with their lances, great masses of infantry closely packed, the tall men of the Prussian Guard, carrying with them a lingering memory of the madness of old Frederick William. Guns also came with them, maxims, field artillery, and a little later the huge howitzer siege guns, the latest masterpieces of Krupp, able to throw shells of a ton weight over miles of country, built to make an end of the forts of Paris.

All these things were new, and yet there was that about those

<sup>1</sup> From "The Prussian Hath Said in His Heart," by Cecil Chesterton. Copyright, 1915, by Louis H. Wetmore, and published by Lawrence J. Gomme.

great masses of moving men that recalled a memory. So, fifteen centuries before, companies of half-civilized mercenaries from the marshes of the empire, and masses of savage raiders from beyond its borders, may have passed that same stream and seen before them the security and wealth of the Roman world with all its rich possibilities of outrage and plunder. The men that now followed in their track were trained in an exact discipline and armed with all the latest instruments of science. But such differences could not prevent a thrill of recollection running through civilized Europe which had seen the thing before. They were the Barbarians. And they were returning.

They approached the first of the great fortresses which blocked their path. It was Liège. They demanded its surrender. The thunder of its guns answered them. It was the answer of civilization. Tiny Belgium, standing at the moment alone in the face of that immense aggression, felt her kinship with Europe, answered for Europe, and placed Europe forever in her debt.

Of the dreadful price at which Belgium purchased imperishable glory I shall speak here only so far as it is necessary to the understanding of what Prussia is and why she must be destroyed. There are no words that an Englishman can find in which to speak of Belgium and all that we feel about her. I prefer to leave such feeble words as I could use unwritten, and to wait for the day when we may help her to see her desire done upon her enemies. But one aspect of her martyrdom relates so closely to the subject of this book that I may not pass it by. No account of how Prussia makes war would be complete without a corresponding picture of how she wages it.

In the two pictures the same outstanding features appear: a contempt of morals and a contempt of honor. It is a favorite gambit of the weak-minded pacifist, who cannot even see what an institution is before he begins to assail it, to say that we must not complain of the outrages incidental to war, since war is itself an outrage. Now war certainly involves the deliberate infliction of physical pain and death; and, if you are a materialist, and think physical pain and death the worst conceivable evils, you are entitled to say that, according to your philosophy, war is itself an outrage. But unless you would be a bigot as well as a materialist, you must not assume that all men accept your first principles as self-evident; and you must recognize that

a doctrine which would condemn war has certainly never been part of the Christian creed, any more than a doctrine which would justify outrages on non-combatants has been a part of the creed of the European warrior.

War, as Christendom has always recognized it as allowable, is an affair conducted under certain strict rules. Some of these rules are dictated by the claims of the Christian virtues of justice and mercy. Others are dictated by that conception of which I spoke in a previous chapter, which is not in itself specifically a Christian virtue, but is necessary to the practice of any high virtue—the conception of honor. The essence of that conception is reciprocity. The rules may vary, but, such as they are, they must be well known and apply to both sides. Each must be able to count on the other observing them. Now the essence of the Prussian theory is the denial of reciprocity. The Prussian, as acknowledged superior to the race in general, claims in war, as in peace, to do what he chooses, and at the same time counts, as did Frederick the Great, on the advantage which he will derive from other men being hampered by scruples from which he is free. That fundamental conception is the key to the whole ghastly record of Prussian atrocities.

It is quite certain that the campaign in Belgium and in northern France has been conducted by the Prussian military authorities with a savage cruelty altogether inconsistent with the traditions of civilized warfare. I am not at all concerned to deny that in this connection there has been exaggeration and falsehood. Some stories have been proved to be untrue, and others are of such a nature as to raise doubts on their first hearing. We may well admit that idle rumor, journalistic love of sensation, and, even deliberate falsehood and fraud (as often as not devised by the enemy for the purpose of discrediting the real case against the Prussian system) have had their share in many of the stories which are current here.

But this does not touch the indisputable minimum contained, for instance, in the official Belgian report, drawn up under the supervision of men of unquestionable judgment and integrity, including the chief justice of Belgium. Nor does it touch the stories of eye-witnesses, including some of our own soldiers as well as those who have actually taken in mutilated Belgian children, which we have all heard personally. Finally, it does not and cannot touch the official admissions of the Prussian government itself.

The Prussian theory and practice is quite simple and logical. Morals being as inapplicable to war as to diplomacy, no considerations should enter into the conduct of a war except a calculation of the material factor likely to promote success. Now in the present war it was of the essence of the Prussian plan of campaign to strike an instant and overwhelming blow at France. The resistance of Belgium was an obstacle. To overcome that obstacle by the thorough military conquest and occupation of Belgium meant delay, and it meant the employment of men who were needed for the projected march on Paris. Therefore Belgium must be held, not by a regular military occupation, but by a reign of terror sufficiently savage to cow its inhabitants into submission.

The Prussian, with his "master morality" and "slave morality," virtually divides the human race into bullies and cowards. He did not appear to be aware, until this war had broken out and had been carried to a certain point, that any other kind of man existed. Possibly that truth is beginning to dawn on him now. Before the war is over he may begin to realize that Christendom is essentially a military thing; not a sheep, but a lion. I think that history will see that it would have paid the Prussians much better to have treated Belgium with greatest respect and consideration, and to have refrained from inflicting any hardships not inseparable from the state of war. Had they done so it is quite possible that there would have been many Belgians who would have been inclined to say that enough had been done for honor, and that further resistance could not reasonably be expected of them. As it is, there is no Belgian, and for a matter of that no Englishman or Frenchman, who has not had the horrors of the Prussian occupation, the slaughtered non-combatants, the desecrated churches, the outraged women and the mutilated children, branded into his mind, and who does not feel that it would be unspeakable if peace were made until Prussia had paid to the last farthing for her crimes.

I have said so much of the atrocity of the Prussian spirit that I have hardly left myself space to speak of its other and much less important quality, which is also the consequence of its loss, or rather repudiation, of the idea of "honor," its curious vulgarity. But that quality is very apparent whether in the emperor's crude and effeminate sneers at his "contemptible" enemies, or in the action of his son, the heir to the Prussian throne, who when ensconced in a French country house, takes

the opportunity to make away with the family plate after the fashion of a common burglar. Morals apart, what has become of the common sense of human dignity in royal personages who do such things? The answer is that it has gone the way of chivalry, humanity and honor, as result of that denial of the reciprocal rights of man and man which is the Prussian first principle. The crown prince doubtless thinks that in looting peaceful houses he is showing himself in the light of a splendid and renowned conqueror. The only answer is that civilized people do not feel like that.

We may take it, then, that the atrocities of the Prussians are in the main calculated and deliberately ordered.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that human nature is so made that if you force men on the pain of death or savage punishment to behave like devils the probable result in most cases will be that, if they obey you, they become like devils. I have already pointed out that the twisting of the moral instincts which the whole Prussian system involves, tends to produce that fearful moral disease which we call perversion. If this is so with civilians, it is much more so with soldiers, for the traditions of the profession of arms are chivalrous, and a soldier sins against his nature much more by such acts as the slaughter of women and children than an ordinary man would.

It seems certain that the element of perverted malice mingled with that of deliberate political calculation in the case of many outrages both on human beings and on historic monuments. To take the less grave case of the latter: while the burning of Louvain seems to have had a definite object—the intimidation of the other historic Belgian towns where the Prussians wished to establish an undisputed dominion—the bombardment of Rheims cathedral, though it must have been ordered by a high authority—seems to have been purely wanton. The lie that a post of observation had been stationed on the tower has been refuted by the French War Office, but it hardly needed refutation. The fact that it was not put forward until several days had passed and until several other and quite contradictory explanations of the incident had been given, stamps it as an afterthought. On the other hand, the deliberation with which shells were aimed at the noblest of all heritages of Christendom is fully proved. There seems to have been no possible motive, political or military, for the outrage. It must have been simply malicious; that is to say, it proceeded from an evil will.

And yet there was a sense in which these Prussian soldiers were right. In attacking the monuments of the old civic freedom in Flanders and the monuments of the old European religion in France they were really attacking their enemy, the enemy which stands behind Cossack lances and French "75's" and British bayonets, the enemy that will conquer them at last: the soul of Europe.

### GERMANY UNCIVILIZABLE<sup>1</sup>

Germany behaves as though it were the most backward among nations. And indeed it is in spite of appearances essentially feudal. There is perhaps a German culture, but there is no German *civilization*.

One may be well informed and yet be hardly civilized. A sense of duty to humanity, a sense of pride, a sense of liberty are independent, certainly not of intelligence, but are independent of mere knowledge of accumulated facts.

If the German people had been truly civilized they would never have maintained silence before the assassination of Belgium. Even among those whose ideas are contrary to the existing political order in Germany, none has risen up against this crime admitted and proclaimed at the beginning of the war in full Parliament by the Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg himself. The universal astonishment at such a silence was so great that even today the world has not recovered from it.

The individual German is the least subtle and the least susceptible to education of any in the world.

It has been my lot to take part in certain European capitals in a number of reunions where English, French, Italians, and Germans came together and conversed. They were all, I was assured, distinguished people, of whom their respective nations might be proud. Now, the German was rarely to be seen in an excellent attitude. He was at once embarrassed and arrogant. He lacked refinement. His politeness was clumsy. He was as though afraid of seeming not to know everything. The most eccentric taste seemed to him the best taste. To him to be up to date was to be up to the minute. He would have been

<sup>1</sup> By Emile Verhaeren. The article from which these extracts are taken was written for *Les Annales*. It was afterward rewritten and published in a volume entitled "Belgium's Agony," by Houghton Mifflin Company.



wretched if any one in his presence had claimed to be up to the second.

As soon as he had the chance to speak and got a hearing, he inaugurated, as it were, a course of lecture. Clearness was not at all necessary to him. One rarely understood precisely what he meant. The fastidiousness and subtlety which led others to seek perfection in phrase and thought had little attraction for him. Germany is essentially the *persona ingrata* everywhere it presents itself. It knows only the methods that divide, and not those which unite. Germany makes proclamations that act upon the mind as frost acts upon plants. Germany knows neither how to attract nor how to charm nor how to civilize, because she has no personal and profound moral force.

Europe under the successive spiritual hegemonies of Athens, Rome, and Paris remained the most admirable center of human development that has ever been.

Under German hegemony Europe would move toward a sort of gloomy and hard organization under which everything would be impeccable, arranged only because everything would be tyrannized over from above.

Germany is the dangerous nation because it is the uncivilizable nation, because its castles, its fields, and its barracks have remained the inexhausted, and perhaps the inexhaustible, reservoirs of human ferocity.

## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CIVILIZATION<sup>1</sup>

These are the facts as shown by the record, and upon them, in my judgment, an impartial court would not hesitate to pass the following judgment:

1. That Germany and Austria in a time of profound peace secretly concerted together to impose their will upon Europe and upon Servia in a matter affecting the balance of power in Europe. Whether in so doing they intended to precipitate a European war to determine the mastery of Europe is not satisfactorily established, although their whole course of conduct suggests this as a possibility. They made war almost inevitable by (a) issuing an

<sup>1</sup>James M. Beck's argument, based on the diplomatic correspondence of the nations involved was very widely circulated. His conclusions are here given.

ultimatum that was grossly unreasonable and disproportionate to any grievance that Austria had and (b) in giving to Servia, and Europe, insufficient time to consider the rights and obligations of all interested nations.

2. That Germany had at all times the power to compel Austria to preserve a reasonable and conciliatory course, but at no time effectively exerted that influence. On the contrary, she certainly abetted, and possibly instigated, Austria in its unreasonable course.

3. That England, France, Italy, and Russia at all times sincerely worked for peace, and for this purpose not only overlooked the original misconduct of Austria but made every reasonable concession in the hope of preserving peace.

4. That Austria, having mobilized its army, Russia was reasonably justified in mobilizing its forces. Such act of mobilization was the right of any sovereign State, and as long as the Russian armies did not cross the border or take any aggressive action no other nation had any just right to complain, each having the same right to make similar preparations.

5. That Germany, in abruptly declaring war against Russia for failing to demobilize when the other powers had offered to make any reasonable concession and peace parleys were still in progress, precipitated the war.

6. That Belgium as a sovereign State has as an inherent right the power to determine when and under what conditions an alien can cross her frontiers. This right exists independently of treaties, but is, in the case of Belgium, reinforced by the Treaty of 1839 and the Hague Convention, whereby the leading European nations (including Germany) guarantee its "perpetual neutrality." The invasion of Belgium by Germany was in violation of these rights, and England only respected its own solemn covenant when, in defense of that neutrality, it declared war against Germany.

The writer of this article has reached these conclusions with reluctance, as he has a feeling of deep affection for the German people and equal admiration for their ideals and matchless progress. Even more he admires the magnificent courage with which the German nation, beset on every hand by powerful antagonists, is now defending its prestige as a nation. The whole-hearted devotion of this great nation to its flag is worthy of the best traditions of the Teutonic race. Nevertheless, this cannot alter

the ethical truth, which stands apart from any considerations of nationality; nor can it affect the conclusion that the German nation has been plunged into this abyss by its scheming statesmen and its self-centered and highly neurotic Kaiser, who in the twentieth century sincerely believes that he is the proxy of Almighty God on earth, and therefore infallible.

In visiting its condemnation, the Supreme Court of Civilization should therefore distinguish between the military caste, headed by the Kaiser and the Crown Prince, which precipitated this great calamity, and the German people.

The very secrecy of the plot against the peace of the world and the failure to disclose to the German people the diplomatic communications hereinbefore quoted strongly suggest that this detestable war is not merely a crime against civilization, but also against the deceived and misled German people. They have a vision and are essentially progressive and peace-loving in their national characteristics, while the ideals of their military caste are those of the Dark Ages.

## AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

### AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND SERBIA<sup>1</sup>

The present world-war was in its origin a "punitive expedition" against the Serbians, for having the impudence to sympathize with their brother Serbs and Croats in Austria-Hungary. The expedition was to have been made in August, 1913, as Signor Giolitti recently revealed to the world, but owing to Italy's refusal to join Austria in a war of aggression it was postponed for a year, until the murder of the archduke by Austrian subjects seemed a fitting opportunity to wipe Serbia off the diplomatic map. The "punitive expedition" began in August last by the "chivalrous" Hungarians murdering two or three thousand men, women, and children of the "barbarous" Slavs near Shabatz and Losnitz. They burned a large number of the "barbarian" women and children alive and gouged out the eyes of others. The Serbians have not taken any reprisals, and although they have captured 60,000 Austrian prisoners, those prisoners when questioned have no complaints to make of their treatment. The Austrian wounded are treated on an absolute equality with the Serbian in the Serbian hospitals. In this war Slav "barbarism" shows up very well against German "culture" and Magyar "chivalry." The case for keeping the South Slavs of Bosnia, Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia subject to Austrians and Magyars on the ground of inferior civilization has completely broken down.

Until the various races of Austria-Hungary obtain political self-government and cultural liberty for their languages and schools, there will never be peace in Europe. There will always be assassinations, revolts, and finally wars. If a peace is patched up leaving the boundaries of Austria-Hungary intact and with no provision made for a radical change in the condition of Rumanians, Slovaks, Croats, and Serbs, within those boundaries, a fresh war will only be a question of years, even

<sup>1</sup> By George Macaulay Trevelyan. From an article in the North American Review, June, 1915, p. 1860-68.

if every other European problem were satisfactorily solved. All the nationalist movements inside Austria-Hungary have been growing with great rapidity during the last half-dozen years, especially the movement drawing the Croats toward the Serbs, who speak the same language and are divided from them only in religion. The reign of terror that has existed in these provinces ever since the war began has made it utterly impossible that the Austro-Hungarian rule can continue in the Slav and Rumanian provinces, except as the rule of the sword.

Some people ask why, if the subject races of Austria-Hungary are thus alienated from the government, they do not now rise in insurrection. The answer is because *all* the young men are taken into the army by the modern system of military slavery, and *all* the leaders are in prison or exile. If that had been done in Italy and throughout Europe in March, 1848, there would have been no year of revolutions. The modern militarist organization makes revolutions impossible; for it is young men who rise in revolt—and *all* the young men are now drafted into the army, where the races keep watch over one another and military discipline renders mutiny the most hazardous and desperate act.

Yet even so, Austria's great military weakness in this war is the hatred of her subject populations, and the secret disloyalty of her soldier slaves. Large portions of her army are guarding other portions, or garrisoning disaffected districts. When they take the field, the unwilling conscripts fight well for a while—they can do no less unless they are ready to be shot—but they take the first opportunity to surrender. That is why the Serbians today have 60,000 prisoners, most of whom, so far as I could judge by their words and conduct, were only anxious not to be caught by the Austrians and made to fight again.

It is because she is not a nation that Austria-Hungary is so weak in war. Already she has failed to defend herself, and since the opening of the year 1915 she has been practically occupied by Kaiser Wilhelm's troops. It was the North Germans and Bavarians who came and saved Hungary, after the great defeat in Serbia last December; otherwise Hungary and probably Austria, too, would have been torn to pieces by an invasion of Russians and Rumanians coming over the Car-

pathian passes, which would probably have led to an Italian invasion as well. Hungary has become a vassal state, protected by Germany.

It is a mistake to think of Austria and Hungary, either singly or together, as a "nation" in the sense in which Russia, Germany, France, and England are nations. If we think so, we fail to understand one of the root causes of the present war. And when people suggest the restoration of the state of things before the war as the basis for a permanent peace, they forget Austria-Hungary. The empire of Vienna and Buda-Pesth is an anachronism, dependent now upon the Prussian arms. It is the domination of two races, the Austrian-Germans and the Magyars, over half a dozen other races.

Indeed, the present war arises quite as much out of the question of Austria-Hungary and its subject nationalities as it does out of the German ambition to dominate Europe. Even German love of domination would not alone have sufficed to set the whole world on fire had not German culture been in alliance with a force equally regardless of the rights of others, the determination of the Magyars of Hungary to "Magyarize" the Rumanians, Slovaks, and Croats who dwelt within the borders of their state. In theory the law of 1868 gives cultural liberty to the Slavs in Hungary, but in practice this law is a dead letter. The whole government machinery is used to oppress any man who wishes to remain a Slav or a Rumanian, or to bring up his children as such. The policy of the Hungarian Premier, Count Tisza, represents this "will to oppress" on the part of the Magyars. The Magyars number only 45 per cent of the population of Hungary. And Count Tisza's policy is not even the policy of the Magyar nation, but of the Magyar oligarchy who deprive even their own race of all political power. This Magyar oligarchy has for years past been the dominant force in the Austro-Hungarian partnership. Buda-Pesth, knowing well what it wanted, has been able to dictate to the vacillating statesmanship of Vienna, which has had occasional hankerings after a more liberal treatment of the subject peoples. When the old Emperor Francis Joseph wanted to introduce universal suffrage throughout his wide dominions, he was prevented by the Magyar politicians, who saw in it the doom of their race ascendancy. Their treatment of the subject races of Hungary has become worse of

recent years. In 1912 they abolished the constitution of Croatia and seized the funds and charters of the orthodox Serb church in Hungary.

This internal tyranny has involved an aggressive foreign policy in the Balkans and toward Russia. For the tyranny exercised over the Croatian South Slavs in Hungary has involved as a corollary the repression of the Serbian South Slavs in Bosnia (the province abutting on Serbia, which is ruled by Austria and Hungary jointly). And the repression in Bosnia has in turn necessitated a hostile attitude on the part of Austria-Hungary toward Serbia. For Serbia and Bosnia are in reality one country divided in half—a free half to the east, and an enslaved half to the west of the Drina River. Since oppression was the order of the day in Bosnia and Dalmatia, the oppressed peoples naturally looked across the Drina to their brothers of free Serbia, especially after Serbia had showed herself redoubtable in war against the Turks and the Bulgars in 1912-13. For the same reason it became more than ever essential to the Austrians to prevent the further development of Serbia, after her victory over the Turks, lest she should become the liberator of the South Slavs. Hence the fatal policy of Austria in making it a *casus belli* for all Europe if Serbia got a single port on the Adriatic. By Austrian decree the Serbians were condemned to remain for ever a bucolic, inland people, with no seaport, though half the eastern Adriatic coast is inhabited by their co-nationals, the South Slavs. Austria has "tied Serbia up in a sack," as the Serbs say.

This artificial seclusion from the sea has been the bane of Serbia. The Austrians have cut her off from civilization and then called her uncivilized. She has been prevented from enjoying commercial and intellectual communication with the great European world, except by way of her enemy, Austria. She was shut in on all sides. No one visited Serbia, no one helped her to develop her resources, no one knew what manner of men inhabited her land. It was assumed that they were all "regicides," dirty, idle keepers of pigs, as their enemies, the Viennese, reported. And, as so often happens, it is only their recent success in war which has at length caused the world to remark the qualities which they have always displayed in peace. As one of the few Englishmen who have visited

Serbia both before and during the present war, I should like to record what the Serbians are really like.

The Serbians have the virtues and the limitations of a peasant democracy. Eighty-six per cent of the population belong to the class of peasant proprietors, cultivating their own farms. There is no class of landlords taking rents. There is no feudalism, no squirearchy, and as yet no important mercantile or industrial classes—no "middle class" or "working-men." There are yeomen, and nothing else. The contrast is strange, as compared to neighboring Hungary, where the Magyars, one of the most feudal of all European races, sacrifice the wealth and happiness of the cultivating peasant to the landlord patrician, who carries off everything politically, socially, and economically. Serbia, on the other hand, is democratic and equalitarian, far more so than either America or England. There are no class questions, because there is practically only one class. Patriotism is the sole political feeling of the average Serbian, because there is no "social problem" and consequently there can be no politics except foreign politics. It is due to the independent manliness of the free yeomen, and to the absence of all class division, that the Serbian army has won redoubtable victories in the field over the larger forces that Austria-Hungary sent into Serbia on their errand of murder, pillage, and destruction. If ever there was a pure victory of freemen over slaves who had been sent by the tyrant to destroy them, it was the Serbian victory last December. A few talks with the poor Austrian prisoners, only too rejoiced to be out of the fighting and absolutely uninterested in the issues of the war, were enough to show why they had been beaten by the sturdy peasant soldiers of Serbia, united in one mood of heroism and devotion.

There is a great difference between Serbia proper and the Macedonian provinces which she has recently acquired down south. Serbian Macedonia contains many races, European and Asiatic, and is still rotten with all the vices of a country but just released from Turkish rule. The inhabitants dwell in gigantic villages of five or ten thousand people each, whence they ride out every morning to till the distant fields. In this their custom resembles that of many of the Sicilians and South Italians. Indeed, the bare limestone mountains and backward civilization of Macedonia are curiously like some parts of



south Italy or Sicily. But the change from south Italy to north Italy is not greater than the change from Serbian Macedonia to northern Serbia. In northern Serbia, which has been free of the Turks for a hundred years and where the entire population is Serbian, you have a landscape of gentle, undulating, fertile hills, cut up into fields by hedges after the English pattern. It is much more like Devonshire or New England than like the typical scenery of the Balkans or Mediterranean. The white-walled, red-roofed farm-houses are scattered widely about this pleasant countryside, for there is no need for the inhabitants to draw together for safety at nightfall. It is this country, the richest in Serbia, that the Austrian troops sacked so ruthlessly during their invasion.

The Serbians are an emotional and mercurial people. The south Slav differs in many respects from the Russian Slav. He is less stolid, having been crossed with Greek and Italian blood, and modified by Italian influence in the course of the Middle Ages. Before the coming of the Turk, the Serbian Empire produced works of Italian art of high rank.

The Serbian peasant is not, like the Russian peasant, devoutly religious. He attends church very little, and he has not much of what we call "personal religion." He is neither clerical nor anti-clerical, but indifferent to his clergy. On the other hand, he is profoundly poetical, and his national songs about Kossovo and Marco Kraljevitch are the food on which his youth is fed. The background of his mind is occupied by the history and legend of his country, as handed down in this poetical and musical form. The modern press and modern literature have not reached him.

The Serbs are less patient in retreat than the Russians, but capable of more fierce attack and of sudden recovery of *morale* after all is apparently lost. Their *retour offensif* against the Austrians in December, when they stopped their hasty retreat, turned round and attacked the pursuing enemy and broke him to pieces, is one of the most extraordinary feats in war, and is also highly illustrative of the mercurial character of Serbian heroism.

These national characteristics are also found still more strongly marked among the Croats of Dalmatia, of the same race and language as the Serbians, but of a different religion, being Roman Catholic, while the Serb is orthodox. The Croats

of Dalmatia, being a sea-going people, have had more to do with the Italians and the outside world than the Serbians ever had, and display their Slav characteristics modified by centuries of such contact. The Dalmatian Croats are subject to the Austrians, not to the Magyars. But the system of military terrorism has now spread from Croatia and Bosnia into Dalmatia. In all the south Slav provinces of Austria-Hungary during this war arbitrary imprisonment and executions are the order of the day, and in Bosnia the wholesale deportation of the inhabitants of suspected districts. It is useless for European statesmen to hope for permanent peace if these races, fully aroused to national consciousness during the last few years, are left to the tender mercies of Austrian and Magyar. So, too, with the Rumanians of eastern Hungary and Transylvania. They are a Latin people, of fine sensibility and intellect, yet treated by their Magyar masters as if they were barbarians, unfit to have any share in government, and not even permitted the freedom of racial self-expression in education and literature. Consequently they are looking across the Carpathian border to their brothers of free Rumania. If ever there was a battle for freedom, there is such a battle now going on in southeastern Europe against Austrian and Magyar. If this war ends in the overthrow of the Magyar tyranny, an immense step forward will have been taken toward racial liberty and European peace. Elsewhere we are fighting to prevent civilization from being put back by German military conquest; in the southeast of Europe we are fighting for a positive improvement of the human lot.



# **GREAT BRITAIN AND HER ALLIES**



## ENGLAND

### THE OPPOSING STRENGTHS<sup>1</sup>

When nations go to war their probable fortunes, other things being equal, are to be measured in numbers.

Other things being equal, the numbers one party can bring against the other in men, coupled with the number of weapons, munitions, and other material, will decide the issue.

But in European civilization other things are more or less equal. Civilian historians are fond of explaining military results in many other ways, particularly in terms of moral values that will flatter the reader. But a military history, however elementary, is compelled to recognize the truth that normally modern war in Europe has followed the course of numbers.

Among the very first, therefore, of the tasks set us in examining the great struggle is a general appreciation of the numbers that were about to meet in battle and of their respective preparation in material.

More than the most general numbers—more than brief, round statements—I shall not attempt. I shall not do more than state upon such grounds as I can discover proportions in the terms of single units—as, to say that one nation stood to another in its immediate armed men as eight to five, or as two to twenty. Neither shall I give positive numbers in less than the large fractions of a million. But, even with such large outlines alone before one, the task is extraordinarily difficult.

It will almost certainly be found, when full details are available after the war, that the most careful estimates have been grievously erroneous in some particular. Almost every statement of fact in this department can be reasonably challenged, and the evidence upon matters which in civilian life are amply recorded and easily ascertainable is, in this department, everywhere purposely confused or falsified.

To the difficulty provided by the desire for concealment

<sup>1</sup> From "The Elements of the Great War: The First Phase," by Hilaire Belloc. Copyright, 1915, by Hearst's International Library Co., and reprinted here by permission of the publishers.

necessary in all military organization, one must add the difficulty presented by the cross categories peculiar to this calculation. You have to consider not only the distinction between active and reserve, but also between men and munitions, between munitions available according to one theory of war, and munitions available according to another. You have to modify statical conclusions by dynamic considerations (thus you have to modify the original numbers by the rate of wastage, and the whole calculus varies progressively with the lapse of time as the war proceeds).

In spite of these difficulties, I believe it to be possible to put before the general reader a clear and simple table of the numbers a knowledge of which any judgment of the war involves, and to be fairly certain that this table will, when full details are available, be discovered not too inaccurate.

Let us start then with some estimate of the number of numbers with which we have to deal—the numbers of men, and the amount of munitions which these men have to use.

The third essential element, equipment, we need not separately consider, because, when one says "men" in talking of military affairs, one only means equipped, trained and organized men, for no others can be usefully present in the field.

Let us start, then, with some estimate of the number of men who are about to take part in battle; let us take for our limits the convenient limits of a year, and let us divide that space of time arbitrarily into three parts or periods.

There was a first period in which the nations opposed brought into the field the men available in the first few weeks for immediate action. It is not possible to set a precise limit, and to say, "This period covers the first six" or "the first eight weeks"; but we can say roughly that, when we are speaking of this first period, we mean the time during which men for whom the equipment was all ready, whose progress and munitioning had all been organized, were being as rapidly as possible brought into play. Such an estimate is not equivalent to an estimate of the very first numbers that met in the shock of battle; those numbers were far smaller, and differed according to the rate of mobilization and the intention of the various parties. The estimate is only that of the total number which the various parties could, and therefore did, bring into play before men not hitherto trained as soldiers or trained but

not believed to be required in the course of the campaign—according as that campaign had been variously foreseen by various governments—came in to swell the figures.

The conclusion of this first period would come, of course, gradually in the case of every combatant, and would come more rapidly in the case of some than in the case of others. But we are fairly safe if we take the general turning-point from the first period to the second to be the month of October, 1914. The second period had begun for some—notably for Germany—with the first days of that month; it had already appeared for all, especially for England, before the beginning of November.

The second period is marked for all the combatants by the bringing into play of such forces as, for various reasons, the government of each had hoped would not be required. The German Empire might have marked them as not required, in the reasonable hope that victory would be quickly assured. The British government might, from a very different standpoint, have believed them not to be required, because it regarded the work of its continental allies as sufficient to gain the common object, etc. But in the case of all, however various the motives, the particular mark of this second period is the straining to put into the field newly trained and equipped bodies which in the first period were, it was imagined, neither needed nor perhaps available.

This second period merges very gradually into the third, or final, period, which is that of the last effort possible to the belligerents. There comes a moment before the end of the first year when, in the case of most of the belligerents, every man who is available at all has been equipped, trained, and put forward, after which there is nothing left but the successive batches of yearly recruits growing up from boyhood to manhood.

Although Britain is in a peculiar position, and Russia, through her tardiness in equipment, in a peculiar position of another kind, yet one may fairly say that the vague margin between the second period of growth and the third period of finality appears roughly somewhere round the month of June. It will fall earlier with Germany, a good deal earlier with France; but from the middle of May at earliest to the end of June at latest may be said to mark the entry of the numerical factor into its third and final phase.



Let us take these three periods one by one.

The first period is by far the most important to our judgment of the campaign; a misapprehension of it has warped most political statements made in Great Britain, and most contemporary judgments of the war as a whole. It is impossible to get our view of the great European struggle—of its nature in the bulk—other than fantastically wrong, if we misapprehend the opening numbers with which it was waged.

There are three ways of getting at those numbers.

The first and worst way is the consulting of general statistics published before the war broke out. Thus we may see in almanacs the French army put down as a little over four million, the German at the same amount, the Russian at about five million, and so forth.

These figures have no relation to reality, because they omit a hundred modifying considerations—such as the age of the reserves, the degree of training of the reserves, the organization prepared for the enrollment of untrained men, etc. The only element in them which is of real value is the statistics—when we can obtain them—of men actually present with the colors before mobilization, to which one may add, perhaps—or at any rate in the case of France and Germany—the numbers of the *active* reserve immediately behind the conscript army in peace.

The second method, which is better, but imperfect, is that which has particularly appealed to technical writers. It consists in numbering *units*; in noting the headquarters and the tale of army corps and of independent divisions.

The fault of this method is twofold. First, that only actual experience can tell one whether units are really being maintained during peace at full strength; and, secondly, that only actual experience discovers how many new units can and will be created when war is joined. In other words, the fault of this method (necessary though it is as an adjunct to all military calculations) lies in its divorce from the reality of numbers.

At the end of the retreat from Moscow each army corps of the Grand Army still preserved its name, each regiment its nominal identity. And the roll was called by Ney, for instance, before the Beresina, division by division, regiment by regiment, and even in the regiments company by company; but in most of these last there was no one to answer, and there is a story of one regiment for which one surviving man answered with

regularity until he also died. What fights is numbers of living men—not headings; and if five army corps are present, each having lost two-fifths of its men, three full army corps are a match for them.

The third method is that of common-sense. We must deduce from the results obtained, from the fronts covered, from the energy remaining after known losses, from the reports of intelligence, from the avenues of communication available, what least and what largest numbers can be present. We must correct such conclusions by our previous knowledge of the way in which each service regards its strength, which most depends upon reserves, how each uses his depots and drafts, what machinery it has for training the untrained and for equipping them. This complicated survey taken, we can arrive at general figures.

Using that method, and applying it to the present campaign, I think we shall get something like the following:

*The Figures of the First Period, Say to October 1-31, 1914*

Germany put across the Rhine in the first period (without counting a certain small proportion of Hungarian cavalry and Austrian artillery) rather more than two and a quarter million men. She put into the eastern field first a quarter of a million which rapidly grew to half a million, and before the end of October to nearly a million; a balance of rather more than another million she used for filling gaps and for keeping her strength at the full, and also in particular cases (as in her violent attempt to break out through Flanders, or rather the beginning of that attempt) for the immediate reinforcement of a fighting line. Say that Germany put into the field altogether five million men in the first period, and you are saying too much. Say that she put into the field altogether in the first period four and a quarter million men, and you are saying probably somewhat too little.

France met the very first shock with about a million men, which gradually grew in the fighting line to about a million and a half. Here the limit of the French force immediately upon the front will probably be set. The numbers continued to swell long before the end of the first period and well on into the second, but they were kept in reserve. Counting the men drafted in to supply losses and the reserve, it is not unwise to

put at about two and a half million men the ultimate French figure, of which one and a half million formed, before the end of the first period, the immediate fighting force.

Austria was ordered by the Germans to put into the field, as an initial body to check any Russian advance and to confuse the beginning of Russian concentration, about a million men; which in the first period very rapidly grew to two million, and probably before the end of the first period to about two million and a half.

Russia put into the field during the first weeks of the war some million and a quarter, which grew during the first period (that is, before the coming of winter had created a very serious handicap, to which allusion will presently be made) to perhaps two million and a half at the very most. I put that number as an outside limit.

Servia, of men actually present and able to fight, we may set down at a quarter of a million; and Belgium, if we like, at one hundred thousand—though Belgian service being still in a state of transition, and the degree of training very varied within it, that minor point is disputable. Indeed it is better, in taking a general survey, to consider only the five great powers concerned.

Of these the fifth, Great Britain, though destined to exercise by sea power and by her recruiting field a very great ultimate effect upon the war, could only provide, in this first period upon the continent, an average of one hundred thousand men. To begin with, some seventy-five thousand, dwindling through losses to little more than fifty thousand, replenished and increased to about one hundred and twenty-five thousand, and approaching, as the end of the first period was reached, one hundred and fifty thousand men actually present upon the front.

We can now set down these figures in the shape of simple units, and see how the numerical chances stood at the opening of the campaign.

The enemy sets out with **23** men, of whom he bids **10** men against the Russians, and sends **22** against the French. The Russians meet the **10** men with about **12**, and the French meet the **22** with about **10**; but as they have not the whole **22** to meet in the first shock, they are struck rather in the proportion of **10** to **16** or **17**, while the presence of the British contingent makes them rather more than **10½**. But these initial

figures rapidly change with the growth of the armies, and before the first period is over the Germans have **22** in the west against **15** French and **1** British, making **16**; while in the east the Russian **12** has grown to, say, **24**, but the Austro-Germans in the east, against those **24**, have grown to be quite **32**. And there is the numerical situation of the first period clearly, and I think accurately, put, *supposing the wastage to be equal in proportion throughout all the armies*. The importance of appreciating these figures is that they permit us to understand why the enemy was morally certain of winning, quite apart from his right judgment on certain disputed theories of war (to which I shall turn in a moment), and quite apart from his heavy secret munitioning which was of such effect in the earlier part of the campaign. He was ready with forces which he knew would be overwhelming, and how superior he was thus numerically in that first period can be best appreciated, I think, by a glance at the diagram on the next page.

It is no wonder that he made certain of a decisive success in the west, and of the indefinite holding up or pushing back of the Russian forces in the east. It is no wonder that he confidently expected a complete victory before the winter, and the signing of peace before the end of the year. To that end all his munitioning, and even the details of his tactics, were directed.

*The Figures of the Second Period, Say to April 15-  
June 1, 1915*


The second period saw in the west, and, in the enemy's case, a very great change proceeding by a number of minute steps, but fairly rapid in character.

The French numbers could not grow very rapidly, because the French had armed every available man. They could bring in a certain number of volunteers; but neither was it useful to equip the most of the older men, nor could they be spared from those duties behind the front line which the much larger population of the enemy intrusted to men who, for the most part, had received no regular training. The French did, however, in this second period, gradually grow to some two and a half million men, behind which, ready to come in for the final period, were about a third of a million young recruits.

Great Britain discovered a prodigious effort. She had

already, comparatively early in the second period, put across the sea nearly half a million men, and drafts were perpetually arriving as the second period came to a close; while behind the army actually upon the continent very large bodies—probably

(1) The superiority of Austro-German Numbers(■) over Allies(□) at the First Shock.



(2) Their superiority even at the end of the 1<sup>st</sup> Period - say October 1914.




Diagram A

another million in number—hastily trained indeed, and presented with a grave problem in the matter of officering, but of excellent material and morale, were ready to appear, before the end of the second period or at its close, the moment their equipment should be furnished. Counting the British effort and the French

together, one may say that, without regard to wastage, the allies in the west grew in the second period from the original 16 to over 30, and might grow even before the second period was over to 35 or even more.

On the enemy's side (neglecting wastage for the moment) there were the simplest elements of growth. Each power had docketed every untrained man, knew his medical condition, where to find him, where and how to train him. The German Empire had during peace taken about one-half of its young men for soldiers. It had in pure theory five million untrained men in the reserve, excluding the sick, and those not physically efficient for service.

In practice, however, a very large proportion of men, even of the efficient, must be kept behind for civilian work; and in an industrial country such as Germany, mainly urban in population, this proportion is particularly large. We are safe in saying that the German army would not be reinforced during the second period by more than two and a half million men. These were trained in batches of some 800,000 each; the equipment had long been ready for them, and they appeared mainly as drafts for filling gaps, but partly as new formations in groups—the first going in or before November, the second in or before February. A third and last group was expected to have finished this rather elementary training somewhere about the end of April, so that May would complete the second period in the German forces.

Austria-Hungary, by an easily appreciable paradox, possessed, though but 80 per cent of the Germans in population, a larger available untrained reserve. This was because that empire trained a smaller proportion of its population by far than did the Germans. It is probable that Austria-Hungary was able to train and put forward during the second period some three million men.

It is a great error, into which most critics have fallen, to underestimate or to neglect the Austro-Hungarian factor in the enemy's alliance. Without thus nearly doubling her numbers, Germany could not have fought France and Russia at all, and a very striking feature of all the earlier weeks of 1915 was the presence in the Carpathians of increasing Austro-Hungarian numbers, which checked for more than three months all the Russian efforts upon that front.

Say that Austria-Hungary nearly doubled her effectives (apart from wastage) in this second period, and you will not be far wrong.

Russia, which upon paper could almost indefinitely increase during the second period her numbers in the field, suffered with the advent of winter an unexpected blow. Her equipment, and in particular her munitioning (that is, her provision of missiles, and in especial of heavy shell), must in the main come from abroad. Now the German command of the Baltic created a complete blockade on the eastern frontier of Russia, save upon the short Roumanian frontier; and the entry of Turkey into the campaign on the side of the enemy, which marked the second period, completed that blockade upon the south, and shut upon Russia the gate of the Dardanelles. The port of Archangel in the north was ice-bound, or with great difficulty kept partially open by ice-breakers, and was in any case only connected with Russia by one narrow-gauge and lengthy line; while the only remaining port of Vladivostock was six thousand miles away, and closed also during a part of the winter.

In this situation it was impossible for the great reserves of men which Russia counted on to be put into the field, and the Russians remained throughout the whole of this second period but little stronger than they had been at the end of the first. If we set them down at perhaps somewhat over three millions (excluding wastage) towards the end of this second period, we shall be near to a just estimate.

We can now sum up and say that, *apart from wastage*, the forces arrayed against each other after this full development should have been about 120 men for the central powers of the enemy—35 (and perhaps ultimately 40) men against them upon the west, and, until sufficient Russian equipment could at least be found, only some 30 men against them upon the east.


Luckily such figures are wholly changed by the enormous rate of the enemy's wastage. The Russians had lost men almost as rapidly as the enemy, but the Russian losses could be and were made good. The handicap of the blockade under which Russia suffered permitted her to maintain only a certain number at the front, but she could continually draft in support of those numbers; and though she lost in the first seven months of the war quite four hundred thousand in prisoners, and perhaps

three-quarters of a million in other casualties, her strength of somewhat over three millions was maintained at the close of the first period.

In the same way drafts had further maintained the British numbers. The French had lost not more than one-fifth of a million in prisoners, and perhaps a third of a million or a little more in killed and permanently disabled—that is, unable to return to the fighting line. In the case of both the French and the British sanitary conditions were excellent.

You have, then, quite 35 for your number in the west, and quite 33 for your number in the east of the allied forces at the end of the winter; but of your enemy forces you may safely deduct 45—50 might be a truer estimate; and it is remarkable that those who have watched the matter carefully at the front are inclined to set the total enemy losses higher than do the critics working at home. But call it only 45 (of which 5 are prisoners), and you have against the 68 allies in east and west no more at the end of this second period than 75 of the enemy.

The following diagram illustrates in graphic form the change that six months have produced.





In other words, at the end of the winter and with the beginning of the spring, although the enemy still has a numerical preponderance, it is no longer the overwhelming thing it was when the war began, and that change in numbers explains the whole change in the campaign.

The enemy was certain of winning mainly because he was fighting more than equal in the east, and at first nearly two to one, later quite four to three, in the west. Those are the conditions of the late summer of 1914. 1915, before it was a third over, had seen the numbers nearly equalized. With the summer of 1915 we might hope to see the numbers at least reversed, and, after so many perilous months, a total (not local) numerical majority at last appearing upon the side of the allies. If ever this condition shall arrive before the enemy can accomplish a decisive result in either field the tide will have turned.

The third period belongs at the moment of writing to the future. All we can say of it is that it presents for the enemy no considerable field of recruitment; but while in the west it offers no increase to the French, it does offer another five units at least, and possible another six or eight, to the British; and to the Russians, if the blockade can be pierced at any point, or if the change of weather, coupled with the broadening of the gauge of the railway to Archangel, permits large imports, an almost indefinite increase in number—certainly an increase of two millions, or twenty of the units we were dealing with in the figures given above.

So much, then, for the numerical factor in men which dominates the whole campaign.

When we turn from this to the second factor—that of munitions—we discover something which can be dealt with far more briefly, but which follows very much the same line.

The enemy in the first period of the war had, if anything, an even greater superiority in munitioning than in men. This superiority was due to two distinct causes. In the first place, as we shall see in a few pages, his theory upon a number of military details was well founded; in the second place, *he made war at his own chosen moment, after three years of determined and largely secret preparation.*

As to the first point:

We may take as a particular example of these theories of war the enemy's reliance upon heavy artillery—and in par-

ticular upon the power of the high explosive and the big howitzer—to destroy permanent fortifications rapidly, and to have an effect in the field, particularly in the preparation of an assault, which the military theories of the allies had wrongly underestimated. It is but one example out of many. It must serve for the rest. The Germans to some extent, and much more the Austrians, prepared an immensely greater provision of heavy ammunition than their opponents, and entered the field with large pieces of a caliber and in number quite beyond anything that their opponents had at the outset of the campaign.

As to the second point:

No peaceful nations, no nations not designing a war at their own hour, lock up armament which may be rendered obsolete, or, in equipment more extensive than the reasonable chances of a campaign may demand, the public resources which it can use on what it regards as more useful things. Such nations, to use a just metaphor, “insure” against war at what they think a reasonable rate. But if some one government in Europe is anarchic in its morals, and proposes, while professing peace, to declare war at an hour and a day chosen by itself, it will obviously have an overwhelming advantage in this respect. The energy and the money which it devotes to the single object of preparation cannot possibly be wasted; and, if its sudden aggression is not fixed too far ahead, will not run the risk of being sunk in obsolete weapons.

Now it is clearly demonstrable from the coincidence of dates, from the exact time required for a special effort of this kind, and from the rate at which munitions and equipment were accumulated, that the government at Berlin came to a decision in the month of July, 1911, to force war upon Russia and upon France immediately after the harvest of 1914; and of a score of indications which all converge upon these dates, not one fails to strike them exactly by more than a few weeks in the matter of preparation, by more than a few days in the date at which war was declared.

Under those circumstances, Berlin with her ally at Vienna had the immense numerical advantage over the French and the Russians when war was suddenly forced upon those countries on the 31st of July last year.

But, as in the case of men, the advantage would only be

overwhelming during the first period. The very fact that the war had to be won quickly involved an immense expenditure of heavy ammunition in the earlier part of it, and this expenditure, if it were not successful, would be a waste.

It takes about five months to produce a heavy piece, and the rate of production of heavy ammunition, though slow, is measurable. At the moment of writing this, towards the close of the second period, the balance is not yet redressed, but it is in a fair way to be redressed. The imperfect and too tardy blockade to which the enemy is somewhat timidly subjected is a factor in aid of this; and we may be fairly confident that, if a third period is reached before the enemy shall have the advantage of a decision, there will be a preponderance of munitioning upon the allied side in the west and east, which will be, if anything, of superior importance to the approaching preponderance in numbers.

Having thus briefly surveyed the opposing strength of either combatant, checked and measured as it varied with the progress of the war, we will turn to the *moral* opposition of military theory between the one party and the other, and show how here again that, *save in the most important matter of all, grand strategy*, the enemy was on the highroad to the victory which he confidently, and, for that matter, reasonably expected.

## THE COALITION CABINET<sup>1</sup>

For the first time in many decades England has a government of "all the talents." After nine years in office its Liberal ministry has been replaced by a cabinet of Liberals and Conservatives. The change came with startling rapidity. It was accompanied by a newspaper controversy of unusual venom, of which the chief characteristics were violent attacks upon Lord Kitchener, the minister for war, and upon Mr. Winston Churchill, the first lord of the admiralty, as the English secretary of the navy is called. Both ministers were virtually charged with faulty conduct of the war in their respective departments.

<sup>1</sup> From *World's Work*, July, 1915, p. 321-8. Various changes have taken place in the cabinet since this article was written.

The new cabinet represents the desire of Englishmen of all shades of politics to unite in the vigorous conduct of the war. After ten months of hesitation they have done what the French did almost immediately—entrusted the national fortunes to those best fitted to rule, irrespective of party. One sees that in the make-up of the cabinet. Though there has been some talk of political favoritism and though political affiliations were taken into account to the extent of the inclusion of representatives of every political group except the Irish Nationalists—and Mr. Redmond was pressed to join—its chief posts seem to have been placed in the strongest hands. Mr. Asquith remained prime minister; Sir Edward Grey, foreign minister. Mr. Lloyd-George left the chancellorship of the exchequer for the new and absolutely vital war post of minister of munitions. Lord Kitchener remained secretary of war. Indeed, the only important Liberal who left the cabinet was Lord Haldane; and since the outbreak of the war Lord Haldane, partly on account of his erstwhile pro-German sympathies, has been negligible. Mr. Winston Churchill, though he lost the admiralty, remained in the cabinet in a subordinate maid-of-all-work position, the acceptance of which by so ambitious a man speaks volumes for the earnestness of the patriotic spirit which pervaded the shuffle. Of the eight Conservatives, on the other hand, the only one who holds a really important war position is Mr. Arthur Balfour, who succeeded Mr. Winston Churchill at the admiralty. Mr. Bonar Law, the leader of the Conservatives, is colonial secretary, and Mr. Austen Chamberlain, secretary for India. Sir Edward Carson<sup>1</sup> is attorney-general; Lord Curzon and Mr. Walter Long accepted subordinate positions, and Lord Lansdowne came in without a portfolio. The remaining place, that of minister of education, went to Mr. Arthur Henderson, parliamentary leader of the Labor Party.

Thus, so far as the management of the war is concerned, the authority of the late Liberal cabinet, which keeps thirteen places in the new formation of twenty-two, remains virtually unimpaired. That this should be so is due to the fact that the driving power in English politics is today undoubtedly on the Liberal side. The only difference in the actual running of the government is that, instead of having the passive support of the Conservatives, Mr. Asquith can now demand their active

assistance. Of this difference he has cleverly availed himself. Mr. Balfour's appearance at the Admiralty is a case in point. Mr. Balfour is about the last man whom one would expect to find in such a post at such a time. He is the very opposite of Mr. Winston Churchill. He is as retiring and lackadaisical as Mr. Churchill is self-assertive and energetic. Even in his prime—and he is more than twenty-five years Mr. Churchill's senior—one cannot imagine his leading a forlorn hope of naval reservists to Antwerp, shouting assurance to frightened mayors across hotel lobbies, or rushing, napkin in hand, into the open street to gaze at Zeppelins.

Under Mr. Balfour's auspices the naval experts at the Admiralty will be safe from interference, while if they need the support of their civilian chief in the cabinet councils or in Parliament—English ministers, unlike the American cabinet, have a seat in the legislature, in the House of Commons if they are plain citizens, in the House of Lords if they are peers—Mr. Balfour can be relied upon to fight their battles with firmness, skill, and discretion.

If events have proved that the Admiralty ought to be left as much as possible to expert control, the exact opposite has been proved in regard to some of the most important functions of the war department. Lord Kitchener's reputation rests upon his genius for administering and leading armies in the field and for diplomacy in difficult places. He helped to organize the Egyptian army after the British occupation in the early 80's; he organized the Omdurman expedition by building impossible railroads and by generally revolutionizing the system of desert commissariat; he settled the Fashoda question between England and France by whiskeys and sodas and a ready display of human tact; he organized the campaign against the Boers under Lord Roberts, brought the war to a triumphant end as Lord Roberts's successor, and in the settlement that followed again showed the value of diplomatic generals. In India he remodeled and "speeded up" the Indian army; in Australia and New Zealand he devised the military machinery that has produced such fine material in the present war. No better choice could have been made for the War Office last summer. But the war has been a war of surprises, of which for England the chief surprise has been the magnitude of its side issues. Perfectly competent to send to France the best equipped expeditionary

force that ever left British ports, Lord Kitchener was "snowed under" by contingent responsibilities. It was not his fault. It was the fault of the development of war into a national industrial as much as a specialized military undertaking. The raising of endless levies and the production of munitions of war are now at least as important as the training and equipment of existing reserves and the administration of armies in the field. Modern warfare in fact is a job for the political publicity agent and for the industrial organizer as much as for the soldier. Lord Kitchener had his hands already overful with purely military problems. Other arrangements had to be made to deal with the rest of the work and that has clearly been Mr. Asquith's chief practical object in reconstructing his cabinet.

That he has been successful there is every reason to believe. The key to his plan has been the creation of the post of minister of munitions for Mr. Lloyd-George, and nobody will be surprised if during the next few months the key does not accomplish more to unlock the reserve of England's patriotism and of her industrial resources than all the rest of the cabinet changes put together.

Those who had watched his routine work in the government had long ago realized that Mr. Lloyd-George could administer as well as apostrophize, but since the outbreak of war he has surprised even his friends. His patience, caution, and ability when confronted by the tremendous task of finding the "silver bullets," not only for his own country but to no small extent for his allies, was wholly admirable. By a few tactful consultations he won the whole-hearted support of his old enemies in the city of London, and by his financial measures their whole-hearted admiration.

Why, then, has he been moved from the chancellorship of the exchequer at this critical time? One answer is that the financing of the war is largely a matter of cool calculation ahead of time and that, having mapped out a policy, Mr. Lloyd-George's great abilities can be better employed in the equally vital but ever present problem of stretching the output of munitions of war and of recruits to the limit.

In Mr. Lloyd-George's new position, especially when examined in the light of Mr. Balfour's appointment to the Admiralty, is to be found the real explanation of the whole crisis, a far more exhaustive and significant explanation than

that afforded by the necessity of helping Lord Kitchener or of eliminating Mr. Winston Churchill. The coalition cabinet seems to mean that right down in her heart England realizes that she has not met this war quite as it ought to be met—as it must be met if she is to do her effective part in winning it. The recruiting difficulty, the labor troubles in the shape of strikes and drunkenness, the continued playing of spectacular football matches, the ostrich-like vagaries of the censorship, the bursts of false optimism and the other symptoms of “something wrong” which have worried the wellwishers of England and encouraged her enemies, are all symptoms of the same trouble. The German people face the war “as one man” because, besides being healthily patriotic, they are splendidly drilled. The French people are a nation in arms because their system of universal military service has trained them to be solidly ready for this war. The Italians drove their government into the war to gratify a national sentiment. The English on the contrary, were unprepared for Armageddon. The island tradition of “glorious isolation,” which in England takes the place of America’s similar tradition of concentrated self-containedness, was still strong. The possibility of war had not been much more seriously regarded by the British people than it seems to be by the Americans. There were no draped statues in Trafalgar Square to beckon the nation on to armed revenge.

The war has shown that the heart of the English people remained fundamentally sound. But finely as the British nation responded to the crisis, the harm wrought by the preceding troubles could not be entirely obliterated. It was not only a question of unpreparednesses. The arbitrariness with which the Liberal cabinet had governed continued despite the obvious determination of its members to do their patriotic best. The Conservatives, despite the political truce, remained somewhat suspicious, as the controversy accompanying the recent crisis proved. More important still, the industrial classes seem to have been unable to shake off the impression produced by the consistent way in which the Liberals had coddled them that the state was made for them and not they for the state. Among the middle classes, too, the old spirit of careless security seems to have been hard to root out.

Hence the immense importance of the Balfour-Lloyd-George combination, the appearance as political bedfellows of the aristo-

cratic Conservative and the socialistic Liberal. To Mr. Lloyd-George falls the vital duty of stimulating industrial England to do its share in the war, to persuade those to enlist who are better qualified to fight than to manufacture, and to guarantee that those who stay to manufacture do so with as much patriotism and efficiency as those who fight. To Mr. Balfour and his Conservative colleagues falls the duty of seeing that from the lesson of their presence in the cabinet the country shall form a true estimate of the crisis that has summoned them there. Their task in that respect should not be a difficult one.

### THE BLOCKADE OF ENGLISH PORTS<sup>1</sup>

This war began on the part of Germany with the cynical repudiation of a solemn treaty on the avowed grounds that when a nation's interests required it, right and good faith must give way to force. The war has been carried on, therefore, with a systematic—not an impulsive or a casual—but a systematic violation of all the conventions and practices by which international agreements had sought to mitigate and to regularize the clash of arms. She has now, I will not say reached a climax, for we do not know what may yet be to come, but she has taken a further step without any precedent in history by mobilizing and organizing not upon the surface but under the surface of the sea a campaign of piracy and pillage.

Are we—can we—here I address myself to the neutral countries of the world—are we to or can we sit quiet as though we were still under the protection of the restraining rules and the humanizing usages of civilized warfare? We think we cannot. The enemy, borrowing what I may, perhaps, for this purpose call a neutral flag from the vocabulary of diplomacy, describes these newly adopted measures by a grotesque and puerile perversion of language as a "blockade." What is a blockade? A blockade consists in sealing up the war ports of a belligerent against sea-borne traffic by encircling their coasts with an impenetrable ring of ships of war.

<sup>1</sup> Speech by Herbert H. Asquith, Prime Minister of England, in the House of Commons, March 1, 1915.



Where are these ships of war? Where is the German navy? What has become of those gigantic battleships and cruisers on which so many millions of money have been spent and in which such vast hopes and ambitions have been invested? I think, if my memory serves me, they have only twice during the course of these seven months been seen upon the open sea. Their object in both cases was the same—murder, civilian outrage, and wholesale destruction of property in undefended seaside towns, and on each occasion when they caught sight of the approach of a British force they showed a clean pair of heels, and they hurried back at the top of their speed to the safe seclusion of their mine fields and their closely guarded forts.

The plain truth is—the German fleet is not blockading, cannot blockade, and never will blockade our coasts.

I propose now to read a statement prepared by his Majesty's government. It declares, I hope in sufficiently plain and unmistakable terms, the view which we take, not only of our rights but of our duty:

Germany has declared that the English Channel, the north and west coasts of France, and the waters around the British Isles are a "war area" and has officially notified that all enemy ships found in that area will be destroyed and that neutral vessels may be exposed to danger. This is, in effect, a claim to torpedo at sight, without regard to the safety of crew or passengers, any merchant vessel under any flag. As it is not in the power of the German Admiralty to maintain any surface craft in these waters, the attack can only be delivered by submarine agency. The law and custom of nations in regard to attacks on commerce have always presumed that the first duty of the captor of a merchant vessel is to bring it before a prize court, where it may be tried, and where the regularity of the capture may be challenged, and where neutrals may recover their cargoes. The sinking of prizes is in itself a questionable act, to be resorted to only in extraordinary circumstances and after provision has been made for the safety of all the crew or passengers—if there are passengers on board. The responsibility for discriminating between neutral and enemy vessels, and between neutral and enemy cargo, obviously rests with the attacking ship, whose duty it is to verify the status and character of the vessel and cargo and to preserve all papers before sinking or even capturing the ship. So, also, is the humane duty to provide for the safety of the crews of merchant vessels, whether neutral or enemy, an obligation on every belligerent. It is on this basis that all previous discussions of the law for regulating warfare at sea have proceeded.

The German submarine fulfills none of these obligations. She enjoys no local command of the waters in which she operates. She does not take her captures within the jurisdiction of a prize court; she carries no prize crew which she can put on board the prize she seizes. She uses

no effective means of discriminating between a neutral and an enemy vessel; she does not receive on board, for safety, the crew of the vessel she sinks. Her methods of warfare are, therefore, entirely outside the scope of any of the international instruments regulating operations against commerce in time of war. The German declaration substitutes indiscriminate destruction for regulated capture. Germany is adopting these methods against peaceful traders and non-combatant crews with the avowed object of preventing commodities of all kinds, including food for the civil population, from reaching or leaving the British Isles and northern France.

Her opponents are therefore driven to frame retaliatory measures in order, in their turn, to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving the German Empire. These measures will, however, be enforced by the British and French governments, without risk to neutral ships or to neutral or non-combatant lives, and with strict observance of the dictates of humanity. The British and French governments will therefore hold themselves free to detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership, or origin. It is not intended to confiscate such vessels or cargoes unless they would be otherwise liable to confiscation. Vessels with cargoes which have sailed before this date will not be affected.

The suggestion which is put forward from a German quarter that we have rejected some proposal or suggestion made to the two powers by the United States government is quite untrue. On the contrary, all we have said to the United States government is that we are taking it into careful consideration in consultation with our allies.

In the statement I have just read of the retaliatory measures we propose to adopt, the words "blockade" and "contraband" and other technical terms of international law do not occur. And advisedly so. In dealing with an opponent who has openly repudiated all the principles both of law and of humanity we are not going to allow our efforts to be strangled in a network of juridical niceties. We do not intend to put into operation any measures which we do not think to be effective, and I need not say we shall carefully avoid any measure which would violate the rules either of humanity or of honesty. But, subject to those two conditions, I say not only to our enemy, but I say it on behalf of the government, and I hope on behalf of the House of Commons, that under existing conditions there is no form of economic pressure to which we do not consider ourselves entitled to resort. If, as a consequence, neutrals suffer inconvenience and loss of trade, we regret it, but we beg them to remember that this phase of the war was not

initiated by us. We do not propose either to assassinate their seamen or to destroy their goods. What we are doing we do solely in self-defense.

If, again, as is possible, hardship is caused to the civil and non-combatant population of the enemy by the cutting off of supplies, we are not doing more in this respect than was done in the days when Germany still acknowledged the authority of the law of nations sanctioned by the first and the greatest of her chancellors, and as practiced by the expressed declaration of his successor. We are quite prepared to submit to the arbitrament of neutral opinion in this war in the circumstances in which we have been placed. We have been moderate and restrained, and we have abstained from things which we were provoked and tempted to do, and we have adopted the policy which recommends itself to reason, common sense, and to justice.

This new aspect of the war only serves to illustrate and to emphasize the truth that the gravity and the magnitude of the task which we have undertaken does not diminish, but increases, as the months roll by. The call for men to join our fighting forces, which is our primary need, has been and is being nobly responded to here at home and throughout the empire. That call, we say with all plainness and directness was never more urgent or more imperious than today. For this is a war not only of men but of material. To take only one illustration, the expenditure upon ammunition on both sides has been on a scale and at a rate which is not only without all precedent but is far in excess of any expert forecast. At such a time patriotism has cast a heavy burden on the shoulders of all who are engaged in trades or manufactures which directly or indirectly minister to the equipment of our forces. It is a burden, let me add, which falls, or ought to fall, with even weight on both employers and employed. Differences as to remuneration or as to profit, as to hours and conditions of labor, which in ordinary times might well justify a temporary cessation of work should no longer be allowed to do so. The first duty of all concerned is to go on producing with might and main what the safety of the state requires, and if this is done I can say with perfect confidence the government on its part will insure a prompt and equitable settlement of disputed points, and in cases of proved necessity will give on behalf of the state such help as is in

their power. Sailors and soldiers, employers and workmen in the industrial world are all at this moment partners and co-operators in one great enterprise. The men in the shipyards and the engineering shops, the workers in the textile factories, the miner who sends the coal to the surface, the dockyard laborer who helps to load and unload the ships, and those who employ and organize and supervise their labors are one and all rendering to their country a service as vital and as indispensable as the gallant men who line the trenches in Flanders or in France or who are bombarding fortresses in the Dardanelles.

I hear sometimes whispers, hardly more than whispers, of possible terms of peace. Peace is the greatest human good, but this is not the time to talk of peace. Those who talk of peace, however excellent their intentions, are in my judgment victims, I will not say of wanton, but of grievous self-delusion. Just now we are in the stress and tumult of a tempest which is shaking the foundations of the earth. The time to talk of peace is when the great tasks in which we and our allies embarked on the long and stormy voyage are within sight of accomplishment. Speaking at the Guildhall at the Lord Mayor's banquet last November I used this language, which has since been repeated almost in the same terms by the prime minister of France, and which I believe represents the settled sentiment and purpose of the country. I said:

We shall never sheathe the sword which we have not lightly drawn until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed.

What I said early in November, now, after four months, I repeat today. We have not relaxed nor shall we relax in the pursuit of every one and all of the aims which I have described. These are great purposes, and to achieve them we must draw upon all our resources, both material and spiritual. On the one side, the material side, the demands presented in these votes is for men, for money, for the fullest equipment of the purposes of war. On the other side, what I have called the spiritual side, the appeal is to those ancient inbred qualities of our race which have never failed us in times of stress—qualities of self-mastery,

self-sacrifice, patience, tenacity, willingness to bear one another's burdens, a unity which springs from the dominating sense of a common duty, unfailing faith, inflexible resolve.

## THE BRITISH BLOCKADE<sup>1</sup>

Great interest had naturally been excited in America over the threatened blockade of Germany by the allied fleets; and many criticisms have been directed against the governments responsible for this policy. This is most natural and legitimate. The Order in Council affects both neutral interests and international law. And the United States of America—the greatest of all neutrals and a leader of reform in international procedure—has a double interest in the discussion.

Let me say, before I go further, that I am in no sense personally responsible for the policy which has been adopted. I was not consulted upon it; and I view with the greatest dislike any course which seems in the smallest degree to violate the rules of international warfare. But those who will consent to consider the present case on its merits will, I think, be persuaded that the policy of the allies has a conclusive moral justification.

Put shortly, the case is this. The Germans declare that they will sink every merchant ship which they believe to be British, without regard to life, without regard to the ownership of the cargo, without any assurance that the vessel is not neutral, and without even the pretence of legal investigation. The British reply that if these are to be the methods of warfare employed by the enemy the allies will retaliate by enforcing a blockade designed to prevent all foreign goods from entering Germany and all German goods from going abroad.

Whether such a policy be, or be not, in harmony with the accepted rules of international law is a point to which I shall refer in a moment. But this, at least, may be said in its favor. It cannot cause the death of a single innocent civilian; it cannot destroy neutral lives and neutral property without legal process; it cannot inflict injury upon neutral commerce com-

<sup>1</sup> By Arthur J. Balfour. Published in pamphlet form by Darling & Son, London, E. C.

parable in character or extent to that which would be produced by a blockade whose legality was beyond question.

But this contention, however true, is in the eyes of some critics quite immaterial. Law (they say) is law. Those who break it are guilty of a wrong which does not become a right because others have broken it in a manner yet more deserving of condemnation. The German practice may be brutal to belligerents and reckless towards neutrals; the British practice may be careful of human life and tender towards the interests of non-combatants. No matter. Neither can find justification in the accepted rules of war; both, therefore, fall under the same condemnation.

But such a mode of reasoning applies the most rigid technical standards in a case where technical standards must be used with caution. It appeals to the letter of international law, but it ignores the spirit.

What, in the eyes of the objector, is the defect of the British Order in Council? It is that the blockade of which notice is there given does not possess all the characteristics of a blockade as defined in authoritative text-books; and that, in particular, it violates the rule which forbids "discrimination" in favor of one neutral as against another.

Now the object of this rule seems clear. It is designed to prevent the blockading power using its privileges in order to mete out different treatment to different countries; as for instance, by letting ships of one nationality pass the blockading cordon while it captures the ships of another. Such a procedure is, on the face of it, fair. It could have no object but to assist the trade of one neutral as against the trade of another, and arbitrarily to redistribute the burden which war unhappily inflicts on neutrals as well as on belligerents. Now I submit that if there be "discrimination" inflicted by the British blockade, it is not discrimination of this kind. It does no doubt leave the German trade with Sweden and Norway in the same position as the German trade with Holland and Denmark, and in a different position from the German trade with America or Africa. But the "discrimination" (if it is to be so described) is not the result of a deliberate policy, but of a geographical accident. It is not due to any desire to favor Scandinavian exporters as compared with American exporters; and in practice it will have no such

effect. They are not, nor to any important extent can they be, competing rivals in the German markets.

It is the equity of the allied case rather than the law which mainly interests the thinking public in America and elsewhere. The question which presses most insistently for an answer is not directly connected with legal definitions of blockade, but with problems of international morality. There are German thinkers of distinction who deny that any such morality exists; but this happily is not a doctrine which has any chance of acceptance among English-speaking peoples. What then does international morality require of one belligerent when the other belligerent tramples international law in the dust?

To some persons the answer to this question seems easy. Why, they ask, should the crime of one party modify the policy of the other? International rules should be obeyed by both sides, but their repudiation by one side leaves the obligation of the other unimpaired.

Such an answer, however, confounds international morality with international law; and though doubtless the two are closely related they are not identical. The obligation of the first is absolute, that of the second is conditional; and one of its conditions is reciprocity.

If any feel inclined to quarrel with the word "conditional" let them consider what would happen if ordinary law were deprived of all its sanctions, if the state lost all power to enforce obligations to protect the innocent, or to punish the guilty. A community so situated might prosper so long as there was a general agreement to obey the laws and the agreement were maintained. But if the criminals broke it whenever it suited them, ought the innocent tamely to submit? Ought they to entrust their security to police who could afford no protection, and to courts which could inflict no penalties? Ought they, in short, to behave precisely as they would if social conditions were normal? Few, I believe, would think so.

Now, the relation between states under international law most closely resembles the relation between individuals in such a community as I have described. International law has no sanctions; no penalties are inflicted on those who violate its rules; and if a state makes use of forbidden weapons the neutrals, who blame its policy, do nothing to protect its victims. Nor is this surprising. In the present unorganized condition of

international relations it could not well be otherwise. But let them remember that impotence, like power, has duties as well as privileges; and if they cannot enforce the law on those who violate both its spirit and its letter let them not make haste to criticize belligerents who may thereby be compelled in self-defense to violate its letter, while carefully regarding its spirit. For otherwise the injury to the future development of international law may be serious indeed. If the rules of warfare are to bind one belligerent and leave the other free, they cease to mitigate suffering; they only load the dice in favor of the unscrupulous; and those countries will most readily agree to changes in the law of nations who do not mean to be bound by them.

But though, as I think, international law can hardly be literally obeyed, unless both sides are prepared to obey it, we must not conclude that the absence of reciprocity justifies the injured party in acting as if international law and international morality had thereby been abrogated. This would be a monstrous doctrine. The Germans, who began the war by tearing up a treaty, continued it by inflicting the worst horrors of war upon a people they had sworn to defend. Could we therefore argue that because the obligations of international law are reciprocal, the allies, when the opportunity occurs, would be justified in plundering private property, shooting innocent civilians, outraging women, and wantonly destroying works of art? Could they rightly do to Germany all that Germany has done to Belgium?

Assuredly not. I preach no such doctrine. These things were brutal and barbarous before the law of nations took formal shape; they would remain brutal and barbarous if the law of nations fell into desuetude. Germany would indeed have no right to complain of retaliation in kind; but this would not justify us in descending to her level. The policy which I am defending has no resemblance to this. It violates no deep ethical instincts; it is in harmony with the spirit of international law; it is more regardful of neutral interests than the accepted rules of blockade; nor is the injury which it is designed to inflict on the enemy of a different character from that inflicted by an ordinary blockade. And, lastly, it is a reply to an attack which is not only illegal, but immoral; and if some reply be legitimate and necessary, can a better one be devised?



RIGHT OF INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGNTY<sup>1</sup>

We wish the nations of Europe to be free to live their independent lives, working out their own forms of government for themselves and their own national development, whether they be great states or small states, in full liberty. That is our ideal. The German ideal—we have had it poured out by German professors and publicists since the war began—is that of the Germans as a superior people; to whom all things are lawful in the securing of their own power; against whom resistance of every sort is unlawful and to be savagely put down; a people establishing a domination over the nations of the continent; imposing a peace that is not to be a liberty for other nations, but subservience to Germany. I would rather perish or leave this continent altogether than live in it under such conditions. After this war, we and the other nations of Europe must be free to live, not menaced by talk of supreme war-lords and shining armor and the sword continually rattled in the scabbard and Heaven continually invoked as an accomplice to German arms, and not having our policy dictated and our national destinies and activities controlled by the military caste of Prussia. We claim for ourselves, and our allies claim for themselves and together we will secure for Europe, the right of independent sovereignty for the different nations; the right to pursue national existence, not in the shadow of Prussian hegemony or supremacy but in the light of equal liberty.

All honor forever be given from us, whom age or circumstances have kept at home, to those who voluntarily have come forward to risk their lives, and give their lives, on the field of battle on land or sea. They have their reward in enduring fame and honor. And all honor be from us to the brave armies and navies of our allies, who have exhibited such splendid courage and noble patriotism. The admiration they have aroused and the comradeship in arms will be an ennobling and endearing memory between us, cementing friendship and perpetuating national goodwill.

And for all of us who are serving the state at home in whatever capacity, whether officials, employers or wage-earners,

<sup>1</sup> Speech by Sir Edward Grey, at Bechstein Hall, London, on March 22, 1915.

doing out utmost to carry on the national life in this time of stress; there is the knowledge that there can be no nobler opportunity than that of serving one's country when its very existence is at stake, and when its cause is just and right; that never was there a time in our history when the crisis was so great and imperative as it is now, or the cause more just and right.

## TRADE UNIONS AND THE WAR<sup>1</sup>

This country is engaging one of the most formidable enemies that it has ever waged war against. The issues are great, the perils are great, and nothing can pull us through but the united effort of every man in the British Empire. If you look at what our brave fellows are doing at the front you can see the perils there facing them, the trials, the privations, and they are doing it without flinching. Never in the history of this country have our men shown greater courage and endurance than they have during this war. They have done all you can expect of mortal man.

We who are comfortable at home, free from privations, free from danger, let us each of us, do his part as nobly as those heroes of ours are doing it at the front. It would be horrible for us to think that those who fall fall through our neglect. It would be a still more ghastly reflection to think that those who fell have given their lives in vain through any slackness or selfishness on the part of any one of us in this land.

What makes Germany a formidable enemy is not merely its preparation for war, it is not merely its organization, potent as that is, but it is the spirit of every class and section of its population. You have only got to read the papers to see that as far as they are concerned they are all of them subordinating everything to the one great national purpose of winning victory for their Fatherland. That is the least we can do in this country for our land.

I never doubted where ultimate victory would lie, never for a moment. Nor have I ever underestimated the difficulties. But although I have never doubted where victory would rest,

<sup>1</sup> Speech by David Lloyd-George, Minister of Munitions, at Liverpool, June 5, 1915.

all the same I know that victory will come the sooner for recognizing the difficulties there are.

We want especially the help of those who can contribute to the increase of the munitions, the equipment, and the material of war. We want the help of employers, we want the help of the workers. We want employers and workmen to feel their responsibility in this matter. It is my intention to utilize as much as I possibly can the business brains of the community.

We want rifles, we want guns we want shells, fuses, chemicals, and explosives. There is one thing we want less of than usual, and that is red tape. It takes such a long time to unwind, and we can't spare the time. Therefore, the first thing I am going to ask you to do is to organize for yourselves in this locality, and in every other locality, the engineering resources for the purpose of assisting the government. You know best what you can do. I know the resourcefulness of the engineers of this country, I know their adaptability. I want you to come together and form your own committee of management. Having done that, organize among yourselves the engineering resources of the locality, with a view to producing the greatest result in the way of helping our gallant forces at the front.

Whatever is done has got to be done with promptitude. That involves our trusting to the integrity, to the loyalty, to the patriotism of the business men to do their best for us in these localities, and do it on fair terms.

I would make the same appeal to labor. I want them also to feel that this is their business. Should Germany win, God help labor! It will come out of it worst of all. The victory of Germany will be the victory of the worst form of autocracy that this world has seen for many a century. There is no section of the community has anything like the interest in the overthrow of this military caste which labor has, and the more they realize that, difficulties will vanish, obstacles will go, and bickerings and slackness. We want to get to work as one man to help to win a triumph for democratic free government against the autocratic systems of Germany and Austria.

As far as the official representatives of organized labor are concerned, we have had nothing but help. The difficulty has been when you get beyond.

I am not saying a word about trade-union regulations during a period of peace. I have no doubt they were essential safe-

guards to the protection of labor against what otherwise might have been a serious interference with their rights and with their prospects. But as I have already pointed out to you, government regulations have to be suspended during the period of the war because they are inapplicable in a time of urgency. The same thing applies to many trade-union regulations and practices.

The first I should like to call attention to are those rules which had been set up for very good reasons to make it difficult for purely unsullied men to claim the position and rights of men who have had a training—that is true in every profession.

I happen to belong to about the strictest trade union in the world—the most jealous trade union in the world. If any unskilled man—and by an unskilled man we mean a man who has not paid our fees—if any man of that sort, however brainy he was, tried to come in and interfere with our business, well, we would soon settle him. But if during the period of the war there were any particular use for lawyers—if you find that upon lawyers depended the success of the war, and it requires a good deal of imagination—even my Celtic imagination will hardly attain to the exalted height—but if that were possible for a moment, do you suppose that even the Incorporated Law Society, the greatest and narrowest of all trade unions, could stand in the way of bringing in outside help in order to enable us to get through our work?

Well, now, the same thing applies here. If all the skilled engineers in this country were turned on to produce what is required, if you brought back from the front every engineer who had been recruited, if you worked them to the utmost limits of human endurance, you have not got enough labor even then to produce all we are going to ask you to produce during the next few months. Therefore, we must appeal to the patriotism of the unions of this country to relax these particular rules, in order to eke out, as it were, the skill, to make it go as far as it possibly can go, in order to enable us to turn out the necessary munitions of war to win a real and a speedy triumph for our country in this great struggle.

Now, the same thing applies to the work of women in the factories. There is a good deal of work now done by men, and men only, in this country which is done in France at the present moment in shell factories by women. Why is that? They have not enough men to go round. The men are working

as hard as they can, for as long hours as they possibly can support, but in spite of that they would not turn out a sufficient number of shells and other material of war without doling out a good part of the work to women in those factories. Well, now, if there are any trade-union regulations to prevent the possibility of that being done, I hope during the period of war these will be suspended.

Now, I am coming to another thing—and I am here to talk quite frankly—it is very much better to do so. There must be no deliberate slowing down of work. I have had two or three very painful cases put before me. One was from an arsenal upon which we were absolutely dependent for the material of war. There was a very skilled workman there who worked very hard and who earned a good deal of money. He was doing his duty by the state. He was not merely warned that if he repeated that offense he would be driven out, I am not quite sure that he was not actually driven out.

The same thing happened in another factory. Now, in the period of war this is really intolerable. We cannot do with it. We cannot afford it, I say again. There may be reasons, there might be very good reasons, that a policy of that sort should be adopted in the period of peace. I am expressing no opinions about that. I am simply stating the case of this particular emergency, and I am sure that the only thing in this emergency is that everybody should put forward all his strength in order to help the country through.

Therefore, I do hope that whatever regulation, whatever practice, whatever custom there may be in existence at the present moment which interferes in the slightest degree in the increase of war material, will be suspended during the period of war.

In this war every country is demanding as a matter of right—not as a matter of appeal—as a matter of right from every one of the citizens, that he should do his best, and that is one of the problems with which we have to deal in this country. It ought to be established as a duty, as one of the essential duties of citizenship, that every man should put his whole strength into helping the country through.

We are engaged in the greatest struggle this country has ever been precipitated into. It is no fault of ours. We sought peace, we asked for peace, we avoided all the paths that led to war, but we should have forever been dishonored if we had shirked the conflict when it came.

Harried into it, we are there to champion the deepest, the highest, the greatest interest ever committed to the charge of any nation. Let us equip ourselves in such a way that Great Britain through the war will be still great, and when the war is over it will be a Greater Britain than ever.

## COMPULSORY ARBITRATION<sup>1</sup>

Belgium, once comfortably well to do, is now waste and weeping, and her children are living on the bread of charity sent them by neighbors far and near. And France—the German army, like a wild beast, has fastened its claws deep into her soil, and every effort to drag them out rends and tears the living flesh of that beautiful land. The beast of prey has not leaped to our shores—not a hair of Britain's head has been touched by him. Why? Because of the vigilant watchdog that patrols the deep for us; and that is my complaint against the British navy. It does not enable us to realize that Britain at the present moment is waging the most serious war it has ever been engaged in. We do not understand it. I have never been doubtful about the result of the war. Nor have I been doubtful, I am sorry to say, about the length of the war and its seriousness. In all wars nations are apt to minimize their dangers and the duration. Men, after all, see the power of their own country; they cannot visualize the power of the enemy. I have always been convinced that the result is inevitably a triumph for this country. I have also been convinced that that result will not be secured without a prolonged struggle.

I will give you first of all my reasons for coming to the conclusion that after this struggle victory must wait on our banners if we properly utilize our resources and opportunities. The natural resources of the allied countries are overwhelmingly greater than those of their enemies. In the man capable of bearing arms, in the financial and economic resources of these countries, in their accessibility to the markets of the world through the command of the sea for the purpose of obtaining material and munitions—all these are preponderatingly in favor of the allied countries. But there is a greater reason than all

<sup>1</sup> Speech by David Lloyd-George at Bangor, February 28, 1915.

these. Beyond all is the moral strength of our cause, and that counts in a struggle which involves sacrifices, suffering, and privation for all those engaged in it. A nation cannot endure to the end that has on its soul the crimes of Belgium. The allied powers have at their disposal more than twice the number of men which their enemies can command. You may ask me why are not those overwhelming forces put into the field at once and this terrible war brought to a triumphant conclusion at the earliest possible moment. In the answer to that question lies the cause of the war.

In the old days when a nation's liberty was menaced by an aggressor a man took from the chimney corner his bow and arrow or his spear, or a sword which had been left to him by an ancestry of warriors, went to the gathering ground of his tribe, and the nation was fully equipped for war. That is not the case now. Now you fight with complicated, highly finished weapons, apart altogether from the huge artillery. Every rifle which a man handles is a complicated and ingenious piece of mechanism, and it takes time. The German arsenals were full of the machinery of horror and destruction. The Russian arsenals were not, and that is the reason for the war. Had Russia projected war, she also would have filled arsenals, but she desired above everything peace. I am not sure that Russia has ever been responsible for a war of aggression against any of her European neighbors. Certainly this is not one of them. She wanted peace, she needed peace, she meant peace, and she would have had peace had she been left alone. She was at the beginning of a great industrial development, and she wanted peace in order to bring it to its full fructification. She had repeatedly stood insolences at the hands of Germany up to the point of humiliation, all for peace, and anything for peace.

Russia was taken at a disadvantage, and is, therefore, unable to utilize beyond a fraction the enormous resources which she possesses to protect her soil against the invader. France was not expecting war, and she, therefore, was taken unawares.

What about Britain? We never contemplated any war of aggression against any of our neighbors, and therefore we never raised an army adequate to such sinister purposes. During the last thirty years the two great political parties in the state have been responsible for the policy of this country at home and abroad. For about the same period we have each been governing this country. For about fifteen years neither

one party nor the other ever proposed to raise an army in this country that would enable us to confront on land a great continental power. What does that mean? We never meant to invade any continental country. That is the proof of it. If we had we would have started our great armies years ago. We had a great navy, purely for protection, purely for the defense of our shores, and we had an army which was just enough to deal with any small raid that happened to get through the meshes of our navy, and perhaps to police the empire. That was all, no more. But now we have to assist neighbors becoming the victims of a power with millions of warriors at its command, and we have to improvise a great army, and gallantly have our men flocked to the standard. We have raised the largest voluntary army that has been enrolled in any country or any century—the largest voluntary army, and it is going to be larger.

If this country had produced an army which was equal in proportion to its population to the number of men under arms in France and in Germany at the present moment there would be three millions and a half in this country and 1,200,000 in the colonies. That is what I mean when I say our resources are quite adequate to the task. It is not our fight merely—it is the fight of humanity. The allied countries between them could raise armies of over twenty millions of men. Our enemies can put in the field barely half that number.

Much as I should like to talk about the need for more men, that is not the point of my special appeal today. We stand more in need of equipment than we do of men. Unless we are able to equip our armies our predominance in men will avail us nothing. We need men, but we need arms more than men, and delay in producing them is full of peril for this country. You may say that I am saying things that ought to be kept from the enemy. I am not a believer in giving any information which is useful to him. You may depend on it he knows, but I do not believe in withholding from our own public information which they ought to possess, because unless you tell them you cannot invite their cooperation. The nation that cannot bear the truth is not fit for war, and may our young men be volunteers, while the unflinching pride of those they have left behind them in their deed of sacrifice ought to satisfy the most apprehensive that we are not a timid race, who cannot face unpleasant facts! The last thing in the world John Bull



wants is to be mollicoddled. The people must be told exactly what the position is, and then we can ask them to help. We must appeal for the cooperation of employers, workmen, and the general public; the three must act and endure together, or we delay and maybe imperil victory. We ought to requisition the aid of every man who can handle metal. It means that the needs of the community in many respects will suffer acutely vexatious, and perhaps injurious, delay; but I feel sure that the public are prepared to put up with all this discomfort, loss, and privation if thereby their country marches triumphantly out of this great struggle. We have every reason for confidence; we have none for complacency. Hope is the mainspring of efficiency; complacency is its rust.

We laugh at things in Germany that ought to terrify us. We say, "Look at the way they are making their bread—out of potatoes, ha, ha!" Aye, that potato-bread spirit is something which is more to dread than to mock at. I fear that more than I do even von Hindenburg's strategy, efficient as it may be. That is the spirit in which a country should meet a great emergency, and instead of mocking at it we ought to emulate it. I believe we are just as imbued with the spirit as Germany is, but we want it evoked. The average Briton is too shy to be a hero until he is asked. The British temper is one of never wasting heroism on needless display, but there is plenty of it for the need. There is nothing Britishers would not give up for the honor of their country or for the cause of freedom. Indulgences, comforts, even the necessities of life they would willingly surrender. Why, there are two millions of them at this hour who have willingly tendered their lives for their country. What more could they do? If the absorption of all our engineering resources is demanded, no British citizen will grudge his share of inconvenience.

But what about those more immediately concerned in that kind of work? Here I am approaching something which is very difficult to talk about—I mean the employers and workmen. I must speak out quite plainly; nothing else is of the slightest use. For one reason or another we are not getting all the assistance we have the right to expect from our workers. Disputes, industrial disputes, are inevitable; and when you have a good deal of stress and strain, men's nerves are not at their best. Some differences of opinion are quite inevitable,

but we cannot afford them now; and, above all, we cannot resort to the usual method of settling them.

I suppose I have settled more labor disputes than any man in this hall, and, although those who only know me slightly may be surprised to hear me say it, the thing that you need most is patience. If I were to give a motto to a man who is going to a conference between employers and workmen I would say: "Take your time; don't hurry. It will come around with patience and tact and temper." But you know we cannot afford those leisurely methods now. Time is victory, and while employers and workmen on the Clyde have been spending time in disputing over a fraction, and when a week-end, ten days, and a fortnight of work which is absolutely necessary for the defense of the country has been set aside, I say here solemnly that it is intolerable that the life of Britain should be imperiled for the matter of a farthing an hour.

There is a good deal to be said for and there is a vast amount to be said against compulsory arbitration, but during the war the government ought to have power to settle all these differences, and the work should go on. The workman ought to get more. Very well, let the government find it out and give it to him. If he ought not, then he ought not to throw up his tools. The country cannot afford it. It is disaster, and I do not believe the moment this comes home to workmen and employers they will refuse to comply with the urgent demand of the government. There must be no delay.

This war is not going to be fought mainly on the battlefields of Belgium and Poland. It is going to be fought in the workshops of France and Great Britain; and it must be fought there under war conditions. There must be plenty of safeguards and the workman must get his equivalent.

Most of our workmen are putting every ounce of strength into this urgent work for their country, loyally and patriotically. But that is not true of all. There are some, I am sorry to say, who shirk their duty in this great emergency. What is the reason? It is mostly the lure of the drink. They refuse to work full time, and when they return their strength and efficiency are impaired by the way in which they have spent their leisure. Drink is doing us more damage in the war than all the German submarines put together.

What has Russia done? Russia, knowing her deficiency, knowing how unprepared she was, said, "I must pull myself together. I am not going to be trampled upon, unready as I am. I will use all my resources." What is the first thing she does? She stops the drink. I was talking to M. Bark, the Russian Minister of Finance, a singularly able man, and I asked, "What has been the result?" He said, "The productivity of labor, the amount of work which is put out by the workmen, has gone up between 30 and 50 per cent." I said, "How do they stand it without their liquor?" and he replied, "Stand it? I have lost revenue over it up to £65,000,000 a year, and we certainly cannot afford it, but if I proposed to put it back there would be a revolution in Russia." One afternoon we had to postpone our conference in Paris, and the French Minister of Finance said, "I have got to go to the Chamber of Deputies, because I am proposing a bill to abolish absinthe." Absinthe plays the same part in France that whisky plays in this country. It is really the worst form of drink used, not only among workmen, but among other classes as well. Its ravages are terrible, and they abolished it by a majority of something like 10 to 1 that afternoon.

That is how those great countries are facing their responsibilities. We do not propose anything so drastic as that—we are essentially moderate men. But we are armed with full powers for the defense of the realm. We are approaching it, I do not mind telling you, for the moment, not from the point of view of people who have been considering this as a social problem—we are approaching it purely from the point of view of these works. We have got great powers to deal with drink, and we mean to use them. We shall use them in a spirit of moderation, we shall use them discreetly, we shall use them wisely, but we shall use them fearlessly, and I have no doubt that, as the country's needs demand it, the country will support our action and will allow no indulgence of that kind to interfere with its prospects in this terrible war which has been thrust upon us.

There are three things I want you to bear in mind. The first is—and I want to get this into the minds of every one—that we are at war; the second, that it is the greatest war that has ever been fought by this or any other country, and the other, that the destinies of your country and the future of the

human race for generations to come depend upon the outcome of this war.

War is a time of sacrifice and of service. Some can render one service, some another, some here and some there. Some can render great assistance, other but little. There is not one who cannot help in some measure, whether it be only by enduring cheerfully his share of the discomfort. In the old Welsh legend there is a story of a man who was given a series of what appeared to be impossible tasks to perform ere he could reach the desires of his heart. Among other things he had to do was to recover every grain of seed that had been sown in a large field and bring it all in without one missing by sunset. He came to an anthill and won all the hearts and enlisted the sympathies of the industrious little people. They spread over the field, and before sundown the seed was all in except one, and as the sun was setting over the western skies a lame ant hobbled along with that grain also. Some of us have youth and vigor and suppleness of limb; some of us are crippled with years or infirmities, and we are at best but little ants. But we can all limp along with some share of our country's burden, and thus help her in this terrible hour to win the desire of her heart.

### BRITAIN'S NEED OF RECRUITS<sup>1</sup>

Napoleon, when asked what were the three things necessary for a successful war, replied: "Money, money, money." To-day we vary that phrase, and say: "Men, material, and money." As regard the supply of money for the war, the government are negotiating a new loan, the marked success of which is greatly due to the very favorable response made by the city. To meet the need for material, the energetic manner in which the new ministry of munitions is coping with the many difficulties which confront the production of our great requirements afford abundant proof that this very important work is being dealt with in a highly satisfactory manner. There still remains the vital need for men to fill the ranks of our armies. In one

<sup>1</sup> Speech of Field Marshal Earl Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, at the Guildhall, London, on June 9, 1915.

of my earliest statements made after the beginning of the war I said that I should require "More men, and still more, until the enemy is crushed." I repeat that statement today with even greater insistence. All the reasons which led me to think in August, 1914, that this war would be a prolonged one hold good at the present time. It is true we are in an immeasurably better situation now than ten months ago, but the position today is at least as serious as it was then. The thorough preparedness of Germany, due to her strenuous efforts, sustained at high pressure for some forty years, have issued in a military organization as complex in character as it is perfect in machinery.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the value of the response that has been made to my previous appeals, but I am here today to make another demand on the manhood of the country to come forward to its defence. I was from the first unwilling to ask for a supply of men in excess of the equipment available for them. I hold it to be most undesirable that soldiers, keen to take their place in the field, should be thus checked and possibly discouraged, or that the completion of this training should be hampered owing to lack of arms. We have now happily reached a period when it can be said that this drawback has been surmounted, and that the troops in training can be supplied with sufficient arms and material to turn them out as efficient soldiers.

It is an axiom that the larger an army is, the greater is its need of an everswelling number of men of recruitable age to maintain it at its full strength; yet, at the very same time the supply of those very men is automatically decreasing. Nor must it be forgotten that the great demand which has arisen for the supply of munitions, equipment, etc., for the armed forces of this country and of our allies also, as well as the economic and financial necessity of keeping up the production of manufactured goods, involves the retention of a large number of men in various trades and manufactures, many of whom would otherwise be available for the colors.

The public has watched with eager interest the growth and the rapidly acquired efficiency of the new armies, whose dimensions have already reached a figure which only a short while ago would have been considered utterly unthinkable. But there is a tendency, perhaps, to overlook the fact that these larger

armies require still larger reserves, to make good the wastage at the front. And one cannot ignore the certainty that our requirements in this respect will be large, continuous, and persistent; for one feels that our gallant soldiers in the fighting line are beckoning, with an urgency at once imperious and pathetic, to those who remain at home to come out and play their part too. Recruiting meetings, recruiting marches, and the unwearied labors of the recruiting officers, committees, and individuals have borne good fruit, and I look forward with confidence to such labors being continued as energetically as hitherto.

But we must go a step further, so as to attract and attach individuals who from shyness—or other causes—have not yet yielded to their own patriotic impulses. The government have asked Parliament to pass a Registration bill, with the object of ascertaining how many men and women there are in the country between the ages of fifteen and sixty-five eligible for the national service, whether in the navy or army, or for the manufacture of munitions, or to fulfil other necessary services. When this registration is completed we shall anyhow be able to note the men between the ages of nineteen and forty not required for munition or other necessary industrial work and therefore available, if physically fit, for the fighting line. Steps will be taken to approach, with a view to enlistment, all possible candidates for the army—unmarried men to be preferred before married men, as far as may be.

When the registration becomes operative I feel sure that the Corporation of the City of London will not be content with its earlier efforts, intensely valuable as they have been, but will use its great facilities to set an example of canvassing for the cause. This canvass should be addressed with stern emphasis to such unpatriotic employers as, according to returns, have restrained their men from enlisting.

What the numbers required are likely to be it is clearly inexpedient to shout abroad. Our constant refusal to publish either these or any other figures likely to prove useful to the enemy needs neither explanation nor apology. It is often urged that if more information were given as to the work and whereabouts of various units, recruiting would be strongly stimulated. But this is the precise information which would

be of the greatest value to the enemy, and it is agreeable to note that a German prince in high command ruefully recorded the other day his complete ignorance as to our new armies.

But one set of figures, available for everybody, and indicating with sufficient particularity the needs of our forces in the field, is supplied by the casualty lists. With regard to these lists, however—serious and sad as they necessarily are—let two points be borne in mind, first, that a very large percentage of the casualties represents comparatively slight hurts, the sufferers from which in time return to the front; and, secondly, that, if the figures seem to run very high, the magnitude of the operations is thereby suggested. Indeed, these casualty lists, whose great length may now and again induce undue depression of spirits, are an instructive indication of the huge extent of the operations undertaken now reached by the British forces in the field.

## SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WAR<sup>1</sup>

The heart of South Africa, Boer and Briton, is with England in this war. Here and there you will find an individual who cherishes bitter and hostile memories, of which there has been an example in Mr. Beyer's letter the other day, so effectually answered by General Botha. But such instances, I believe, are so rare that really they are the exceptions which seem to prove the rule. Of course, it goes without saying that every person of English descent is heartily with the mother country, and I do not suppose it would be an overestimate to add that quite 80 per cent of the Dutch are of the same way of thinking.

Still, there is a party among the South African Dutch that sees no necessity for the invasion of German Southwest Africa. This party overlooks the fact that the Germans have for long been preparing to invade them; also that if by any chance Germany should conquer in this war South Africa would be one of the first countries that they would seize.

South Africa is united; it has forgotten its recent labor troubles. I answer "absolutely" all such things are past history,

<sup>1</sup> By Sir Henry Rider Haggard. Quoted from the New York Times Current History of the War, December 1, 1914, p. 125-8.

blown away and destroyed by this great wind of war. South Africa, down to its lowest Hottentot, has, I believe, but one object, to help England to win in this vast battle of the nations. Why, even the natives, as you may have noticed, are sending subscriptions from their scanty hoards and praying to be allowed "to throw a few stones for the king."

At Pretoria I was asked to inspect a company of boy scouts, and there I found English and Dutch lads serving side by side with the utmost brotherhood. Again I met most of the men who had been leaders of the Boers in the war. One and all professed the greatest loyalty to England. Moreover, I am certain that this was not lip loyalty; it was from the heart. Especially was I impressed by that great man, General Botha, with whom I had several conversations. I am convinced that at this moment the king has no truer or more faithful servant than General Botha.

Germany, which has miscalculated so much in connection with this war and the part that the British Empire would play in it, miscalculated nowhere more than it did in the case of South Africa. The German war lords hoped that India and Egypt would rise, they trusted that Canada and Australia would prove lukewarm, but they were certain that South Africa would seize the opportunity to rebel. How could it be otherwise, they thought, seeing that but yesterday she was at death grips with us.

Then came the great surprise. Lo and behold instead of rebelling, South Africa promptly cabled to England saying that every British soldier might be withdrawn from her shores and, further, that the burghers of the land would themselves undertake the conquest of the German possessions of Southwest Africa for the Crown. They are doing so at this moment. I believe that today there is no British soldier left at the Cape, and I know that now a great force is moving on Southwest Africa furnished by Boer and Briton alike. Can the history of the world tell us of any parallel case to this—that a country conquered within a dozen years should not only need no garrison, but by its own free will undertake war against the enemies of its late victor? Surely this is something of which Britain may feel proud.

It has been caused first by 'a supreme and glorious trust in the justice and generosity of England, and secondly by a deep



distrust of Germany. To my own knowledge, Germany has been intriguing in South Africa for the last quarter of a century. There is no question that for many years Germany has had its eye upon South Africa as a desirable field of settlement for its subjects under the German and not the British flag. Now, the Boers are perfectly well acquainted with this fact and have no wish to exchange the beneficent rule of Britain for that of Potsdam, the King Log of George V for the King Stork of Kaiser Wilhelm.

## DIVIDED COUNCILS IN BRITISH EMPIRE<sup>1</sup>

It is February, 1915; the war has lasted six months. The irritation in this country against England grows apace. Having the power on the ocean, her disregard of the rights of neutrals is keeping the United States poor.

Marvelous indeed is the reaction of American public sentiment within six months. Hands are across the sea, but they are now stretched forth to the invincible Germans and their Austrian allies. The change is noted among different classes and even in high circles. Public sentiment in America is steadily drifting and the drift is altogether against England. The moving picture men in New York and Chicago note the decline in the earlier enthusiasm of the audiences for the allies. Policemen who have been watching the crowds that surround the war bulletin boards have informed the writer that a clear majority of the watchers are not in sympathy with England. There are few calls for the erstwhile popular song, "'Tis a Long Way to Tipperary." The German bazar in the Seventy-first Regiment Armory, New York, in two weeks cleared \$325,000, while the Prince of Wales Relief Fund, on the American side, is proving a complete failure. The circulation of the new journal, *The Fatherland*, has increased in three months from 30,000 to 120,000. The morning and evening *Staats-Zeitung* have doubled their sales. There is a notable increase in the receipts of the Irish-American journals. And the journals written in English which treat the German

<sup>1</sup> From "The King, the Kaiser and Irish Freedom," by James K. McGuire. Copyright, 1915, by the Devin-Adair Company, and reprinted here by permission of the publishers.

side fairly find some consolation in the improvement of their circulation and advertising receipts. Not an Irish-American newspaper has been found to print the war letters of T. P. O'Connor, M.P., long a favorite with this class of readers. Numerous college professors have come out and, encouraged by numbers, are now engaged in defending Germany. The Teutonic publicists are in great demand from ocean to ocean. Our Irish guests who oppose Redmond continue to receive a warm welcome.

There remains not the least question that in the second month of the year 1915 a clear majority of the American people, quietly or openly, favors Germany against England, while feeling profoundly sorry for the state of Belgium and France.

The reasons for this extraordinary but certain change in American public sentiment is due to the following principal reasons:

1. The discoveries that England poisoned the German news wells.
2. The proof that the stories of German atrocities are false.
3. The feeling that England caused "hard times" by bottling up our commerce.
4. The evidence that the attempt to starve Germany, which failed, starves the United States.
5. Pride in the American flag and national sorrow over its humiliation on the ocean.
6. The degrading spectacle of British warships guarding and watching the entrance to American harbors.
7. The popular belief that the products of American farms and factory should be held as sacred on the sea as on the land.
8. That God owns the ocean—not England.
9. Admiration on the part of Americans for pluck, courage and skill; they feel Germany is the underdog, fighting against heavy odds.
10. Faith and confidence in the solid virtues and patriotism of our neighbors of German blood.

In addition, the growing belief in the United States is that Germany-Austria is steadily and surely winning the war.

The American public appreciates that the war dispatches dated Petrograd are mostly inventions or gross exaggerations and sent out to bolster up the cause of the allies. Again and again the communications dated Paris have been found to con-

tain false news of victories and to give scarcely any reference to the failure of the French armies to make any notable advance in three months.

Contrasted with the inventions of London, Paris and Petrograd, the Berlin military and naval dispatches are models of brevity, clearness and modesty.

Observing Americans are contrasting the solidarity, harmony and common purpose of the people of Germany with the divided counsels, rebellions and mutinies which are observed in the British Empire. All Germans, whether in Germany or America, believe firmly in the justice of the German cause. In England several of the leading members of the cabinet resigned rather than endorse England's unjust declaration of war on Germany. The most long-standing friend of the United States in English public life is John Morley, the biographer of Gladstone. He withdrew from the British government along with Secretary Trevelyan and John Burns, the labor member from Battersea, London, who resigned as minister of public works, giving up a salary of \$25,000 per annum. Notable protests were made by Keir Hardie, Ramsay McDonald and Lawrence Guinnell, of County Cork, Ireland, members of the British Parliament. The suppression of meetings and newspapers continues in Ireland. The country, as has been said, is really in a state of martial law. Vessels are inspected carefully in all Irish ports lest they may be found running rifles and machine guns.

There are seditions in Egypt that make the British hold on the Suez Canal insecure. In South Africa the rebellious Boers have united with the Germans and for four months have been able to hold the field. Private letters from India show that the British troops in that land will be required to crush various insurrections, and there is little likelihood of a very large number of Indian troops being sent to the continent. Recruiting in Canada among the Irish Nationalists is a complete failure. Letters from officers of the principal Irish societies contain the interesting information that scarcely 500 Irish Nationalists have enlisted from that country. Similar reports are now being verified and accepted as true from Australia, Tasmania and New Zealand. There is an insurrection in Morocco that has put the French Empire in North Africa into grave peril.

All in all, the British Empire and her French and Russian

allies are having many troubles, the effects of which are gradually impressing Americans. Advices from Italy as late as February, 1915, show that public sentiment is favorable to Germany, and there is no likelihood of Italy being drawn into the conflict to fight on the side of the allies. If British diplomacy should prevail on Roumania to espouse their cause, that country will be offset by Bulgaria, which is ready to strike. Persia has been delivered to Russia by England and has revolted.

Russia is facing a revolution in Finland, there is a widespread disaffection in Russian Poland, revolts are under way in the Mohammedan possessions of the Russian Empire, in Bokahra, Turkestan and Chiva. The oppressed Jews are opposed to war. The most sanguinary battles of the war are being fought in territory that has large Jewish population, so the world may see the extermination of most of the Jewish race in eastern Europe, where the majority of those unfortunate people live. A movement has been started in Afghanistan, to whose borders Russia is diverting troops, while the Turks have an army of 600,000 men assailing Russia in Trans-Caucasia. While the allies are numerically superior they are confronted with numerous internal and racial troubles which have increased the obstacles to their progress in both the eastern and western theaters of the war. These serious diversions at the end of the first act of the world's tragedy have been hidden from Ireland, but the news is gradually percolating through. The news has greatly interfered with the recruiting in Ireland, where conscription is threatened. Many young men, fearing a forced draft into the army are leaving the country.

## ENGLAND CONTROLS WORLD NEWS<sup>1</sup>

England has controlled the news of the world for more than a century. It has been her greatest diplomatic weapon. It has probably gained more for her than her huge navy and her fine army. More than once it has saved her from serious loss.

Not one great event but has been seen for the rest of the world through English eyes or told to the rest of the world as England wished to tell it. The traditional racial characteristics

<sup>1</sup> By Arthur Moore. Reprinted from the New York American, December 10, 1914.

of each of us were fitted upon us by England for all the world to learn by heart. And the myth of "British fair play" stands above all the characterizations we suffer under as the greatest masterpiece of them all.

Europe knows America and we misunderstand Europe through news bearing the London date. Negro burning, the Camorra, bull fights, the Dreyfus case, Russian Jew slaughters, pass to and fro as "news" through London.

Since the establishment of the Triple Entente London remade the French character for the world. On the date of the Entente's beginning, the myth of French decadence became the miracle of French renaissance. From the same moment the "bear that walks like a man" was transformed by Dr. Dillon and a host of lesser English into a simple Christian hero.

The menace of German militarism became known to the world curiously enough, about the time that the French became regenerate and the Russians finally "tucked in their shirts," that is, about the time of the formation of the Entente. From that date onward till the beginning of the war we heard more and more of this new menace that had taken the place of the Slav hordes as the world-wide bugaboo. And it was not from France, but from England, that the tales of this new terror came.

When the great war broke upon the world we were already prepared to believe everything against the Germans, as we were ready to believe everything against the Russians when they were fighting the Japanese, allies of England.

Newspapers do not manufacture news. They can only collect it from the best available sources and present it to their readers in the most acceptable form. That the best available source of all international news is now, as it always has been, England, is the fault of no one. But it is a serious fact that ought to be realized fully and constantly by every man and woman who reads the newspapers in these times. Today almost all the important news is foreign news, and it is news about events that are changing the whole world. Never before has England's monopoly of international news been of so tremendous a value to England or so dangerous to the rest of the world.

One need not be pro-German to fear and to distrust the use to which England may put this tremendous power that she possesses; one need only be a little thoughtful. We may well

be called upon as a nation to play a very important part in the final adjustments following this conflict. And if we open-eyed fall a victim once more to this most powerful weapon of British diplomacy we may fail in playing our part in a manner that we may lastingly regret. Day by day our judgment is being undermined by this force in the hands of England. But knowing it we ought to guard against it, pro-German and anti-German alike, till the war is over.

## LORD NORTHCLIFFE AND THE WAR<sup>1</sup>

Lord Northcliffe has been a power in British journalism for now nearly twenty years. It was on May 4, 1896, that the first issue of the Daily Mail was sold in the streets of London. Its advent marked a revolution in the press not merely of the metropolis but of the whole kingdom.

Besides the Daily Mail Lord Northcliffe is also the chief proprietor of The Times, which he secured control of some eight or nine years ago, and the Evening News, which came into his possession about a couple of years before the Daily Mail was started.

To many Englishmen Lord Northcliffe, as the director-in-chief of these three powerful journals, seems a sinister figure. Yet it would be easy, I imagine, to overestimate the extent to which he actually lays down the policies of his newspapers. He is believed to write himself many of the editorials in the Daily Mail, but I have never heard of his writing a single one for The Times or the Evening News. The three papers pursue, it is true, though in very different ways, the same general lines, but this probably arises from a natural approximation of attitude and opinion rather than from a central inspiration. One often, too, hears it said that Lord Northcliffe cares only for circulations and success and that he will champion any cause and exploit any momentary passion if only by so doing he can sell more papers. This is a ludicrous untruth. Lord Northcliffe is an extremely practical journalist who understands all sides of the business, is proud, and naturally so, of the unexampled triumphs

<sup>1</sup> By Sydney Brooks. From an article in the North American Review, August, 1915, p. 186-96.

he has achieved in his chosen profession, and possesses a highly developed instinct for catching the popular favor. But he is also a man of genuine public spirit and patriotism. He has travelled much and with an understanding eye and mind; he is one of the comparatively few Englishmen who really know America and can enter into the American point of view; he is one of the largest employers of labor in the kingdom and one of the largest manufacturers of paper in the world. All this, and a zest in life that brings him into agreeable relations with multitudes of people, make him a man who would count in any sphere. He enjoys life and he enjoys power and he enjoys particularly turning out a better newspaper than anyone else; but for money itself he has, I should say, the indifference that most men feel who have made a sufficient fortune in their early years by sheer hard work and to whom it is simply an instrument for further activities. Lord Northcliffe is a prodigious and insatiable worker, a man of swift and strong emotions, of instantaneous, usually shrewd, sometimes erratic and impulsive decisions, kindly and generous in his periodical relations with men, tingling with ideas himself and quick to appreciate them in others, with an ever-present sense of humor that can generally be appealed to when his self-confidence shows signs of passing into rashness or obstinacy, an expert fisherman and therefore a man who knows how to wait, and a joyous and wholly delightful companion on the golf-links. He is in every sense a man of power, but it is power directed to no personal or unworthy ends. So far from merely giving the public what it wants he more often makes it want the many excellent things he has to give; and if he were once convinced that the national interest demanded that a certain thing should be done, Lord Northcliffe would do it and would keep on doing it, whatever the loss of popularity or circulation or advertisements.

Lord Northcliffe was the first man with knowledge and courage enough to lay bare the shortage of shells and machine guns, which, so long as it lasts, must pile up the casualty lists and operate as a fatal barrier to any sustained advance. Nobody, again, who knows him can doubt that in acting as he did, he was impelled solely by public motives. Nor, I think, can anyone question that the net result has been highly advantageous to everybody except Lord Northcliffe, that the country at last realizes the truth which official assurances had obscured or per-

verted, and that it was only by painting the situation in its real colors that the British people could be stirred to the gigantic efforts necessary to retrieve it. It was the question of the shells far more than anything else that brought down the Liberal government and led to the coalition ministry, the division in the powers of the War Office, and the appointment of Mr. Lloyd George as minister of munitions. These developments may have been discussed and meditated even before Lord Northcliffe started on his campaign. But his journals, and his alone, made them inevitable; and it is merely a question of time before the value of the national service that they thus rendered is ungrudgingly recognized.

For all editors and newspaper proprietors the war has necessarily been a time of peculiar difficulties and anxiety. The censorship controls their news columns, but it does not control their editorial policy. To know when the interests of the country called for silence and when for plain speaking; to weigh the public gain that might be hoped for from criticizing the speeches or actions of ministers against the risk that thereby the national unity might be impaired; to decide how far particular measures or policies should be advocated and how far it would be better to leave the initiative solely in the hands of the government—all these problems, occurring and recurring in a hundred different forms, have asked for their solution an extraordinary degree of balance and discrimination. The papers under Lord Northcliffe's control have borne the test well. They have never underestimated the enemy or lent any countenance to the ludicrous notion that this war will be either a short or an easy one. They have consistently striven against official optimism or reticence or timidity to induce the nation to face the facts. On many questions—the internment of aliens, for instance, the drink problem, the best way of handling the labor difficulty, the need of national service, and the supply of shells—their suggestions and their insight have been proved by the event to be superior to the government's. Their criticisms have in the main been constructive and directed solely to the more efficient prosecution of the war; and their timely disclosures of deficiencies that grew the more dangerous and the harder to remedy the longer they remained unrealized or only hinted at or surrounded with mystery, may prove to have saved the country from a great disaster.



## FRANCE

### GERMAN REPLY TO FRANCE<sup>1</sup>

Through the French Yellow Book, as through all the official publications of the Triple Entente, there runs as a red thread the idea, that Germany could have prevented the war if she had exerted her influence on Austria-Hungary, so that the latter might moderate her demands on Serbia. In this matter the powers of the Triple Entente begin from the one-sided standpoint: that Russia had a right to act as the protector of Serbia, and could demand from Germany recognition and respect for this claim. On the other hand, the members of the Triple Entente deny Austria-Hungary the right to take, in opposition to the provocations, lasting for years, of a small neighbor, the steps which she found necessary for the maintenance of her security and her position as a great power. According to the view of Russia and her friends, Germany ought to have caught Austria-Hungary's uplifted arm, and acquiesced in the standpoint adopted by Russia, that it lay with the powers to decide how far Austria-Hungary should be permitted to exact satisfaction for herself in face of the Serbian provocations. In other words, in the diplomatic duel between the Triple Entente on the one side and Austria-Hungary and Germany on the other, the last named ought quietly to have accepted the defeat and humiliation which had been planned for them by the Triple Entente. As they did not see fit to submit to this and as Germany, in loyalty to the obligations of her alliance, took her stand on Austria-Hungary's side, war broke out.


That Germany, as is repeatedly hinted in the Yellow Book, steadily refused to lend her hand to the bringing about of a peaceful solution, is an assertion which strikes the truth right in the face and is refuted by the Yellow Book itself in various places. Germany only expressed her objection to the English proposal to adjust the disputed question in a conference of four

<sup>1</sup> This reply to the French Yellow Book was published in the Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, an official German government organ, on December 21, 1914.

powers or by means of conversations between four, because every interference of the powers in the question, which, according to the German view, concerned Austria-Hungary and Serbia alone, was opposed to the standpoint which Germany had adopted on principle from the beginning of the crisis, and because the German government had from the outset been of opinion that direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg offered more prospect of success and, in the event of an agreement being possible at all, would lead to the goal more quickly. In spite of this undoubtedly justified objection, the Berlin cabinet, as is evident even from the Yellow Book, showed on every occasion the greatest willingness to lend its hand to the promotion of a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

Equally unjustified is the reproach which has been directed against Germany, that she refused to counsel moderation to Austria-Hungary. Germany took all the steps in Vienna which were reconcilable with the dignity of her ally. She only refused to exercise the pressure upon Austria-Hungary which was demanded by Russia and her friends. In conformity with Germany's advice, the Austro-Hungarian government at once declared itself prepared not to try to attack the territorial integrity of Serbia. It is also owing to Germany that the direct exchange of ideas between Vienna and St. Petersburg, which had been interrupted for a few days, was again resumed, a fact in regard to which, of course, all the publications of the governments of the Triple Entente very wisely remain silent.

The manner in which the Yellow Book describes the action of Baron von Schoen, the ambassador at Paris, is very characteristic of the one-sided standpoint of the Triple Entente. He was commissioned to suggest to the French government in a friendly way common action in the direction of peace, and he had also expressed in this connection the request that counsels of moderation should also be given in St. Petersburg from Paris. Every impartial person will be obliged to admit that an irrefutable proof of the conciliatoriness of the German government, as well as of its wish to see peace preserved, is to be seen in this step. But the French statesmen see in Baron von Schoen's suggestion nothing but a clumsy attempt by Germany to sow distrust between Russia and France. Note this carefully! The powers of the Triple Entente demand of Germany that she should not only give her ally good advice, but that she should



exercise pressure upon her. They reproach Germany severely for not falling in with this demand. But if Germany requests France to exert a moderating influence on her ally, then that is a perfidious attempt to cause dissension! Moreover, how does this friendly keeping in touch with the French government by the German ambassador, which has been so much misinterpreted on the French side, agree with the later assertion of M. Viviani, that Germany was thoroughly desirous of war and that against France?

The documents published in the French Yellow Book lay stress on the admirable spirit of conciliation and peaceableness which the Russian government is said to have displayed from the beginning of the crisis. In opposition to this, the fact need only be recalled that M. Sazonof remarked in the very first conversation which he had with the French and English ambassadors that Russia would be compelled to mobilize. According to this, the intention existed from the outset of exerting pressure by means of military threats in the negotiations with Austria-Hungary. As is well known, Russian mobilization was then resolved upon as early as July 25 and was in progress from that day in the whole Russian Empire, as was established subsequently on unimpeachable evidence.

The reports of the English ambassador in St. Petersburg, who, however, acted in this matter with apparent independence and without directions from his government, prove that he watched the military activity which was beginning in Russia with increasing anxiety and repeatedly warned the Russian foreign minister against premature mobilization.

The manner in which the official documents published in the Yellow Book try to wind round about this important point is extremely worthy of notice. The proof must be furnished at any cost that it was Germany who made a beginning with military preparations. But the Yellow Book is only able to adduce for such "proofs" the fact that, according to the report of the French consul at Frankfurt, troops had arrived there on July 29, by the roads from Darmstadt, Cassel and Mainz; also that, according to the report of the French ambassador in Munich of the same date, the mills in Illkirch had been requested to reserve their stocks for the army, and that the transportation of flying machines was reported from Strassburg and the recall of Bavarian non-commissioned infantry

officers on leave from Metz. A more meager body of proof can hardly be imagined.

The French ambassador in St. Petersburg then sees himself also compelled, when he reports to his government Russia's mobilization against Germany, in default of other effective proof, to have recourse to his imagination and to assert that the Russian general mobilization had only been a consequence of the Austro-Hungarian general mobilization and the military measures of Germany. It is not easy to say in a few words so many untruths as are contained in this telegram from M. Paléologue of July 31, No. 118 of the Yellow Book. Not even the Russian government has ventured to justify its mobilization in this manner. It is universally known that Germany confined herself, up to July 31, to precautionary measures which were unconditionally necessary, in view of the comprehensive military measures of her neighbors. It was only after the mobilization of the whole Russian army, which was officially announced on July 31, that the state of threatening danger of war was proclaimed in Germany, and only on the evening of August 1 that mobilization was ordered.

The French Yellow Book tries to prove another point which the well-known report of the English ambassador at Vienna, drawn up four weeks after the outbreak of war, had vainly endeavored to do, namely, that Austria-Hungary and Russia were about to come to an understanding in regard to the note to Serbia, when Germany suddenly destroyed all hopes of the preservation of peace by her declaration of war. This assertion has already been refuted by the Wiener Fremdenblatt on September 25 in a conclusive manner. To prevent the repetition of the legend, however, it must be pointed out once more, that Russia, at the moment when Germany had succeeded in setting the Austro-Hungarian and Russian direct conversations going again, regardless of the assurances solemnly given by the Russian minister of war and chief of the general staff to the German military attaché, that the troops on the German frontier would not be mobilized, ordered during the night of July 30-31 general mobilization—consequently against Germany as well—and thereby brought to naught the whole mediatory work of Germany. Consequently all the juggling tricks of the Triple Entente will not succeed in getting rid of the fact that the guilt of having unleashed the European war falls on Russia.

THE SOUL OF PARIS<sup>1</sup>

In the beginning of the war it seemed as though the soul had gone out of Paris and that it had lost all its life.

In all the streets of Paris there was a shutting up of shops. Every day put a new row of iron curtains between the window panes, until at the end of the twelfth day the city seemed as dismal as London on a Sunday, or as though all the shops were closed for a public funeral. Scraps of paper were pasted on the barred-up fronts.

"Le magasin est fermé à cause de la mobilisation."

"M. Jean Cochin et quatre fils sont au front des armées."

"Toute la personne de cet établissement est mobilisée."

The French government was afraid of the soul of Paris. Memories of the Commune haunted the minds of men who did not understand that the character of the Parisian has altered somewhat since 1870. Ministers of France who had read a little history, were terribly afraid that out of the soul of Paris would come turbulence and mob-passion, *crises de nerfs*, rioting, political strife, and panics. Paris must be handled firmly, sobered down by every possible means, kept from the knowledge of painful facts, spoon-fed with cheerful communiqués whatever the truth might be, guarded by strong but hidden force, ready at a moment's notice to smash up a procession, to arrest agitators, to quell a rebellion, and to maintain the strictest order.

Quietly, but effectively, General Galièni, the military governor of "the entrenched camp of Paris," as it was called, proceeded to place the city under martial law in order to strangle any rebellious spirit which might be lurking in its hiding place. Orders and regulations were issued in a rapid volley fire which left Paris without any aid of its old life or liberty. The *terrasses* were withdrawn from the cafés. No longer could the philosophic Parisian sip his *petit verre* and watch the drama of the boulevards from the shady side of a marble-topped table. He must sit indoors like an Englishman, in the darkness of his public-house, as though ashamed of drinking in the open. Absinthe was banned by a thunder-stroke from the Invalides, where

<sup>1</sup> From "The Soul of the War," by Philip Gibbs. Copyright, 1915, by McBride, Nast & Co., and reprinted here by permission of the publishers.

the military governor had established his headquarters, and Parisians who had acquired the absinthe habit trembled in every limb at this judgment which would reduce them to physical and moral wrecks, as creatures of the drug habit suddenly robbed of their nerve-controlling tabloids. It was an edict welcomed by all men of self-control who knew that France had been poisoned by this filthy liquid, but they too became a little pale when all the cafés of Paris were closed at eight o'clock.

Other edicts followed, or arrived simultaneously like a broadside fired into the life of the city. Public processions "with whatever patriotic motive" were sternly prohibited. "Purveyors of false news, or of news likely to depress the public spirit" would be dealt with by courts martial and punished with the utmost severity. No musical instruments were to be played after ten o'clock at night, and orchestras were prohibited in all restaurants. Oh, Paris, was even your laughter to be abolished, if you had any heart for laughter while your sons were dying on the fields of battle?

The newspaper censors had put a strangle grip upon the press, not only upon news of war but also upon expressions of opinion. Gustave Hervé signed his name three days a week to blank columns of extraordinary eloquence. Georges Clemenceau had a series of striking headlines which had been robbed of all their text. The intellectuals of Paris might not express an opinion save by permission of the military censors, most of whom, strangely enough, had German names.

The civil police under direction of the military governor were very busy in Paris during the early days of the war. Throughout the twenty-four hours, and especially in the darkness of night, the streets were patrolled by blue-capped men on bicycles, who rode, four by four, as silently as shadows, through every quarter of the city. They had a startling habit of surrounding any lonely man who might be walking in the late hours and interrogating him as to his nationality, age, and business.

They were very quick to follow the trail of a stranger, and there was no sanctuary in Paris in which he might evade them.

For several months there was a spy mania in Paris, and the police, acting under military orders, showed considerable activity in "Boche" hunting. It was a form of chase which turned me a little sick when I saw the captured prey, just as I used to

turn sick as a boy when I saw a rat caught in a trap and handed over to the dogs, or any other animal run to earth. All my instincts made me hope for the escape of the poor beast.

But it was not of German spies that the French government was most afraid. The French government was more afraid of the true Parisians. To sober them down in case their spirit might lead to trouble, the streets of Paris were kept in darkness and all places of amusement were closed as soon as war was declared. In case riots should break forth from secret lairs of revolutionary propaganda, squadrons of Gardes Republicains patrolled the city by day and night, and the agents de police were reenforced by fusiliers marins with loaded rifles, who—simple fellows as they are—could hardly direct a stranger to the Place de la Concorde or find their own way to the Place de la Bastille.

At all costs Paris was not to learn the truth about the war if there were any unpleasant truths to tell. For Paris there must always be victories and no defeats. They must not even know that in war time there were wounded men; otherwise they might get so depressed or so enraged that (thought the French government) there might be the old cry of "Nous sommes trahis!" with a lopping off of ministers' heads and dreadful orgies, in which the streets of Paris would run red with blood. This reason alone—so utterly unreasonable, as we now know—may explain the farcical situation of the hospitals in Paris during the first two months of the war. Great hotels like the Astoria, Claridge's, and the Majestic had been turned into hospitals magnificently equipped and over-staffed. Nothing that money could buy was left unbought, so that these great palaces might be fully provided with all things necessary for continual streams of wounded men. High society in France gave away its wealth with generous enthusiasm. Whatever faults they might have they tried to wash them clean by charity, full-hearted and overflowing, for the wounded sons of France. Great ladies who had been beauties of the salons, whose gowns had been the envy of their circles, took off their silks and chiffons and put on the simple dress of the *infirmière* and volunteered to do the humblest work, the dirty work of kitchen-wenches and scullery-girls and bedroom-girls, so that their hands might help, by any service, the men who had fought for France. French doctors, keen and brilliant men who hold

a surgeon's knife with a fine and delicate skill, stood in readiness for the maimed victims of the war. The best brains of French medical science were mobilized in these hospitals of Paris. But the wounded did not come to Paris until the war had dragged on for weeks. After the Battle of the Marne, when the wounded were pouring into Orleans and other towns at the rate of seven thousand a day, when it was utterly impossible for the doctors there to deal with all that tide of agony, and when the condition of the French wounded was a scandal to the name of a civilized country, the hospitals of Paris remained empty, or with a few lightly wounded men in a desert of beds. Because they could not speak French, perhaps, these rare arrivals were mostly Turcos and Senegalese, so that when they awakened in these wards and their eyes rolled round upon the white counterpanes, the exquisite flowers and the painted ceilings, and there beheld the beauty of women bending over their bedsides—women whose beauty was famous through Europe—they murmured "Allahu akbar" in devout ecstasy and believed themselves in a Mohammedan paradise.

It was a comedy in which there was a frightful tragedy. The doctors and surgeons standing by these empty beds, wandering through operating-theaters magnificently appointed, asked God why their hands were idle when so many soldiers of France were dying for lack of help, and why Paris, the nerve center of all railway lines, so close to the front, where the fields were heaped with the wreckage of the war, should be a world away from any work of rescue. It was the same old strain of falsity which always runs through French official life. "Politics!" said the doctors of Paris; "those cursed politics!"

But it was fear this time. The government was afraid of wounded were diverted from the capital, wandering on long and devious journeys, side-tracked for hours, and if any ambulances came it was at night, when they glided through back streets under cover of darkness, afraid of being seen.

They need not have feared, those ministers of France. Paris had more courage than some of them, with a greater dignity and finer faith. When the French ministry fled to Bordeaux without having warned the people that the enemy was at their gates, Paris remained very quiet and gave no sign of wild terror or panic-stricken rage. There was no political cry or revolutionary outburst. No mob orator sprang upon a café chair to



say "Nous sommes trahis!" . . . There was not even a word of rebuke for those who had doctored the official communiqués and put a false glamour of hope upon hideous facts. Hurriedly and dejectedly over a million people fled from the city, now that the government had led the way of flight. They were afraid, and there was panic in their exodus, but even that was not hysterical, and men and women kept their heads, though they had lost their hopes. It was rare to see a weeping woman. There was no wailing of a people distraught. Sadly those fugitives left the city which had been all the world to them, and the roads to the south were black with their multitudes, having left in fear but full of courage on the road, dejected, but even then finding a comedy in the misery of it, laughing—as most French women will laugh in the hour of peril—even when their suffering was greatest and there was a heartache in their humor.

After all the soul of Paris did not die, even in those dark days when so many of its inhabitants had gone, and when, for a little while, it seemed a deserted city. Many thousands of citizens remained, enough to make a great population, and although for a day or two they kept for the most part indoors, under the shadow of a fear that at any moment they might hear the first shells come shrieking overhead, or even the clatter of the German cavalry, they quickly resumed the daily routine of their lives, as far as it was possible at such a time.

After the battle of the Marne the old vitality of Paris was gradually restored. The people who had fled by hundreds of thousands dribbled back steadily from England and provincial towns where they had hated their exile and had been ashamed of their flight. They came back to their small flats or attic rooms rejoicing to find all safe under a layer of dust—shedding tears, some of them, when they saw the children's toys, which had been left in a litter on the floor, and the open piano with a song on the music-rack, which a girl had left as she rose in the middle of a bar, wavering off into a cry of fear, and all the domestic treasures which had been gathered through a life of toil and abandoned—forever it seemed—when the enemy was reported within twenty miles of Paris in irresistible strength. The city had been saved. The Germans were in full retreat. The great shadow of fear had been lifted and the joy of a great hope thrilled through the soul of Paris, in spite of all that death

*là-bas*, where so many young men were making sacrifices of their lives for France.

The wounded were allowed at last to come to Paris and the surgeons who had stood with idle hands found more than enough work to do, and the ladies of France who had put on nurses' dresses walked very softly and swiftly through long wards, no longer thrilled with the beautiful sentiment of smoothing the brows of handsome young soldiers, but thrilled by the desperate need of service, hard and ugly and terrible, among those poor bloody men, agonizing through the night, helpless in their pain, moaning before the rescue of death.

Into the streets of Paris, therefore, came the convalescents and the lightly wounded, and one-armed or one-legged officers or simple "poilus" with bandaged heads and hands could be seen in any restaurant among comrades who had not yet received their baptism of fire, had not cried "Touché!" after the bursting of a German shell.

The theaters and music-halls of Paris opened one by one in the autumn of the first year of war. Some of the dancing girls and the singing girls found their old places behind the footlights, unless they had coughed their lungs away or grown too pinched and thin. But for a long time it was impossible to recapture the old spirit of these haunts, especially in the music-halls, where ghosts passed in the darkness of deserted *promenoirs*, and where a chill gave one goose-flesh in the empty stalls.

Paris was half ashamed to go to the Folies Bergères or the Renaissance, while away *là-bas* men were lying on the battlefields or crouching in the trenches. Only when the monotony of life without amusement became intolerable to people who have to laugh so that they may not weep, did they wend their way to these places for an hour or two. Even the actors and actresses and playwrights of Paris felt the grim presence of death not far away. The old Rabelaisianism was toned down to something like decency, and at least the grosser vulgarities of the music-hall stage were banned by common consent.

The shadow of war crept through every keyhole in Paris and no man or woman shut up in a high attic with some idea or passion could keep out the evil genii which dominated the intellect and the imagination, and put its cold touch upon the senses, through that winter of agony when the best blood in France slopped into the water-logged trenches from Flanders to

the Argonne. Yet there were coteries in Paris which thrust the *thing* away from them as much as possible, and tried to pretend that art was still alive, and that philosophy was untouched by these brutalities.

I have written many words about the spirit of Paris in war. Yet all these little glimpses I have given reveal only the trivial characteristics of the city. Through all these episodes and outward facts, rising above them to a great height of spirituality, the soul of Paris was a white fire burning with a steady flame. I cannot describe the effect of it upon one's senses and imagination. I was only conscious of it, so that again and again, in the midst of the crowded boulevards, or in the dim aisles of Notre Dame, or wandering along the left bank of the Seine, I used to say to myself, silently or aloud: "These people are wonderful! . . . They hold the spirit of an unconquerable race. . . . Nothing can smash this city of intellect, so gay, and yet so patient in suffering, so emotional and yet so stoic in pride and courage!" There was weakness, and vanity, in Paris. The war had not cleansed it of all its vice or of all its corruption, but this burning wind of love for *La Patrie* touched the heart of every man and woman, and inflamed them so that self-interest was almost consumed, and sacrifice for the sake of France became a natural instinct. The ugliest old hag in the market shared this love with the most beautiful woman of the salons, the demi-mondaine with her rouged lips knelt in spirit, like Mary Magdalene, before the cross, and was glad to suffer for the sake of a pure uncarnal love, symbolized to her by the folds of the tricolor or by the magic of that word, "La France!" which thrilled her soul, smirched by the traffic of the streets. The most money-loving bourgeois, who had counted every sou and cheated every other one, was lifted out of his meanness and materialism and did astounding things, without a murmur, abandoning his business to go back to the colors as a soldier of France, and regarding the ruin of a life's ambitions without a heartache so that France might be free. There were *embusqués* in Paris—perhaps hundreds, or even thousands of young men who searched for soft jobs which would never take them to the firing line, or who pleaded ill-health with the successful influence of a family or political "pull." Let that be put down honestly, because nothing matters save the truth. But the manhood of Paris as a whole, after the first shudder of dismay, the first agonies of this

wrench from the safe, familiar ways of life, rose superbly to the call of *la Patrie en danger!* The middle-aged fathers of families and the younger sons marched away singing and hiding their sadness under a mask of careless mirth. The boys of eighteen followed them in the month of April, after nine months of war, and not a voice in Paris was raised to protest against this last and dreadful sacrifice. Paris cursed the stupidity of the war, cried "How long, O Lord, how long?" as it dragged on in its misery, with accumulating sums of death, was faint at the thought of another winter campaign, and groaned in spirit when its streets were filled with wounded men and black-garbed women. But though Paris suffered with the finer agonies of the sensitive intelligence, it did not lose faith or courage, and found the heart to laugh sometimes, in spite of all its tears.

## BOMBARDMENT OF RHEIMS CATHEDRAL<sup>1</sup>

Rarely has an occurrence in the present war given our opponents so welcome an opportunity for charges, as groundless as they are venomous, as the bombardment of Rheims cathedral. Not only the French government, but also a considerable number of known and of anonymous writers have reproached Germany and, in spite of her many verifications to the contrary, upheld the charge that there was no military necessity for the bombardment which in their opinion was rather due to a mad lust of destruction. And yet as early as September 23, 1914, the German Army Command declared officially that the bombardment was caused and necessitated solely by the misuse of one of the cathedral towers as an observation tower. Our opponents may try to reason away that fact as much as they like; fact it will remain.

It is proved beyond all doubts that the French army command used the cathedral for a post of observation directly after our troops quitted the town. The French periodical, *L'Illustration*, stated on September 26, 1914, that an electric searchlight had been installed in the north tower of the cathedral on September 13, 1914. Abbé Thिनот, maitre de

<sup>1</sup> Official statement issued by the German War Office at Berlin. This translation was furnished through the courtesy of Dr. K. A. Fuehr.

chappelle at the cathedral, expressly confirms the statement in the same periodical under the date of October 10, 1914. That article which bears the abbé's signature admits that the searchlight worked at least during the whole night of September 13, 1914.

An English technical paper, called *The Wine and Spirit Record*, under the date of November 8, 1914, has an account by Mr. Frank Hedges Butler of the firm of Hedges & Butler, Ltd., Regent street, London. Mr. Butler says that he watched the development of the fight from the top of the tower, and that he had noticed a Red Cross flag on the top, middle of September, 1914, and beside the flag a telephone, an electric installation and soldiers' beds.

Not only the cathedral itself, but its nearest surroundings have been utilized by the French for military purposes. Thus the Paris correspondent of the *London Times* reports on September 22, 1914: "The German bombardment of Rheims cathedral appears to have been provoked—in theory at all events—by the fact that the French planted their artillery in the city itself and replied to the enemy's guns with great vigor." On leaving the cathedral, the reporter noticed himself "at the head of the main street" a park of French artillery with a strong rear guard of infantry behind it.

These reports of a press that is certainly not anti-French have been fully confirmed by German observations. Here is an example: Franz Beckmann, a reservist of the infantry regiment No. 74, became a French prisoner of war at Rheims on August 13, 1914. Beckmann, who has meanwhile returned to Germany, has declared on his oath that during the days from September 18 till 19, 1914, on several occasions he clearly recognized military observers on one of the cathedral towers from the hospital in the School of Place Belle Cour, which immediately adjoins the cathedral. Aviators, too, have established this beyond any doubt.

Aviators have also ascertained that infantry, heavy batteries and ammunition columns were located within the town, which is by no means unfortified, but built and used as a fortress. Hence orders were first of all given to fire at the town in order to scatter the massed troops. These orders made special reference to the fact that the supreme army command had issued explicit orders to spare the cathedral under any circumstances. Since September 12 a fierce artillery battle was raging between

the French batteries in the town and its outskirts and the German batteries outside the town. On September 19, 7 a. m., when troops were reported as massing near the cathedral, its immediate surroundings were also bombarded by the entire artillery. The bombardment was done in a most circumspect manner, with the aid of a map of the town, of which each battery leader had a copy. Between 10 and 11 a. m., the leader of the mortar battery of foot artillery, regiment No. —, ascertained through the periscope a signal post on one of the cathedral towers, and also observed that flag signals were given from that station. Since aviators made the same observation, the battery leader reported to the divisional commander, Lieutenant-General —, who himself verified the presence of the observation post through the periscope. It was impossible to dislodge the post with shrapnel. Hence the General Command was asked whether, under these circumstances, observance of the order to spare the cathedral was to be continued. The General Command replied that if the existence of a hostile observation station on the cathedral was established beyond all doubt, a mortar shot might be fired at the tower. At 12:15 p. m., Captain —, an officer of the General Staff, handed to the leader of the battery an order from the General Command to bombard the cathedral, provided the above-mentioned condition was fulfilled. After the captain, too, had satisfied himself through the periscope as to the correctness of the observation reported, at 12:20 a shot was fired at the cathedral, which struck the tower at the spot where the signalling scout stood. The captain watched the effect of the shot, and as the scout was no longer to be seen, the firing at the cathedral was not resumed.

About 5 p. m. the watchmen of the battery perceived that the cathedral was on fire. It seems that the houses adjoining the cathedral were burning, and that the scaffolding which had been erected around the cathedral for repairs caught fire, which spread to the cathedral itself. The first lasted two days. It was then ascertained that it had destroyed the woodwork of the cathedral roofing. Further damage, apart from the effect of the shot fired at the tower, could not be ascertained. The flag with the red cross was still waving from the tower.

That was the only bombardment which was aimed at the cathedral itself.

Some days later, on September 22, or 23, aviators again

located hostile batteries behind the cathedral to its right. With the aid of a town map, the location of those batteries was once more taken under fire. One of the shots struck the destroyed woodwork of the cathedral roofing; this happened neither with intention nor was it, as the battery officer subsequently ascertained, due to miscalculation of the gunners. If the cathedral was otherwise damaged, that happened through stray shots, which are easily explained by the immediate proximity of the cathedral to the points aimed at.

Bombardment of the city of Rheims has occurred on several other occasions, the reason in every case being that, as has been ascertained beyond any doubt, the town and the district belonging to it were used for all kinds of military purposes. Apart from the almost daily artillery fire against the batteries located within the town, the more important bombardments took place in consequence of specific orders clearly indicating the various sections which were to be taken under fire. An express order to the General Command directed the cathedral and the complex of monasteries and hospitals in the southeast of the town to be spared. That order was observed whenever the town was bombarded. Each time, only the enemy's positions inside the town and on its outskirts as well as railroad stations and tracks or important road junctions, were bombarded. Firing at the cathedral again was expressly made conditional on use being made of the edifice for military purposes.

It is an undeniable fact that the French army command has drawn the fortified city of Rheims within the French line of defense. It is proved that French artillery was not only stationed in the immediate surroundings of Rheims, but also within the city boundaries in open squares, and even in the closest neighborhood of the cathedral. Troops were quartered all over the town. Hence it was a military necessity to bombard it. The original intention of sparing the cathedral entirely could not be adhered to because the French command compelled the Germans to bombard it, by placing heavy guns near the edifice, and by using one of the towers for observation.

If the bombardment caused considerable damage the French themselves are to be blamed. More particularly the deplorable loss of sculptural work on the main façade and the consequences of the fire inside the cathedral are not due directly

to the bombardment, but to the fire of the scaffolding which had been erected for renovating purposes. On September 19, that scaffolding was burning for hours, the French not making the slightest attempt to remove the burning beams, and thus to destroy this dangerous fire center. Furthermore, it was an almost incomprehensible negligence not to take in good time effectual measures for the protection of the precious treasures of art. There would have been ample time to do so since the evacuation of the town. According to Swiss newspaper reports, the *Cri de Paris* rightly and most severely censured the municipal administration of Rheims for that incredible carelessness. Thus the French people alone are to be blamed for the deplorable destruction.

It is perfectly evident to every impartial thinker that the Germans, in dealing with a historic piece of architecture, have not offended against international law, and that the bombardment of town and cathedral was owing to an imperative military necessity. But on that very occasion, the French made themselves guilty of an offense against international law and against the dictates of humanity, so outrageous that it would have been better for them not to call the world's attention to those very occurrences which are indeed a brand and stigma, though not on the German, but on the French shield of honor.

Nurse Alwine Ehlert of Berlin, Staff-Surgeon Dr. Pflugmacher of Potsdam and Johannes Pruellage, vicar of Stadtlohn in Westphalia, have given testimony that on September 17, 1914, numerous wounded, and be it understood, only German wounded, were brought to the cathedral from hospitals, amongst others from Mumm's champagne factory, which had been fitted up as a hospital. The purpose is unmistakable: quartering the wounded in the cathedral would justify hoisting the Red Cross flag on it. Under the protection of that emblem, which all nations have hitherto held sacrosanct, the scouting station was to guide the deadly fire of the French artillery. It was a diabolical plan, which in its infamy and shame was only surpassed by the manner in which it was carried out. When the stay in the smoke-filled cathedral became unbearable, part of the inmates succeeded in reaching the courtyard of the cathedral, and in finding refuge in the buildings there. But when those buildings, too, were in danger of fire, the refugees tried to get out into the open. The square in front of the



cathedral was empty, but the streets leading to the square were crowded, the people being held back by cordons of military posts. When the wounded stepped out into the square with raised hands, the rabble began yelling like mad, broke through the line of posts, and made the soldiers fire at the Germans. The shots fired by the posts drove the unfortunate men back into the cathedral yard. The posts then encircled the yard, so that there was no longer any chance of escaping. In the buildings which the fire had not yet seized those who were locked in in vain sought protection, in corners, under tables and behind furniture, against the smoke and the attacks of the threatening mob and military. French soldiers cowardly murdered them, having no mercy on their piteous condition. Only a small part of them remained unhurt. Later on, they were led away, the furious mob and escort hurling vile insults and blows at them.

The fire spread in the cathedral, and the men who were left in it were in ever greater danger, yet with threats they were prevented from leaving the building. Unless a priest had shown sufficient humane and honorable feeling to help and shield them in time they would surely have died a miserable death. Thus at least part of them were saved, whilst a number of those who were badly wounded and could not move without help, were burned to death. With cynical frankness, E. Ashmead Bartlett, on October 31, 1914, wrote in the *National Weekly*, of which he is a reporter:

"Of the unique carved figures on the bases of the two towers inside Notre Dame, which no other cathedral possesses, little remains except a mass of charred and blackened stone on the floor and the mummified outlines of some of the upper figures, which looked, when I was there, exactly like the bodies of the burnt German wounded lying a few yards away."

## BELGIUM

### MERCIER'S PASTORAL LETTER<sup>1</sup>

My Very Dear Brethren: I cannot tell you how instant and how present thought of you has been to me throughout the months of suffering and of mourning through which we have passed. I had to leave you abruptly on the 20th of August in order to fulfill my last duty toward the beloved and venerated Pope whom we have lost, and in order to discharge an obligation of the conscience from which I could not dispense myself, in the election of the successor of Pius X., the Pontiff who now directs the Church under the title, full of promise and of hope, of Benedict XV.

It was in Rome itself that I received the tidings—stroke after stroke—of the partial destruction of the Cathedral Church of Louvain, next of the burning of the library and of the scientific installations of our great university and of the devastation of the city, and next of the wholesale shooting of citizens, and tortures inflicted upon women and children and upon unarmed and undefended men.

And, while I was still under the shock of these calamities, the telegraph brought us news of the bombardment of our beautiful metropolitan church, of the Church of Notre Dame au delà la Dyle, of the episcopal palace, and of a great part of our dear city of Malines.

Afar from my diocese, without means of communication with you, I was compelled to lock my grief within my own afflicted heart and to carry it, with the thought of you, which never left me, to the foot of the crucifix.

I craved courage and light, and sought them in such thoughts as these: A disaster has visited the world, and our beloved little Belgium, a nation so faithful in the great mass of her population to God, so upright in her patriotism, so noble in her king and government, is the first sufferer. She bleeds; her

<sup>1</sup> The Christmas pastoral letter of Cardinal D. J. Mercier, Archbishop of Malines, is one of the most widely circulated documents of the war. It is here reproduced in full.

sons are stricken down within her fortresses and upon her fields, in defense of her rights and of her territory.

Soon there will not be one Belgian family not in mourning. Why all this sorrow, my God? Lord, Lord, hast Thou forsaken us? Then I looked upon the crucifix. I looked upon Jesus, most gentle and humble Lamb of God, crushed, clothed in His blood as in a garment, and I thought I heard from His own mouth the words which the Psalmist uttered in His name: "O God, my God, look upon me; why hast Thou forsaken me? O my God, I shall cry, and Thou wilt not hear."

And forthwith the murmur died upon my lips, and I remembered what our Divine Saviour said in His gospel: "The disciple is not above the master, nor the servant above his lord." The Christian is the servant of a God who became man in order to suffer and to die.

To rebel against pain, to revolt against providence because it permits grief and bereavement, is to forget whence we came, the school in which we have been taught, the example that each of us carries graven in the name of a Christian, which each of us honors at his hearth, contemplates at the altar of his prayers, and of which he desires that his tomb, the place of his last sleep, shall bear the sign.

My dearest brethren, we shall return by and by to the providential law of suffering, but you will agree that since it has pleased a God-made man who was holy, innocent, without stain, to suffer and to die for us who are sinners, who are guilty, who are perhaps criminals, it ill becomes us to complain whatever we may be called upon to endure. The truth is that no disaster on earth, striking creatures only, is comparable with that which our sins provoked and whereof God Himself chose to be the blameless victim.

Having recalled to mind this fundamental truth, I find it easier to summon you to face what has befallen us and to speak to you simply and directly of what is your duty and of what may be your hope. That duty I shall express in two words—patriotism and endurance.

My dearest brethren, I desire to utter in your name and my own the gratitude of those whose age, vocation, and social conditions cause them to benefit by the heroism of others without bearing in it any active part.

When, immediately on my return from Rome, I went to

Havre to greet our Belgian, French, and English wounded; when, later, at Malines, at Louvain, at Antwerp, it was given to me to take the hands of those brave men who carried a bullet in their flesh, a wound on their forehead, because they had marched to the attack of the enemy or borne the shock of his onslaught, it was a word of gratitude to them that rose to my lips. "O valiant friends," I said, "it was for us, it was for each one of us, it was for me, that you risked your lives and are now in pain. I am moved to tell you of my respect, of my thankfulness, to assure you that the whole nation knows how much she is in debt to you."

For in truth our soldiers are our saviors.

A first time, at Liège, they saved France; a second time, in Flanders, they arrested the advance of the enemy upon Calais. France and England know it; and Belgium stands before them both, and before the entire world, as a nation of heroes.

Never before in my whole life did I feel so proud to be a Belgian as when, on the platforms of French stations, and halting a while in Paris, and visiting London, I was witness of the enthusiastic admiration our allies feel for the heroism of our army. Our king is, in the esteem of all, at the very summit of the moral scale. He is doubtless the only man who does not recognize that fact, as simple as the simplest of his soldiers, he stands in the trenches and puts new courage, by the serenity of his face, into the hearts of those of whom he requires that they shall not doubt of their country. The foremost duty of every Belgian citizen at this hour is gratitude to the army.

If any man had rescued you from shipwreck or from a fire, you would assuredly hold yourselves bound to him by a debt of everlasting thankfulness. But it is not one man, it is 250,000 men who fought, who suffered, who fell for you so that you might be free, so that Belgium might keep her independence, her dynasty, her patriotic unity; so that after the vicissitudes of battle she might rise nobler, purer, more erect, and more glorious than before.

Pray daily, my brethren, for these 250,000 and for their leaders to victory; pray for our brothers in arms; pray for the fallen; pray for those who are still engaged; pray for the recruits who are making ready for the fight to come.

In your name I send them the greeting of our fraternal sympathy and our assurance that not only do we pray for the success of their arms and for the eternal welfare of their souls, but that we also accept for their sake all the distress, whether physical or moral, that falls to our own share in the oppression that hourly besets us, and all that the future may have in store for us, in humiliation for a time, in anxiety, and in sorrow. In the day of final victory we shall all be in honor; it is just that today we shall all be in grief.

To judge by certain rumors that have reached me, I gather that from districts that have had least to suffer some bitter words have arisen toward our God, words which, if spoken with cold calculation, would not be far from blasphemous.

Oh, all too easily do I understand how natural instinct rebels against the evils that have fallen upon Catholic Belgium. The spontaneous thought of mankind is ever that virtue should have its instantaneous crown and injustice its immediate retribution.

But the ways of God are not our ways, the Scripture tells us. Providence gives free way, for a time measured by Divine wisdom, to human passions and the conflict of desires. God, being eternal, is patient. The last word is the word of mercy, and it belongs to those who believe in love. "Why art thou sad, O my soul? and why dost thou disquiet me? *Quare tristis es anima, et quare conturbas me?*" Hope in God. Bless Him always. Is He not thy Saviour and thy God? *Spera in Deo quoniam adhuc confitebor illi, salutare vultus mei et Deus meus.*

When holy Job, whom God presented as an example of constancy to the generations to come, had been stricken, blow upon blow, by Satan, with the loss of his children, of his goods, of his health, his enemies approached him with incitations to rebellion; his wife urged upon him a blasphemy and a curse. "Dost thou still continue in thy simplicity? Curse God, and die." But the man of God was unshaken in his confidence. "And he said to her: Thou hast spoken like one of the foolish women: if we have received good things at the hand of God, why should we not receive evil? *Dominus dedit, Dominus abstulit; sicut Domino placuit ita factum est. Sit nomen Domini benedictum.*" And experience proved that saintly one

to be right. It pleased the Lord to recompense, even here below, His faithful servant. "The Lord gave Job twice as much as he had before. And for his sake God pardoned his friends."

Better than any other man, perhaps, do I know what our unhappy country has undergone. Nor will any Belgian, I trust, doubt of what I suffer in my soul, as a citizen and as a bishop, in sympathy with all this sorrow. These last four months have seemed to me age long. By thousands have our brave ones been mowed down. Wives, mothers are weeping for those they shall never see again; hearths are desolate; dire poverty spreads, anguish increases.

At Malines, at Antwerp the people of two great cities have been given over, the one for six hours, the other for thirty-four hours, to a continuous bombardment, to the throes of death.

I have traversed the greater part of the districts most terribly devastated in my diocese, and the ruins I beheld, and the ashes, were more dreadful than I, prepared by the saddest of forebodings, could have imagined.

Other parts of my diocese, which I have not yet had time to visit, have in like manner been laid waste. Churches, schools, asylums, hospitals, convents in great numbers are in ruins. Entire villages have all but disappeared. At Werchter-Wackerzeel, for instance, out of 380 homes 130 remain. At Tremeloo two-thirds of the village is overthrown. At Bueken, out of 100 houses 20 are standing. At Schaffen, 189 houses out of 200 are destroyed; 11 still stand. At Louvain the third part of the buildings are down; 1,074 dwellings have disappeared. On the town land and in the suburbs 1,823 houses have been burned.

In this dear city of Louvain, perpetually in my thoughts, the magnificent church of St. Peter will never recover its former splendor. The ancient college of St. Ives, the art schools, the consular and commercial schools of the university, the old markets, our rich library with its collections, its unique and unpublished manuscripts, its archives, its gallery of great portraits of illustrious rectors, chancellors, professors, dating from the time of its foundation, which preserved for masters and students alike a noble tradition, and were an incitement in their studies, all this accumulation of intellectual, of historic,

and of artistic riches, the fruit of the labors of five centuries—all is in the dust.

Many a parish lost its pastor. There is now sounding in my ears the sorrowful voice of an old man, of whom I asked whether he had had mass on Sunday in his battered church. "It is two months," he said, "since we had a church." The parish priest and the curate had been interned in a concentration camp.

Thousands of Belgian citizens have in like manner been deported to the prisons of Germany, to Munsterlagen, to Celle, to Magdeburg. At Munsterlagen alone, 3,100 civil prisoners were numbered. History will tell of the physical and moral torments of their long martyrdom.

Hundreds of innocent men were shot. I possess no complete necrology; but I know that there were ninety-one shot at Aerschot and that there, under pain of death, their fellow-citizens were compelled to dig their graves. In the Louvain group of communes 176 persons, men and women, old men and sucklings, rich and poor, in health and sickness, were shot or burned.

In my diocese alone I know that thirteen priests or religious were put to death.

One of these, the parish priest of Gelrode, suffered, I believe, a veritable martyrdom. I made a pilgrimage to his grave, and amid the little flock which so lately he had been feeding with the zeal of an apostle, there did I pray to him that from the height of heaven he would guard his parish, his diocese, his country.

We can neither number our dead nor compute the measure of our ruins. And what would it be if we turned our sad steps toward Liège, Namur, Audenne, Dinant, Tamines, Charleroi, and elsewhere? And there, where lives were not taken and there, where the stones of buildings were not thrown down, what anguish unrevealed! Families hitherto living at ease now in bitter want; all commerce at an end, all careers ruined, industry at a standstill, thousands upon thousands of workingmen without employment, working women, shopgirls, humble servant girls without the means of earning their bread, and poor souls forlorn on the bed of sickness and fever, crying, "O Lord, how long, how long?"

There is nothing to reply. The reply remains the secret of God.

Yes, dearest brethren, it is the secret of God. He is the Master of events and the Sovereign Director of the human multitude. *Domini est terra et plenitudo ejus; orbis terrarum et universi qui habitant in eo.* The first relation between the creature and his Creator is that of absolute dependence. The very being of the creature is dependent; dependent are his nature, his faculties, his acts, his works.

At every passing moment that dependence is renewed, is incessantly reasserted, inasmuch as, without the will of the Almighty, existence of the first single instant would vanish before the next. Adoration, which is the recognition of the sovereignty of God, is not, therefore, a fugitive act; it is the permanent state of a being conscious of his own origin. On every page of the Scriptures Jehovah affirms His sovereign dominion.

The whole economy of the old law, the whole history of the chosen people, have the same end—to maintain Jehovah upon His throne and to cast idols down. "I am the first and the last. I am the Lord, and there is none else; there is no God beside Me. I form the light and create darkness, I make peace and create evil. Woe to him that gainsayeth his maker, a sherd of the earthen pots. Shall the clay say to him that fashioneth it, What art thou making, and thy work is without hands? Tell ye, and come, and consult together. A just God and a Saviour, there is none beside Me."

Ah, did the proud reason of mankind dream that it could dismiss our God? Did it smile in irony when through Christ and through His church He pronounced the solemn words of expiation and of repentance? Vain of fugitive successes, O light-minded man, full of pleasure and of wealth, hast thou imagined that thou couldst suffice even to thyself?

Then was God set aside in oblivion, then was He misunderstood, then was He blasphemed, with acclamation, and by those whose authority, whose influence, whose power had charged them with the duty of causing His great laws and His great order to be revered and obeyed. Anarchy then spread among the lower ranks of mankind, and many sincere consciences were troubled by the evil example. How long, O Lord, they



wondered, how long wilt Thou suffer the pride of this iniquity? Or wilt Thou finally justify the impious opinion that Thou carest no more for the work of Thy hands? A shock from a thunderbolt, and behold, all human foresight is set at naught! Europe trembles upon the brink of destruction!

The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.

Many are the thoughts that throng the breast of man today, and the chief of them all is this:

God reveals Himself as the Master. The nations that made the attack, and the nations that are warring in self-defense, alike confess themselves to be in the hand of Him without Whom nothing is made, nothing is done.

Men long unaccustomed to prayer are turning again to God. Within the army, within the civil world, in public, and within the individual conscience, there is prayer. Nor is that prayer today a word learned by rote, uttered lightly by the lip; it surges from the troubled heart, it takes the form, at the feet of God, of the very sacrifice of life. The being of man is a whole offering to God. This is worship, this is the fulfillment of the primal moral and religious law—the Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and Him only shalt thou serve.

And even those who murmur, and whose courage is not sufficient for submission to the hand that smites us and saves us, even these implicitly acknowledge God to be the Master, for if they blaspheme Him, they blaspheme Him for His delay in closing with their desires.

But as for us, my brethren, we will adore Him in the integrity of our souls. Not yet do we see in all its magnificence the revelation of His wisdom, but our faith trusts Him with it all. Before His justice we are humble, and in His mercy hopeful. With holy Tobias we know that because we have sinned He has chastised us, but because He is merciful He will save us.

It would perhaps be truer to dwell upon our guilt now, when we are paying so well and so nobly what we owe. But shall we not confess that we have indeed something to expiate? He who has received much, from him shall much be required. Now dare we say that the moral and religious standard of our people has risen as its economic prosperity has risen? The observance of Sunday rest, the Sunday mass, the reverence for

marriage, the restraints of modesty—what had you made of these?

What, even within Christian families, had become of the simplicity practiced by our fathers, what of the spirit of penance, what of respect for authority? And we, too, we priests, we religious, I, the bishop, we whose great mission it is to present in our lives, yet more than in our speech, the Gospel of Christ, have we earned the right to speak to our people the word spoken by the apostle to the nations, "Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ"?

We labor indeed, we pray indeed, but it is all too little. We should be, by the very duty of our state, the public expiators for the sins of the world. But which was the thing dominant in our lives—expiation or our comfort and well-being as citizens? Alas! we have all had times in which we, too, fell under God's reproach to His people after the escape from Egypt: "The beloved grew fat and kicked; they have provoked me with that which was no god, and I will provoke them with that which is no people." Nevertheless, He will save us, for He wills not that our adversaries should boast that they, and not the Eternal, did these things. "See ye that I alone am, and there is no other God beside me. I will kill and I will make to live. I will strike and I will heal."

God will save Belgium, my brethren; you cannot doubt it.

Nay, rather, He is saving her.

Across the smoke of conflagration, across the stream of blood, have you not glimpses, do you not perceive signs of His love for us? Is there a patriot among us who does not know that Belgium has grown great? Nay, which of us would have the heart to cancel this last page of our national history? Which of us does not exult in the brightness of the glory of this shattered nation? When in her throes she brings forth heroes, our mother country gives her own energy to the blood of those sons of hers. Let us acknowledge that we needed a lesson in patriotism. There were Belgians, and many such, who wasted their time and their talents in futile quarrels of class with class, of race with race, of passion with personal passion.

Yet when, on August 2, a mighty foreign power, confident in its own strength and defiant of the faith of treaties,

dared to threaten us in our independence, then did all Belgians, without difference of party, or of condition, or of origin, rise up as one man, close ranged about their own king and their own government, and cry to the invader: "Thou shalt not go through!"

At once, instantly, we were conscious of our own patriotism. For down within us all is something deeper than personal interests, than personal kinships, than party feeling, and this is the need and the will to devote ourselves to that more general interest which Rome termed the public thing, *Res publica*. And this profound will within us is patriotism.

Our country is not a mere concourse of persons or of families inhabiting the same soil, having among themselves relations more or less intimate, of business, of neighborhood, of a community of memories happy or unhappy.

Not so; it is an association of living souls subject to a social organization, to be defended and safeguarded at all costs even the cost of blood, under the leadership of those presiding over its fortunes. And it is because of this general spirit that the people of a country live a common life in the present, through the past, through the aspirations, the hopes, the confidence in a life to come, which they share together.

Patriotism, an internal principle of order and of unity, an organic bond of the members of a nation, was placed by the finest thinkers of Greece and Rome at the head of the natural virtues. Aristotle, the prince of the philosophers of antiquity, held disinterested service of the city—that is, the state—to be the very ideal of human duty.

And the religion of Christ makes of patriotism a positive law; there is no perfect Christian who is not also a perfect patriot. For our religion exalts the antique ideal, showing it to be realizable only in the absolute. Whence, in truth, comes this universal, this irresistible impulse which carries at once the will of the whole nation in one single effort of cohesion and of insistence in face of the hostile menace against her unity and her freedom?

Whence comes it that in an hour all interests were merged in the interest of all, and that all lives were together offered in willing immolation? Not that the state is worth more, essentially, than the individual or the family, seeing that the good of the family and of the individual is the cause and reason

of the organization of the state. Not that our country is a Moloch on whose altar lives may lawfully be sacrificed. The rigidity of antique morals and the despotism of the Caesars suggested the false principle—and modern militarism tends to revive it—that the state is omnipotent, and that the discretionary power of the state is the rule of right. Not so, replies Christian theology; right is peace—that is, the interior order of a nation, founded upon justice. And justice itself is absolute only because it formulates the essential relation of man with God and of man with man.

Moreover, war for the sake of war is a crime. War is justifiable only if it is the necessary means for securing peace. St. Augustine has said: "Peace must not be a preparation for war. And war is not to be made except for the attainment of peace." In the light of this teaching, which is repeated by St. Thomas Aquinas, patriotism is seen in its religious character.

Family interests, class interests, party interests, and the material good of the individual take their place, in the scale of values, below the ideal of patriotism, for that ideal is right, which is absolute. Furthermore, that ideal is the public recognition of right in national matters and of national honor. Now, there is no absolute except God. God alone, by His sanctity and His sovereignty, dominates all human interests and human wills. And to affirm the absolute necessity of the subordination of all things to right, to justice, and to truth, is implicitly to affirm God.

When, therefore, humble soldiers whose heroism we praise answer us with characteristic simplicity, "We only did our duty," or "We were bound in honor," they express the religious character of their patriotism. Which of us does not feel that patriotism is a sacred thing, and that a violation of national dignity is in a manner a profanation and a sacrilege?

I was asked lately by a staff officer whether a soldier falling in a righteous cause—and our cause is such, to demonstration—is not veritably a martyr. Well, he is not a martyr in the rigorous theological meaning of the word, inasmuch as he dies in arms, whereas the martyr delivers himself, undefended and unarmed, into the hands of the executioner; but if I am asked what I think of the eternal salvation of a brave man who has

consciously given his life in defense of his country's honor and in vindication of violated justice, I shall not hesitate to reply that, without any doubt whatever, Christ crowns his military valor, and that death, accepted in this Christian spirit, assures the safety of that man's soul. "Greater love than this no man hath," said our Saviour, "that a man lay down his life for his friends."

And the soldier who dies to save his brothers and to defend the hearths and altars of his country reaches this highest of all degrees of charity. He may not have made a close analysis of the value of his sacrifice, but must we suppose that God requires of the plain soldier in the excitement of battle the methodical precision of the moralist or the theologian? Can we who revere his heroism doubt that his God welcomes him with love?

Christian mothers, be proud of your sons. Of all griefs, of all our human sorrows, your is perhaps the most worthy of veneration. I think I behold you in your affliction, but erect, standing at the side of the Mother of Sorrows, at the foot of the Cross. Suffer us to offer you not only our condolence, but our congratulation. Not all our heroes obtain military honors, but for all we expect the immortal crown of the elect. For this is the virtue of a single act of perfect charity—it cancels a whole lifetime of sins. It transforms a sinful man into a saint.

Assuredly a great and a Christian comfort is the thought that not only among our own men, but in any belligerent army whatsoever, all who in good faith submit to the discipline of their leaders in the service of a cause they believe to be righteous are sharers in the eternal reward of the soldier's sacrifice. And how many may there not be among these young men of twenty who, had they survived, might possibly not have had the resolution to live altogether well, and yet in the impulse of patriotism had the resolution to die so well?

Is it not true, my brethren, that God has the supreme art of mingling His mercy with His wisdom and His justice? And shall we not acknowledge that if war is a scourge for this earthly life of ours, a scourge whereof we cannot easily estimate the destructive force and the extent, it is also for multitudes of souls an expiation, a purification, a force to lift them to the pure love of their country and to perfect Christian unselfishness?

We may now say, my brethren, without unworthy pride, that our little Belgium has taken a foremost place in the esteem of nations. I am aware that certain onlookers, notably in Italy and in Holland, have asked how it could be necessary to expose this country to so immense a loss of wealth and of life, and whether a verbal manifesto against hostile aggression, or a single cannon shot on the frontier, would not have served the purpose of protest. But assuredly all men of good feeling will be with us in our rejection of these paltry counsels. Mere utilitarianism is no sufficient rule of Christian citizenship.

On the 19th of April, 1839, a treaty was signed in London by King Leopold, in the name of Belgium, on the one part, and by the Emperor of Austria, the King of France, the Queen of England, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Russia, on the other; and its seventh article decreed that Belgium should form a separate and perpetually neutral state, and should be held to the observance of this neutrality in regard to all other states. The co-signatories promised, for themselves and their successors, upon their oath, to fulfill and to observe that treaty in every point and every article without contravention or tolerance of contravention. Belgium was thus bound in honor to defend her own independence. She kept her oath. The other powers were bound to respect and to protect her neutrality. Germany violated her oath; England kept hers.

These are the facts.

The laws of conscience are sovereign laws. We should have acted unworthily had we evaded our obligation by a mere feint of resistance. And now we would not rescind our first resolution; we exult in it. Being called upon to write a most solemn page in the history of our country, we resolved that it should be also a sincere, also a glorious page. And as long as we are required to give proof of endurance, so long we shall endure.

All classes of our citizens have devoted their sons to the cause of their country, but the poorer part of the population have set the noblest example, for they have suffered also privation, cold, and famine. If I may judge of the general feeling from what I have witnessed in the humbler quarters of Malines and in the most cruelly afflicted districts of my diocese, the people are energetic in their endurance. They look to be righted; they will not hear of surrender.

Affliction is, in the hand of Divine Omnipotence a two-edged sword. It wounds the rebellious, it sanctifies him who is willing to endure.

God proveth us, as St. James has told us, but He "is not a tempter of evils." All that comes from Him is good, a ray of light, a pledge of love. "But every man is tempted by his own concupiscence. . . . Blessed is he that endureth temptation, for when he hath been proved he shall receive the crown of life, which God hath promised to them that love Him."

Truce, then, my brethren, to all murmurs of complaint. Remember St. Paul's words to the Hebrews, and through them to all of Christ's flock, when, referring to the bloody sacrifice of our Lord upon the cross, he reminded them that they had not yet resisted unto blood. Not only to the Redeemer's example shall you look, but also to that of the 30,000—perhaps 40,000—men who have already shed their life blood for their country.

In comparison with them, what have you endured who are deprived of the daily comforts of your lives, your newspapers, your means of travel, communication with your families? Let the patriotism of our army, the heroism of our king, of our beloved queen in her magnanimity, serve to stimulate us and support us. Let us bemoan ourselves no more. Let us deserve the coming deliverance. Let us hasten it by our virtue even more than by our prayers. Courage, brethren. Suffering passes away; the crown of life for our souls, the crown of glory for our nation, shall not pass!

I do not require of you to renounce any of your national desires. On the contrary, I hold it as part of the obligations of my episcopal office to instruct you, as to your duty in face of the power that has invaded our soil and now occupies the greater part of our country. The authority of that power is no lawful authority. Therefore in soul and conscience you owe it neither respect nor attachment nor obedience.

The sole lawful authority in Belgium is that of our king, of our government, of the elected representatives of the nation. This authority alone has a right to our affection, our submission.

Thus the invader's acts of public administration have in themselves no authority; but legitimate authority has tacitly ratified such of those acts as affect the general interest, and this ratification, and this only, gives them juridic value. Occupied

provinces are not conquered provinces. Belgium is no more a German province than Galicia is a Russian province. Nevertheless, the occupied portion of our country is in a position it is compelled to endure. The greater part of our towns, having surrendered to the enemy on conditions, are bound to observe those conditions. From the outset of military operations the civil authorities of the country urged upon all private persons the necessity of abstention from hostile acts against the enemy's army.

That instruction remains in force. It is our army, and our army solely, in league with the valiant troops of our allies, that has the honor and the duty of national defense. Let us intrust the army with our final deliverance.

Toward the persons of those who are holding dominion among us by military force, and who assuredly cannot but be sensible of the chivalrous energy with which we have defended and are still defending our independence, let us conduct ourselves with all needful forbearance. Some among them have declared themselves willing to mitigate, as far as possible, the severity of our situation and to help us to recover some minimum of regular civic life. Let us observe the rules they have laid upon us so long as those rules do not violate our personal liberty, nor our consciences as Christians, nor our duty to our country. Let us not take bravado for courage, nor tumult for bravery.

You especially, my dearest brethren in the priesthood, be you at once the best examples of patriotism and the best supporters of public order. On the field of battle you have been magnificent. The king and the army admire the intrepidity of our military chaplains in face of death, their charity at the work of the ambulance. Your bishops are proud of you. You have suffered greatly. You have endured much calumny. But be patient; history will do you justice. I today bear my witness for you.

Wherever it has been possible I have questioned our people, our clergy, and particularly a considerable number of priests who had been deported to German prisons, but whom a principle of humanity, to which I gladly render homage, has since set at liberty. Well, I affirm, upon my honor, and I am prepared to assert upon faith of my oath, that until now I have not met a single ecclesiastic, secular or regular, who had once



incited civilians to bear arms against the enemy. All have loyally followed the instructions of their bishops, given in the early days of August, to the effect that they were to use their moral influence over the civil population so that order might be preserved and military regulations observed.

I exhort you to persevere in this ministry of peace, which is for you the sanest form of patriotism; to accept with all your hearts the privations you have to endure; to simplify still further, if it is possible, your way of life. One of you who is reduced by robbery and pillage to a state bordering on total destitution, said to me lately: "I am living now as I wished I had lived always."

Multiply the efforts of your charity, corporal and spiritual. Like the great Apostle, do you endure daily the cares of your church, so that no man shall suffer loss and you not suffer loss, and no man fall and you not burn with zeal for him. Make yourselves the champions of all those virtues enjoined upon you by civic honor as well as by the gospel of Christ.

"Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever modest, whatsoever just, whatsoever holy, whatsoever lovely, whatsoever of good fame, if there be any virtue, if any praise of discipline, think on these things." So may the worthiness of our lives justify us, my most dear colleagues, in repeating the noble claim of St. Paul: "The things which ye have learned and received and heard and seen in me, these do ye, and the God of Peace shall be with you."

Let us continue then, dearest brethren, to pray, to do penance, to attend holy mass, and to receive holy communion for the sacred intention of our dear country. . . . I recommend parish priests to hold a funeral service on behalf of our fallen soldiers on every Saturday.

Money, I know well, is scarce with you all. Nevertheless, if you have little, give of that little for the succor of those among your fellow-countrymen who are without shelter, without fuel, without sufficient bread. I have directed my parish priests to form for this purpose in every parish a relief committee. Do you second them charitably and convey to my hands such alms as you can save from your superfluity, if not from your necessities, so that I may be the distributor to the destitute who are known to me.

Our distress has moved the other nations. England, Ireland,

and Scotland; France, Holland, the United States, Canada, have vied with each other in generosity for our relief. It is a spectacle at once most mournful and most noble. Here again is a revelation of the providential wisdom which draws good from evil. In your name, my brethren, and in my own, I offer to the governments and the nations that have succored us the assurance of our admiration and our gratitude.

With a touching goodness, our holy father Benedict XV. has been the first to incline his heart toward us. When, a few moments after his election, he deigned to take me in his arms, I was bold enough then to ask that the first pontifical benediction he spoke should be given to Belgium, already in deep distress through the war. He eagerly closed with my wish, which I knew would also be yours. Today, with delicate kindness, his holiness has decided to renounce the annual offering of Peter's Pence from Belgium.

In a letter dated on the beautiful festival of the Immaculate Virgin, December 8, he assures us of the part he bears in our sufferings. He prays for us, calls down upon our Belgium the protection of heaven, and exhorts us to hail in the then approaching advent of the Prince of Peace the dawn of better days.

One last word, my dearest brethren: At the outset of these troubles I said to you that in the day of the liberation of our territory we should give to the Sacred Heart and to the Blessed Virgin a public testimony of our gratitude. Since that date I have been able to consult my colleagues in the episcopate, and, in agreement with them, I now asks you to make, as soon as possible, a fresh effort to hasten the construction of the national basilica, promised by Belgium in honor of the Sacred Heart.

As soon as the sun of peace shall shine upon our country we shall redress our ruins, we shall restore shelter to those who have none, we shall rebuild our churches, we shall reconstitute our libraries, and we shall hope to crown this work of reconciliation by raising, upon the heights of the capital of Belgium, free and Catholic, that national basilica of the Sacred Heart. Furthermore, every year we shall make it our duty to celebrate solemnly, on the Friday following Corpus Christi, the festival of the Sacred Heart.

OUT OF THE DEEP<sup>1</sup>

If ever, then, a community has shown itself worthy in loftiness and independence of life to make a part of European civilization, that community is the Belgian nation. She possessed, if I may use the metaphor, a more complete armory of weapons, material, intellectual and moral, than any other nation of her size. She had won the respect and admiration, not only of the smaller neutral states, but of the great sovereign nations of the world. And those sovereign nations had gone further; they had sworn together to protect her. She had shown herself worthy of their protection, and never more so than on the day when one of her pledged protectors seized her treacherously by the throat and sought to strangle her.

There lies the deepest shame of Germany. She chose that little nation most deserving of life and growth to suffer for the German opinion of the labor and existence of the non-German world. More than that, though infinitely stronger than Belgium—stronger by how many million men?—Germany did not even attack her face to face. She schemed and lied and even flattered. To within two hours of a cruel ultimatum she was breathing forth the purity of her intentions. She could have dared to offer open battle, but she preferred a treacherous ambushade. And by this deed she has created against herself in the hearts of Belgians a hatred so passionate and so universal, that it will go down from generation to generation to a depth that no man can foretell. So far as any human sentiment can be, this hatred will be eternal. It will become a part of the education of our primary schools, it will be a tradition in our families, an instinct in our homes. It will be for us a hallowed reserve of rage and vigor. We shall feel, all of us, as did a peasant with whom I had a brief but wonderful conversation, not long ago, in a coast-village between Coxyde and Dunkirk. He said: "My wish is that when I am dying I may use the last reserve of my strength, which I shall have stored up inside me, to utter one more curse, one more word of hatred against the Germans." I remarked that such feelings were far from Christian. He replied: "So much the worse!"

<sup>1</sup> From "Belgium's Agony," by Emile Verhaeren. Copyright, 1915, by Houghton Mifflin Company, and reprinted here by permission of the publishers.

THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM<sup>1</sup>

There remains only one grave point: the neutrality of Belgium. No doubt Germany had agreed to treat Belgium as a neutral state. But what are the facts? On the day the war between France and Germany seemed unavoidable, it was reported that fifty automobiles full of French officers rushed over the frontier to Liège and were welcomed in the fortress, which had partly been built by French engineers. Immediately afterward French aviators passed through Belgium on their way to the Rhine, where they began their bomb-throwing at the Coblenz bridges. Everything suggested that Germany's long-standing fear was justified, that French-speaking Belgium was in a secret understanding with France, that it would allow the French army liberties which would at once expose Germany's most defenseless portion to attack. Germany had no right to wait until it might be too late. It had to force its troops over Belgian territory before the French could undertake in great style what they had started to do. Yet Germany did not come to Belgium as an enemy; it promised to repay any damage and not only guaranteed the integrity of the land but was most willing to make every possible restitution.

Belgium chose to put itself on the side of France, with which its sympathies have always connected it. It was an hour in which the world was sure of French victory, as Russia was battering at the gates of Germany from the other side and England was to give its mighty aid, too. Belgium thus became one of the allies, enthusiastically willing to help in this world rush against Germany. Did this mean that Germany attacked a land which was unprotected and which had relied for its safety on its neutrality papers? Certainly not. The story of the fights about Liège tells of the gigantic fortifications with which Belgium had prepared itself for just this German attack. Belgium was one great fortified camp, and every stone in the walls must have been carried to them with the understanding that the course of historic events in the next war would force France and Germany to fight on Belgian battlegrounds, and that Belgium ought to take sides

<sup>1</sup> From "The War and America," by Hugo Münsterberg. Copyright, 1914, by D. Appleton & Co., and reprinted here by permission of the author.

with the probable winner. Belgians and Germans did not meet for the first time. A great war reporter from the time when the reporting was still wireless and the warring still fireless, Julius Caesar, tells that the Belgians are very courageous and that they live next to the Germans, who are settled in the Rhine region, and that they live in constant warfare with them.

Belgium knew exactly that these neutrality treaties were not treaties comparable to the contracts of private persons who are bound by the laws of the land and by the laws of honesty to fulfill them under every possible condition. It is nothing but sheer hypocrisy if the enemies of Germany, including the Anglophile portion of the American press, behave as if this had not been common knowledge the world over. This kind of treaties has been violated in the last fifty years almost as often as any conflicts have happened. Only this morning the papers report China's official protest against the breach of the neutrality treaty by Japan, which has landed troops to fight against Kiou Chou in plain defiance of the agreement. There was no life need for Japan to break the treaty, as there was for Germany, but of course Japan is now England's friend and its breach of neutrality is therefore perfectly agreeable and welcome on Broadway.

Did not America break its solemn treaty with Colombia when a vital interest was involved? Is not the majority of Congress even inclined to apologize for the wrong which was done to Colombia in the Panama revolution? Yet could Roosevelt really have acted otherwise? Was it not true, moral statesmanship to put America's canal work above a treaty which, like all such international agreements, was made with the reservation that it holds only if it does not come into conflict with the life and honor of the people involved. Gladstone, to whom the present English statesmen refer, has clearly said that this is also England's view concerning the treaties with Belgium. It was England's view until it became convenient to change it for the purpose of denouncing Germany.

America's most popular statesman has said a hundred times that such international arbitration treaties are not worth the paper on which they are written and that are too often even dangerous, because they give an illusory feeling of safety. They seem to abolish the fundamental law of five thousand

years of history that ultimately the life needs of a healthy nation are decisive. To be sure, Belgium knew better and made its war plans. It knew that such agreements are at present not more than a matter of international etiquette. Certainly life goes on more smoothly and more pleasantly, if we stick to the rules of etiquette and to the prescriptions of nice manners. But everybody knows that etiquette stops when the house is on fire and that good manners must be forgotten even by the best mannered when life and death are involved. Germany did what any other state would have done, did it with regret and with the best will not to bring any suffering to Belgium, if Belgium only would not join the allies. But Germany could do what it did with a clean conscience; it did not violate the higher laws of honor.

## THE BALKANS

### THE BALKAN STATES AND THE WAR<sup>1</sup>

The European conflict began in the Balkans; it will probably end in the Balkans, for the closing period of this gigantic struggle will inevitably be protracted by fresh war in those regions, unless the present artificial and unnatural distribution of territories in the peninsula can be replaced by a more reasonable and equitable arrangement in conformity with the principle of nationalities. Continued misery and unrest in the Balkans, the direct result of alien and unsympathetic rule, after threatening the peace of Europe for more than a generation has at last brought about the great conflagration.

The ultimate cause of all the trouble, the *fons et origo mali*, will be found in the Treaty of Berlin, the proximate cause in the Treaty of Bucharest. At the close of the war of 1877-1878 Turkish authority in Europe had been practically extinguished. An effort to effect its partial restoration was made by Lord Beaconsfield, aided by Count Andrassy, who had already secured Bosnia and Herzegovina as Austria's share in the sick man's inheritance, and by Prince Bismarck, who declared that the Balkan Christians were not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier. The denial of Crete to Greece was a crime which entailed a heavy retribution. The appropriation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria was a gross wrong to Serbia, which had twice taken up arms on Russia's side. But the treatment accorded to newly-born Bulgaria was the greatest crime of all. Scarcely two million Bulgarians received political independence under Turkish suzerainty; some 800,000 were given autonomy under a Turkish governor; while more than a million unhappy beings were handed back to Turkish tyranny with nothing to console them but the promise of reforms. The "big Bulgaria" of the Treaty of San Stefano had been correctly delimited—except in some

<sup>1</sup> Reprinted from the *Quarterly Review*, April, 1915, p. 424-38.

small particulars—on ethnographic lines and represented a united nation; the little Bulgaria which issued from the dissecting room at Berlin was a maimed and mutilated remnant. The darkness of night fell once more over Macedonia, which for a few brief months had witnessed the dawn of liberty.

The seeds of future trouble were thus sown, and the doleful harvest was reaped during the next three decades. For several years the Macedonian Bulgars patiently awaited the promised reforms; it was not till 1893 that, despairing of aid from the Powers, they began to form revolutionary associations. For ten years the struggle against Turkish oppression went on; in 1903 it culminated in a general insurrection of the Bulgarian population in the Monastir vilayet. A merciless repression followed; the powers were at last compelled to intervene; and Austria-Hungary and Russia, the "two most interested powers," were allowed by Europe to try their hand at reforms. The "Mürzteg program," which they elaborated, proved, as might have been expected, a total failure. The two powers were mainly concerned in prosecuting their rival interests; in January, 1908, they finally fell out with each other, and their place was taken by Great Britain and Russia. The Anglo-Russian scheme, the "Reval program," drawn up a few months later, seemed at last to ensure effective European control in unfortunate Macedonia. But this was precisely what the more patriotic, or rather chauvinistic, element among the Turks was determined to prevent. The Reval project had scarcely been announced when the Young Turk revolution broke out in the Monastir region under Enver Bey and Niazi Bey; the "constitution," promulgated in 1876 with the object of thwarting foreign interference, was proclaimed once more for the same purpose—together with the "perfect equality of races and creeds," a venerable phrase embodied in the Hatt-i-Sherif of 1839 and since then repeated *ad nauseam* on innumerable occasions. The Powers, believing or affecting to believe that all would now go well with Turkey and her Christian subjects, committed the unpardonable error of withdrawing their officials from Macedonia, thus sacrificing at a stroke the whole position acquired at the cost of a naval demonstration and five years of laborious diplomacy.

The consequences of this blunder were soon evident. Allowed a free hand in Macedonia, the Young Turks, who had



been fêted in London and Paris as the harbingers of civilization, proceeded to stretch the races of that country on a Procrustean bed. Bulgarians, Greeks, Vlachs, Serbs, Albanians—all alike were expected to renounce their nationality and to become "good Ottomans." In order to facilitate their conversion a general disarmament was decreed, and was carried out with the utmost barbarity. A conspiracy of silence was maintained in the European press; and the world knew little of the horrors of 1910 and 1911. But a community of misfortune drew the Christian races together; the formation of a Balkan alliance, hitherto a dream, became a reality; and the battle of Lule Burgas sounded the knell of Turkish domination in Europe.

Had the statesmanship of the victorious Balkan nations proved equal to the task of providing a reasonable division of the liberated regions on the basis of nationalities, the great European conflict might have been averted or at least postponed for several years. The secular feud between Teuton and Slav, the resolve of Germany to challenge the maritime and commercial supremacy of Great Britain, the yearning of France for her lost provinces, the centrifugal forces at work in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and the intolerable burden of increased armaments, might have continued to threaten without disturbing the peace of the world for another decade or even another generation. The partition of Africa, an immense achievement, had been effected without a European war. The separation of Norway from Sweden had been accomplished without the shedding of blood. If time could be gained, it was at least conceivable that the advance of democracy and the growth of a universal conscience might have finally triumphed over old-world militarism. However this may be, the golden opportunity for effecting a settlement of the Balkan question was lost when the conference of the delegates from the various states which assembled in London in December, 1912, broke up without arriving at an agreement.

After the break-up of the London Conference matters went from bad to worse among the allies. The mysterious assassination of King George of Greece at Salonika removed a moderating influence of priceless value, which was replaced by military chauvinism. At Belgrade, M. Hartwig, the Russian representative, the virtual author of the second war, encour-

aged the Servian government to tear up its treaty with Bulgaria. An anti-Bulgarian compact was concluded between Servia and Greece; and, when the Balkan delegates assembled again in London to make peace with Turkey, the Servian and Greek delegates, with the object of exhausting Bulgaria by continuing the war, combined to delay the signature of the treaty until Sir Edward Grey politely hinted that their presence in London was no longer necessary. Then followed the dreary wrangle over the question of Russian arbitration, prolonged by the vacillation of the Russian cabinet, which repeatedly changed its standpoint, sometimes veering to the Servian, sometimes to the Bulgarian point of view. The delay gave Austria-Hungary time to prosecute her intrigues at Sofia; while at Belgrade M. Hartwig, who pursued a policy of his own, encouraged the Servians to put forward impossible demands. The tension became intolerable; and at last, under Austrian inspiration, the war party at Sofia broke away. On June 29, 1913, an order was issued to attack the Servian and Greek armies. The question of the responsibility for this insensate act is now *sub judice* at Sofia. The order was recalled two days later and the troops withdrawn, with fatal results to the campaign which followed. But the position of Bulgaria was in any case hopeless. Rumania, setting aside the compact of Petrograd, and Turkey, tearing up the Treaty of London, fell upon her from the north and east.

The rupture between the allies was a success for Austrian policy, which had steadily labored for this end. On the day of the Bulgarian attack the members of the Austrian legation at Sofia could scarcely conceal their delight. "From the beginning," wrote the inspired Reichspost some months later, "we knew of the formation of the Balkan Alliance and we set ourselves to break it up." In truth Austria knew only of M. Hartwig's plan but the confession of the Reichspost is nevertheless instructive. Ever since the Berlin Treaty it has been the settled policy of Austria to promote discord in the Balkans. Of this abundant proof could be given if space permitted; it is enough to recall King Milan's unprovoked attack on Bulgaria, carried out under her auspices in the sacred name of "equilibrium" in 1885, and the Greco-Rumanian alliance against Bulgaria, arranged by Baron von Burian, the new Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, in 1901. The Treaty

of Bucharest, which perpetuated the causes of discord and indeed increased them, was another triumph for Austria; it violated the principle of nationalities, to which for domestic reasons she was always opposed, and facilitated the preparation of her approaching coup in the Balkans. The creation of a big Serbia, extending down the valley of the Vardar, would form an obstacle, of course, to her long-projected advance to the Ægean. But it had at least the advantage of perpetuating Bulgarian exasperation; and the effort to govern a hostile population would be a cause of weakness to Serbia. But Austria had already decided to settle accounts with that power. The treaty, of course, could not stand; but it served Austria's purpose for the present, so she confined herself to reserving her claim to its revision in the future while the kaiser enthusiastically proclaimed its finality.

The main problem which the Balkan delegates both in London and Bucharest had to face was how to come to any kind of an arrangement that would satisfy the swash-bucklers and demagogues at home; most of them, moreover, were party leaders themselves and had their own political future to consider, which might be fatally compromised if they surrendered any portion of the national claims. At Bucharest, for instance, M. Venizelos received orders from King Constantine to demand so much of the Ægean coast that only a few kilometers near Dedeagatch would have been left to Bulgaria. He refused and tendered his resignation, but eventually had his own way. Similarly Dr. Daneff had demanded his recall before the premature break-up of the London Conference. Strange as it may seem, if the powers of the Entente, either during the London Conference or before the signature of the Treaty of Bucharest, had interposed with an equitable solution, the Balkan delegates would have welcomed an intervention which would have enabled them to plead *force majeure*, and the various governments would have done likewise. Resistance would never have been attempted without armed support from the central powers, and of this there was no prospect whatever.

On the day before the signature of the Treaty of Bucharest, Austria, already aware of the terms of the treaty, inquired as we know from Signor Giolitti's disclosures, whether Italy would agree that a *casus foederis* had arisen for a joint attack

on Serbia; he was met by a refusal. What passed between Austria and Germany at this time is unknown, but there is nothing to show that Germany backed the Austrian request on this occasion. On the other hand, it seems improbable that Austria would have taken this step without consulting her principal ally. The Italian reply seems to have given Austria pause; and, if William II donned his "shining armor" at this moment, he soon replaced it in the cupboard. That Austria meditated an attack on Serbia so early as the preceding June, when the war between the Balkan allies, which she had deliberately fomented, broke out, seems proved by the recent revelations of M. Pichon and the historian Guglielmo Ferrero; while M. Take Jonescu, the Rumanian statesman, relates that at that time the Austrian minister at Bucharest declared to him that Austria would come to the aid of Bulgaria "with arms in her hands." "Nous avons fait bonne affaire," said a high Austrian official gleefully to a friend of the writer at the moment of the Bulgarian attack in Macedonia. But the Treaty of Bucharest caused Austria to make up her mind. The murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, which took place ten months later, furnished a convenient pretext for putting her design into execution; Germany was now ready; the shining armor at Berlin was displayed to all the world, and the great catastrophe followed.

The Treaty of Bucharest is founded on the ruins of violated contracts; it stands on the flimsy substructure of torn-up "scraps of paper." It has not been recognized by any of the powers, and therefore cannot be regarded as a legitimate substitute for previous arrangements which they have drawn up or sanctioned. It presents a series of grotesque frontiers, traced on vindictive lines in violation of the principle of nationalities and in defiance of economic laws. It has condemned more than a million unhappy beings to conditions of existence which cause them to regret the rule of the Turks. It was completed during a period of eight days—a short time for the discussion of the most complicated question of modern times—and was imposed on the Bulgarian delegates almost literally at the point of the bayonet. Before the end of the negotiations M. Maiorescu, the Rumanian prime minister, intimated to M. Toncheff that, if he failed to sign the document, within forty-eight hours Rumanian troops would occupy Sofia.


Bulgaria now demands the revision of the treaty, so far, at least, as regards a portion of her lost kindred in Macedonia. On the reply to this request depends her attitude towards the present war, and, strangely enough, that of Rumania also; for Rumania, rightly desirous of union with the cognate race in Transylvania, is ready to throw in her lot with the Entente powers if Bulgaria will do likewise. The question is thus of the utmost importance, for, apart from the considerable aid which the two states can render to the allied cause, their military action would almost certainly be followed by that of Italy, and the war would be shortened by many months. Rumania, which hopes to annex a region with 4,000,000 inhabitants, has now abandoned the doctrine of Balkan "equilibrium" propounded with so much unction by the victors in 1913; she is now willing to consent to concessions to Bulgaria in Macedonia, and even to restore to her a portion of the territory of which she deprived her in that year. That an injustice has been done to Bulgaria has been publicly admitted by M. Take Jonescu, the most brilliant of contemporary Rumanian statesmen, who recognizes that she had been wronged in Macedonia.

Bulgaria is willing to leave the whole question between herself and her former allies to the eventual decision of the powers and to maintain a strict neutrality. In return for her neutrality she has been promised by the Entente powers the whole of eastern Thrace as far as the Enos-Midia line laid down by the Treaty of London, together with considerable concessions in Macedonia. This promise, it is understood, will be fulfilled at the end of the war. For her active and timely aid she has been promised larger concessions in Macedonia. But in return for this she desires the present cession of at least a portion of the district, now in Serbian occupation, lying south of the line laid down by the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of 1912. Beyond this line Serbia pledged herself "not to ask for anything"; and the region in question is, or rather was, inhabited by a compact Bulgarian population.

By the irony of fate Bulgaria, humiliated and despoiled, is now in a position to control the action of her neighbors; and the Entente powers, anxious to secure her cooperation and that of Rumania, have undertaken to urge the desired concessions on Serbia. M. Pashitch, if he were a free agent, would

doubtless comply; it is obviously in Serbia's own interest to help her allies to shorten the war; and the concessions will in any case have to be made at its conclusion. But the military coterie which surrounds the prince regent will not hear of them. It was the officers who insisted on the repudiation of the treaty of 1912; among them are some of the conspirators who placed the present dynasty on the throne. Their calculation is that the Entente will win in the end and that no concessions will then be necessary; but they leave out of account the sacrifices which their policy will impose on their allies and on Serbia herself owing to the protraction of the war. The prince, accordingly, has countered the proposals of the powers with a proclamation promising constitutional rights to the Macedonian Bulgars—he describes them as sons of the Servian conqueror Dushan—thus indicating the resolve of Serbia to retain them under her rule. Everyone must admire the heroism with which the Servians have defended their country against enormous odds, but, in this instance at least, they cannot be congratulated on political wisdom. The true expansion of Serbia lies in the direction of Bosnia, northern Herzegovina, and southern Dalmatia, with the ports of Metkovich, Spalato and Sebenico. When she obtains these regions she will more than double her territory. Whether Catholic Croatia will join her is a question which might be left to its inhabitants. The extreme south of Dalmatia, with Gravosa and Cattaro, should go to Montenegro.

In urging both Serbia and Rumania to refuse all concessions to Bulgaria, Greece has acted against the interests of the Entente. Her policy is due in part to hostility to Bulgaria—the hatred of the Greek for the Bulgar is something phenomenal, surpassing in bitterness all other race hatreds of the world; in part to the military considerations which dominate the court of Athens—Bulgaria, it is urged, must not receive any accession of territory, for her military strength would thereby be increased; in part to the fear that a precedent may be created for concessions on the part of Greece. Such concessions, however, will be inevitable if at the end of the war the Entente powers carry out their declared intention to vindicate the principle of nationalities; the regions of Kastoria, Florina, Yenidjé-Vardar, Voden, Kukush, and Drama should go to their rightful owners. Kavala, hitherto mainly a



Turkish town, should also be handed over to Bulgaria; it is inconceivable that this promising seaport should be cut off from its hinterland. Greece should seek her legitimate expansion in the twelve islands now occupied by Italy (that power obtaining compensation in the Trentino) and on the western coast of Asia Minor, where the Hellenic element is strong. Greece should withdraw from southern Albania in accordance with the Corfu Convention; and the Albanian state should be restored under a new ruler, receiving Ipek and Dibra in the north.

The Emperor William, who telegraphed to his Rumanian cousin that the Treaty of Bucharest was "definitive" and who "fought like a lion" to obtain Kavala for his Greek brother-in-law, will find that his family policy, more suited to the Middle Ages than to modern times, was a blunder. Nothing but an arrangement based on the sound principle of nationalities will ever bring peace to the Balkan Peninsula. A durable peace in southeastern Europe, followed by a revival of the Balkan Alliance, will, it is to be hoped, be among the beneficent results of the present calamitous war.

## RUSSIA

### PROHIBITING THE SALE OF ALCOHOL<sup>1</sup>

In the far from reassuring picture of the financial situation of Russia during the war there is yet one bright spot. I refer to the prohibition of the sale of vodka.

And it must be understood that the initiative of this measure came from the people itself. For a long time the more thoughtful elements of the population have demanded the cessation of the sale of alcohol by the state. But the government ignored these demands, and continued to draw hundreds of millions of roubles from the intoxication and brutalization of the masses of the people, taking no notice of the resolutions forwarded by the municipalities and rural communes concerning the abolition of the vodka traffic. The only means of action remaining to those who strove to combat alcoholism was a moral propaganda. And in this connection we have of late years witnessed an interesting phenomenon: in the various Russian cities "abstainers' clubs" have been formed, managed by *bratzy*, or "little brothers," whose members give a solemn promise to abstain from the consumption of alcoholic drinks. "This movement had a slightly mystical or sectarian character," writes a Russian publicist. And for some years the moral impulse of this propaganda has opposed itself to the policy of popular alcoholization practised by tsarism for many years past. The criticism of the democratic press, the protests of labor organizations, medical societies, etc., have finally overcome the resistance of the government, and on the 31st of January, 1914, a rescript of the tsar was published which ordered local administrators to take into consideration the will of the people as expressed in the resolutions concerning the suppression of the vodka traffic, and to close the vodka shops where the population so demanded. After the publication of this imperial rescript a wave of anti-alcoholic propa-

<sup>1</sup> From "Russia and the Great War," by Gregor Alexinsky. Copyright, 1915, by Charles Scribner's Sons and reprinted here by permission of the publishers.



ganda swept through all Russia. Between February and July of 1914 one-tenth of the total number of vodka-shops maintained by the state were closed by the wish of the local population. In certain districts the movement was remarkable in its dimensions; in the government of Riazan no less than 309 vodka-shops out of a total of 391 were closed, or 79 per cent.

On the 17th and 18th of July (old style), when the Russian army was being mobilized, the sale of alcoholic drinks was discontinued over practically the entire territory of the empire. But this was only a temporary measure, and the government had the intention of recommencing its disastrous trade after a brief period of delay. However, the people, seizing a favorable moment and pretext, expressed its desire to see the sale of vodka completely discontinued. Labor associations, municipalities, zemstvos, rural communes, and cooperative societies demanded that the sale of alcohol should be prohibited "for the whole duration of the war, and if possible for ever."

The government was once more forced to give way before the popular pressure. On the 16th of August the Russian journals published an official communications, according to which the emperor "indicated to the minister of finances that the existing situation demanded a change in the point of view concerning the means tending to the diminution of alcoholism, and that in place of palliatives the question of more decisive measures must be confronted—notably the question of a reconstruction of the whole budget on the basis of a gradual elimination therefrom of the enormous revenues derived from the monopoly of alcohol."

The ministry of finances conducted an inquiry into the results of the temporary suppression of the sale of alcohol. In Moscow, according to the data of the examining magistrates, "the number of crimes and misdemeanors in common law for the period included between the 17th of July and the 13th of August had diminished by 47 per cent. compared with the normal." In the city of Simbirsk "the criminality diminished by one-half; in Orel by 80 per cent; in Odessa by 75 per cent; and in Kostroma by 95 per cent."

Industrial employers stated that "the suppression of wine-shops has increased the productivity of labor." This fact is verified by one of the contributors to the *Journal des Débats*. "In the Russian factories and foundries," he writes, "the returns of labor very sensibly increased [after the suppression

of the sale of alcohol]. In this respect figures are cited which we have not the courage to reproduce, so great is the difference between the two sets of figures. But in a coal-mine with which we are well acquainted the verified increase in the yield is 15 per cent. The figures for Monday's work, which used to be bad in the extreme, are now normal."

In spite of all these facts the superior financial bureaucrats were ill-pleased by the suppression of the drink traffic, which had yielded them ample revenues. A member of the finance committee, M. Migulin, asserted in his articles that "the absolute suppression of the sale of alcoholic drinks will probably not be successful if it is long persisted in," etc. But the people continued its protests against alcoholism. The jury of one of the provincial Courts of Assizes inserted in one of its verdicts the declaration that alcoholism is one of the principal causes of crime. "Drinking," it said, "is worse than the present war. The devastation of war can be repaired, but nothing can be expected of alcoholism save a general peril."

On the 22d of August an ordinance of the tsar was published relating to the suppression of the sale of alcohol and alcoholic drinks "until the end of the war." A month later—on the 28th of September—at a meeting of the "Union of Christian Abstainers of Russia"—a telegram from the tsar to the president of the union was read in which Nicholas II made the declaration: "I have already decided to suppress forever the sale of vodka by the state in Russia."

A few groups of manufacturers—distillers, wine-merchants, etc.—attempted to protest against the suppression of the drink traffic. But the press put them in their place. "No compromises, no half-measures. . . . The ruin of whole branches of industry? So be it! What else can be done? Ought we to poison the people in order to benefit the revenues of 3,000 distillers of vodka and a few thousand owners of vineyards and breweries? Can we compare the losses of the distillers, owners of vineyards, and breweries, with the great and net profit which will accrue to Russia from her complete sobriety?"

### *The Polish Problem*

The process of capitalistic development has united Poland to Russia by the indestructible bonds of commercial exchange. The annual produce of the factories and workshops of Poland represents a value of 1,000 million roubles, and two-thirds of

this is consumed by the Russian market. And in spite of all the errors and horrors of the policy of reactionary tsarism, the forces of economic evolution have cleared the ground for a new ideology, as far as the propertied classes in Poland are concerned. This new ideology manifests itself today in this "Russo-Polish" patriotism, which at times perhaps seems even too Russophile and too enthusiastic.

As for the poorer classes of Polish society, as for the proletariat, the political tendencies of this, the most revolutionary element of modern Poland, are of another kind. For a long time now the more thoughtful of the Polish workers have abandoned the idea of a Polish war of independence, and have dreamed rather of a conflict of classes. There is only one very small group of Polish Socialists which holds a different opinion; this group, even before the war, was conducting a propaganda inciting to a national insurrection of the Poles against Russia. But this propaganda had no success among the populace—firstly, because its utopian character was too obvious, and, secondly, because the propaganda was supported by the Austrian government.

### *The Armenian Problem*

Naturally, the revolutionary proletariat of Poland, as well as that of Russia, does not wish to preserve the Russian state in its present form, with an autocracy, a system of government by police, etc. It desires to transform it into a democratic state, but by means of its own efforts, and not by the help of the German and Austrian monarchies. Not with Austria and Germany against Russia, but with the Russian people against the Russian reaction—such is the creed of the best and most thoughtful elements of the popular masses in Poland.

If we now turn our attention from Poland to the Caucasus—or rather to the Trans-Caucasian region—we shall there find a political situation analogous in many ways to that existing in Poland. In the Trans-Caucasian country there is a people as unfortunate as the Polish, or perhaps even more unfortunate; for while Poland has been divided among three European states, all more or less civilized, Armenia has been divided between three states, of which one—Russia—is half-Europeanized, while the other two—Persia and Turkey—were and still are almost completely barbarous. Every one remem-

bers the horrors of the Armenian massacres organized by the Turks—not only by the old Turks in the days of the Red Sultan, Abdul Hamid, but more recently also by the Young Turks, the friends of the German emperor.

*Finland—The Ukraine*

Among the greatest blunders of tsarism during the war we must emphasize its Finnish policy.

In November, 1914, three and a half months after the beginning of the war, the Russian government issued an imperial ukase relating to the Finnish problem, the tenor of which was as follows:

‘His Imperial Majesty has sanctioned a program of legal measures relating to Finland, a program which has been drawn up by a Commission specially appointed by his Majesty to that effect. The Commission finds that the program in question includes two principal groups of measures.

“1. Measures designed to fortify the authority of the Government in Finland, so that the law may be executed and order maintained.

“2. Measures designed to establish closer political relations and economic unity in respect of Finland and the rest of the Empire.

“The measures which follow are enumerated in the first group:

“Revision of the laws relating to the disciplinary responsibility of the authorities of Finland. Removal to the Imperial Courts of all causes dealing with offences committed by Finnish civil functionaries in the exercise of their duties; revision of the Finnish law relating to the status of civil functionaries, in particular those which relate to their immovability, the modification of their oath, and their right to attach themselves to political parties; the training of a staff of officials destined to fill vacancies in the administration of Finland and in particular the institution of Chairs of Finnish Law in the Universities of the Empire; the introduction of the teaching of Finnish and Swedish in the schools of the Empire, and the addition of Russian to the subjects of the matriculation examination at Helsingfors University; the promulgation of a law touching the application to Finland of the measure known as the Exceptional Law; the revision of the regulations of the police and

gendarmarie in Finland; the promulgation of laws applicable conjointly to the Empire and Finland relating to the Press, assemblies, and societies; the extension of the control of the Minister of Public Instruction (Russian) over Finnish educational institutions; the adoption of measures prohibiting the introduction of arms and ammunition into Finland, etc., etc.

"In the second group are enumerated the following measures:

"The settlement of questions relating to religion and the Orthodox Church in Finland and the placing of Orthodox Church schools under the authority of the Holy Synod; the extension to Finland of import duties equal to those imposed throughout the rest of the Empire and special measures designed to ensure to goods, such as sugar, meat, etc., produced in Russia, privileges in the Finnish market; the promulgation of a law common to Finland and the Empire concerning the acquisition and loss of Russian nationality; the extension to Finland of the activities of the Rural Peasants' Bank (Russian)," etc., etc.

The reader will realize that this amounts to a veritable political and economic conquest of Finland, by the Russian police and officials on the one hand and by Russian merchandise on the other.

The publication of such a "program" of "legal" measures is a provocation unheard of even in the history of the Finnish Constitution, which has already had to bear many an unlawful blow. This provocation—above all, in time of war—shows an absolute lack of the most elementary tact on the part of the Russian government. One of the moderate Russian journals, expressing its profound amazement at this program, stated that it belonged to the past rather than to the future. It is needless to say that the Finnish people, loyal during the present war, as they were during the Japanese war, have done nothing whatever to merit such treatment, and that public opinion, not only in Finland but also in the neighboring states of Sweden and Norway, was revolted by these reactionary measures.

"This program of Russification," exclaimed the Stockholm Dagblad, "is the very opposite of the fine promises of liberty and autonomy made in the form of a manifesto to the Poles and Galicians by the Grand Duke Nicholas."

The Ukrainian problem is perhaps the least well known, as

far as the European public is concerned, of all the nationalist or racial problems existing in modern Russia. The explanation is that until recently the nationalist movement of the Ukrainians was cultural rather than political. In the domain of their national culture the Ukrainians have accomplished much. Their literature is flourishing, and some of their ancient poets (for example, Shevtshenko) and certain of their modern authors (Ivan Franko, Vasil Stefanik, etc.) would adorn the literature of any country. Ukrainian philology and history, the Ukrainian arts, and other manifestations of the national genius of this talented people, have undergone a rapid development of late.

Unfortunately, the erroneous policy of reactionary tsarism weighed heavily on the intellectual movements of the Ukrainians. The Russian government opposed it by every possible means. Even the terms "Ukraine" and "Ukrainian" were prohibited, being replaced by "Little Russia" and "Little Russian." To justify this persecution tsarism accused the Ukrainians of "separatist" tendencies. This accusation was false, for the separatist policy has not and could not have any hold upon Ukrainian society. From the economic point of view the Ukraine, which covers ten governments of southern and southwestern Russia, is closely bound up with the economic organism of all Russia—more closely even than Poland and the Caucasus. The cities and industrial centers of the Ukraine are denationalized, or rather internationalized, for their population represents a great admixture of races and languages, the Russian language being sensibly predominant in current usage and in the press. A large proportion of the Ukrainian "intellectuals" have been profoundly influenced by Russian culture. The most eminent poet of the Ukraine, Tarass Shevtshenko, who was deported to the Far East by the Russian government for his "subversive ideas," was not only a Ukrainian patriot, but a Russian patriot also, and his dream was to facilitate the ties of friendship between the two peoples, which are brothers by birth, and to compose a common Russo-Ukrainian tongue which could be understood by both peoples.

The Austrian government has of late years shown itself wiser than the Russian. It abated its persecution of the Ukrainians living on Austrian territory, in Bukovina, and eastern Galicia, granting them certain concessions in the sphere of public instruction and political rights, and the Ukrainian nation-

alist movement developed more freely in Austria than in Russia. The Austrian Ukrainians (the "Russiny" or Ruthenians) founded primary and secondary schools, in which the teaching was in the Ukrainian tongue, while in Russia the Ukrainian children are taught in Russian, which is not their mother-tongue.

This policy of the Austrian government, which was designed to attract Ukrainian sympathies, was based upon political calculations. Austria wished to create a separatist movement among the Russian Ukrainians and an Austrian "orientation" of that movement. But the great mass of Russian Ukrainians failed to be seduced by Austria, and, in spite of all the injustice which they suffered at the hands of tsarism, they refused the idea of separatism, hoping that a true national liberation of the Ukraine would come simultaneously with the liberation of all Russia and the abolition of the old state of affairs throughout the empire.

### THE JEWS IN POLAND<sup>1</sup>

The state of affairs in Russian Poland is at present more desperate than it has ever been before, during war and revolt; and this is not due to the pressure of the conditions or the horror of the situation, but is due to the Poles themselves, to the over-stimulation of the national feeling which sends forth its breath of madness all over Europe and now whirls round in Polish brains to drive out magnanimity and humanity, not to speak of reason, which, on the whole, has no jubilee in Europe in the year 1914.

Denial of the rights of man to Jewish subjects belongs to the nature of Russia. Now and then Europe has been startled when an uncommon massacre of innocent Jews has taken place, as in Kishineff, but all have known and know that Russia stows her Jewish population together in the Polish outskirts of the realm, stows them together so tightly that they can neither live nor die, denies them the liberty of moving, the liberty of studying, even the right of school—and university—education beyond a certain (too small) percentage. Only such Jews who

<sup>1</sup> By Georg Brandes. Reprinted from *The Day*, November 29, 1915.

hold a university degree are allowed to live in the capitals of the empire. No young Jewish woman is allowed to take up her abode near the universities in Petrograd or Moscow, unless she has been enrolled as a prostitute, and it has happened that the police have made their appearance and accused her of forgery, complaining that she did not carry on her profession, but was reading scientific books instead. If a man is, for instance, a doctor of medicine, he may take up his abode in Moscow; in case he is married his wife may live there with him. But if the couple has a two-year-old child, the mother is not allowed to take it with her into the railway carriage and let it live with her in the capital. For the child has no right to live there. If this right is wanted a detailed petition must be sent in to the governor general, in whose power it is to grant or refuse it.

In a few of the cases where plunder and murder of a Jewish population in Russia have taken place, the outrages have partly been excused, or at any rate explained, through the almost incomprehensible ignorance of the peasants. Russia's most famous political economist, who at the same time is a great estate owner, has told me himself that when the elections to the first Duma took place he was informed that each of the peasants on his estate had voted for himself. He asked them, surprised, what they meant, and explained to them that in this way none of them could be elected; but they answered with the question, "Does not each deputy get so many rubles a day? Yes. And do you think that we should let so much money go to another if we, perhaps, might get it ourselves?"

The same prominent estate owner told me that one day he asked some of his peasants if they really had partaken in a pogrom which had taken place in the neighboring parish—he could not believe it, as they looked so good-natured. To his astonishment they answered yes, and when he asked them about the reason they replied: "You know it very well." They then explained that they had killed these Jews because the Jews had killed their Saviour. He: "But that was so long ago and it was not they who did it and it did not happen in this country." To which they, again astonished, exclaimed: "Was it long ago? We thought it was last week." It appeared that they had understood from the priest's explanation that the crucifixion had taken place then and there.



Under such conditions one is not surprised by any outrage. But to see the hatred of the Jews spread in Russian Poland, where people understand how to read and write, that must surely fill one with wonder. The great number of Jews in the old Polish kingdom originated in the days of Casimir the Great (1309-1370), who out of love for his concubine, Esther, opened his country to the Jews and made conditions favorable for them. Since then the number has increased, as the czars locked up all their Jewish subjects there. So they have been living separated and with a special dress like the Jews of Denmark at the time of Holberg. They have, however, felt and suffered as Polish patriots. As early as 1794 a regiment of Jewish volunteers fought under Kosciusko; their colonel fell in 1809. In 1830 the shallow Polish national government refused the Jews' petition to be allowed to enter the army. As they then ventured to apply for admission to the Polish public schools Nicholas I punished them, allowing 36,000 families to be carried away to the steppes of south Russia, where the regulation for the enlistment of children overtook them. All their small boys from the age of six years were sent to Archangel in Cossack custody to be trained as sailors. They died in multitudes on the way.

The evils which befell all the inhabitants of Poland regardless of their creed for some time suppressed the hatred of the Jews which is always lurking in the masses.

In the year 1860 the equalization of the Jews with the Catholics was a reality in Warsaw, and when, in February, 1861, at two large public places in Warsaw, the Russians had shot on the kneeling masses singing the national anthem, the Jews felt impelled to show their national feeling through an unmistakable manifestation.

In masses they accompanied their rabbis into the Catholic churches just as the Christians in crowds entered the synagogues to sing the same hymn.

This last feature, the processions of the two creeds into each other's churches singing the same song, made such an impression on Henrik Ibsen, the great Scandinavian poet, that again and again he returned in his conversations to this as one of the greatest and most beautiful experiences he had ever had.

And now under the whirlstorm of madness which nationalism has driven across Europe, all this is lost; nay, from a religious reconciliation it has been turned into flaming hatred between the races.

In 1912 the election of a deputy to the Duma was to take place in Warsaw. The population of the town consists of between seven and eight hundred thousand. As among them there are 300,000 Jews, the majority of the electors, it was in the power of that majority to elect a Jewish deputy. Because of their Polish national feeling, however, they gave up this right, as they wanted Warsaw, as the capital of the Kingdom of Poland, to be represented by a man who not only in spirit, but also by race, was a Pole. Of the Polish committee they only demanded that the party concerned be no enemy to the Jews. It proved, however, that the committee in its arrogance would not deal with them at all and proposed Kucharschewski, a pronounced anti-Semitic candidate and a man who publicly declared that he desired the election to the Duma only to work for the extermination of the Jews of Poland. By the way, it is strange to notice how the word "exterminate," which thirty years ago in the days of Bismarck and Eduard von Hartmann as *ausrotten* was subject to the curse and condemnation of the Poles, has now come to honor, and how easily it passes their lips.

As the Jews, of course, could not vote on such a man, they urgently asked the committee to propose another candidate not inimical to them. This reasonable request was refused with coarseness and Kucharschewski's candidacy maintained. Because of that the Jews were obliged to look about for another candidate of Polish family who was fit for the position and was not hostile to them. In spite of numerous applications, they did not succeed in finding such a man; at the last moment, when all attempts had failed, Jagello, the Social Democrat, declared himself willing to accept the candidacy of the Jews.

The only thing in his favor was the fact that he was of pure Polish blood. As their leading men all belong to the higher middle class, they did not share his views. But the state of affairs forced them to support him. Lord Beaconsfield used to maintain that the natural disposition of the Jewish race was conservative, but foolish politics, instead of encouraging the conservative instincts of the race, forced it to cast its lot with the most extreme elements of the opposition. It has proved true here.

Jagello was elected.

The leading men in Russian Poland, who, as a matter of fact, through the whole new century, had fought against the

Jews, although secretly, for fear they should forfeit the sympathy of the intellectual aristocracy of Europe, used this electoral victory of the Jews, which had been forced upon them, to throw off the mask and openly act as their passionate enemies. The so-called cooperative movement developed during the last twelve years, and in itself nothing but a fight against the Jewish commerce, under a different name, now changed into a systematic and cruelly effected boycotting of the Jewish population. In private as in public life, the openly pronounced password was: not to buy from Jews, not to associate with Jews.

At the head of this movement marched the intelligence of Poland, among others some of its most famous authors, avowed free thinkers as Nemojewski, nay, as Alexander Swientachowski. Literary life presents many changes, metamorphoses, which in thoroughness are not very much inferior to those of Ovid. A good deal is necessary to make one who for one-half century has witnessed the want of character among writers feel even the slightest surprise. But I should willingly have sworn that I should never have lived to see Alexander Swientochowski a nationalist, he the most uncompromising adversary of nationalism, who endured a good deal for his conviction, to see the poet of "Chawa Rubin" an anti-Semitic chief. Not only does all that Alexander Swientochowski wrote rise against him, but also the words, the powerful words, which issued from his mouth in his palmy days.

The whole Polish press placed itself at the disposal of this movement. Young Polish louts were posted outside the Jewish shops and ill-treated the Christian women and children who wanted to buy there. By means of the well-known Dumowski a new paper, *Dwa Groszi*, was started, which simply urged pogroms. It soon came to bloody struggles. Polish undergraduates killed an old Jew in the Sliiska street in Warsaw. In the little town of Welun peasants poured naphtha on the house of a Jew and put fire to it, burning a large family. Similar acts occurred in several other places, until the Russian government stopped this pogrom movement in order to prevent the Polish nationalism from getting stronger.

The Polish priests in the villages incited the people from the pulpit to boycotting of and war against the Jews. After the sentence in the Beilis action the Polish newspapers were

almost alone in publishing on circulars the information that Beilis had been acquitted, but that the existence of religious murder had been satisfactorily proved. Nay, the free thinker, Nemojewski, wrote a book, in which he maintained the monstrous lie that Jewish religious murders are facts, and traveled all over the country with an agitatorial lecture to the same purpose.

Under these circumstances, the Jews in Russian Poland turned to the few men whose names were so esteemed or whose characters were so unimpeachable that their words could not be unheeded.

Ladislas Mickiewicz, the excellent son of the great Mickiewicz, who had passed his whole life in Paris, first as a publisher and translator of the works of his father, and then as a Polish patriotic author, convened, together with some other prominent men, a great meeting at Warsaw to restore the inner peace. In vain he begged and besought his countrymen, who had enemies enough otherwise, not to act as enemies of the Jews, who had always been their friends. No Polish newspaper gave any report of his speech.

All this took place before the war. The provisional result was the economic destruction of the Russian-Polish Jews. But now during the war the glow of the bloody hatred of the Jews has blazed out in far stronger flames and the Russian government has as yet done nothing to subdue or quench the fire.

During the mobilization several Polish newspapers, for instance, the *Głos Lubelski*, brought the alarming news in heavy type: "In England great pogroms against the Jews. The English government does not check them." The paper was conscious of the lie. But the question was to set an example to follow.

When the lack of gold and silver began to be felt the Polish newspapers accused the Jews of hiding the valuable metals. On closer examination, it was found that many non-Jewish business people (for instance, Ignaschewski in Lublin, a very rich Pole) were withholding whole bags full of gold and silver coins, for which they were punished rather severely; but this was not proved against a single Jew.

Furthermore, the Jews were, among other things, accused of having smuggled in a coffin 1,500,000 rubles in gold into

Germany; and the protest against the accusation entered by the representatives and ministers of the Jewish congregation at Warsaw was printed in Russian papers, but not in a single Polish one.

All these things were preparations for pogroms; but many others were made. The anti-Semites printed a proclamation in Yiddish in which the Jews were called upon to revolt against Russia; they took care that this proclamation was put into the pockets of the unsuspecting Jews in the streets of the different towns; those who had distributed the papers denounced the party concerned to the police. Everybody upon whom the proclamation was found was shot.

At last the Jews were, as in the Middle Ages, both in word and writing accused of having poisoned the wells. If some Cossacks or other Russian soldiers died, the Poles accused the Jews of having caused their death.

The chief accusation was, however, the accusation of espionage, which obtained general credence and was used both when Austrian troops came to some town or village and when Russian troops expelled the Austrians. The result was the same. A suitable number of Jews were conscientiously shot by the Russians as well as by the Austrians. There are, however, lists of those who really have been unmasked as spies. A Potocki was among them, and had to pay for it with his life; but no Jewish name is found on these lists.

The pursuit of the Jews by the Russian-Polish anti-Semites is the more invidious under these circumstances, as 300,000 Jewish soldiers, among them many volunteers, are serving in the Russian army, and as the self-sacrifice of the army and the Red Cross hitherto has been immeasurable. In the great congregations are special hospitals for Russian soldiers—regardless of their creed—founded by Jews and with Jewish money. Not a few Jewish soldiers have already won the highest military distinctions, nay, a few of them have even received them from Mr. Rennenkampf, the commander-in-chief himself, who used to be a zealous anti-Semite, as the Russian court on the whole is passionately anti-Semitic. The manifesto from the czar *To my dear Jewish subjects*, which has been printed in the French newspapers, has never been anything but a fabrication.

While the usual accusation against the Jews in Russian Poland was that of sympathizing with the Russians—for which

they have no special reason—Mr. A. Warinski, who in Russia is classed among the black ones, also called the true Russians—in Politiken has made the charge against them that the German attempts of gaining the Poles "have only had the effect desired on the Russian and Polish Jews, as these elements, because of psychological relation with the Prussians, feel disposed to place themselves at the side of Germany." This accusation and the arguments for it might express the culmination. The Jew shall and must be Judas. If it cannot be accomplished in one way the opposite way is tried. Mr. Warinski does not say one word about how many Jews have gone into the war as volunteers out of pure enthusiasm for Poland. They have not been able to believe, as I for my part cannot believe, that the last outcrop of nationalism in Russian Poland is more than a temporary epidemic.

How could Russian Poles in the long run be unfaithful to the only powers they have been able to appeal to, the only powers which took an interest in them? How can they who are fighting for their liberty after so many years' ill-treatment be willing to seize an opportunity to ill-treat the only people who (to its misfortune) is in their power, the only people who have suffered far more and twenty times as long as they themselves; and the only ones who are too strong to be destroyed through any ill-treatment? How can the Poles, who were at times ruined as a state through the treachery of their own men, want to fling out the accusation of treason against a tribe which has never betrayed itself and which even in the deepest abasement never betrayed the only Slavic tribe who in the Middle Ages gave a refuge to its children?

I suppose that the Poles will maintain against this appeal to them that I, whom the Ruthenians could never bring to make any attack on them, am now, because of my descent, speaking in favor of a matter, which is very unpleasant to them. My personal descent has so little influenced my proceedings and way of thinking that during the whole of my public life I have been subject to continual attacks in national Jewish periodicals and newspapers as the man who denied community of descent and supposed community of faith.

This spring during my stay in America I was continually attacked in the American Jewish papers as the callous denier of the Jews. It was nonsense, as is most of that which appears in

print, but it proves at least that it is not on behalf of my blood but on behalf of my mind that I speak on this occasion. My sympathy is not with the Jews as Jews, but as the suppressed and ill-treated.

I am the man who a generation ago wrote: "We love Poland, not in the same way that we love Germany or France or England, but as we love liberty. For what is to love Poland but to love liberty, to feel a deep sympathy with misfortune and to admire courage and combative enthusiasm? Poland is the symbol of all that which the supreme among mankind have loved and for which they have fought."

These were my words and hitherto I have adhered to them.

Shall I have to feel ashamed of having written them, now that Poland's future is being decided?

## RUSSIAN CULTURE<sup>1</sup>

In this time of crisis, when the clash of ideas seems as fierce as the struggle of the hosts, it is the duty of those who possess authentic information on one or the other points in dispute to speak out firmly and clearly. I should like to contribute some observations on German and Russian conceptions in matters of culture. I base my claim to be heard on the fact that I have had the privilege of being closely connected with the Russian, German, and English life. As a Russian Liberal, who had to give up an honorable position at home for the sake of his opinions, I can hardly be suspected of subserviency to the Russian bureaucracy.

I am struck by the insistence with which the Germans represent their cause in this world-wide struggle as the cause of civilization as opposed to Muscovite barbarism; and I am not sure that some of my English friends do not feel reluctant to side with the subjects of the tsar against the countrymen of Harnack and Eucken. One would like to know, however, since when have the Germans taken up this attitude? They were not so squeamish during the "war of emancipation" which gave birth to modern Germany. At that time the people of

<sup>1</sup> From "The Russian Problem," by Paul Vinogradoff. Published by George H. Doran Company. The article here reprinted originally appeared in the Times, September 14, 1914.

eastern Prussia were anxiously waiting for the appearance of Cossacks, as heralds of the Russian hosts who were to emancipate them from the yoke of Napoleon. Did the Prussians and Austrians reflect on the humiliation of an alliance with the Muscovites, and on the superiority of the Code Civil, when the Russian guard at Kulm stood like a rock against the desperate onslaught of Vandamme? Perhaps by this time the inhabitants of Berlin have obliterated the bas-relief in the "Alley of Victories" which represents Prince William of Prussia, the future victor of Sedan, seeking safety within the square of the Kaluga regiment! Russian blood flowed in numberless battles in the cause of the Germans and Austrians. The present Armageddon might perhaps have been avoided if the Tsar Nicholas I had left the Hapsburg monarchy to its own resources in 1849, and had not unwisely crushed the independence of Hungary. Within our own memory, the benevolent neutrality of Russia guarded Germany in 1870 from an attack in the rear by its opponents of Sadowa. Are all such facts to be explained away on the ground that the despised Muscovites may be occasionally useful as "gun meat," but are guilty of sacrilege if they take up a stand against German taskmasters in "shining armor"? The older generations of Germany had not yet reached that comfortable conclusion. The last recommendation which the founder of the German Empire made on his death-bed to his grandson was to keep on good terms with that Russia which is now proclaimed to be a debased mixture of Byzantine, Tartar, and Muscovite abominations.

The hour of trial has appealed to the best feelings and the best elements of the Russian nation. It has brought out in striking manner the fundamental tendency of Russian political life and the essence of Russian culture, which so many people have been unable to perceive on account of the chaff on the surface. Russia has been going through a painful crisis. In the words of the manifesto of October 17-30, 1905, the outward casing of her administration had become too narrow and oppressive for the development of society with its growing needs, its altered perceptions of rights and duties, its changed relations between government and people. The result was that deep-seated political *malaise* which made itself felt during the Japanese war, when Russian society at large refused to take any interest in the fate of the army; the feverish rush for



"liberties" after the defeat; the subsequent reign of reaction and repression, which has cast such a gloom over Russian life during these last years. But the effort of the national struggle has dwarfed all these misunderstandings and misfortunes, as in Great Britain the call of the common motherland has dwarfed the dispute between Unionists and Home Rulers. Russian parties have not renounced their aspirations; Russian Liberals in particular believe in self-government and the rule of law as firmly as ever. But they have realized as one man that this war is not an adventure engineered by unscrupulous ambition, but a decisive struggle for independence and existence; and they are glad to be arrayed in close ranks with their opponents from the Conservative side. A friend, a Liberal like myself, writes to me from Moscow: "It is a great, unforgettable time; we are happy to be all at one!" And from the ranks of the most unfortunate of Russia's children, from the haunts of the political exiles in Paris, comes the news that Bourtzeff, one of the most prominent among the revolutionary leaders, has addressed an appeal to his comrades urging them to stand by their country to the utmost of their power.

I may add that whatever may have been the shortcomings and the blunders of the Russian government, it is a blessing in this decisive crisis that Russians should have a firmly-knit organization and a traditional center of authority in the power of the czar. The present emperor stands as the national leader, not in the histrionic attitude of a war lord, but in the quiet dignity of his office. He has said and done the right thing, and his subjects will follow him to a man. We are sure he will remember in the hour of victory the unstinted devotion and sacrifices of all the nationalities and parties of his vast empire. It is our firm conviction that the sad tale of reaction and oppression is at an end in Russia, and that our country will issue from this momentous crisis with the insight and strength required for the constructive and progressive statesmanship of which it stands in need.

Apart from the details of political and social reform, is the regeneration of Russia a boon or a peril to European civilization? The declamations of the Germans have been as misleading in this respect as in all others. The master-works of Russian literature are accessible in translation nowadays, and the cheap taunts of men like Bernhardi recoil on their own

heads. A nation represented by Pushkin, Turgeneff, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky in literature, by Kramskoy, Verestchagin, Repin, Glinka, Moussorgsky, Tchaikovsky in art, by Mandeleeff, Metchnikoff, Pavloff in science, by Kluchevsky and Solovieff in history, need not be ashamed to enter the lists in an international competition for the prizes of culture. But the German historians ought to have taught their pupils that in the world of ideas it is not such competitions that are important. A nation handicapped by its geography may have to start later in the field, and yet her performance may be relatively better than that of her more favored neighbors. It is astonishing to read German diatribes about Russian backwardness when one remembers that as recently as fifty years ago Austria and Prussia were living under a régime which can hardly be considered more enlightened than the present rule in Russia. The Italians in Lombardy and Venice have still a vivid recollection of Austrian jails; and as for Prussian militarism, one need not go further than the exploits of the Zabern garrison to illustrate its meaning. This being so, it is not particularly to be wondered at that the eastern neighbor of Austria and Prussia has followed to some extent on the same lines.

But the general direction of Russia's evolution is not doubtful. Western students of her history might do well, instead of sedulously collecting damaging evidence, to pay some attention to the building-up of Russia's universities, the persistent efforts of the *zemstvos*, the independence and the zeal of the press. German scholars should read Herzen's vivid description of the "idealists of the forties." And what about the history of the emancipation of the serfs, or of the regeneration of the judicature? The "reforms of the sixties" are a household word in Russia, and surely they are one of the noblest efforts ever made by a nation in the direction of moral improvement.

Looking somewhat deeper, what right have the Germans to speak of their ideals of culture as superior to those of the Russian people? They deride the superstitions of the *mujikkh* as if tapers and genuflexions were the principal matters of popular religion. Those who have studied the Russian people without prejudice know better than that. Read Selma Lagerlöf's touching description of Russian pilgrims in Palestine. She, the Protestant, has understood the true significance of the

religious impulse which leads these poor men to the Holy Land, and which draws them to the numberless churches of the vast country. These simple people cling to the belief that there is something else in God's world besides toil and greed; they flock towards the light, and find in it the justification of their human craving for peace and mercy. For the Russian people have the Christian virtue of patience in suffering: their pity for the poor and oppressed is more than an occasional manifestation of individual feeling—it is deeply rooted in national psychology. This frame of mind has been scorned as fit for slaves! It is indeed a case where the learning of philosophers is put to shame by the insight of the simple-minded. Conquerors should remember that the greatest victories in history have been won by the unarmed—by the Christian confessors whom the emperors sent to the lions, by the "old believers" of Russia who went to Siberia and to the flames for their unyielding faith, by the Russian serfs who preserved their human dignity and social cohesion in spite of the exactions of their masters, by the Italians, Poles, and Jews, when they were trampled under foot by their rulers. It is such a victory of the spirit that Tolstoy had in mind when he preached his gospel of non-resistance; and I do not think even a German on the warpath would be blind enough to suppose that Tolstoy's message came from a craven soul. The orientation of the so-called "intelligent" class in Russia—that is, the educated middle class, which is much more numerous and influential than people suppose—is somewhat different, of course. It is "western" in this sense, that it is imbued with current European ideas as to politics, economics, and law. It has to a certain extent lost the simple faith and religious fervor of the peasants. But it has faithfully preserved the keynote of popular ideals. It is still characteristically humanitarian in its view of the world and in its aims. A book like that of General von Bernhardi would be impossible in Russia. If anybody were to publish it, it would not only fall flat, but earn for its author the reputation of a bloodhound. Many deeds of cruelty and brutality happen, of course, in Russia, but no writer of any standing would dream of building up a theory of violence in vindication of a claim to culture. It may be said, in fact, that the leaders of Russian public opinion are pacific, cosmopolitan, and humanitarian to a fault. The mystic philosopher, Vladimir

Solovieff, used to dream of the union of the churches with the pope as the spiritual head, and democracy in the Russian sense as the broad basis of the rejuvenated Christendom. Dostoyevsky, a writer most sensitive to the claims of nationality in Russia, defined the ideal of the Russians in a celebrated speech as the embodiment of a universally humanitarian type. These are extremes, but characteristic extremes pointing to the trend of national thought. Russia is so huge and so strong, that material power has ceased to be attractive to her thinkers. Nevertheless, we need not yet retire into the desert or deliver ourselves to be bound hand and foot by "civilized" Germans. Russia also wields a sword—a charmed sword, blunt in an unrighteous cause, but sharp enough in the defence of right and freedom. And this war is indeed our *Befreiungskrieg*. The Slavs must have their chance in the history of the world, and the date of their coming of age will mark a new departure in the growth of civilization.

## THE FUTURE OF POLAND<sup>1</sup>

Until the war broke out in August, 1914, the outlook for the future afforded little encouragement to hope for any immediate or marked change in the circumstances of the Poles. But with startling suddenness, when the first shot was fired, the whole situation changed in the most dramatic manner.

Even before the grand duke's proclamation was issued, a fundamental, but as yet unobservable, change in the Polish question had taken place. The rupture of friendly relations and the outbreak of war between Russia and Germany vitally affected the position of the Poles in Russia. We have seen how the scheme for the partition of Poland originated in Germany, and was pressed upon Russia by Frederick the Great. In the difficulties which have arisen as the result of that and subsequent partitions, German initiative in combating Polonism has never been wanting, and it has long been recognized in Poland that Germany was the ultimate source of the forces which assailed them so relentlessly. The action of Prussia

<sup>1</sup> From "Poland and the Polish Question," by Ninian Hill. Copyright, 1915, by F. A. Stokes Company, and reprinted here by permission of the publishers.

during the insurrection of 1863, in delivering up Polish refugees, was defended by Count Eulenberg on the ground that they were acting in accordance with treaty obligations.

Both Germany and Russia had to deal with a similar problem. Their mutual frontier was inhabited by a foreign and disaffected population, and their common difficulties in dealing with the Poles drew them together and resulted in concerted action. Austria had been a member of this copartnery till war drove her out, a bankrupt, in 1867. In both Russia and Germany the Polish language is banned in schools and administration. No Poles are employed in public offices, and army conscripts are drafted to distant provinces. But Germany, not content with these measures, over-reached herself. The *Ansiedelungs Kommission* found no counterpart in Russia. It showed the Poles clearly that Germany was an implacable foe, and it has contributed largely in promoting the movement for conciliation with Russia.

It needed but the first gunshot to break the ties which for so long had bound Russia to German policy, and to bring about the reconciliation of the two great Slav families. The first advances were made by the Poles. On the outbreak of war a remarkable scene was enacted in the Duma. As happened in our own Parliament, all party wrangling and strife ceased—as by the wave of a magician's wand. Amidst indescribable enthusiasm the leading representatives of various nationalities declared their loyalty, and their determination to defeat the enemy.

The response of Russia to this spontaneous outburst of loyalty was prompt and generous. With eloquent and stirring words the Grand Duke Nicholas addressed the Poles in a proclamation dated August 1 (14). It was remarkable, not only for its contents but also because the grand duke used the Polish language. It has been translated as follows:

**Poles!** The hour has struck in which the sacred dream of your fathers and forefathers may find fulfilment.

A century and a half ago the living flesh of Poland was torn asunder, but her soul did not die. She lived in hopes that there would come an hour for the resurrection of the Polish nation and for a brotherly reconciliation with Russia.

The Russian army now brings you the joyful tidings of this reconciliation. May the boundaries be annihilated which cut the Polish nation into parts! May that nation reunite into one body under the scepter of the

Russian Emperor! Under this scepter Poland shall be reborn, free in faith, in language, in self-government.

Only one thing Russia expects of you: equal consideration for the rights of those nationalities to which history has linked you.

With open heart, with hand fraternally outstretched, Russia steps forward to meet you. She believes that the sword has not rusted which, at Grünwald, struck down the enemy.

From the shores of the Pacific to the North Seas the Russian forces are on the march. The dawn of a new life is breaking for you.

May there shine, resplendent above that dawn, the sign of the Cross, symbol of the Passion and the resurrection of nations!

The effect of the grand duke's proclamation was instantaneous. It touched a chord long waiting to vibrate, and was received with the most profound emotion and joy.

Nor in this time of reconciliation have the Jews been overlooked. It has been announced that the civil law restrictions which have so grievously afflicted them are to be removed. The pale of settlement is to be swept away, and the Jews are to be admitted to the full rights of Russian citizenship. Nothing is more remarkable than that such revolutionary measures should be welcomed by all sections of public opinion, even the anti-Semitic press expressing approval in the warmest terms. For the first time, in modern history at any rate, some hundreds of commissions in the army have been granted, and very early in the war an heroic Jewish doctor was decorated with the military cross of St. George for conspicuous gallantry.

In considering the future of Poland it will not be without interest to recall here some of Rousseau's ideas as to the best form of government. His treatise on the subject was first published some nine years before the new constitution of 1791 was adopted, and was designed to assist the Poles in framing it. One of the difficulties which presented itself to him was the immense extent of the Polish dominions. It is only God, he remarks, who can govern the world, and it needs more than human faculties to govern great nations. All the smaller states, whether republics or monarchies, prosper simply because they are small. The citizens know each other personally; the leaders can then see for themselves whatever evils exist, the reforms required, and that their orders are carried out. The vast provinces, he thought, could never secure the strict administration of the small republics. The first reform needed

was to reduce governmental areas. Great Poland, Little Poland, and Lithuania should form three states in one, each with a separate administration. The provincial dietines should be developed, and their authority extended in their respective palatinates; but he adds this word of wise caution: "Mark carefully the limitations, and do nothing which may break the bonds binding them to the common legislation and in subordination to the body of the republic. In one word, seek to extend and to perfect the system of federal government, which alone unites the advantages of great and small states, and therefore the only one which can suit you."

A great war such as is now raging obliterates frontiers. Already it has swept away the demarcations of the Congress of Vienna, and has led incidentally to the resurrection of Poland. The name of Poland once more appears on the maps; it is printed in bold headlines in our newspapers. We learn that the eastern theater of war is in Poland—rather than in Prussia, Russia, or Austria. Upon the result of the war will depend the new frontiers. It is inevitable that compensation will be demanded, but by whom, or when, or where, remains to be seen. Already the alterations on the map of Europe are in progress.

It is too soon yet to foresee the extent and nature of the changes that are in the process of being brought about. Doubtless the spoils will go to the strong, but if peace is to be established on a satisfactory basis the interests of the inhabitants of the territory concerned must be allowed due weight. It is a fortunate circumstance for Poland that her dearest wish, the interest of Russia, and the sympathy of her friends throughout the world coincide.

# ITALY

## ITALY'S DEFECTION<sup>1</sup>

When I spoke eight days ago there was still a glimmer of hope that Italy's participation in the war could be avoided. That hope proved fallacious. German feeling strove against the belief in the possibility of such a change. Italy has now inscribed in the book of the world's history, in letters of blood which will never fade, her violation of faith.

I believe Machiavelli once said that a war which is necessary is also just. Viewed from this sober, practical, political standpoint, which leaves out of account all moral considerations, has this war been necessary? Is it not, indeed, directly mad? Nobody threatened Italy; neither Austria-Hungary nor Germany. Whether the Triple Entente was content with blandishments alone history will show later. Without a drop of blood flowing, and without the life of a single Italian being endangered, Italy could have secured the long list of concessions which I recently read to the House—territory in Tyrol and on the Isonzo as far as the Italian speech is heard, satisfaction of the national aspirations in Trieste, a free hand in Albania, and the valuable port of Valona.

Why have they not taken it? Do they, perhaps, wish to conquer the German Tyrol? Hands off! Did Italy wish to provoke Germany, to whom she owes so much in her upward growth as a great power, and from whom she is not separated by any conflict of interests? We left Rome in no doubt that an Italian attack on Austro-Hungarian troops would also strike the German troops. Why did Rome refuse so light-heartedly the proposals of Vienna? The Italian manifesto of war, which conceals an uneasy conscience behind vain phrases, does not give us any explanation. They were too shy, perhaps, to say openly what was spread abroad as a pretext by the press

<sup>1</sup> Speech by Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, German Imperial Chancellor, in the Reichstag, May 28, 1915.



and by gossip in the lobbies of the Chamber, namely, that Austria's offer came too late and could not be trusted.

What are the facts? Italian statesmen have no right to measure the trustworthiness of other nations in the same proportion as they measured their own loyalty to a treaty. Germany, by her word, guaranteed that the concessions would be carried through. There was no occasion for distrust. Why too late? On May 4 the Trentino was the same territory as it was in February, and a whole series of concessions had been added to the Trentino of which nobody had thought in the winter.

It was, perhaps, too late for this reason, that while the Triple Alliance, the existence of which the king and the government had expressly acknowledged after the outbreak of war, was still alive, Italian statesmen had long before engaged themselves so deeply with the Triple Entente that they could not disentangle themselves. There were indications of fluctuations in the Rome cabinet as far back as December. To have two irons in the fire is always useful. Before this Italy had shown her predilection for extra dances. But this is no ballroom. This is a bloody battlefield upon which Germany and Austria-Hungary are fighting for their lives against a world of enemies. The statesmen of Rome have played against their own people the same game as they played against us.

It is true that the Italian-speaking territory on the northern frontier has always been the dream and the desire of every Italian, but the great majority of the Italian people, as well as the majority in Parliament, did not want to know anything of war. According to the observation of the best judge of the situation in Italy, in the first days of May four-fifths of the Senate and two-thirds of the Chamber were against war, and in that majority were the most responsible and important statesmen. But common sense had no say. The mob alone ruled. Under the kindly disposed toleration and with the assistance of the leading statesmen of a cabinet fed with the gold of the Triple Entente, the mob, under the guidance of unscrupulous war instigators, was roused to a frenzy of blood which threatened the king with revolution and all moderate men with murder if they did not join in the war delirium.

The Italian people were intentionally kept in the dark with regard to the course of the Austrian negotiations and the extent of the Austrian concessions, and so it came about that

after the resignation of the Salandra cabinet nobody could be found who had the courage to undertake the formation of a new cabinet, and that in the decisive debate no member of the Constitutional party in the Senate or Chamber even attempted to estimate the value of the far-reaching Austrian concessions. In the frenzy of war honest politicians grew dumb, but when, as the result of military events (as we hope and desire) the Italian people become sober again it will recognize how frivolously it was instigated to take part in this world war.

We did everything possible to avoid the alienation of Italy from the Triple Alliance. The ungrateful rôle fell to us of requiring from our loyal ally, Austria, with whose armies our troops share daily wounds, death, and victory, the purchase of the loyalty of the third party to the alliance by the cession of old-inherited territory. That Austria-Hungary went to the utmost limit possible is known. Prince Bülow, who again entered into the active service of the empire, tried by every means, his diplomatic ability, his most thorough knowledge of the Italian situation and of Italian personages, to come to an understanding. Though his work has been in vain the entire people are grateful to him. This storm also we shall endure. From month to month we grow more intimate with our ally. From the Pilitza to the Bukowina we tenaciously withstood with our Austro-Hungarian comrades for months the gigantic superiority of the enemy. Then we victoriously advanced.

So our new enemies will perish through the spirit of loyalty and the friendship and bravery of the central powers. In this war Turkey is celebrating a brilliant regeneration. The whole German nation follows with enthusiasm the different phases of the obstinate, victorious resistance with which the loyal Turkish army and fleet repulse the attacks of their enemies with heavy blows. Against the living wall of our warriors in the west our enemies up till now have vainly stormed. If in some places fighting fluctuates, if here or there a trench or a village is lost or won, the great attempt of our adversaries to break through, which they announced five months ago, did not succeed, and will not succeed. They will perish through the heroic bravery of our soldiers.

Up till now our enemies have summoned in vain against us all the forces of the world and a gigantic coalition of brave soldiers. We will not despise our enemies, as our adversaries

like to do. At the moment when the mob in English towns is dancing around the stake at which the property of defenseless Germans is burning, the British government dared to publish a document, with the evidence of unnamed witnesses, on the alleged cruelties in Belgium, which are of so monstrous a character that only mad brains could believe them. But while the English press does not permit itself to be deprived of news, the terror of the censorship reigns in Paris. No casualty lists appear, and no German or Austrian communiqués may be printed. Severely wounded invalids are kept away from their relations, and real fear of the truth appears to be the motive of the government.

Thus it comes about, according to trustworthy observation, that there is no knowledge of the heavy defeats which the Russians have sustained, and the belief continues in the Russian "steam-roller" advancing on Berlin, which is "perishing from starvation and misery," and confidence exists in the great offensive in the west, which for months has not progressed. If the governments of hostile states believe that by the deception of the people and by unchaining blind hatred they can shift the blame for the crime of this war and postpone the day of awakening, we, relying on our good conscience, a just cause, and a victorious sword, will not allow ourselves to be forced by a hair's breadth from the path which we have always recognized as right. Amid this confusion of minds on the other side, the German people goes on its own way, calm and sure.

Not in hatred do we wage this war, but in anger—in holy anger. The greater the danger we have to confront, surrounded on all sides by enemies, the more deeply does the love of home grip our hearts, the more must we care for our children and grandchildren, and the more must we endure until we have conquered and have secured every possible real guarantee and assurance that no enemy alone or combined will dare again a trial of arms. The more wildly the storm rages around us the more firmly must we build our own house. For this consciousness of united strength, unshaken courage, and boundless devotion, which inspire the whole people, and for the loyal cooperation which you, gentlemen, from the first day have given to the Fatherland, I bring you, as the representatives of the entire people, the warm thanks of the emperor.

In the mutual confidence that we are all united we will conquer, despite a world of enemies.

ITALY'S JUSTIFICATION<sup>1</sup>

I address myself to Italy and to the civilized world in order to show not by violent words, but by exact facts and documents, how the fury of our enemies has vainly attempted to diminish the high moral and political dignity of the cause which our arms will make prevail. I shall speak with the calm of which the King of Italy has given a noble example, when he called his land and sea forces to arms. I shall speak with the respect due to my position and to the place in which I speak. I can afford to ignore the insults written in imperial, royal, and archducal proclamations. Since I speak from the Capitol, and represent in this solemn hour the people and the government of Italy, I, a modest citizen, feel that I am far nobler than the head of the house of the Habsburgs.

The commonplace statesmen who, in rash frivolity of mind and mistaken in all their calculations, set fire last July to the whole of Europe and even to their own hearths and homes, have now noticed their fresh colossal mistake, and in the Parliaments of Budapest and Berlin have poured forth brutal invective of Italy and her government with the obvious design of securing the forgiveness of their fellow citizens and intoxicating them with cruel visions of hatred and blood. The German chancellor said he was imbued not with hatred, but with anger, and he spoke the truth, because he reasoned badly, as is usually the case in fits of rage. I could not, even if I chose, imitate their language. An atavistic throwback to primitive barbarism is more difficult for us who have twenty centuries behind us more than they have.

The fundamental thesis of the statesmen of central Europe is to be found in the words "treason and surprise on the part of Italy toward her faithful allies." It would be easy to ask if he has any right to speak of alliance and respect for treaties who, representing with infinitely less genius, but with equal moral indifference, the tradition of Frederick the Great and Bismarck proclaimed that necessity knows no law, and consented to his country trampling under foot and burying at the bottom of the ocean all the documents and all the customs of

<sup>1</sup> Speech by Antonio Salandra, Italian Premier, in the Capitol at Rome, June 2, 1915.

civilization and international law. But that would be too easy an argument. Let us examine, on the contrary, positively and calmly, if our former allies are entitled to say that they were betrayed and surprised by us.

Our aspirations had long been known, as was also our judgment on the act of criminal madness by which they shook the world and robbed the alliance itself of its closest *raison d'être*. The Green Book prepared by Baron Sonnino, with whom it is the pride of my life to stand united in entire harmony in this solemn hour after thirty years of friendship, shows the long, difficult, and useless negotiations that took place between December and May. But it is not true, as has been asserted without a shadow of foundation, that the ministry reconstituted last November made a change in the direction of our international policy. The Italian government, whose policy has never changed, severely condemned, at the very moment when it learned of it, the aggression of Austria against Serbia, and foresaw the consequences of that aggression, consequences which had not been foreseen by those who had premeditated the stroke with such lack of conscience.

In effect, Austria, in consequence of the terms in which her note was couched and in consequence of the things demanded, which, while of little effect against the Pan-Serbian danger, were profoundly offensive to Serbia, and indirectly so to Russia, had clearly shown that she wished to provoke war. Hence we declared to Von Flotow that, in consequence of this procedure on the part of Austria and in consequence of the defensive and conservative character of the Triple Alliance treaty, Italy was under no obligation to assist Austria if, as the result of this *démarche*, she found herself at war with Russia, because any European war would in such an event be the consequence of the act of provocation and aggression committed by Austria.

The Italian government on July 27 and 28 emphasized in clear and unmistakable language to Berlin and Vienna the question of the cession of the Italian provinces subject to Austria, and we declared that if we did not obtain adequate compensation the Triple Alliance would have been irreparably broken. Impartial history will say that Austria, having found Italy in July, 1913, and in October, 1913, hostile to her inten-

tions of aggression against Serbia attempted last summer, in agreement with Germany, the method of surprise and the *fait accompli*.

The horrible crime of Serajevo was exploited as a pretext a month after it happened—this was proved by the refusal of Austria to accept the very extensive offers of Serbia—nor at the moment of the general conflagration would Austria have been satisfied with the unconditional acceptance of the ultimatum. Count Berchtold on July 31 declared to the Duke of Avarna that, if there had been a possibility of mediation being exercised, it could not have interrupted hostilities, which had already begun with Serbia. This was the mediation for which Great Britain and Italy were working. In any case, Count Berchtold was not disposed to accept mediation tending to weaken the conditions indicated in the Austrian note, which, naturally, would have been increased at the end of the war.

If, moreover, Serbia had decided meanwhile to accept the aforementioned note in its entirety, declaring herself ready to agree to the conditions imposed on her, that would not have persuaded Austria to cease hostilities. It is not true, as Count Tisza declared, that Austria did not undertake to make territorial acquisitions to the detriment of Serbia, who moreover, by accepting all the conditions imposed upon her, would have become a subject state. The Austrian ambassador, Herr Merey von Kapos-Mere, on July 30, stated to the Marquis di San Giuliano that Austria could not make a binding declaration on this subject, because she could not foresee whether, during the war, she might not be obliged, against her will, to keep Serbian territory.

On July 29 Count Berchtold stated to the Duke of Avarna that he was not inclined to enter into any engagement concerning the eventual conduct of Austria in the case of a conflict with Serbia.

Where is, then, the treason, the iniquity, the surprise, if, after nine months of vain efforts to reach an honorable understanding which recognized in equitable measure our rights and our liberties, we resumed liberty of action? The truth is that Austria and Germany believed until the last days that they had to deal with an Italy weak, blustering, but not acting, capable of trying blackmail, but not enforcing by arms her good right,

with an Italy which could be paralyzed by spending a few millions, and which by dealings which she could not avow was placing herself between the country and the government.

I will not deny the benefits of the alliance; benefits, however, not one-sided, but accruing to all the contracting parties, and perhaps not more to us than to the others. The continued suspicions and the aggressive intentions of Austria against Italy are notorious and are authentically proved. The chief of the general staff, Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf, always maintained that war against Italy was inevitable, either on the question of the irredentist provinces or from jealousy, that Italy intended to aggrandize herself as soon as she was prepared, and meanwhile opposed everything that Austria wished to undertake in the Balkans, and consequently it was necessary to humiliate her in order that Austria might have her hands free, and he deplored that Italy had not been attacked in 1907. Even the Austrian minister of foreign affairs recognized that in the military party the opinion was prevalent that Italy must be suppressed by war because from the Kingdom of Italy came the attractive force of the Italian provinces of the empire, and consequently by a victory over the kingdom and its political annihilation all hope for the irredentists would cease.

We see now on the basis of documents how our allies aided us in the Lybian undertaking. The operations brilliantly begun by the Duke of the Abruzzi against the Turkish torpedo boats encountered at Preveza were stopped by Austria in a sudden and absolute manner. Count Aehrenthal on October 1 informed our ambassador at Vienna that our operations had made a painful impression upon him and that he could not allow them to be continued. It was urgently necessary, he said, to put an end to them and to give orders to prevent them from being renewed, either in Adriatic or in Ionian waters. The following day the German ambassador at Vienna, in a still more threatening manner, confidently informed our ambassador that Count Aehrenthal had requested him to telegraph to his government to give the Italian government to understand that if it continued its naval operations in the Adriatic and in the Ionian Seas it would have to deal directly with Austria-Hungary.

And it was not only in the Adriatic and in the Ionian Seas that Austria paralyzed our actions. On November 5 Count Aehrenthal informed the Duke of Avarna that he had learned

that Italian warships had been reported off Saloniki, where they had used electric searchlights, and declared that our action on the Ottoman coasts of European Turkey, as well as on the Ægean Islands, could not have been allowed either by Austria-Hungary or by Germany, because it was contrary to the Triple Alliance treaty.

In March, 1912, Count Berchtold, who had in the meantime succeeded Count Aehrenthal, declared to the German ambassador in Vienna that, in regard to our operations against the coasts of European Turkey and the Ægean Islands, he adhered to the point of view of Count Aehrenthal, according to which these operations were considered by the Austro-Hungarian government contrary to the engagement entered into by us by Article VII of the Triple Alliance treaty. As for our operations against the Dardanelles, he considered it opposed, first, to the promise made by us not to proceed to any act which might endanger the *status quo* in the Balkans, and, secondly, to the spirit of the same treaty, which was based on the maintenance of the *status quo*.

Afterward, when our squadron at the entrance to the Dardanelles was bombarded by Fort Kumkalessi and replied, damaging that fort, Count Berchtold complained of what had happened, considering it contrary to the promises we had made, and declared that if the Italian government desired to resume its liberty of action, the Austro-Hungarian government could have done the same. He added that he could not have allowed us to undertake in the future similar operations or operations in any way opposed to this point of view. In the same way our projected occupation of Chios was prevented. It is superfluous to remark how many lives of Italian soldiers and how many millions were sacrificed through the persistent vetoing of our actions against Turkey, who knew that she was protected by our allies against all attacks on her vital parts.

We were bitterly reproached for not having accepted the offers made toward the end of May, but were these offers made in good faith? Certain documents indicate that they were not. Francis Joseph said that Italy was regarding the patrimony of his house with greedy eyes. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg said that the aim of these concessions was to purchase our neutrality, and, therefore, gentlemen, you may applaud us for not having accepted them. Moreover, these concessions, even in their last



and belated edition, in no way responded to the objectives of Italian policy, which are, first, the defense of Italianism, the greatest of our duties; secondly, a secure military frontier, replacing that which was imposed upon us in 1866, by which all the gates of Italy are open to our adversaries; thirdly, a strategical situation in the Adriatic less dangerous and unfortunate than that which we have, and of which you have seen the effects in the last few days. All these essential advantages were substantially denied us.

To our minimum demand for the granting of independence to Trieste the reply was to offer Trieste administrative autonomy. Also the question of fulfilling the promises was very important. We were told not to doubt that they would be fulfilled, because we should have Germany's guarantee, but if at the end of the war Germany had not been able to keep it, what would our position have been? And in any case, after this agreement, the Triple Alliance would have been renewed, but in much less favorable conditions, for there would have been one sovereign state and two subject states.

On the day when one of the clauses of the treaty was not fulfilled, or on the day when the municipal autonomy of Trieste was violated by an imperial decree or by a lieutenant's orders, to whom should we have addressed ourselves? To our common superior—to Germany? I do not wish to speak of Germany to you without admiration and respect. I am the Italian prime minister, not the German chancellor, and I do not lose my head. But with all respect for the learned, powerful, and great Germany, an admirable example of organization and resistance, in the name of Italy I declare for no subjection and no protectorate over any one. The dream of a universal hegemony is shattered. The world has risen. The peace and civilization of future humanity must be founded on respect for existing national autonomies. Among these Germany will have to sit as an equal, and not as a master.

But a more remarkable example of the unmeasured pride with which the directors of German policy regard other nations is given in the picture which Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg drew of the Italian political world.

I do not know if it was the intention of this man, blinded by rage, personally to insult my colleagues and me. If that was the case, I should not mention it. We are men whose life

you know, men who have served the state to an advanced age, men of spotless renown, men who have given the lives of their children for their country.

The information on which this judgment was based is attributed by the German chancellor to him whom he calls the best judge of Italian affairs. Perhaps he alludes to Prince Bülow, with the brotherly desire to shoulder responsibilities upon him. Now, I do not wish you to entertain an erroneous idea of Prince Bülow's intentions. I believe that he had sympathies for Italy, and did all he could to bring about an agreement. But how great and how numerous were the mistakes he made in translating his good intentions into action! He thought that Italy could be diverted from her path by a few millions ill-spent and by the influence of a few persons who have lost touch with the soul of the nation, by contact, attempted, but, I hope, not accomplished, with certain politicians.

The effect was the contrary. An immense outburst of indignation was kindled throughout Italy, and not among the populace, but among the noblest and most educated classes and among all the youth of the country, which is ready to shed its blood for the nation. This outburst of indignation was kindled as the result of the suspicion that a foreign ambassador was interfering between the Italian government, the Parliament, and the country. In the blaze thus kindled internal discussions melted away, and the whole nation was joined in a wonderful moral union, which will prove our greatest source of strength in the severe struggle which faces us, and which must lead us by our own virtue, and not by benevolent concessions from others, to the accomplishment of the highest destinies of the country.

## ITALY IN THE WAR<sup>1</sup>

On May 4 Italy denounced the Triple Alliance, and from that moment war with the Central Empires was virtually proclaimed. It was just nine months from the outbreak of hostilities. Since the interval had been filled with incessant negotiation, there has been a tendency to judge to the moral disadvantage of Italy her months of calculated waiting. There

<sup>1</sup> Reprinted from the *Unpopular Review*, July, 1915, p. 17-26.

seems something a little unhandsome, not to say sordid, in so bargaining oneself into war. Our ill-informed American press very generally took this view. Such a judgment of Italy's policy, will I think, hardly be held by those who fairly analyze the very complex situation that lay before her. Honestly torn in many directions, it was impossible for her to make the straightforward response of a France, Russia, or England. Her final decision was less the result of a sudden national urge than of a gradual concentration of many and conflicting motives. In these circumstances all that one can require of Italy is clearheadedness and sagacity. Those qualities, I feel, she has shown in a high degree. Nor was her choice uninfluenced by more ideal motives. Indeed the subtle interweaving of material and ideal aims into a firm fabric of policy, makes the Italian case particularly attractive and instructive to students of statecraft. Let us follow the threads singly.

At the outset of the war Italy found herself in the disadvantageous position of aggrieved and neglected partner of the Central Empires. To Austria and Germany she was bound by the defensive pact, the Triple Alliance. Immediately she was forced to offend her allies by declaring them aggressors. The alternative was to enter to her disadvantage into a war about which she had not been consulted. Under the treaty, her right to be consulted was clear. Apart from his general right, her especial interests in the Adriatic were ignored. She had to face the prospect of a new partition of the Balkan region. Under the Triple Alliance she was assured of territorial compensation in case of any aggrandizement of Austria and Germany. But Germany and Austria without offering compensation of any sort to Italy were plainly setting out on a career of territorial conquest. In short, Italy was morally freed from what had always been an onerous obligation, from the moment that Austria and Germany cast the European situation into chaos, to Italy's probable disadvantage, without Italy's assent or will, and in disregard of Italy's treaty rights. From the moment of the Austrian and German ultimatums the Triple Alliance was annulled *de jure*. Its abrogation *de facto*, nine months later, was almost a superfluity, a mere courtesy that Italy owed to herself.

Italy promptly and duly asserted her complete liberty of action. It was, however, far from a comfortable freedom.

She had to fear from her former allies, Germany and Austria, in the event of their military success, a vindictive revenge. On the other hand, her obvious policy of joining the allies was beset with moral and material difficulties. It is an ugly thing, even when one is in one's good right, to fight today against the partner of yesterday. Moreover Italy, deep in debt for the Tripolitan campaign, was not ready to fight. There was as well a firmly rooted conviction among the manufacturing and banking classes that a correct neutrality would actually pay better than a doubtful war against former allies. Even those who believed Italy's destiny required war, might well have been in doubt when to turn. Supposing the people would permit adherence to the Central Empires—and that was never seriously among the possibilities—the Central Empires seemed destined to defeat, while their promises to Italy were both conditional upon their victory and upon the still more uncertain consideration of their good faith. *Teutonica fides*, after the violation of Belgium and the rending of The Hague war conventions was something less than a satisfactory guarantee. But the better and more popular alternative of joining the allies was also none too easy. How far Russia and Serbia would admit Italy's aspiration to control the Adriatic was doubtful. The probable admission of Russia to the Mediterranean threatened an unfavorable readjustment of naval power. Other considerations opposing a quick decision were the pro-German sympathies of the royal family and court, and the pacifist tendencies of the ultra-Socialists. Besides, the ex-premier and veteran opportunist Giolitti, with a strong personal following in Parliament very embarrassing to the cabinet, had taken his stand on the principle that Italy should not fight. Clearly it needed time for this complex of interests to settle into a unified national sentiment.

Still to the credit of the foresight of Italy's rulers it should be said that, whatever turn the negotiations took, Italy consistently acted like a nation that meant to fight. An enormous work of army organization and supply was steadily effected, the necessary financial measures were taken. The war spirit grew apace, while the government prudently kept it within bounds. Between dealing with a victorious and vengeful Germany, and helping to accomplish her defeat, I cannot suppose that the government ever really hesitated. It was from the first merely a question of going in to best advantage and

getting the best terms. The prolonged negotiation with Austria should be regarded merely as a tactical and dilatory move. Italy, while free from her old pact, lacked ostensible provocation. Such ground was found correctly enough in Clause VII of the Triple Alliance, under which any signatory altering the territorial *status quo* should make a "previous agreement . . . based upon the principle of reciprocal compensation for all territorial or other advantages" that any signatory "might acquire over and above the existing *status quo*."

So Italy proceeded to ascertain her rights under the moribund Triple Alliance. Austria finally made partial and unsatisfactory promises to cede the Italian-speaking portions of the Trentino and of the Adriatic littoral. Such engagements were indefinite, being based not on geographical but racial divisions, and susceptible of various interpretation. Besides, the concessions were to be effective only after the war. Italy trusted no such repudiable scraps of paper. From Austria, for that matter, Italy neither desired nor expected satisfaction. The whole negotiation was merely a manœuvre to gain time for military preparation, and to afford a creditable exit from the old entanglement.

It is the failure to perceive the entirely tactical character of the dealings with Austria that has vitiated most American comment. Even as well informed a journal as the New York Evening Post writes: "It is to be presumed that the allies have outbid the concessions and promises of Austria and Germany." This is a perfunctory and erroneous appraisal of what should be a clear issue. From Germany and Austria Italy never had anything to expect save eventual chastisement. It was only a question of how and when she should fight, not merely for her national aspirations but also for her national existence. Nor were the negotiations with Austria of a sort to deceive anyone. They were merely a result of the false position that Italy occupied as Austria's ally. When in mid-winter Italy occupied the Albanian port of Avalona she showed her hand. But already Premier Salandra's pronouncement for "armed neutrality" could be read only in one way. When on March 22, the German and Austrian consuls advised their nationals to quit Italy they expressed an expert judgment that Italy's military preparations were complete, and war imminent.

As a matter of fact, everything was ready except to eliminate

Giolitti with his peace-at-any-price adherents, and to change the somewhat anxious neutrality of the king into a desire for action. When late in April Salandra's cabinet resigned, finding the embarrassment of the Giolittians intolerable, the issue was referred from the government to the people. At Rome, Florence, Milan, and other great cities there were the most unequivocal demonstrations demanding war. The Salandra cabinet returned to power. Italy was in all respects ready, and the formalities of a Parliamentary vote for war on May 21, and a royal declaration of war on May 23 merely confirmed a decision that had been already made in the hearts of fifty million people. For the opportunist *Triplicista* Giolitti the hour had passed. He publicly declared his intention no longer to interfere, and was soon to be a voluntary exile from a land whose deepest moral convictions he had affronted.

Why did the Italian people want war? From a complex of motives, some material, others of an ideal sort. Dislike of the Teuton is deep-rooted among the people. The aged heroes of the *Risorgimento* are still living. The memory of Austrian oppression is still vivid. Every Italian schoolboy is taught to regard the Austrians as hereditary foes, just as every well-regulated American schoolboy of the '60s and '70s was brought up more or less of an Anglophobe. This is the legacy of history, an imponderable motive but a strong one. A more personal dislike of the Teuton is caused by the swarm of German tourists who incessantly over-run the peninsula. Grotesquely clad, noisy, overbearing, demanding much and paying little, they commit manifold and repeated offenses against the Latin notions of courtesy. The *Tedeschi* hurt more by their condescending rough-shod amiability than they do by their arrogance. They constitute for the eminently gentle and decorous folk of Italy a kind of plague. The Italian sighs with characteristic resignation, and sums up his opinion of the Germans in the statement that he finds them "antipathetic." The business success of resident Germans has given the racial prejudice a more interested tinge. From the banks to the inevitable Gambrinus Halle you find the German marvellously thriving. There was a sense that Italian commerce, finance, and manufacture were being honeycombed by German enterprise—the germ of a political Knownothingism. These prejudices are evidently of the more unhandsome sort, yet they had to be reck-

oned with, and any fair allotment of the responsibility would bear heavily against Germany. She was disliked by a people naturally most open-minded and hospitable. It was easy for an Englishman, an American, a Frenchman, a Russian to find a welcome in Italy, but not for a German.

Unquestionably, however, the resurgence of Latin ambition counted for much in the decision. Without taking too seriously the perfervid titanism of D'Annunzio and the looser sensationalism of the futurist Marinetti, the notion of a Latin renaissance has been strong in Italian hearts. Withal the more vigorous Italians have been not quite proud of her recent history. Italy exists less by virtue of her might than as a product of the bargaining genius of Cavour. In a military way she has yet to prove herself. This was, even among her more thoughtful leaders, a reason for not evading the present ordeal. It was her chance to count greatly in Roman fashion, with the alternative of fastening upon herself indelibly the disrepute of being a mere trafficker. While one cannot rate this type of patriotism highly on any moral scale, it is at least disinterested. There entered into it also magnanimous emulation of the sister nation, France, nobly spending her best blood in the cause of freedom. From the first, Italy, as a free nation only lately liberated from oppression, was morally committed against German oligarchy, and to the parliamentary states. Again such a fealty belongs to the imponderables, but also to more powerful sort of moral incentives.

Finally, Italy has shared to the full the horror of all civilization against the Teuton warfare of barbarity. The mother of modern scholarship, the land of libraries, Italy was appalled, as was no other nation, by the sacking of Louvain. The custodian of innumerable monuments, which even centuries of war have spared, Italy felt as no other nation could the wanton destruction of the Cathedral of Rheims. My Italian cook, seeing a photograph of that noble façade, remarked, "They want to leave nothing venerable outside of Germany." It was an eminently Italian sentiment. As insensate Germany has added horror to horror and cruelty to cruelty, the grim conviction has grown that such deeds must be stopped, and that, if necessary, Italy must help pay the dire price of stopping them. It is a sentiment that has morally arrayed all civilization against Germany, and must eventually draw enough free nations into the war to effect her overthrow.

Such is Italy's case. She goes into the war for self-preservation and for furthering her legitimate national aspirations. She marches to relieve her exiled fellow countrymen who live in oppression. She moves to vindicate her valor. In so doing she takes her place beside natives akin to her in tongue, race, institutions, or love of liberty. She draws her sword to abate intolerable wrong and cruelty. She thrusts back in advance ruthless foes who would make targets of her towers and domes. In the last analysis, she fights to avert from her women and children the hazard of a lot more terrible than Goth or Lombard, Hun or Vandal, Northman or Saracen conqueror ever inflicted.

Her severest critics chiefly reproach her with her delay and prolonged negotiations. It seems to me that precisely in this is shown her fine Latin lucidity. Caught without fault of her own in a false diplomatic position, she had first to extricate herself: she has done so wisely; she needed to perfect her military organization: she now enters the war, as the Russian fortunes wane, at the moment and in the condition to do most good to her allies; she had to create a unified national sentiment: she has completed the work, and is today the single nation fighting by clear popular mandate. There are hundreds of cases of nations who have plunged heedlessly into war. Has any nation ever delayed to better purpose? Italy enters the world war, in her own time, and with clean hands. Will anyone who has fairly considered her case maintain that her fight for imperative national interest is merely sordid? She fights indeed for national interest, but, as in the great days of the *Risorgimento*, national interest enlists and comprises her finest enthusiasms, her highest ideality.

### CAUSES OF ITALY'S ACTION<sup>1</sup>

There are two Italys. One is the Italy of intrigue; the other the Italy of idealism. One is the Italy of Machiavelli; the other the Italy of Mazzini, of Garibaldi. One is the Italy of astute diplomacy; the other the Italy of popular enthusiasm.

Which Italy is it that has now entered the war?

Italy's enemies say it is the Italy of Machiavelli, the Italy

<sup>1</sup> From the Outlook, June 2, 1915, p. 252-3.



of intrigue, of official diplomacy. Italy, they say, waited until she saw which way the struggle was going, meantime bargaining for land; then, forgetting her obligations as a member of the Triple Alliance, she chose at the critical moment to turn against her old allies for the sake of a share in the spoils.

Is this a just judgment? We believe it is not. This is not to say that Italy during these months of war has given herself over to unthinking enthusiasm and has forgotten her skill in diplomacy. On the contrary, Italy's statesmen during these months have shown themselves worthy successors of those who helped to form Italy's great diplomatic traditions. Diplomacy does not necessarily mean intrigue, perfidy, selfishness. On the contrary, Italy's greatest diplomat and statesman united diplomacy with the cause of liberty, and used his statesmanship for the establishment of national unity based on freedom. And today, thanks to Cavour, Italy has grown to be a great nation under one of the most democratic of kings.

The Italy that has entered this war is not the Italy of Machiavelli, the Italy of diplomatic intrigue; neither is it the Italy of mere radical idealism, the Italy of Mazzini. It is rather the Italy of Cavour—the Italy of both liberation and statesmanship.

Two years ago Italy had her warning. Then Austria and Germany proposed to do what they are doing now. They called upon Italy for support. Italy said, No. Germany held Austria in leash. A year later—last June and —July—Austria and Germany, without consulting their ally, Italy, united in their aggression upon Servia.

It is Austria that has brought Italy into the war. There may be found in history two Italys, but so far as international relations are concerned, only one Austria. Austria has never had a Cavour. And when last July she made war on Servia, repudiating all chance of peaceful settlement, declining the intervention of other powers, and ignoring the rights and interests of her ally Italy, she made war on all of democratic Europe, and directly affronted and threatened Italy herself.

If Italy had then joined forces with France, England, and Russia, she would have been justified. But Italy was patient and waited. Thereupon began the interesting struggle between the two Italys within herself, between the two forces of official authority and of public opinion.

During the intervening months it has been clear that public opinion has been urging Italy into the war, and that official authority has been restraining Italy from war. Now at last official authority has yielded to public opinion and Italy has joined the allies.

The official has been thinking largely of Italy's territorial opportunities, of its relation to the governments of other countries, of its future position geographically and diplomatically. He has also known what the possibilities of war are, what preparation for war involves, and what the results of war may be. The man-in-the-street, on the other hand, is moved by more primitive instincts. He has not been anxious to get into the war for the sake of getting territory; he has not been concerned very much about the strategic value of a strait here or a harbor there. The common people of Italy have, rather, been moved by a common impulse toward national liberty and national unity, and they have been affected by their memories of what has happened to Italy in the past. The Italian people remember their struggle for liberation, and they remember that in that struggle their worst foreign foe was Austria. And mingled with their feelings aroused by the memory of their past is a feeling of comradeship for Italians living under Austrian rule across the Adriatic.

The Italian people may be mistaken, but they are not bent on a war of selfish aggression, they are not stirred by mere desire for self-defense, although they dimly see the dangers to Italy that would follow a defeat for the cause of the allies. The disappearance of the revolutionary spirit and of discontent shows that they have become united, as the Russian people have become united and the French people have become united, in the face of what each believes to be a great national cause.

In entering the war on the side of liberty, democracy, and international law Italy places herself where she belongs. Under these circumstances war can only have upon the people of Italy the effect of unification, and upon Europe it will have the effect of making heavier the punishment that is destined to fall upon those who, in the name of autocracy, have trampled under foot the public law of nations.



# **THE UNITED STATES AND THE WAR**



# NEUTRALITY OF THE UNITED STATES

## OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT WILSON<sup>1</sup>

SIR: I petition you to invite the neutral powers to confer with the United States of America for the purpose of requesting Britain, France, and Germany to withdraw from the soil of Belgium and fight out their quarrel on their own territories. However the sympathies of the neutral states may be divided, and whatever points now at issue between the belligerent powers may be doubtful, there is one point on which there can be neither division nor doubt, and that is that the belligerent armies have no right to be in Belgium, much less to fight in Belgium, and involve the innocent inhabitants of that country in their reciprocal slaughter. You will not question my right to address this petition to you. You are the official head of the nation that is beyond all question or comparison the chief of the neutral powers, marked out from all the rest by commanding magnitude, by modern democratic constitution, and by freedom from the complication of monarchy and its traditions, which have led Europe into the quaint absurdity of a war waged formally between the German kaiser, the German czar, the German king of the Belgians, the German king of England, the German emperor of Austria, and a gentleman who shares with you the distinction of not being related to any of them, and is therefore describable monarchically as one Poincaré, a Frenchman.

I make this petition on its merits, without claiming any representative character except such as attaches to me as a human being. Nobody here has asked me to do it. Except among the large class of constitutional beggars, the normal English feeling is that it is no use asking for a thing if you feel certain that it will be refused, and are not in a position to enforce compliance. Also, that the party whose request is refused and not enforced looks ridiculous. Many Englishmen will say that a request to the belligerents to evacuate Belgium

<sup>1</sup> By George Bernard Shaw. Reprinted from the Nation (London), November 7, 1914.

forthwith would be refused; could not be enforced; and would make the asker ridiculous. We are, in short, not a prayerful nation. But to you it will be clear that even the strongest power, or even allied group of powers, can have its position completely changed by an expression of the public opinion of the rest of the world. In your clear western atmosphere and in your peculiarly responsible position as the head and center of western democracy, you, when the European situation became threatening three months ago, must have been acutely aware of the fact to which Europe was so fatally blinded—namely, that the simple solution of the difficulty in which the menace of the Franco-Russo-British entente placed Germany was for the German emperor to leave his western frontier under the safeguard of the neighborliness and good faith of American, British, and French democracy, and then await quite calmly any action that Russia might take against his country on the east. Had he done so, we could not have attacked him from behind; and had France made such an attack—and it is in the extremest degree improbable that French public opinion would have permitted such a hazardous and unjustifiable adventure—he would at worst have confronted it with the fullest sympathy of Britain and the United States, and at best with their active assistance. Unhappily, German kings do not allow democracy to interfere in their foreign policy; do not believe in neighborliness; and do believe in cannon and cannon fodder. The kaiser never dreamed of confiding his frontier to you and to the humanity of his neighbors. And the diplomatists of Europe never thought of that easy and right policy, and could not suggest any substitute for it, with the hideous result which is before you.

Now that this mischief has been done, and the two European thunderclouds have met and are discharging their lightnings, it is not for me to meddle with the question whether the United States should take a side in their warfare as far as it concerns themselves alone. But I may plead for a perfectly innocent neutral state, the state of Belgium, which is being ravaged in a horrible manner by the belligerents. Her surviving population is flying into all the neighboring countries to escape from the incessant hail of shrapnel and howitzer shells from British cannon, French cannon, German cannon, and, most tragic of all, Belgian cannon; for the Belgian army is being forced to devastate its own country in its own defense.

For this there can be no excuse; and at such a horror the rest of the world cannot look on in silence without incurring the guilt of the bystander who witnesses a crime without even giving the alarm. I grant that Belgium, in her extreme peril, made one mistake. She called to her aid the powers of the entente alone instead of calling on the whole world of kindly men. She should have called on America, too; and it is hard to see how you could in honor have disregarded that call. But if Belgium says nothing, but only turns her eyes dumbly toward you while you look at the red ruin in which her villages, her heaps of slain, her monuments and treasures are being hurled by her friends and enemies alike, are you any the less bound to speak out than if Belgium had asked you to send her a million soldiers?

Not for a moment do I suggest that your intervention should be an intervention on behalf of either the allies or the entente. If you consider both sides equally guilty, we know that you can find reasons for that verdict. But Belgium is innocent; and it is on behalf of Belgium that so much of the world as is still at peace is waiting for a lead from you. No other question need be prejudged. If Germany maintains her claim to a right of way through Belgium on a matter which she believed (however erroneously) to be one of life and death to her as a nation, nobody, not even China, now pretends that such rights of way have not their place among those common human rights which are superior to the more artificial rights of nationality. I think, for example, that if Russia made a descent on your continent under circumstances which made it essential to the maintenance of your national freedom that you should move an army through Canada, you would ask our leave to do so, and take it by force if we did not grant it. You may reasonably suspect, even if all our statesmen raise a shriek of denial, that we should take a similar liberty under similar circumstances in the teeth of all the scraps of paper in our Foreign Office dustbin. You see, I am frank with you, and fair, I hope, to Germany. But a right of way is not a right of conquest; and even the right of way was not, as the imperial chancellor imagined, a matter of life and death at all, but a militarist hallucination, and one that has turned out, so far, a military mistake. In short, there was no such case of overwhelming necessity as would have made the denial of a right of way to the German army equivalent to a



refusal to save German independence from destruction, and therefore to an act of war against her, justifying a German conquest of Belgium. You can therefore leave the abstract question of international rights of way quite unprejudiced by your action. You can leave every question between the belligerents fully open, and yet, in the common interest of the world, ask Germany to clear out of Belgium, into France or across the channel, if she can, back home if she can force no other passage, but at all events out of Belgium. A like request would, of course, be addressed to Britain and to France at the same time. The technical correctness of our diplomatic position as to Belgium may be unimpeachable; but as the effect of our shells on Belgium is precisely the same as that of the German shells, and as by fighting on Belgian soil we are doing her exactly the same injury that we should have done her if the violation of her neutrality had been initiated by us instead of by Germany, we could not decently refuse to fall in with a general evacuation.

At all events, your intervention could not fail to produce at least the result that even if the belligerents refused to comply, your request would leave them in an entirely new and very unpleasant relation to public opinion. No matter how powerful a state is, it is not above feeling the vast difference between doing something that nobody condemns and something that everybody condemns except the interested parties.

That difference alone would be well worth your pains. But it is by no means a foregone conclusion that a blank refusal would be persisted in. Germany must be aware that the honor of England is now so bound up with the complete redemption of Belgium from the German occupation that to keep Antwerp and Brussels she must take Portsmouth and London. France is no less deeply engaged. You can judge better than I what chance Germany now has, or can persuade herself she has, of exhausting or overwhelming her western enemies without ruining herself in the attempt. Whatever else the war and its horrors may have done or not done, you will agree with me that it has made an end of the dreams of military and naval steam-rolling in which the whole wretched business began. At a cost which the conquest of a whole continent would hardly justify, these terrible armaments and the heroic hosts which wield them push one another a

few miles back and forward in a month, and take and retake some miserable village three times over in less than a week. Can you doubt that though we have lost all fear of being beaten (our darkened towns, and the panics of our papers, with their endless scares and silly inventions, are mere metropolitan hysteria), we are getting very tired of a war in which, having now reestablished our old military reputation, and taught the Germans that there is no future for their empire without our friendship and that of France, we have nothing more to gain? In London and Paris and Berlin nobody at present dares say "Sirs, ye are brethren; why do ye wrong one to another?"; for the slightest disposition toward a Christian view of things is regarded as a shooting matter in these capitals; but Washington is still privileged to talk common humanity to the nations.

Finally, I may remind you of another advantage which your aloofness from the conflict gives you. Here, in England and in France, men are going to the front every day; their women and children are all within earshot; and no man is hard-hearted enough to say the worst that might be said of what is going on in Belgium now. We talk to you of Louvain and Rheims in the hope of enlisting you on our side or prejudicing you against the Germans, forgetting how sorely you must be tempted to say as you look on at what we are doing, "Well, if European literature, as represented by the library of Louvain, and European religion, as represented by the Cathedral of Rheims, have not got us beyond this, in God's name let them perish." I am thinking of other things—of the honest Belgians, whom I have seen nursing their wounds, and whom I recognize at a glance as plain men, innocent of all warlike intentions, trusting to the wisdom and honesty of the rulers and diplomatists who have betrayed them, taken from their farms and their businesses to destroy and be destroyed for no good purpose that might not have been achieved better and sooner by neighborly means. I am thinking of the authentic news that no papers dare publish, not of the lies that they all publish to divert attention from the truth. In America these things can be said without driving American mothers and wives mad; here, we have to set our teeth and go forward. We cannot be just; we cannot see beyond the range of our guns. The roar of the shrapnel deafens us; the black smoke of the howitzer blinds us;

and what these do to our bodily senses our passions do to our imaginations. For justice, we must do as the mediæval cities did—call in a stranger. You are not altogether that to us; but you can look at all of us impartially. And you are the spokesman of Western democracy. That is why I appeal to you.

## AMERICA SHOULD INTERFERE<sup>1</sup>

We are a people different from, but akin, to all the nations of Europe. We should feel a real friendship for each of the contesting powers and a real desire to work so as to secure justice for each. This cannot be done by preserving a tame and spiritless neutrality which treats good and evil on precisely the same basis. Such a neutrality never has enabled and never will enable any nation to do a great work for righteousness. Our true course should be to judge each nation on its conduct, unhesitatingly to antagonize every nation that does ill as regards the point on which it does ill, and equally without hesitation to act, as cool-headed and yet generous wisdom may dictate, so as disinterestedly to further the welfare of all.

One of the greatest of international duties ought to be the protection of small, highly civilized, well-behaved and self-respecting states from oppression and conquest by their powerful military neighbors. Such nations as Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Uruguay, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden play a great and honorable part in the development of civilization. The subjugation of any one of them is a crime against, the destruction of one of them is a loss to, mankind. I feel the strongest way that we should have interfered, at least to the extent of the most emphatic diplomatic protest and at the very outset—and then by whatever further action was necessary—in regard to the violation of the neutrality of Belgium; for this act was the earliest and the most important and, in its consequences, the most ruinous of all the violations and offenses against treaties committed by any combatant during the war. But it was not the only one. The Japanese and English forces not long after violated Chinese neutrality in attacking Kiao-Chau. It has been alleged and not

<sup>1</sup> From "America and the World War," by Theodore Roosevelt. Copyright, 1915, by Charles Scribner's Sons, and reprinted here by permission of the publishers.

denied that the British ship "Highflier" sunk the "Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse" in neutral Spanish waters, this being also a violation of the Hague conventions; and on October 10 the German government issued an official protest about alleged violations of the Geneva convention by the French. Furthermore, the methods employed in strewing portions of the seas with floating mines have been such as to warrant the most careful investigation by any neutral nations which treat neutrality pacts and Hague conventions as other than merely dead letters. Not a few offenses have been committed against our own people.

If, instead of observing a timid and spiritless neutrality, we had lived up to our obligations by taking action in all of these cases without regard to which power it was that was alleged to have done wrong, we would have followed the only course that would both have told for world righteousness and have served our own self-respect. The course actually followed by Messrs. Wilson, Bryan, and Daniels has been to permit our own power for self-defense steadily to diminish while at the same time refusing to do what we were solemnly bound to do in order to protest against wrong and to render some kind of aid to weak nations that had been wronged. Inasmuch as, in the first and greatest and the most ruinous case of violation of neutral rights and of international morality, this nation, under the guidance of Messrs. Wilson and Bryan, kept timid silence and dared not protest, it would be—and is—an act of deliberate bad faith to protest only as regards subsequent and less important violations. Of course, if, as a people, we frankly take the ground that our actions are based upon nothing whatever but our own selfish and short-sighted interest, it is possible to protest only against violations of neutrality that at the moment unfavorably affect our own interests. Inaction is often itself the most offensive form of action; the administration has persistently refused to live up to the solemn national obligations to strive to protect other unoffending nations from wrong; and this conduct adds a peculiar touch of hypocrisy to the action taken at the same time in signing a couple of score of all-inclusive arbitration treaties pretentiously heralded as serving world righteousness. If we had acted as we ought to have acted regarding Belgium we could then with a clear conscience have made effective protest regarding every other case of violation of the rights of neutrals or of offenses committed by belligerents against one another or against

us in violation of the Hague conventions. Moreover, the attitude of the administration has not even placated the powers it was desired to please. Thanks to its action, the United States during the last five months has gained neither the good-will nor the respect of any of the combatants. On the contrary, it has steadily grown rather more disliked and rather less respected by all of them.

In facing a difficult and critical situation, any administration is entitled to a free hand until it has had time to develop the action which it considers appropriate, for often there is more than one way in which it is possible to take efficient action. But when so much time has passed, either without action or with only mischievous action, as gravely to compromise both the honor and the interest of the country, then it becomes a duty for self-respecting citizens to whom their country is dear to speak out. From the very outset I felt that the administration was following a wrong course. But no action of mine could make it take the right course, and there was a possibility that there was some object aside from political advantage in the course followed. I kept silence as long as silence was compatible with regard for the national honor and welfare. I spoke only when it became imperative to speak under penalty of tame acquiescence in tame failure to perform national duty. It has become evident that the administration has had no plan whatever save the dexterous avoidance of all responsibility and therefore of all duty, and the effort to persuade our people as a whole that this inaction was for their interest—combined with other less openly expressed and less worthy efforts of purely political type.

## RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRALITY<sup>1</sup>

In the present war America is neutral, Americans are not neutral. This paradox is easily explained. In the first instance the word neutral is used in an international sense; in the second instance it is used in a moral sense. Internationally the United States is out of the war; morally its people are in it and in it just to the extent that they have moral convictions.

<sup>1</sup> From "Made in Germany," by Franklin M. Sprague. Copyright, 1915, by the Pilgrim Press, and reprinted here by permission of the publishers.

Our president in his proclamation of neutrality warns the people against hasty and partisan speech. Men of all nations are among us as neighbors. War stirs the deepest emotions. Thus far we agree with him. We are, however, moral beings and freedom of speech and of the press are corner stones of this republic. There are vast moral and political issues involved in this war, and Americans have a legitimate and profound interest in them.

We cannot, therefore, agree with the President in urging a complete neutrality of thought. We are bound to treat all belligerents alike but we are not bound to *think* of them alike. Neutrality does not mean that the government or the people shall have no opinions about the war or refrain from expressing them. It does not mean that they may not consider its causes and consequences, or that they are indifferent to the issues involved, or the manner in which the war is carried on. It does not hinder the people from criticising the belligerents. It requires neutral nations to assert and protect their own rights when threatened by belligerents, and, in case international laws governing the conduct of war are violated by any belligerent, it is the duty of a neutral, as one of the makers of such laws, to enter a solemn protest.

A subtle and mischievous thing about the discussion of neutrality in our country is the tacit assumption that there are two standards of morality concerning it, one for the private citizen and another for the government. Some say that private citizens may express their opinions, but the government must not criticise or protest against the most outrageous violations of international law by belligerents. Others regard the silence of the government in such cases as cowardly if not criminal.

A double standard of morality is essentially the negation of morality.

When Germany invaded Belgium the neutrality proclaimed by America would have violated law, betrayed Belgium and introduced international anarchy had it not been for a single circumstance, viz.: a release from her old obligations by Belgium.

Belgium had a legal, international and moral right to call upon every nation amenable to international law to help her enforce that law against Germany, who frankly and officially said to the world upon her invasion of Belgium, "*This act is contrary to the rights of nations.*"

As a party to international law, therefore, and upon its confessed violation, the United States had no more right to proclaim neutrality without the consent of Belgium, than she has to proclaim neutrality should one of our states declare war against another, or a foreign power declare war against the state of Massachusetts. Belgium, by implication, gave her consent. She did not call on the United States for help.

The President issued his proclamation of neutrality. It soon became evident that he had gone beyond the requirements of what jurists call "strict" neutrality, or the withholding material assistance from either side, and enjoined neutrality in speech, feeling and thought toward all acts of the belligerents, including the blackest and most colossal crime in history—the invasion of Belgium. Here we have an instance of benevolent neutrality, a friendly leaning to one side. In what did this leaning consist? In the failure to make a solemn protest against Germany's violation of international law in the invasion of Belgium.

In releasing the United States from the obligation of physical support, Belgium did not and could not release us from the duty of protesting against the overthrow of our own common law and the law common to the nations by the act of Germany.

Our failure to make this protest, our acquiescence in this violation of international law and the terrible crime committed, gave Germany a moral advantage over Belgium of great importance. This we repeat is benevolent neutrality. In addition to this, it did violence to the right, dishonored the law, and misrepresented the people who, while they hate war and rejoiced to escape it, regard the obligations of their country, the sovereignty of her laws, her honor as paramount to all other considerations. It should be noted that all other neutral powers followed the example of the United States in consenting, by their silence, to this outrageous breach of the world's laws.

*Benevolent neutrality whether active or passive toward any belligerent is equivalent to an unneutral act.*

Upon the violation of international law, it is the unquestioned legal right and moral duty of every other country belonging to the family of nations, to enter its protest against such violation.

Our distinguished ex-president, William H. Taft, endorses President Wilson's course and says, he "would not have interfered by diplomatic protest regarding the invasion of Belgium." Is a protest interference? To interfere is to meddle in matters that do not concern us. Did not the violation of international

law in the invasion of Belgium concern us? Are we not a member of the family of nations so that international law is our law as well? If so are we "interfering" when we ask that the law be observed? We should constantly bear in mind the fact that all jurists hold that international law is the common law of the land. It was our legal duty, therefore, to protest against its violation in the invasion of Belgium.

There was another and infinitely more binding obligation to protest resting upon the United States, and that was the moral obligation imposed upon us by the behests of our Christian religion and the common conscience of mankind. This is the *Suprema Lex* towering above all human laws and treaties to which all men, all presidents and nations, all kings and potentates and peoples owe immediate and unconditional obedience. Any neutrality that defies this law is vicious and unneutral in its very nature.

It was and still is the mandate of this supreme law, that a solemn protest be made against the unrighteousness of the invasion of Belgium and the hordes of murderers, incendiaries and brigands who were turned loose upon her soil.

Opinions differ as to whether the Hague conventions are binding upon neutrals and belligerents. The last article says that unless all belligerents sign them they are null. Servia did not sign them. If all had signed it is conceded that these conventions would have created a treaty to which the United States was a signatory, and that we should have been bound to protest against its violation; as it is we are not so bound. This is Mr. Taft's position. Is it tenable? Suppose the Hague conventions, as such, are not legally binding, it is a *non sequitur* to infer that we should not protest against their violations. We are not legally bound to be grateful, but it does not follow that we should not protest against ingratitude. What the Hague conventions condemned were moral wrongs. Moreover, pre-existing international law had already forbidden these things, so that they were illegal as well.

#### *Sympathetic Neutrality*

In international law neutrality is refraining from giving material aid to either of the opposing belligerents. It has nothing whatever to do with the *opinions* of the neutral. In other words, legal neutrality does not extend to the feelings, thought or speech of the neutral nation. It is, therefore, an error to say



that the United States should observe the spirit as well as the law of neutrality.

The law of neutrality is one of those *mala prohibita* which imply, *per se*, no moral obligation, while the *spirit* of neutrality goes behind the law and deals with its moral aspects and is a matter of conscience. We have already seen that there is no such thing as moral neutrality.

Our neutrality should be honest and strictly enforced and in these respects the course of President Wilson is to be heartily approved. What is objected to is the attempt by the President and others to import into the simple international principle of neutrality ideas of silence and other elements that are not only foreign to it, but vicious in their nature and mischievous in their consequences.

A mighty nation of one hundred millions of people sees its own and the laws of all governments openly flouted, the peaceable inhabitants of a sister nation slaughtered in cold blood, scores of unoffending merchant ships without a moment's notice torpedoed by pirates and sunk, carrying down men, women and children, and when witnessing this spectacle of fiendish brutality and terrible suffering that curdles the blood and fills us with maddening indignation, are we to be told that neutrality requires the people to be neutral in their thoughts and the government to keep perfectly silent? Sympathetic neutrality answers yes; we answer no.

Sympathetic neutrality eliminates all moral considerations. It would see nothing wrong in the attitude or acts of any of the belligerents. It would treat them all alike. It puts the robber and the robbed, the guilty and the innocent, in the same catalog and would extend sympathy alike to all.

#### *The Responsibility of the United States Respecting the War*

The vastness of our territory, population and wealth, the virility, liberty, intelligence and enterprise of the people, and above all, the high standards of religion and morality that prevail and will be maintained, in spite of temporary drawbacks, combine to make us as a nation the foremost power in the world.

No higher compliment was ever paid us than the recent statement of Earl Grey in London; he said, "The present conflict probably would never have taken place, had the policy of American pacifists, that the signatory nations to the Hague

conventions should undertake collective responsibility for the enforcement of international laws, been adopted." He further says, "The neutral powers who signed the Hague conventions missed a great opportunity by not protesting against the violation of the international regulations that occurred in this war, which probably would have led to a diminution of its horrors."

The neutral powers not only "missed a great opportunity," *they neglected a duty*. This is the point to be emphasized. This is where the United States has signally failed. Our position among the nations, the fact that we proposed at the Hague the very measure that might have prevented this crime, show that we were alive to the importance of maintaining the international laws of war, and the fact that we signed the conventions, thereby agreeing to uphold these laws, renders our failure to protest the more culpable and humiliating.

Had we stoutly protested at the outset of the war, other neutral nations would in all probability have followed our example, for they look to us to take the lead in maintaining neutral rights.

## UNARMED NEUTRALITY<sup>1</sup>

The administration at Washington in its policy of neutrality is navigating a foggy sea strewn with rocks, along coasts where the lighthouses have been put out and the buoys changed into floating mines. President Wilson is still manfully trying to use the regular charts of treaties and international law; and insists upon sailing the good old compass courses. In a world full of roarings and vaporings, the United States is the one great power in the world which continues to base its policy upon permanent lines of good will. Even Italy and China, the only other populous nations of the earth which have not been drawn into the war, find their neutrality strained to the utmost by the demands of neighboring powers. Every belligerent has set up some new and strange doctrines of its own in international affairs, put forward in the hope to realize some small and temporary advantage over its military adversaries. While it is not

<sup>1</sup> From an article by Albert Bushnell Hart, in the *Annals of the American Academy*, July 1915, p. 213-21.

true that international law has for the time being gone into "innocuous desuetude," it is true that the three powers with which we come closest into touch—Great Britain, Germany and France—all make use of what we might call an eclectic international law, choosing the principles that suit them, and filling in the gaps with new ideas of their own.

One reason for the present confusion on this subject is that too much stress has been laid upon documentary international law, such as Hague conferences, Declarations of London, treaties, and the generalizations of the text writers; and too little attention has been paid to the fundamental reasons why there should be neutrals, neutral rights and neutral trade. Hence an international mix-up. Germany notifies the world that the seizure of provision ships and cargoes is so contrary to all principle of international law, that it justifies the sinking of American merchantmen bound to English ports, without even the opportunity for the crew to escape. Then in the Frye case, the Germans insist that the capture of the cargo of the Frye was justified because it was consigned "for orders" to Liverpool, which is a fortified port; and the German presumption was that it was intended for the British government. Germany then turns round and politely promises reparation for the destruction of the vessel because of a treaty of 1828 between Prussia and the United States to which the United States had not alluded. This treaty, by the way, like the Belgian neutrality treaties of 1831 and 1839, was made by Prussia but is recognized as valid by the Empire of Germany; while many German writers have insisted that the Belgian treaties ceased to have binding force when Prussia and other states joined in a federal union.

England is equally illogical. In 1908 that power asked that the question of maritime law in time of war be left out of the Hague discussions, in order that they might be treated in a separate conference in London. The resulting Declaration of London of 1911 was satisfactory to Great Britain and was signed by her representatives, but appears to have been held up by a technicality in the House of Lords. Nevertheless when the present war broke out, Great Britain announces that she will stand by the Declaration of London; then modifies the list of contraband in that declaration; again alters that list to the extent of including rubber as contraband, which by the

declaration is declared to be under no circumstances contraband; then throws the whole theory of contraband to the winds by claiming the right to capture any vessel bound to enemy's ports, or cargoes ultimately destined to enemy's territory. This is not so much a "scrap of paper" as a scrap heap of papers.

The only way out of this mix-up is for the United States to insist, yesterday, today, and every day to the end of the war, that whatever mean or brutal thing the belligerents may do to each other, the United States stands unmoved upon its right to be a neutral and to act as a neutral. From that safe and sane position, steady efforts have been made to drive the United States. Both continental Eurys and insular Boreas have blown with all their might to deflect the United States from its steady middle course. Englishmen write with grief and disappointment of the unwillingness of the United States to realize that the allies are fighting the battles of America; and that we ought to come to their aid by land and sea. Their treatment of our neutral ships, however, is not prepossessing. It gives some color for the German charge that the purpose of Great Britain is to get control of all the seas and make the laws of trade for other nations. On the other side, the Germans, officially, unofficially and German-Americanally insist that the United States has made itself one of the allies by furnishing munitions to the enemies of Germany. We are told that the blood of German soldiers killed by shrapnel manufactured in America will cry out against us. Just what would be the legal status of the blood of British soldiers who were killed for the lack of our shrapnel does not distinctly appear! Nor is it plain how to classify the blood of the Servians, killed by German shrapnel fired from Turkish guns in 1912, and from Bulgarian guns in 1913.

Nevertheless, nothing is clearer than that there is a steady accumulation of anger and hostile feeling toward the United States. The English are not altogether displeased that the United States should remain neutral, because they are getting the goods. The United States shows no moral objection to furnishing superior shrapnel to shed the blood of soldiers in any uniform. The English have driven all but one of the German commerce destroyers off the seas; they are feeding and supplying themselves, notwithstanding the German submarine

campaign; and they are receiving supplies of food and ammunition from the United States in any desired quantity. It is true that they have accomplished this by their superior naval power, combined with a sublime indifference to their own principles of neutral trade.

The Germans, however, are in a very different case. Quite contrary to their expectations and to the probabilities as shown by the experience of the Southern Confederacy in our Civil War, they have been unable seriously to damage British merchant commerce. Great Britain is relentlessly uprooting neutral commerce, which means substantially the American commerce with Germany and her allies. The English have hoped to starve out the Germans, exactly as the Germans have hoped by battleships, aircraft or submarines, to starve out the British islands. The consequent frame of mind among thoughtful Germans seems to be not unlike that of thoughtful Northerners during our Civil War. We felt a sense of passionate resentment against the British people because they were akin to us in civilization, and were supposed to be a lofty and high-minded people who should sympathize with the aspirations of a great nation. The Americans insisted that the British government was bound to take precautions against commerce destroyers, such as it had never taken before. The United States rolled up, and once actually presented, a bill for a thousand million dollars for the prolongation of the war. That fierce feeling, which we now see to be not wholly reasonable, lasted for thirty-five years. It was extinguished only by an apology from Great Britain followed by a so-called arbitration in which Great Britain accepted a hand upon which she must inevitably lose the game. Fifteen and a half million dollars for the Alabama claims were paid in cash. Still it was not till the Spanish War of 1898 that John Bull again became the favorite cousin.

It looks now as though there would be a similar experience between Germany and the United States. From the first week of the war to the present time the point of view of the most intelligent German subjects in the United States has been that they were unwarrantably deprived of the natural sympathy of the American people. What they expect of the United States government is what we expected of the British government—not a cold impartiality, but a decided leaning in their favor. Without insisting on a direct violation of neutrality as a mark

of friendship, the Germans have expected that the United States would go to the extreme in their behalf. They would like a prohibition of export of military munition, or, failing that, an embargo like that of 1807 which cut off all exports. They want the American newspapers, universities and chambers of commerce to think that the Germans are in the right; and they feel that a failure so to think must have a malevolent motive. This is a serious state of things for America—one of the most troublesome results of the war; and it is likely to leave behind it a legacy of international irritation.

Nevertheless it is impossible for the United States to avoid this distressing state of things. First because it is not only a bad moral policy to rob Peter in order to pay Paul, but because Paul is likely to make himself heard on the subject in the future. Still more because it is not the duty of the people of the United States to give either physical or moral support to either side. The woe of Belgium has led the Americans to join in one of the most magnificent outbursts of practical charity ever known to mankind; but if the United States felt itself bound to go to war to defend the neutrality of every neutralized state and strait, it would be in the position of the gendarme in the play written by the boys in a French lycee. The culminating incident is the benevolent gendarme discovering a poor woman on the curbstone.

"What is the matter, my unfortunate one?" he inquires. "Alas, I am so wretched. I have lost my husband, my brothers and sisters, my children. I am homeless, I am starving. I have nowhere to go." "Poor woman, what can I do for you?" says the gendarme. Thereupon a happy thought comes to him. He draws his hanger and stabs himself—you understand, to show his sympathy! A cooler-headed gendarme might have taken the poor woman into the nearest restaurant and revived her with nourishing food and drink, and then he could have rescued another unfortunate on some other day.

The United States has troubles of its own—present and impending—and may thank God that it is outside of the realm of trenches and bombs and poisonous gases. It is the duty of this country to stand solidly and continuously by the great principle that it has a sovereign, national right to stay out of a war just as much as to go into it. We cannot command the great belligerents to lay down their arms, nor can they compel

us to take up arms. The United States has an unrivalled opportunity to show that personal sympathies with either side cannot push the government from its consistent duty of preventing military expeditions, or the building of warships or the enlistment of troops, within our boundaries; that it will allow no foreign ships of war to make the United States their base of operation. When the war is over—for that date also is written in the books of the fates—the United States will have an honorable record in this respect. The difficulties of the Washington government during the Civil War, and its insistence at that time on more than common neutrality on the part of other powers, are the best examples for the present.

## THE MEANING OF NEUTRALITY<sup>1</sup>

The subject of American neutrality and the European war is one intimately and vitally connected with the history and policy of the United States. One hundred and twenty-two years ago, or less than five years after the federal constitution was established, the government of the United States was required to make a momentous decision. The wars growing out of the French Revolution were well under way and the circle of conflict had just been rounded out by the entrance of the power which then held and has since continued to hold the world's naval supremacy.

Those who speak in awe-struck whispers of the problems, grave though they be, that confront us today, perhaps are not always acquainted with the appalling uncertainties and awful responsibilities that rested upon the statesmen of an earlier day, who furnished us with the chart and compass by which we have since sailed. Regarding Europe as having a set of primary interests in which the United States, with its geographical and political detachment, had no direct concern, the administration of Washington announced to the world that the United States would pursue a neutral course. The history of American diplomacy during the twenty-two years that followed, down to the close of the Napoleonic wars, is chiefly concerned with the efforts of the United States to perform the duties and maintain

<sup>1</sup> Remarks of John Bassett Moore as presiding officer at the third session of the Nineteenth Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, April 30 and May 1, 1915.

the rights appertaining to it as an independent and neutral nation. This period of storm and stress has well been denominated the struggle for neutrality, and in it were formulated the fundamental principles on which the modern system of neutrality is based. In the task of formulation, the chief part was borne by Thomas Jefferson, whose philosophic discernment, keen intelligence, and extended learning enabled him to give to his work a peculiar logical and original character. What we call neutrality is a system of conduct regulated, not by the emotions nor by individual conceptions of propriety, but by certain well defined rules, and it is synonymous with impartiality only in the sense that those rules are to be enforced with impartial rigor upon all belligerents.

It is proper to advert to the fact that, during the war that is now going on in Europe, various neutral nations have issued embargoes under which the exportation of various articles is forbidden. These are commonly interpreted, I think erroneously, as "neutrality proclamations." In reality they are essentially regulations of a domestic nature, employed for the purpose of preserving a proper supply of articles, including even arms and munitions of war, in the countries concerned.

## SCOPE AND OBJECTS OF THE WAR<sup>1</sup>

The American people without distinction of party are highly content with the action of their national administration on all the grave problems presented to the government by the sudden outbreak of the long-prepared war in Europe—a war which already involves five great states and two small ones. They heartily approve of the action of the administration on mediation, neutrality, aid to Americans in Europe, discouragement of speculation in foods, and, with the exception of the extreme protectionists, admission to American registry of foreign-built ships; although the legislation on the last subject, which has already passed Congress, is manifestly inadequate.

Our people cannot see that the war will necessarily be short, and they cannot imagine how it can last long. They

<sup>1</sup> From "The Road toward Peace," by Charles W. Eliot. Copyright, 1915, by Charles W. Eliot and published by Houghton Mifflin Company. Reprinted here by special permission of the author.



realize that history gives no example of such a general interruption of trade and all other international intercourse as has already taken place, or of such a stoppage of the production and distribution of the necessities of life as this war threatens. They shudder at the floods of human woe which are about to overwhelm Europe.

Hence, thinking Americans cannot help reflecting on the causes of this monstrous outbreak of primitive savagery—part of them come down from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and part developed in the nineteenth—and wondering what good for mankind, if any, can possibly come out of the present cataclysm.

The whole people of the United States, without regard to racial origin, are of one mind in hoping that mankind may gain out of this prodigious physical combat, which uses for purposes of destruction and death all the new forces of nineteenth-century applied science, some new liberties and new securities in the pursuit of happiness; but at this moment they can cherish only a remote hope of such an issue. The military force which Austria-Hungary and Germany are now using on a prodigious scale, and with long-studied skill, can only be met by similar military force, and this resisting force is summoned more slowly than that of Austria-Hungary and Germany; although the ultimate battalions will be heavier. In this portentous physical contest the American people have no part; their geographical position, their historical development, and their political ideals combine to make them for the present mere spectators; although their interests—commercial, industrial, and political—are deeply involved. For the moment, the best thing our government can do is to utilize all existing neutrality rights, and, if possible, to strengthen or develop those rights; for out of this war ought to come more neutral states in Europe, and greater security for neutralized territory.

The chances of getting some gains for mankind out of this gigantic struggle will be somewhat increased if the American people, and all other neutral peoples, arrive through public discussion at some clear understanding of the causes and the possible and desirable issues of the war, and the sooner this public discussion begins, and the more thoroughly it is pursued, the sounder will probably be the tendencies of public sentiment outside of the contending nations, and the conclusions which the peace negotiations will ultimately reach.

When one begins, however, to reflect on the probable causes of the sudden lapse of the most civilized parts of Europe into worse than primitive savagery, he comes at once on two old and widespread evils in Europe from which America has been exempt for at least one hundred and fifty years. The first is secret diplomacy with power to make issues and determine events, and the second is autocratic national executives who can swing the whole physical force of the nation to this side or that without consulting the people or their representatives.

The actual catastrophe proves that secret negotiations, like those habitually conducted on behalf of the "concert of Europe," and alliances between selected nations, the terms of which are secret, or, at any rate, not publicly stated, cannot avert in the long run outrageous war, but can only produce postponements of war, or short truces. Free institutions, like those of the United States, take the public into confidence, because all important movements of the government must rest on popular desires, needs, and volitions. Autocratic institutions have no such necessity for publicity. This government secrecy as to motives, plans and purposes must often be maintained by disregarding truth, fair dealing, and honorable obligations, in order that, when the appeal to force comes, one government may secure the advantage of taking the other by surprise. Duplicity during peace and the breaking of treaties during war come to be regarded as obvious military necessities.

The second great evil, under which certain large nations of Europe—notably Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary—have long suffered and still suffer, is the permanent national executive, independent of popular control through representative bodies, holding strong views about rights of birth and religious sanctions of its authority, and really controlling the national forces through some small council and a strong bureaucracy. So long as executives of this sort endure, so long will civilization be liable to such explosions as have taken place this August, though not always on so vast a scale.

Americans now see these things more clearly than European lovers of liberty, because Americans are detached from the actual conflicts by the Atlantic, and because Americans have had no real contact with the feudal or the imperial system for nearly three hundred years. Pilgrim and Puritan, Covenanter and Quaker, Lutheran and Catholic alike left the feudal system and autocratic government behind them when they crossed the

Atlantic. Americans, therefore, cannot help hoping that two results of the present war will be: (1) The abolition of secret diplomacy and secret understandings, and the substitution therefor of treaties publicly discussed and sanctioned, and (2) the creation of national executives—emperors, sultans, kings, or presidents—which cannot use the national forces in fight until a thoroughly informed national assembly acting with deliberation, has agreed to that use.

The American student of history since the middle of the seventeenth century sees clearly two strong though apparently opposite tendencies in Europe: First, the tendency to the creation and maintenance of small states such as those which the Peace of Westphalia (1648) recognized and for two centuries secured in a fairly independent existence, and, secondly, a tendency from the middle of the nineteenth century toward larger national units, created by combining several kindred states under one executive. This second tendency was illustrated strongly in the case of both Germany and Italy, although the Prussian domination in Germany has no parallel in Italy. Somewhat earlier in the nineteenth century the doctrine of the neutralization of the territories of the small states was established as firmly as solemn treaties could do it. The larger national units had a more or less federative quality, the components yielding some of their functions to a central power, but retaining numerous independent functions. This tendency to limited unification is one which Americans easily understand and appreciate. We believe in the federative principle, and must therefore hope that out of the present European horror will come a new development of that principle, and new security for small states which are capable of guaranteeing to their citizens "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"—a security which no citizen of any European country seems today to possess.

Some of the underlying causes of the horrible catastrophe the American people are now watching from afar are commercial and economic. Imperial Germany's desire for colonies in other continents—such as Great Britain and France secured earlier as a result of keen commercial ambitions—is intense. Prussia's seizure of Schleswig in 1864-65 had the commercial motive; and it is with visions of ports on the North Sea that Germany justifies her present occupation of Belgium. The Russians have for generations desired to extend their national territory southward to the Ægean and the Bosphorus, and east-

ward to good harbors on the Pacific. Lately they pushed into Mongolia and Manchuria, but were resisted successfully by Japan. Austria-Hungary has long been seeking ports on the Adriatic, and lately seized without warrant Herzegovina and Bosnia to promote her approach to the Ægean, and is now trying to seize Serbia with the same ends in view. With similar motives Italy lately descended on Tripoli, without any excuse except this intense desire for colonies—profitable or unprofitable. On the other hand, the American people, looking to the future as well as to the past, object to acquisitions of new territory by force of arms; and since the twentieth century opened they have twice illustrated in their own practice—first in Cuba, and then in Mexico—this democratic objection. They believe that extensions of national territory should be brought about only with the indubitable consent of the majority of the people most nearly concerned. They also believe that commerce should always be a means of promoting goodwill, and not ill-will, among men, and that all legitimate and useful extensions of the commerce of a manufacturing and commercial nation may be procured through the policy of the "open door"—which means nothing more than that all nations should be allowed to compete on equal terms for the trade of any foreign people, whether backward or advanced in civilization. No American administration has accepted a "concession" of land in China. They also believe that peaceable extensions of territory and trade will afford adequate relief from the economic pressure on a population too large for the territory it occupies, and that there is no need of forcible seizure of territory to secure relief. It is inevitable, therefore, that the American people should hope that one outcome of the present war should be—no enlargement of a national territory by force or without the free consent of the population to be annexed, and no colonization except by peaceable commercial and industrial methods.

One of the most interesting and far-reaching effects of the present outbreak of savagery is likely to be the conviction it carries to the mind of thinking people that the whole process of competitive armaments, the enlistment of the entire male population in national armies, and the incessant planning of campaigns against neighbors, is not a trustworthy method for preserving peace. It now appears that the military preparations of the last fifty years in Europe have resulted in the most

terrific war of all time, and that a fierce ultimate outbreak is the only probable result of the system. For the future of civilization this is a lesson of high value. It teaches that if modern civilization is to be preserved, national executives—whether imperial or republican—must not have at their disposal immense armaments and drilled armies held ready in the leash; that armaments must be limited, an international supreme court established, national armies changed to the Swiss form, and an international force adequate to deal with any nation that may suddenly become lawless agreed upon by treaty and held always in readiness. The occasional use of force will continue to be necessary even in the civilized world; but it must be made not an aggressive, but a protective, force, and used as such—just as protective force has to be used sometimes in families, schools, cities, and commonwealths.

At present, Americans do not close their eyes to the plain fact that the brute force which Germany and Austria-Hungary are now using can only be overcome by brute force of the same sort in larger measure. It is only when negotiations for peace begin that the great lesson of the futility of huge preparations for fighting to preserve peace can be given effect. Is it too much to expect that the whole civilized world will take to heart the lessons of this terrible catastrophe, and cooperate to prevent the recurrence of such losses and woes? Should Germany and Austria-Hungary succeed in their present undertakings, the civilized nations would be obliged to bear continuously, and to an ever-increasing amount, the burdens of great armaments, and would live in constant fear of sudden invasion, now here, now there—a terrible fear, against which neither treaties nor professions of peaceable intentions would offer the least security.

It must be admitted, however, that the whole military organization, which has long been compulsory on the nations of continental Europe, is inconsistent in the highest degree with American ideals of individual liberty and social progress. Democracies can fight with ardor, and sometimes with success, when the whole people is moved by a common sentiment or passion; but the structure and discipline of a modern army like that of Germany, Austria-Hungary, or Russia has a despotic or autocratic quality which is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of democratic society. To make war

in countries like France, Great Britain, and the United States requires the widespread, simultaneous stirring of the passions of the people on behalf of their own ideals. This stirring requires publicity before and after the declaration of war and public discussion; and the delays which discussion causes are securities for peace. Out of the present struggle should come a check on militarism—a strong revulsion against the use of force as means of settling international disputes.

It must also be admitted that it is impossible for the American people to sympathize with the tone of the imperial and royal addresses which, in summoning the people to war, use such phrases as "My monarchy," "My loyal people," or "My loyal subjects"; for there is implied in such phrases a dynastic or personal ownership of the peoples which shocks the average American. Americans invariably think that the right way for a ruler to begin an exhortation to the people he rules is President Wilson's way—"my fellow countrymen."

It follows from the very existence of these American instincts and hopes that, although the people of the United States mean to maintain faithfully a legal neutrality, they are not, and cannot be, neutral or indifferent as to the ultimate outcome of this titanic struggle. It already seems to them that England, France and Russia are fighting for freedom and civilization. It does not follow that thinking Americans will forget the immense services which Germany has rendered to civilization during the last hundred years, or desire that her power to serve letters, science, art, and education should be in the least abridged in the outcome of this war, upon which she has entered so rashly and selfishly, and in so barbarous a spirit. Most educated Americans hope and believe that by defeating the German barbarousness the allies will only promote the noble German civilization.

The presence of Russia in the combination against Germany and Austria-Hungary seems to the average American an abnormal phenomenon; because Russia is itself a military monarchy with marked territorial ambitions; and its civilization is at a more elementary stage than that of France or England; but he resists present apprehension on this score by recalling that Russia submitted to the "concert of Europe" when her victorious armies were within seventeen miles of Constantinople, that she emancipated her serfs, proposed The Hague con-

ferences, initiated the "Douma," and has lately offered—perhaps as war measures only—autonomy to her Poles and equal rights of citizenship to her Jews. He also cannot help believing that a nation which has produced such a literature as Russia has produced during the last fifty years must hold within its multitudinous population a large minority which is seething with high aspirations and a fine idealism.

For the clarification of the public mind on the issues involved, it is important that the limits of American neutrality should be discussed and understood. The action of the government must be neutral in the best sense; but American sympathies and hopes cannot possibly be neutral; for the whole history and present state of American liberty forbids. For the present, thinking Americans can only try to appreciate the scope and real issues of this formidable convulsion, and so be ready to seize every opportunity that may present itself to further the cause of human freedom and of peace at last.

### IF AMERICA ENTERS THE WAR<sup>1</sup>

Writing at this date—in the month of July—it is quite impossible for a European to discern future American action in regard to the war. We know very little of the feelings of the whole of the United States toward this gigantic world upheaval. Our American friends who write to us are cordial and enthusiastic supporters of the allies. Most of the newspapers on the Atlantic seaboard are obviously pro-ally. But some of us who have more than a passing acquaintance with the great republic understand that when an Englishman goes to the United States he naturally mingles with Americans of British descent, and it is these who have sent so many thousands of messages to us. Any one who has traveled through most of the United States, as I have, must realize the vast difficulty of arriving at anything approximate to a consensus of American opinion on the war, or any other topic. I assume, however, that seven American men and women out of ten are in sympathy with little Belgium. The superb generosity

<sup>1</sup> By Lord Northcliffe. Reprinted from the *North American Review*, September 1915, p. 345-8.

of the American people, who are preventing the Germans from starving the Belgians to death, is abundant proof of the sympathy of the majority of the people of the United States with the Belgian section of the allies. It is possible that a great many are not in sympathy with England, or with Russia, or with France, or with Italy.

It always seems to me, therefore, that if the United States enters the war she will naturally devote her attention to the liberation of Belgium. It appears to me, too, that such a plan would have the additional merit of enthusiastically arousing the whole of the American people to their task. It would also give the American army, assuming such was raised, a definite work of its own, untrammelled by precedent and free from the friction that would arise through its cooperation with armies speaking a different language or having entirely different traditions. It is certain that the American character and the American genius for invention would bring to bear on this war new ideas which the Americans would prefer to carry out in their own way. An American army would start with an enormous advantage over existing armies. It would have knowledge of the experiences and mistakes of the last year, and it would bring that invaluable essential, a new and clear eye, to bear on problems which have befogged those who have been over-concentrating for so long.

It is suggested in some American publications that the allies, and particularly Great Britain, are anxious for American co-operation. I see cartoons in American newspapers suggesting that John Bull is holding out his hand appealingly to Uncle Sam in this conflict. If there be many people in England with that view I have not met them. We know that you are even less prepared than we were twelve months ago, and that in any case participation would not be possible for a long time ahead. We feel that the war is a European matter, and that the Canadians and Australians are involved only because the heart of their empire has been struck at. Others of us think that if the United States entered the arena she would be so busy manufacturing munitions of war for herself that we should lose the valuable support she has been giving us in that direction. Again, there are others—I am quite frank, and the point of view has been urged upon me by prominent Frenchmen—who believe that German influence in the United



States is so strong that when the settlement of the war comes to be made, American intervention, if it had taken place, might tend to the strengthening of Germany's hands at the peace conference.

But while I know of no active movement among the allies to involve the United States in this world catastrophe, it is obvious that just as Germany blundered into a war with Great Britain, so it looks as if she were forcing the United States into the war. Americans who are now traveling in Germany are only too well aware of the hostility towards them that has been directly engendered by the government. A careful perusal of the thousands of small German newspapers which answer to your "boiler-plate" country journals shows that the German Press Bureau has promoted a virulent anti-American propaganda. The leading newspapers of the German Empire are sufficiently hostile to the United States, but I would draw American attention to the virulence of the government-controlled minor organs, which are attacking the United States in exactly the same terms as those in which they attacked England, and in almost the same language as they used against Italy while she was deciding to take her part in the war.

The whole scheme is illustrative of the German miscalculation of the psychology of other nations. It is part and parcel of the modern German theory that people can be frightened into such attitude of mind as Germany may desire. These careful and laboriously engineered sneers at and attacks on the United States come from a people who believe that the Americans will not go to war, because to do so would injure American *business*. In this spirit, thousands of articles and pictures relating to "Herr Dollarman" are being circulated in Germany and Austria. I do not know who advises the German government upon the American national character; but he bears a very heavy responsibility if he suggests that the United States will indefinitely submit to insult and humiliation. I have already expressed the opinion in American newspapers that Washington has displayed great dignity in the handling of its relations with the Germans. A lesser nation might have hurried into quick reprisal, but the republic has always shown the leisured dignity and calm nerves which one expects from a hundred millions of people composed in the main of the best races in the world.

As to the maritime aspect of possible American intervention: I presume that the United States would immediately seize such German ships as are imprisoned in her harbors and use them as transports. For the rest, it is difficult to see in what way the United States with its present navy could very greatly help the allies. The American submarine service would be able to demonstrate its efficiency only if the German warships came from their hiding, and at present there seems to be no indication of a willingness to emerge. The Germans would, I have no doubt, construct submarine capable of crossing the Atlantic, but they would probably be speedily dealt with by Americans through some of the means that we have already discovered for meeting the menace of the submarines. The American fleet might co-operate with our fleet in the Mediterranean or join our grand fleet in the North Sea; but, as a matter of fact, we have absolute confidence in our navy, and feel that we shall be able to deal with the Germans at sea.

Of one thing I have very little doubt, and that is that if the United States should be goaded into this struggle she will see it through in the same way as on previous occasions. She will spare neither men nor money in that part of the struggle which she undertakes. She will show to the Germans that behind the fine American business brain is a soul that, as in the past, does not hesitate at the sacrifice of blood for the preservation of great ideals. If the Americans enter the war it will be with no sordid motive, with no idea of the acquisition of territory, but for the noble purpose of gaining freedom for those who are downtrodden and of showing to the world that citizenship of the United States is as inviolable as was that of Rome.

# SHIPMENT OF ARMS

## GERMAN PROTEST<sup>1</sup>

The different British Orders in Council have altered the universally recognized rules of international law in such a one-sided manner that they arbitrarily suppress the trade of neutral countries with Germany. Already, prior to the last Order in Council, the shipment of conditional contraband, especially foodstuffs, to Germany, was practically impossible. In fact, prior to the protest which the American government made in London on December 28, 1914, not a single shipment of such goods for Germany has been effected from the United States.

Also, after the lodging of the protest, and as far as is known to the German embassy, only one such shipment has been attempted by an American skipper. Ship and cargo were immediately seized by the British, and are still detained at a British port. As a pretext for this unwarranted action the British government referred to a decree of the German Federal Council concerning the wheat trade, although this decree only covered wheat and flour and no other foodstuffs, although imported foodstuffs were specially exempt from this decree, and although the German government had given all necessary guarantees to the United States government, and had even proposed a special organization in order to secure these foodstuffs for the exclusive consumption of the civilian population.

The seizure of an American ship under these circumstances was in contradiction with the recognized principles of international law. Nevertheless the United States government has not yet obtained the release of the ship, nor has it after eight months of war succeeded in safeguarding the legitimate American trade with Germany. Such a delay, especially where the supply of foodstuffs is concerned, seems equivalent to complete failure. It is therefore to be assumed that the United States

<sup>1</sup> Memorandum by Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, German Ambassador at Washington, dated April 4, 1915, and addressed to the United States Government.

government has accepted England's violations of international law.

Furthermore has to be considered the attitude of the government of the United States concerning the question of the exportation of war material. The imperial embassy hopes to agree with the government of the United States in assuming that, with regard to the question of neutrality, there is not only the formal side to be considered, but also the spirit in which neutrality is enforced.

Conditions in the present war are different from those in any former wars. For this reason it is not justified to point at the fact that perhaps in former wars Germany furnished belligerents with war material, because in those former cases the question was not whether any war material was to be furnished to the belligerents, but merely which one of the competing countries would furnish it. In the present war, with the exception of the United States, all the countries capable of a noteworthy production of war material are either at war themselves or completing their armaments, and have accordingly prohibited the exportation of war material. Therefore the United States of America is the only country in a position to export war material. This fact ought to give a new meaning to the idea of neutrality, independent of the formal law.

Instead of that, and in contradiction with the real spirit of neutrality, an enormous new industry of war materials of every kind is being built up in the United States, inasmuch as not only the existing plants are kept busy and enlarged, but also new ones are continually founded.

The international agreements for the protection of the right of neutrals originate in the necessity of protecting the existing industries of the neutral countries. They were never intended to encourage the creation of entirely new industries in neutral states, as, for instance, the new war industry in the United States, which supplies only one party of the belligerents.

In reality the American industry is supplying only Germany's enemies. A fact which is in no way modified by the purely theoretical willingness to furnish Germany as well, if it were possible.

If the American people desire to observe true neutrality, they will find means to stop the exclusive exportation of arms to

one side, or at least to use this export trade as a means to uphold the legitimate trade with Germany, especially the trade in foodstuffs. This spirit of neutrality should appear the more justified to the United States as it has been maintained toward Mexico.

According to the declaration of a congressman, made in the House Committee on Foreign Relations December 30, 1914, President Wilson is quoted as having said on February 4, 1914, when the embargo on arms for Mexico was lifted: "We should stand for genuine neutrality, considering the surrounding facts of the case." He then held in that case, because Carranza had no ports, while Huerta had them and was able to import these materials, that "it was our duty as a nation to treat them [Carranza and Huerta] upon an equality if we wished to observe the true spirit of neutrality as compared with a mere paper neutrality."

This conception of "the true spirit of neutrality," if applied to the present case, would lead to an embargo on arms.

## AMERICAN REPLY TO GERMAN PROTEST<sup>1</sup>

I have given thoughtful consideration to your Excellency's note of the 4th of April, 1915, inclosing a memorandum of the same date, in which your Excellency discusses the action of this government with regard to trade between the United States and Germany, and the attitude of this government with regard to the exportation of arms from the United States to the nations now at war with Germany.

I must admit that I am somewhat at a loss how to interpret your Excellency's treatment of these matters. There are many circumstances connected with these important subjects to which I would have expected your Excellency to advert, but of which you make no mention, and there are other circumstances to which you do refer which I would have supposed to be hardly appropriate for discussion between the government of the United States and the government of Germany.

I shall take the liberty, therefore, of regarding your Excel-

<sup>1</sup> This reply was officially signed by William Jennings Bryan, as Secretary of State, and was made public on April 21, 1915. It was reported that the note was drafted by President Wilson personally.

lency's references to the course, pursued by the government of the United States, with regard to interferences with trade from this country such as the government of Great Britain have attempted, as intended merely to illustrate more fully the situation to which you desire to call our attention, and not as an invitation to discuss that course.

Your Excellency's long experience in international affairs will have suggested to you that these relations of the two governments with one another cannot wisely be made a subject of discussion with a third government, which cannot be fully informed as to the facts, and which cannot be fully cognizant of the reasons for the course pursued.

I believe, however, that I am justified in assuming that what you desire to call forth is a frank statement of the position of this government in regard to its obligations as a neutral power.

The general attitude and course of policy of this government in the maintenance of its neutrality I am particularly anxious that your Excellency should see in their true light. I had hoped that this government's position in these respects had been made abundantly clear, but I am, of course, perfectly willing to state it again.

This seems to me the more necessary and desirable because, I regret to say, the language, which your Excellency employs in your memorandum, is susceptible of being construed as impugning the good faith of the United States in the performance of its duties as a neutral.

I take it for granted that no such implication was intended, but it is so evident that your Excellency is laboring under certain false impressions that I cannot be too explicit in setting forth the facts as they are, when fully reviewed and comprehended.

In the first place, this government has at no time and in no manner yielded any one of its rights as a neutral to any one of the present belligerents.

It has acknowledged, as a matter of course, the right of visit and search and the right to apply the rules of contraband of war to articles of commerce. It has, indeed, insisted upon the use of visit and search as an absolutely necessary safeguard against mistaking neutral vessels for vessels owned by any enemy and against mistaking legal cargoes for illegal. It has

admitted also the right of blockade if actually exercised and effectively maintained.

These are merely the well-known limitations which war places upon neutral commerce on the high seas. But nothing beyond these has it conceded.

I call your Excellency's attention to this, notwithstanding it is already known to all the world as a consequence of the publication of our correspondence in regard to these matters with several of the belligerent nations, because I cannot assume that you have official cognizance of it.

In the second place, this government attempted to secure from the German and British governments mutual concessions with regard to the measures those governments respectively adopted for the interruption of trade on the high seas. This it did, not of right, but merely as exercising the privileges of a sincere friend of both parties and as indicating its impartial good-will.

The attempt was unsuccessful, but I regret that your Excellency did not deem it worthy of mention in modification of the impressions you expressed. We had hoped that this act on our part had shown our spirit in these times of distressing war, as our diplomatic correspondence had shown our steadfast refusal to acknowledge the right of any belligerent to alter the accepted rules of war at sea in so far as they affect the rights and interests of neutrals.

In the third place, I note with sincere regret that in discussing the sale and exportation of arms by citizens of the United States to the enemies of Germany, your Excellency seems to be under the impression that it was within the choice of the government of the United States, notwithstanding its professed neutrality and its diligent efforts to maintain it in other particulars, to inhibit this trade, and that its failure to do so manifested an unfair attitude toward Germany.

This government holds, as I believe your Excellency is aware and as it is constrained to hold in view of the present indisputable doctrines of accepted international law, that any change in its own laws of neutrality during the progress of a war, which would affect unequally the relations of the United States with the nations at war, would be an unjustifiable departure from the principle of strict neutrality, by which it has consistently sought to direct its actions, and I respectfully submit that

none of the circumstances, urged in your Excellency's memorandum, alters the principle involved.

The placing of an embargo on the trade in arms at the present time would constitute such a change and be a direct violation of the neutrality of the United States. It will, I feel assured, be clear to your Excellency that holding this view and considering itself in honor bound by it, it is out of the question for this government to consider such a course.

I hope that your Excellency will realize the spirit in which I am drafting this reply. The friendship between the people of the United States and the people of Germany is so warm and of such long standing, the ties which bind them to one another in amity are so many and so strong, that this government feels under a special compulsion to speak with perfect frankness, when any occasion arises which seems likely to create any misunderstanding, however slight or temporary, between those who represent the governments of the two countries.

It will be a matter of gratification to me if I have removed from your Excellency's mind any misapprehension you may have been under regarding either the policy or the spirit and purposes of the government of the United States.

Its neutrality is founded upon the firm basis of conscience and good-will.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

## INTERNATIONAL DUTY<sup>1</sup>

Germany promised that she would not call upon any neutral power to prevent the export or transport of arms or munitions of war on behalf of any belligerent. Germany broke this promise when she made precisely such a demand upon us. This was a flagrant act of bad faith on the part of Germany. It is especially flagrant in view of the fact, testified to me by one of the representatives at the Hague conferences, and well known to all connected with the Hague conferences, that this

<sup>1</sup> By Theodore Roosevelt. Reprinted from an article, "International Duty and Hyphenated Americanism," in the *Metropolitan*, October 1915, p. 7-8+.



article was insisted upon by Germany. Mr. Charles Noble Gregory, the chairman of the standing committee on international law of the American Bar Association, in a capital piece setting forth the right of our citizens to sell munitions of war to any belligerent power, mentions the same fact. He states that one of our Hague representatives told him that the chief interest of the German delegates seemed to be in securing this article, because the Krupp works at Essen were the chief purveyors of munitions of war to foreign powers.

A representative of a great American arms manufactory informed me recently that they had been about to abandon their work prior to the beginning of this war, because the Germans systematically endeavored to undersell them in every country. It has been the settled policy of Germany to drive all other countries out of the business of manufacturing arms and supplies because, of course, if this were once substantially accomplished, the rest of the world would be completely helpless before Germany; and Germany has made it evident that she knows no such thing as international morality and looks upon all other nations, including the United States, merely as possible prey. The Americans who are now striving to prevent the sale of munitions of war to the countries endeavoring to secure the redress of Belgium's wrongs, that is, the allied powers, are playing the game of a ruthlessly militaristic and anti-American Germany against their own country as well as against the interests of humanity at large. They are profoundly unpatriotic from the standpoint of the interests of the United States. They are committing the gravest possible offense against the cause of international right and of the interests of humanity.

It was Germany which for decades supplied Turkey with the means of keeping the Christians of her European and Asiatic provinces in a state of dreadful subjection. It was Germany which established the artillery in the Belgian forts—and, as one of the men engaged in the work informed a friend of mine, the German War Office was then furnished with blueprints of what had been done and of the neighboring geography so as to enable the German armies to take the forts with the least possible delay and damage. Essen has been the center of military supplies to belligerents and has exported on an enormous scale to belligerents in all the modern wars, making vast profits from this traffic even in the late Balkan wars.

Germany has consistently followed this course, even when one of the belligerents alone had access to her markets and the other, with which she was nominally in sympathy, had no such access. This was shown in the Boer War. Among the supplies furnished by Germany to Great Britain for use against the Boers were 108 15-pound quick-firing guns and 54,000 rounds of ammunition for them; 65,000 hundred-weight of swords, cutlasses, bayonets and arms of other sorts; 8,000,000 rounds of small-arms' ammunition and 1,000,500 of metal cartridge cases other than small-arms' ammunition; and some 27,000 hundredweight of cordite, gunpowder, dynamite and the like. In short, Germany has thriven enormously on the sale of arms to belligerents when she was a neutral; she insisted that such sale be sanctioned by the Hague conventions; she, so far as possible, desires to prevent other nations from manufacturing arms; and if she is successful in this effort she will have taken another stride to world dominion. The professional pacifists, hyphenated Americans, and beef and cotton-Americans; in short, all the representatives of American mollicoddleism, American greed, and downright treachery to America, in seeking to prevent shipments of munitions to the allies, are playing the game of a brutal militarism against Belgium and against their own country.

Of course, if sales of munitions are improper in time of war, they are precisely as improper in time of peace, for in time of peace they are made only with a view to possible war. To prohibit them is to put a premium upon aggressive nations manufacturing their own ammunition, for it is the non-aggressive nations that do not conduct great manufactories for munitions of war. On November 13, 1870, Goldwin Smith, who was in ardent sympathy with the Germans in their contest with France of that year, wrote to his friend, Max Müller, upholding the propriety of the action of the United States in selling munitions of war to France, the right to do which had been insisted upon by President Grant. He stated that the Americans were acting in accordance with the right view of international law in refusing to prohibit such sales of arms. His letter runs in part: "If this were done, a great disadvantage would be given against the interests of civilization to the powers which during peace employed their revenues in arming themselves for war instead of endowing professors. A

moral and civilized people which had been benefiting humanity would be assailed by some French Empire which had been collecting chassepots, and when it wants to provide itself with the means of defense international law would shut up the gunshops."

In our existing treaties with Germany the right to such shipment of arms is explicitly affirmed, as it has also been in the Hague Convention from which I have above quoted. The American government has always maintained the right of its citizens to ship arms to belligerents. President Washington, through his secretary of state, Thomas Jefferson, and his secretary of the treasury, Alexander Hamilton, took this position when France protested against the sale of arms to England in 1793, the answer being that "the exporting from the United States of warlike instruments and military stores is not to be interfered with." President Lincoln, through his secretary of state, William H. Seward, took this view in 1862, when Mexico complained of the export of military supplies from the United States for the benefit of the French. President Lincoln and Secretary Seward sympathized with Mexico but explicitly informed Mexico that Mexico could not "prescribe to us what merchandise we shall not sell to French subjects because it may be employed in military operations against Mexico." President Grant and Secretaries of State Henry Clay, Bayard, Blaine, Olney and John Hay are among the high officials who have publicly taken the same position. At this time to alter such a rule during the pendency of a state of war to the benefit of one of the warlike powers would be to place the United States on the side of that power—of the wrongdoing power—and to make it in effect itself a belligerent. The position was correctly stated on January 25 last by President Wilson through Secretary of State Bryan in a published letter which recites that "the duty of a neutral to restrict trade in munitions of war has never been imposed by international law or by municipal statute. It has never been the policy of this government to prevent the shipment of arms or ammunition into belligerent territory"; and in response to the German protest it was stated that our right to export munitions of war to belligerents was settled and assured and it was declared that our government holds "that any change in its own laws of neutrality during the progress of a war which would affect unequally the relations

of the United States with the nations at war would be an unjustifiable departure from the principles of strict neutrality by which it has sought to direct its actions."

A great expert on international law has said "that a system under which a peaceful commercial state may not, when attacked, use her cash and her credits in international markets to equip herself for defense is intolerable and in every way pernicious. Rules which interfere with such a right would tend to give the victory in war to the belligerent best prepared at the outset and therefore to make it necessary for peaceful nations to be in a constant state of overpreparedness." Under the German proposal a well behaved state which was not armed to the teeth could not, if wantonly attacked, be allowed to equip herself for defense. The American professional pacifists, in accepting the German position in this matter, are, as usual, playing into the hands of the powers that believe in unprincipled aggression. The warlike and aggressive nation chooses the moment of attack and is fully equipped in advance. If the nation assailed cannot replenish her supplies from outside, she must always maintain them in time of peace at the highest point or else expose herself to ruin. The professional pacifists, the cotton-Americans, the beef barons and the German-Americans—in other words, the hyphenated Americans, the greedy materialists and all the mollicoddles of both sexes—advocate the prohibition of the shipment of munitions to the allies who are engaged in fighting Belgium's battles. They thereby take a stand which, not merely in the concrete case of the moment but in all future cases, would immensely benefit powerful and aggressive nations which cynically disregard the rules of international morality at the expense of the peaceful and industrial nations which have no thought of aggression and which act toward their neighbors with honorable good faith.

From the standpoint of international law, as I have shown above, we have the absolute right to make such shipments Washington and Lincoln, in fact, all our Presidents and secretaries have peremptorily refused to allow this right to be questioned. The right has been insisted upon by Germany in her own interest, more strongly than by any other nation, up to the beginning of the present war. It has been exercised by Germany herself on a larger scale than by any other nation up to the time that she herself went to war.

From the standpoint of morality the justification is even more clear. Selling arms to a belligerent may be morally either very right or very wrong. This depends absolutely upon the justice of the cause in which the arms are to be used. This is just as true in international as in private matters. It is moral and commendable to sell arms to a policeman in order that he may put down black-handers, white-slavers, burglars, highwaymen and other criminals who commit acts of violence. It is immoral to sell arms to those who are committing or intend to commit such acts of violence. In the same way it is thoroughly immoral in any way to help Germany win a triumph which would result in making the subjugation of Belgium perpetual. It is highly moral, it is from every standpoint commendable, to sell arms which shall be used in endeavoring to secure the freedom of Belgium and to create a condition of things which will make it impossible that such a crime against humanity as its subjugation by Germany shall ever be repeated, whether by Germany or by any other power.

I am not speaking as an enemy of Germany. I have as much German blood in my veins as I have English or French. I am speaking, as every American citizen ought to speak, purely as an American. I believe that the United States should adopt as the two cardinal principles of its foreign policy: First, the duty of being amply ready to guard its own rights; and second, the duty to show sympathy with, and so far as possible to make effectively evident this sympathy with, every nation which by its conduct deserves such sympathy, and to stand against every nation in every specific case where it is guilty of misconduct. In 1878, for instance, our sympathies should have been against England and for Russia and Bulgaria. In the eighties our sympathies anent Egypt and the Soudan should have been with England and against France. In 1914 our sympathies should have been against Germany and for England, France, Russia and Belgium, if we were loyal to our own American traditions and to the great world-laws of righteousness. In each case American sympathies should have been based on the conduct of the various powers in the event under consideration. Moreover, it is cowardly to remain neutral between right and wrong. It is cowardly to "remain neutral in thought and speech" and therefore to fail to uphold right and to condemn wrong. It is a base and unworthy thing for a nation to enter into engage-

ments for securing right against wrong and then to fail to keep such engagements. Finally, and most important, no nation can ever help forward the cause of international peace and justice until it proves by its actions that it will refuse to be neutral in cases of international wrongdoing, and that in acting against the wrongdoer it is merely acting against the wrong and would at once reverse its action if the wrong were reversed.

Germany's action toward Belgium, and her action toward non-combatants as shown by the murder of women and children on the *Lusitania*, and, alas, by far worse crimes committed on women and children ashore in Belgium and northern France, and by the collection of excessive contributions, and the bombing of defenseless towns, and the destruction of cathedrals, universities and cities, and by the wholesale ravaging of the countryside; and her action toward combatants by the use of poisonous gas and similar methods of war: were all in flagrant violation of Hague Convention II of 1899 and IV of 1907 and of the international agreements and well established laws of war upon which this convention was based. All, separately and collectively, were criminal actions against international right, against civilization, against justice and humanity throughout the world. When such is the case America is recreant to her duty when she fails to act. Even if not called upon to act by the Hague Convention she has the right and the duty to act as soon as any such gross violations of international law occur. This is the only way to establish proper precedents in international law, and to save it from becoming a farce. France, for instance, exercised this right and performed this duty when in the case of the "Trent" the United States committed against England the same kind of wrong which England fifty years previously had committed against us—a wrong which Abraham Lincoln promptly redressed. Unless neutral powers are willing to take decisive action against such violations of international right as Germany has committed, it is impossible to treat international law as being of any binding value.

I wish to emphasize the fact that we could deprive Germany of the plea of necessity for acting as she has done in Belgium and in the *Lusitania* matter by making it evident that we would be able and willing to act against France and England under reversed circumstances exactly as quickly as against Germany. If the wrongs of Belgium were redressed and the

actions of the type Germany took in the Lusitania matter and in the other matters alluded to above were disavowed and abandoned, we ought then to do all in our power to insist that England and France in their turn live up to their obligations—including their obligations to neutral commerce on the high seas as such obligations were avowed and understood prior to the outbreak of the war. I am not speaking in the least as an enemy of Germany, I am speaking from the standpoint of the United States, as one who desires to see the United States both a strong and a just nation, who desires to see it act in precisely the same fashion to Germany and Russia, to England, France and Austria, and to all other nations, treating each purely on its merits, as shown by its conduct in given circumstances.

It is a gross iniquity to demand action against nations which have offended, if at all, in minor matters, while we take no effective steps to secure the redress of the frightful wrongs committed by the other side. To demand action against France and England, who are now standing for humanity and civilization, would be infamous until and unless we have previously taken effective action against Germany, whose offenses against us and against civilization have been a hundredfold worse than anything that can even be alleged—truthfully or untruthfully—against the allies. England has proposed to arbitrate the questions at issue between us and herself. We are under solemn treaty obligations, entered into by the present administration, to arbitrate such matters with England. We are in honor bound either to accept England's proposal or to abrogate the arbitration treaty. For the administration to follow any other course would be a proof of trickiness and insincerity.

The foolish professional pacifists who advocate refusing to sell munitions of war to the allies are proposing a course of action as wicked as it is base; and those making such a proposal or approving and advocating action in accordance therewith, should be listed on a roll of national dishonor. It has even been proposed that the United States should spend a billion dollars in paying Germany to give Belgium back to her own people. The profound immorality of this proposition surpasses even its fatuity. If it could be adopted, it would of course merely be paying blackmail on a gigantic scale, and be a direct encouragement to nations to commit wrong in order to get

money. If such a proposal were adopted by the United States, the fact would completely justify Germany or Japan in seizing New York or San Francisco and refusing to leave until we had paid into the German or Japanese coffers a sum, say, twice as much as that which it has been thus proposed to pay into the German coffers in order to get them to surrender Belgium.

The full flower of treachery to the duties of the United States and to the rights of the nations of mankind is best observed when the professional pacifist and the hyphenated American strike hands on some public occasion. Recently a so-called Labor Peace Conference was held at Washington for the purpose of intimidating public servants by political threats into refusing to allow the export of arms and munitions to the allies. The newspapers reported that one of the officials of a German-American organization announced that "the members of his body would not enlist in the event of war between the United States and Germany." If this statement is correct, the gentleman in question and those for whom he spoke are traitors and in the event of war should be dealt with in summary fashion. The hyphenated American has been shown in actual practise to be loyal only to that part of his title which precedes the hyphen. He is thoroughly disloyal to the "American" part of his hyphenated cognomen, and he must be thus disloyal, because of the necessities of the case. The professional German-Americans of this kind ought by rights immediately to be deprived of their United States citizenship. Their place is not here. Their place is in Germany, in the trenches; and the sooner they go thither, the better it will be for everything decent in American citizenship. And in saying this I wish to emphasize my belief that the professional German-Americans are not a bit worse than all other professional hyphenated Americans. These professional German-Americans sin most bitterly against the real Americans of German blood. We have no better citizens than the Americans of German birth or descent who in good faith are fulfilling the duties of American citizenship and who are Americans and nothing else. I happen to know that these men, men who are entitled to the highest honor and the highest respect from all their fellow-Americans, feel a peculiar indignation at the professional German-Americans, the hyphenated Americans, who by their actions during the past year have dishonored their own stock and have done



all the damage they could to the country which offered itself as a refuge to them or to their forefathers.

The United States owes a duty to other nations. We should so act as to show that we are one in a community of nations, with common rights and common duties, and that we are fit by our own trained strength to do our duty to others as well as to ourselves. This duty the United States can never perform until and unless she acts purely as a nation, not as a knot of jangling nationalities. If America means nothing but a squabbling congeries of German-Americans, Irish-Americans, English-Americans, French-Americans, Jewish-Americans, Italian-Americans, Scandinavian-Americans, then it is not worth while to have it a nation at all. Every man in our country who seeks to divide himself from his fellow-Americans along lines of creed or national origin is a bad American. Every man in this country who seeks to shape the policy of the nation, not in accordance with the interests of the United States and of humanity at large, but in accordance with the interests of the nation from which he or his ancestors sprang, is a thoroughly unworthy and unpatriotic citizen and should leave the country, to whose welfare his mere presence is a menace.

## SALE OF MUNITIONS TO BELLIGERENTS<sup>1</sup>

With respect to the rights of our citizens as neutrals to sell munitions of war to any belligerent power, it is submitted:

1. That these rights are in no way denied by the rules of international law.
2. That these rights are not forbidden by any municipal statute or ordinance except as to vessels of war and, in certain limited cases, as to our neighboring American republics, when the latter are involved in civil strife.
3. That such rights have been constantly exercised in this country since the beginning of its history and in like manner have been habitually exercised by the manufacturers of the most enlightened commercial nations of the world, not only in remote times, but during all recent years.

<sup>1</sup> By Charles Noble Gregory. Reprinted from the *Annals of the American Academy*, July 1915, p. 183-191.

4. That such rights were fully recognized and reserved by the conventions of the Second Hague Conference in 1907.

5. That the maintenance of such rights is wise and necessary as their abolishment would force upon all nations a policy of the highest military and naval preparedness, which policy is one of vast economic loss and deeply hostile, instead of favorable, to peace.

6. That the fact that certain belligerents are prevented by the forces of the other from taking advantage of our markets does not make sales to those who have such access a breach of neutrality.

7. That the powers which most severely attack this right have greatly profited by habitually exercising it in all recent wars and, under parallel circumstances, where the market was accessible to but one of the belligerents, have continued these sales to the other.

One of the expert delegates to the United States at The Hague told this writer within the week that he remarked at The Hague that apparently the main object of the Conference was to prevent any interference with the export of arms by the Krupps at Essen.

These Hague Conventions were generally ratified—Austria-Hungary and Germany both ratifying them on November 27, 1909. I do not refer to these conventions as establishing any new rule but as stating clearly and agreeing explicitly to the existing rule.

Turning from the legality to the policy of the rule in question, it is submitted:

That a system under which a peaceful commercial state may not, when attacked, use her cash and her credit in the international markets to equip herself for defense is intolerable and in every way pernicious.

The war-like and aggressive nation chooses the moment of attack and is naturally fully equipped. If the nation assailed cannot replenish her supplies from outside she must always maintain them at the top notch of efficiency or she exposes herself to ruin.

If a nation, the moment she becomes, willingly or unwillingly, a belligerent, is helpless to augment her defensive equipment from outside, if she cannot, as this writer, if he may be allowed to quote himself, said recently in the Outlook, import "a pound

of powder, a gallon of petrol, an ounce of copper, a gun, a sabre, a harness or a horse," then a wasteful system is forced on all nations under which they must always, without intermission or relaxation maintain their defenses and warlike supplies on a war footing of the highest efficiency and amplitude.

It is constantly strongly urged that since the allies command the seas, and the Germans cannot get access to our markets, while the allies can, that real neutrality requires us to refuse such supplies to the allies. It is submitted that nothing could be more impossible or confusing than to shift the rule of neutral obligations with the varying events and successes of war. The risks of capture may thus shift, but not the obligation of the neutral.

German citizens have habitually sold vast quantities of military supplies to belligerents. Essen is perhaps the very center of military supplies and has exported on an enormous scale to belligerents in all modern wars, making, it is understood, vast profits from this traffic in the late Balkan wars. It will be interesting to know what has been Germany's practice when one of the belligerents had access to her markets and the other had not. Has the rule been observed, which she now presses upon us? Has she recognized this situation as compelling her to deny to the power having access, the right to buy, on the ground that *real neutrality so required?*

The war between the South African republic and Great Britain began in October, 1899, and was closed by the Treaty of Pretoria at the end of May, 1902. During the earlier portion of the war, supplies were received by the Boers through Lorenzo Marques, a neighboring Portuguese port with some freedom, but in August, 1900, all the customs officials at Lorenzo Marques were dismissed and their places filled by military officers and a force of 1,200 men was sent out from Lisbon. The frontier was guarded and the trade stopped.

The strictness of the Portuguese authorities increased with the decline of the fortunes of the Boers.

England had seized and searched a number of neutral steamers—including three German steamers—and positively claimed the right to seize contraband bound to the Boers though through a neutral port. She relied for this largely on the precedents of our Civil War, and it would appear that the access of the Boer force to German markets was substantially destroyed. The question occurred to the writer, would it be found that

during the later years there were imported from Germany into England large quantities of arms and military supplies notwithstanding this situation? He therefore took the liberty to apply to the British Embassy at Washington which very obligingly cabled to London for information. April 27, a letter from the Embassy advised that "when the Boers were shut off from supplies by sea, Great Britain got from Germany 108 fifteen-pounder quick-firing guns and 500 rounds per gun. They were purchased from Ehrhardt by private negotiation." It is respectfully submitted that this is sufficient to support the practice of our government. But this writer had made other investigations which showed vastly larger military supplies passing from Germany to Great Britain at this time. This appears from the statistics as to the foreign trade of the United Kingdom compiled at the custom house, and presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of His Majesty and printed for His Majesty's stationery office.

It is submitted that the practice of the government of the United States in declining to forbid the sale and export by its citizens of munitions of war to either belligerent at the present time is not in conflict with international or municipal law. It is in accord with a wise and salutary international policy. It is in entire harmony with the express declaration of the last Hague Conference and with the long continued practice of this country, and of those countries which have questioned the practice.

## ARGUMENT AGAINST SALE OF ARMS<sup>1</sup>

The Democratic Text Book, 1914, issued by the Democratic Congressional Committee and The Democratic National Committee, contains on page 43 the following announcement by Hon. W. J. Bryan, Secretary of State:

The announcement made by this government, that it regards the making of loans by American citizens to the governments of nations engaged in war as inconsistent with the spirit of neutrality, has created a profound impression throughout the world. It is the first time that a great nation has taken this stand on the subject of war loans. The matter has been discussed at The Hague and at peace conferences, but it encountered so much opposition that nothing tangible has resulted. The President, there-

<sup>1</sup> By Edmund von Mach. Reprinted from the *Annals of the American Academy*, July 1915, p. 192-4.

fore, blazes a new way when, without conference with other nations and without support from conventions, he commits this nation to his policy.

It is inconsistent with the spirit of neutrality for a neutral nation to make loans to belligerent nations, for money is the worst of contraband.

In these two paragraphs Mr. Bryan himself has refuted all the arguments of the opponents of a law laying an embargo on the export of munitions of war.

It is, moreover, noticeable that he uses the expressions "loans by American citizens to the governments of nations engaged in war" and "a neutral nation to make loans to belligerent nations" as synonymous so far as America is concerned. And so it should be, for here the sovereignty is the people's and the government is theirs, too. It is impossible to quote as true for America those passages of the so-called Law of Nations—which really represents the crystallized customs of Europe—which say that citizens either individually or collectively can do what the government cannot do. The American government is, at least in theory, the expression of the collective will of the people.

President Cleveland expressed this idea in his annual message to Congress, December 2, 1895, when he said:

The performance of this duty [*i.e.*, to observe in "good faith" neutrality toward Spain] should not be made more difficult by a disregard on the part of our citizens of the obligations growing out of their allegiance to their country which should restrain them from violating as individuals the neutrality which the nation of which they are members is bound to observe in its relations to friendly sovereign states.

And the Supreme Court of the United States has said (14 How. 38, 49):

For as the sovereignty resides in the people, every citizen is a portion of it, and is himself personally bound by the laws which the representatives of the sovereignty may pass, or the treaties into which they may enter, within the scope of their delegated authority. And when that authority has pledged its faith to another nation that there shall be peace and friendship between the citizens of the two countries, every citizen of the United States is equally and personally pledged. The compact is made by the department of the government upon which he himself has agreed to confer the power. It is his own personal compact as a portion of the sovereignty in whose behalf it is made. And he can do no act, nor enter into any agreement to promote or encourage revolt or hostilities against the territories of a country with which our government is pledged by treaty to be at peace, *without a breach of his duty as a citizen, and the breach of faith pledged to the foreign nation.*

From the foregoing quotations, the authoritative importance

of which for the conduct of American citizens and their government is undeniable, it would appear that:

1. What is morally wrong for the government is morally wrong also for each individual citizen.

2. When a large number of individual citizens persist in the commission of acts which run counter to the moral obligations of their government, the government has the right and the duty to take steps to prevent such acts.

3. It is contrary to the spirit of American institutions and the ideals of the American people, for the government to disclaim responsibility for the continued and open acts of a large number of their citizens.

4. American dealings with other nations must be bona fide and according to the spirit, and not only the letter, of any compact or understanding.

5. It is *not* unneutral for America to "blaze a new way," or to regulate the conduct of her citizens by laws, proclamations or otherwise, even during the progress of a war.

This last assertion has been severely attacked by the advocates of an unlimited trade in death-dealing arms. They have argued that the Allies would be justified in considering the laying of an embargo on the export of arms to be an unneutral act. The Allies could not claim this, because they themselves have forced several—if not all of the neutral states of Europe—to declare embargoes of various kinds against Germany and Austria *since* the war began.

The case in favor of stopping the traffic in munitions of war, therefore, may be summarized as follows:

1. The government of the United States cannot, either legally or morally, export arms to either of the belligerents.

2. The export of arms by the citizens of the United States has grown to such large proportions that it is known to all.

3. The government of the United States cannot advance the excuse that it is not morally responsible for the acts of its citizens.

4. The President and Secretary of State have publicly declared, and asked for votes on the strength of their declaration, that the government has the *right* "to blaze a new way" and that it is not restrained from giving expression in law to the moral sense of right and wrong of the American people.

5. It is, therefore, the right and consequently the duty of the

American government to have legislation enacted which will make it legally wrong for individual citizens to commit acts, the moral wrong of which nobody can deny, in view of the decision of the United States Supreme Court quoted above.

6. The present American government itself has acknowledged the moral wrong of the trade in contraband, in the passage quoted above from the Democratic Text Book.

7. It is, therefore, committed to the enactment of legislation—if it has no other means of accomplishing the same end—forbidding the traffic in munitions of war.

### SELLING ARMS TO THE ALLIES<sup>1</sup>

The sale of arms and munitions to belligerents in the present war and the questions of law relating thereto have drawn attention to the French arms debate in the Senate of the United States in 1872. It has been assumed in some quarters that the matter in controversy then was the same as at present: that we were guilty of an infraction of our duties as a neutral; that we were helping the French with arms and ammunition to the detriment and disadvantage of Germany; and that the notable speech of Carl Schurz on that occasion was a protest against such infraction.

A reference to dates will show that this is a misconception. The Franco-German war had been fought and ended more than a year before the French arms question came up as a matter of controversy among us. King William was crowned as German emperor in the palace at Versailles on the 18th of January, 1871. Carl Schurz's speech was made in the United States Senate on the 20th of February, 1872. The debate and investigation arose upon a question whether a ring of our government officials and a few private speculators had defrauded the United States and violated our laws by sales of government arms in order to put money in their own pockets. The question whether there had been a breach of neutrality was only incidental. The manufacture and sale of arms by private individuals or corporations to belligerents was never

<sup>1</sup> By Horace White. Reprinted from the *North American Review*, July 1915, p. 53-8.

called in question in the debate. The arms sold during the Franco-Prussian war were the property of our government, and the breach of neutrality, if any, was due to that fact.

The year 1872 was that in which the Liberal Republican revolt took place against public scandals which were then epidemic. It was a time when much corruption was uncovered and when any suspicious circumstances were likely to attract considerable attention. There had been large sales of arms from the public arsenals following our Civil War and the disbandment of our armies—sales both to belligerents and non-belligerents. Some suspicious circumstances were discovered. One was that the law governing such sales required that the offerings of arms should be in pursuance of previous public advertisement, whereas there had been no advertising except in a single instance. Another was that when breech-loading rifles were sold the government made and sold cartridges to fit them; that the law prohibited the selling of government arms to any friendly power which was at war with another friendly power; that the arms sold were not obsolete but serviceable; and actually better than the arms then in the hands of the militia of the several states. In fact there were good grounds for an inquiry into the matter, but not for a condemnation of anybody offhand.

There were answers to all of these charges, which if not wholly satisfactory, took the sting out of them, so that the French arms sale was not heard of in the subsequent political campaign. As to the failure to advertise, it was shown that General Schofield, when secretary of war, had ruled orally that when there had been one advertisement for thirty days of a particular kind of property for sale by the department, it was not necessary to advertise separately each subsequent sale of the same kind of property. As to the manufacture of cartridges for the rifles it was contended that it was the custom of the trade when dealing in breech-loaders for the seller to furnish cartridges to the buyer, without which the arms would be useless.

It was proved that when the first sales were made to the Remington Company, General Dyer, the chief of ordinance, did not know and had no reason to suppose that they were agents of the French government; that when that fact became known the secretary of war prohibited further sales to them,



but did allow their representative to take one lot which had been sold but not delivered before their destination became known. Other parties then came in as buyers who sold to still other parties, who in turn sold to the French.

The fact came out in the investigation that when the secretary of war learned that some of these arms went to the French government he caused an offer to be made to sell the same number and kind of arms to the Prussian government, but the offer was declined and the answer was returned that the Prussian government had no objection to our selling to the French. Bismarck added that he could get the arms cheaper on the banks of the Loire.

As to the expediency of selling at all, it was in the discretion of the War Department to sell arms not actually in use. The secretary could decide for himself when a particular pattern had been, or was likely to be, superseded by a better one. Such decisions, however, were made only with the approval of the Ordnance Department.

In short, it turned out that there was nothing reprehensible in the sales *per se*, though probably some persons on this side of the water and some on the other side made more money out of them than a fair commission. No question relating to the manufacture and sales of arms and munitions by private persons to foreigners or to foreign governments, whether belligerent or non-belligerent, entered into the discussion. That question has been raised now because the sea power of the allies enables them to carry away the things which they buy in our markets.

Words count for something here. We are accused of exporting arms and ammunition to the enemies of Germany. That would not be a breach of neutrality even if we did the exporting ourselves. But in fact the buyers do their own exporting. They pay the freight. They assume all the risks of conveyance. If our offence were phrased correctly it would be in words like these: "You commit a breach of neutrality by allowing American citizens to sell arms to English and French buyers." President Wilson replies: "American citizens have always had that right and they cannot be deprived of it. They will sell to you on the same terms." Germany replies: "We do not want your arms and ammunition. We have plenty of our own. We only want your wheat and cotton. Great Britain puts a

barrier in the way of our obtaining these things. We ask you to remove that barrier for us."

We are told that we might restore peace to Europe at once by stopping the sale of arms and ammunition—by giving victory to Germany. This means that we could thus consign France and her Continental allies to the mastery and savagery under which Belgium has been writhing during the last eleven months. We are asked to do this in the name of neutrality!

Where is the line to be drawn, in the forum of conscience, between the different kinds of war tools? What things are to be included in the phrase "arms and ammunition" and what excluded? Nitre is one of the raw materials of gunpowder, cotton is one of the raw materials of torpedoes. Petroleum is one of the necessities of submarines, of aeroplanes and of motor cars. Horses are indispensable for cavalry. Motor cars are required for land transport of all kinds. Coal is a necessity for every movement of troops and warships and for baking bread for the soldiers. Shall we desist in selling horses and motor cars to English, French and Canadian buyers because they may use some of them to expel the German invaders of Belgium?

Money is perhaps the chief desideratum of nations in war time, since it is immediately convertible into weapons and materials of war. American newspapers were recently graced with advertisements of a German treasury loan at 5 per cent interest, the proceeds to be expended solely in our markets. It is needless to inquire too closely what kind of goods it was expended for.

It is said that when we were at war with Spain, Germany, at the request of our ambassador at Berlin, prohibited the exportation of arms to Spain. The official record in this case, if there be any, has not been made public. It remains to be seen whether our ambassador at Berlin was instructed by his own government to make such request; also whether Spain tried to buy arms in Germany; also whether Germany did or did not sell them, and if she did not, whether she was justified in refusing.

When neutrality is put upon a higher plane than the settled law and practice of nations we are bound to inquire on which side the preponderance of moral principles is to be found. Which of the contending parties began the war and made itself

responsible for the awful human misery that has flowed from it? The reasons why Germany declared war may be briefly summarized thus: (1) The necessity of giving "a free hand to Austria in dealing with Servia"; (2) the mobilization of Russia; (3) the secret, hostile intentions of France; (4) the commercial jealousy of England; (5) Germany's need of a place in the sun; (6) her need of a place on the sea.

These causes for beginning a world war are sufficiently variegated. All of them may be dismissed except the first. Everybody knows now that if the first had not existed none of the others would have been heard of. After giving Austria her head in a world war Germany exclaimed that she was defending herself and fighting for existence! She then carried fire and sword into Belgium.

The belief of the great majority of people of the United States is that Germany began the war without sufficient cause, and that when she invaded Belgium she made herself the outlaw of the nations—a country whom no agreements can bind.

Closely connected with this thought is the conviction that no limit can ever be put to the world's expenditure for armaments while one incorrigible outlaw is at large. Even in time of peace the cost of armies and navies goes on increasing, and this is logical. If every nation may declare war at its own whim it may reasonably estimate beforehand the cost of it and provide for it accordingly. There is no reason why it should pause short of the last dollar in its treasury, and the last male inhabitant capable of carrying a gun. The costs of armaments will go on increasing until the entire net earnings of the human race are absorbed in death dealing instruments or until a supreme tribunal shall be established to decide international disputes and to enforce its decisions. It is the opinion of most Americans that the most incorrigible and dangerous outlaw and armed maniac now existing is Germany, and that the first and indispensable step toward a restriction of armaments and a quiet world is to throttle and disarm her, and that no price is too great to pay for such a consummation. Any result of the present war which falls short of this will be the preliminary to a new armament and another war on a wider scale than the present one, since the United States will make preparations for the next one and most probably take part in it.

Germany, by bursting her way through Belgium, was enabled

to seize 80 to 90 per cent of the coal and iron resources of France and the greater part of her apparatus for the production of arms. She holds also the entire resources of Belgium, both of raw material and finished product. The foul blow by which she possessed herself of these indispensable treasures had two consequences which she did not look for—the active hostility of England and the moral indignation of all other nations. In helping France to make good the loss which she sustained through such perfidy the American people think that they are doing God's service, and their only regret is that they cannot do more of it. If they had foreseen the present conditions they would have enlarged their gun factories and powder mills to meet the emergency more promptly.

A German writer in the *New York Times* of May 30, Mr. Vom Bruck, says: "If the German nation is wiped out with the help of American arms and ammunition no man of the white race in the United States would be able to think of such a catastrophe without horror and remorse." All of the contending nations say that they are fighting for existence, which means that if they do not win in the end they will be wiped out. With such an alternative staring us in the face very few tears would be shed by Americans, of any color, if both the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs, with all their belongings, should be wiped off the face of the earth.

## WAR CONTRABAND

### "THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS"<sup>1</sup>

During the last few months our ears have been much belabored with a high-sounding phrase. The world dearly loves a phrase, and the less of meaning it has the more it will be petted and coddled. "High air castles are cunningly built of words, the words well bedded also in good logic mortar," rails Carlyle in cynical mood, but philosophical withal, his cynicism gleaming with the flame of truth. "The freedom of the seas" is the latest shibboleth. Serious men and serious publications have fallen to its charm, and there are today many well meaning persons, doing their thinking at second-hand, who are victims to the mischief of this fallacious phrase.

Let us begin by clearly understanding what is meant. In time of peace, when nations respect international law and the code of morality, the seas are free to all the world. The sea is the one great democracy, for there all nations are equal and the ocean bestows impartially its favors. England, the greatest naval power in the world, possesses no rights that are not enjoyed by Holland, whose naval power is negligible; or shared by Switzerland, whose flag no ocean has seen. England's naval strength gives her no advantages over other nations; she is subject to the same laws and rules and regulations; her might does not absolve her from responsibilities or relieve her from obligations. "The freedom of the seas" is, therefore, an expression without meaning and without value when conscience governs, when sanity rules, when morality is dominant, and nation calls to nation in the voice of friendship. But what is the case in time of war?

This phrase would not have been much heard if German calculations had worked out successfully. We must state the facts plainly in order to ascertain the truth. When Germany plunged Europe into war a year ago she relied with as much

<sup>1</sup> By A. Maurice Low. Reprinted from the North American Review, September 1915, p. 395-403.

confidence on her navy as on her army; she was as certain that her navy was strong enough to enable her to keep the sea as she felt secure in the invincibility of her army. Events quickly made her realize that she had as greatly overrated her own naval strength as she had underestimated that of her opponent. A few months after the declaration of war the German mercantile flag vanished from the seven seas; the great German merchant marine, on which the life of the empire depends, had either fallen prize to the enemy, or was bottled up in neutral ports, or tied up to the deserted docks of home ports: a mocking memory of what once had been Germany's pride. Her ships of war, after having given a gallant account of themselves, were battered and sent beneath the waves or driven to seek asylum by internment; her fighting fleet, refusing to fight, is powerless. In contrast to the collapse of German sea power, her enemy carried out the most marvellous troop movement the world records. Hundreds of thousands of men, with their horses, guns and supplies, were sent from the four quarters of the globe to France. Hundreds of thousands of tons of merchandise—raw material for manufacturing purposes, food stuffs, military equipment of all kinds—had entered and cleared from the ports of Great Britain and France. And while this was going on, possibly only because the German navy virtually was non-existent and the British navy held command of the seas, the coast of Germany was laid under blockade, the high sea fleet of Germany was "contained" by the British navy, and was a menace only as a "fleet in being" must always be a military danger to be reckoned with and guarded against. To sum up: Germany, a year after the declaration of hostilities, despite the millions she has spent upon her navy, has seen her commerce destroyed, her ports closed, her supplies dwindling, her military strength weakened, her financial position daily growing more precarious, because she cannot sell, and what she buys she must pay for in gold at a ruinous price.

Under these circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that Germany, in her extremity, should appeal to the sympathy of the United States, and clamor for "the freedom of the seas."

War is brutal business, and one of the brutalities of war is that the innocent often suffer almost as much as the guilty; the neutral nation, neither responsible for the war nor having anything to gain by it, has its commerce dislocated, its people

forced to take great risks and meet heavy losses. To prevent Germany from obtaining cotton, for instance, works a very serious loss to the American cotton grower, but it is one of the consequences of the war provoked by Germany. Cotton is absolutely essential to Germany for the prosecution of the war, for without cotton Germany is unable to manufacture guncotton, and without guncotton, torpedoes are useless and high explosives cannot be made. Great Britain and her allies, therefore, must prevent Germany from securing cotton.

Under a system that has slowly expanded, the world has agreed that when nations are at war certain articles used exclusively for military purposes shall be declared contraband; they may be traded in at the risk of the trader, but are properly subject to capture. In the old days the contraband list was very simple—powder, cannon, firearms, and a few other similar articles. Modern warfare has called every resource of science to its aid, with the result that there is scarcely an article of commerce that cannot be used for military purposes; hence the contraband list has been greatly extended, and now covers the principal articles of commerce as well as many entering into the arts and sciences. Take cotton as a typical illustration. Before the discovery of high explosives, its value was commercial and not military, but since the invention of the modern gun, with its great range and penetrative power, cotton, to nations at war, has become one of the most important elements in the manufacture of munitions, and its commercial use is subordinate. It is the same with scores of other articles that lose their innocent character the moment war is declared.

Out of the intercourse of nations has grown up international law, which is not law in the sense of municipal law, but is a rather loose arrangement by which nations agree to do or not to do certain things that are partly for their own interest, partly for the general convenience and benefit of mankind. International law is founded largely on precedent, on arrangements that have been found to work with fair satisfaction, partly on treaties and agreements that have become incorporated into the unwritten law of nations.

It is this vague and ill-defined *corpus juris* that allows belligerents certain rights and protects the rights of neutrals. Thus, it is lawful for a belligerent to blockade an enemy's port, but the blockade must be effective physically, not merely a paper

decree. Having effectually sealed the ports, or being in command of the approaches to the coast, a neutral vessel attempting to enter a blockaded port may be lawfully captured, and, with its cargo, condemned as prize.

But while the right of seizure is granted to the belligerent so as to enable him to inflict as much damage as possible upon his opponent, and a neutral government must not, as a government, supply either belligerent or give any help to the one not given to the other, the observance of strict neutrality places no restrictions upon the trading of the *citizens* of a neutral nation with belligerents. A neutral may trade with a belligerent, but he does so at his peril. If there is sufficient profit to risk sending cotton or anything else to a country under blockade, there will always be adventurous spirits to make the attempt. Neither equity nor morals requires the neutral government to prevent this commerce. To do so would be to make the so-called neutral not a neutral, but an ally of one belligerent and an opponent of the other. The obligation to prevent the cargo reaching its destination is imposed not upon the neutral, but upon the belligerent, who must be strong enough to make his blockade effective or suffer the consequences.

International law makes a foolish and illogical distinction between absolute and conditional contraband. Under the former is comprised all articles that are solely for military use—arms, projectiles, explosives, ingredients for their manufacture, and other things of a similar character, the government at war having notified the world by proclamation of what it holds to be absolute contraband.

Conditional contraband may be used for military purposes, but need not necessarily be so used, and its legality of seizure hinges on use and ownership. Take foodstuffs as an illustration; it is because Great Britain is strong enough to prevent the importation of foodstuffs into Germany that the German government would like to have international law changed.

Foodstuffs imported by a government or purchased by the military authorities are absolute contraband, on the theory that they are to be applied to military use. Foodstuffs purchased by private individuals are conditional contraband, on the theory, an entirely false one as I shall presently show, that they are for the use not of the military but of the civilian population; and while humanity does not revolt at the thought of an



enemy's army being starved, it refuses to allow the "innocent"—that is, the non-combatants—to be starved.

This is the extreme of absurdity. The complexities of modern warfare make it impossible to differentiate between combatants and "non-combatants." The man, woman, or child working in the Krupp factory in Essen is as much a combatant as the Prussian private in the trenches in France. The private fires a rifle, and if his aim is good, he kills a British or French or Belgian soldier; yes, but with what?—with the cartridge that is the handiwork of *the men, women, and children working in the Krupp factory in Essen*. The theory of "non-combatant" seems to collapse here.

The conductor who is today in charge of a freight train of cotton *en route* to a mill to be converted into explosives, is a "non-combatant," whose starvation is a crime. But tomorrow he is called to the colors as a reservist, and thus he may be starved, because he is a combatant. A schoolboy's debating club would laugh at a proposition so illogical.

Germany would like to enjoy "the freedom of the seas" while denying that freedom to other nations. In torpedoing neutral merchant vessels and giving their crews and passengers no chance to escape, Germany has violated the fundamental law of nations that the sea is free to all neutrals, and a vessel may be destroyed only *after* adequate provision has been made for the protection of life.

The purpose of a blockade is threefold. It is (1) to prevent the enemy from receiving those articles of military necessity without which it cannot prosecute the war; (2) to prevent the importation of food if the country is not able to furnish food for the support of its army and civil population from its own resources; (3) to prevent the enemy from engaging in commerce. All three purposes are designed to accomplish the same end. If the enemy cannot obtain military supplies, its offensive is weakened and its resistance breaks down. If the enemy is placed on short rations, its moral and physical strength is impaired. If it cannot trade, its financial power is crippled, and beggary forces the surrender of its armies.

To the emotional, this may sound very dreadful; and it is very dreadful. Slowly to strangle a nation to death, to weaken its power of resistance, to enfeeble it by hunger, to impoverish it—these things move pity. But war, as it has been observed,

is brutal business, and while the neutral may be moved by contemplating its horrors and may with propriety try to mitigate them, no neutral may or should interfere in what is clearly not its concern. To do so, I repeat—and it cannot be too often repeated because of the erroneous views entertained—is to strip the neutral of neutrality and make him an ally.

The cry raised by Germany that it is inhuman, and against all precedent in civilized warfare, to starve the non-combatant population, I deny on three grounds.

First, I deny its inhumanity. It is, on the contrary, the most humane way of conducting war. When people feel the pangs of hunger they will no longer fight, and the war can sooner be brought to an end by hunger than it can in any other way. It is more humane to make people experience the discomforts of short rations (it is dishonest to talk about their being "starved," as if they were actually in danger of dying from want of nourishment) than to kill them with bullets, or cause them to suffer the awful agony of suffocation from gas, or to wound them and compel them to drag out the rest of their lives crippled, blind, tortured by their wounds, a misery to themselves and a charge upon relatives or charity.

Second, I deny the existence of "non-combatants." For the reasons I have already given, practically the entire population of the German Empire may be said to be fighting, either in the field or in the factory. A neutral who joins the armed forces of a belligerent, according to international law, forfeits his neutrality. A German, man or woman, who contributes to the fighting efficiency of Germany, loses his or her status as a non-combatant. Neither law nor morality will recognize a dual relation: a combatant for the profit of Germany, and a non-combatant so that the individual may escape the rigors of war.

Third, I deny that a blockade to prevent a civilian population obtaining food is without precedent in modern warfare; and for that precedent I refer the reader to the American Civil War. President Lincoln's blockade of the Confederacy had a double purpose: to prevent the exportation of cotton, which was the only means by which the South could raise money; and to prevent the importation of foodstuffs, medical supplies, and articles of military necessity. In all history there is no greater lover of humanity than Lincoln, no man with a heart more tender, no man with a deeper love for his fellow man;

and yet Lincoln put in force a blockade that slowly but very surely strangled the South; that paralyzed it financially and brought its people to know the meaning of hunger. He did this because of his humanity; because, terrible as were the sufferings of the South, they were less dreadful than slaughter and the human wreckage of war. And in that day, there were, in fact as well as in name, non-combatants. There were no great factories in which women and children worked turning out shells and cartridges and high explosives; the places of the men withdrawn from industrial pursuits were not filled by women; trade came to an absolute standstill, for when the men left field or forge or factory the women could not supplant them.

Does anyone believe that if Germany had been able to destroy the British fleet, and the coasts of England were under blockade and her people were being reduced to surrender by starvation, Germany would be the champion of "the freedom of the seas"? Germany has openly announced that that is what she is attempting to do—to starve England into surrender. That, she has said, is the purpose of her submarine warfare—to cut off the food supplies of England, Great Britain not being self-sustaining and having to rely on other countries to feed her people.

Germany having met defeat on the sea, now invokes the aid of the neutral nations to bring about "the freedom of the seas." Having been unable to destroy the British navy by gunfire she would destroy its usefulness by diplomacy. It is the British navy that stands between Germany and the food she does or does not need, but which she seems so anxious to secure, the cotton which America alone can supply, and the numerous other articles neutral nations would willingly sell if German ports were not barred by British cruisers. What Germany cannot do by her own strength the world is to do for her; the world, calling itself neutral, is to give the lie to its professions of neutrality by nullifying the advantage England possesses through superior naval strength.

An idea that is fantastic, dishonest, or dangerous will always commend itself to a certain type of mind if it is clothed in the garments of rhetoric or can be made to serve morality and appeal to self-interest. "The freedom of the seas" can be made to serve two masters, Mammon and Righteousness. The neutral trader, instead of being incommoded by war, would

greatly profit by it, as there would be no interference with trade, and the inevitable effect of war is to enhance commodity prices, so that self-interest would be served. Blockades being outlawed and so-called non-contraband goods immune from seizure, sea power would lose its former importance, and the world would no longer be shocked by witnessing the seizure of a ship attempting to carry goods of prime military necessity to a blockaded belligerent. Why some persons should regard it as peculiarly immoral for a cruiser to seize a merchant vessel trying to trade with the enemy, but find no violation of morality if the same goods are seized on land, it is not easy to say, but they do.

This is the explanation of Germany's anxiety to secure "the freedom of the seas," and is the meaning of the propaganda now being carried on in the United States. If blockades are no longer sanctioned and so-called "private property" rights in cargoes are recognized, Germany, after the conclusion of peace, need spend less money on her navy and have very much more to spend on her army, on building even larger guns than those she now has, and creating greater reserves of arms and ammunition than she had when war was declared last year. But it is a principle that the serious and matured thought of neither the United States nor Great Britain will accept, as it would immeasurably weaken the defensive power of both countries, and would mean the reckless abandonment of a weapon on which both nations must rely for defense.

That the United States may be involved in war is a contingency not to be dismissed lightly or regarded as impossible, for in history nothing is impossible. If the United States were at war the result might be determined by two things—its power effectively to blockade the coast of its enemy, and its power to prevent the enemy from being supplied by neutrals. The United States is the one country that is self-contained. It can rely on its own resources to furnish all the food it needs; out of the earth it can dig coal, copper, iron, and the other minerals on which war feeds; cotton is the yield of its fields; all the guns and munitions and everything else necessary to warfare, its own skilled workmen could create. The United States might be blockaded, if such a thing were possible, and its people would know none of the horrors of famine or have to deny themselves either necessity or luxury.

Enjoying by the grace of fortune such superb advantages, is it conceivable that American statesmen would consider, or the American people permit, their sacrifice in obedience to the demand of the false prophets, the sentimentalists, the theorists, who, meaning well, do the most harm because their vision is clouded and they live in a maze?

No, "the freedom of the seas" in time of war is impossible, because it is a perversion of both the human and natural law, the law that enables the man or the animal endowed with superior advantages to use them for protection when life is at stake.

### NEUTRALIZATION OF THE SEA<sup>1</sup>

This is written by a man of English descent whose youth and early manhood were passed in America, who there acquired a deep sympathy and admiration for most that America represents, who believes, further, that America might, if she seized her opportunities, play a leading rôle in giving a new development to organized society by becoming the pivot of its world-wide organization on more civilized lines, and who sees all this placed in jeopardy by possibility of a very serious cleavage of policy as between herself and England. This cleavage is the more serious because in England its existence even is hardly realized and its real cause in no way discussed. Attempts at bridging it are, in consequence, the more liable to grave misunderstandings.

Let me outline the difference very briefly. A bitter feeling has grown up in England, owing to the impression that in the interest of a trade in copper or cotton, America, oblivious to all other considerations, is, or was, prepared to enforce her point of view even to the extent of ranging herself on the side of England's enemies. This monstrous assumption is for the moment put into the background by a half-hope that Germany's submarine blockade may now cause America to come over on the side of the Allies. Such, broadly, indicates English feeling and discussion. The Spectator—most pro-American of English journals—has been drawing disturbing parallels with the Trent affair, promising that in the forthcoming discussions "we shall

<sup>1</sup> By Norman Angell. Reprinted from the North American Review, May 1915, p. 694-701.

think nothing of the risks we run" and that there shall be no Abraham Lincoln or Queen Victoria to act as restraining influences. And the public attitude of the Spectator is but a mild reflection of private opinion in many circles.

Here, of course, we have misunderstanding number one. There has never been any danger that America would, because of such a dispute, range herself on the side of Germany. The thing is preposterous. Very nearly as unlikely is the contingency of her joining the Allies because of Germany's "blockade." Americans have recognized that on the whole Britain's action is in accordance with sea law as it stands and as America has accepted it, and if Germany's action now makes the position of neutrals impossible, the remedy for America will be not an alliance with the Allies to restore the law as Britain has been enforcing it, but at the conclusion of the war to see that it is changed altogether.

And that contingency—the point at which the whole dispute will inevitably crystallize—English opinion has absolutely failed to envisage. There is in England not the faintest realization—I have not seen a line of discussion concerning it in the press—that the inevitable outcome of the present contraband and blockade difficulties will be an irresistible movement in America for the neutralization of the high seas, or, failing that, their domination by the American navy.

Yet that movement, backed as it will be by a most formidable combination of patriotic sentiment and commercial and industrial interest, will raise the fundamental problem of English national policy; and England will be confronted by the demand for the limitation of a power round the preservation of which has centered her deepest national pride and upon which she has learned to believe her security as a nation and empire depends.

And this profound conflict of policy is not even being discussed in England: for most Englishmen the Anglo-American differences are concerned with quite other things. The English public are likely in consequence one day to be presented with demands which, because there has been no adequate discussion of the causes which underlie them, will seem unwarrantable and preposterous, and on no account to be granted. And yet America will not withdraw them. Such a situation is always dangerous.

Let us get the elements of the thing clear. As this war has

developed, Americans have more and more awakened to the realization, which has never been vivid to them before, that maritime law, as it stands and as it is enforced, reduces to a fiction in war-time their freedom of movement throughout the world, the sovereignty of their flag over American ships, and their free intercourse with nations with which they and the rest of the world are at peace.

Those things, always regarded with pride by Americans, have assumed during the last generation, owing to the increase of their foreign trade and their relations with the outside world, a very much greater material importance than they have had in past wars; their whole financial and industrial system has been disorganized by a war in which they are not combatants. In vast and growing interests they find themselves the helpless victims of forces quite outside their own control. But apart from the material aspect, the restraint upon the freedom of their ships means the destruction of cherished delusions around which have gathered a mass of patriotic sentiment and pride so great that the awakening is bound to affect their whole outlook in the matter of their relations with the rest of the world.

It is only natural that Englishmen should fail to understand how this realization must affect the ordinary American, especially of the Middle West or the West. This ordinary American has had no knowledge of the details of sea law, of conditional and absolute contraband, and so forth, but has lived in the absolute conviction that the United States, by her past wars, by the respect which she is able to impose for her flag, by the power of her navy and army, had acquired the right to go about her lawful business on the high seas without let or hindrance from any earthly power; that an American ship, flying the American flag, carrying goods to a country with which America and all the rest of the world was at peace, could go secure and unmolested; that an American merchant had at least won the right, backed by the power of his country, to trade with the four corners of the world. And now he learns—to put it briefly and without legal refinements—that it is all a fiction. And that realization is bound to give impetus to a demand not for small concessions of detail in the administration of contraband law, but for fundamental and radical changes in the matter of the complete control of the sea as a whole.

It is probable that very many Americans themselves do not

realize clearly how this dispute is developing and how the United States will be pushed to take a stand for a profound alteration of the entire maritime situation.

I have in another connection imagined the present situation being explained to the astonished American in about the terms of the following passage:

The American merchant cannot sell a sack of wheat or a ton of iron to any country, although that country may be at peace with him and with the rest of the world, save by the permission of a foreign naval bureaucrat; the American merchant carries on his trade not by virtue of any right that his Government has managed to enforce, but simply to the extent to which a foreign official will permit him. A Chicago or New York magnate, for instance, may enter into vast commercial arrangements with some foreign magnate of Amsterdam or Rome or Buenos Ayres, and the Governments of the United States and of Holland and Italy and Argentina may be agreed as to the legitimacy of the transaction—but it will not be completed unless British officials, making themselves judges of all its details, decide that it is to the interest and convenience of his British Majesty. The American merchant may make oath, which may be supported by the foreign merchant, that the cargo is of such and such a nature, destined for such and such a purpose; all that will go for nothing if in the decision of a court in which neither the American nor the Dutchman nor the Argentine is represented the circumstances are not what the parties profess them to be. An American ship can be searched, its cargo can be turned upside down, can be held up indefinitely by a British lieutenant, and the fiat of a British court will decide the fate of the American merchant's enterprise.

Now whether that is an over-statement of the situation can be judged from the admission of a famous English writer on sea law whose efforts were in large part responsible for the defeat of the ratification of the Declaration of London. Although he takes the ground that Britain's authority at sea is already too curtailed, he admits that the present law leaves the Prize Courts the right to administer not the law of England, but the law of nations, and to decide every material question affecting the rights of neutrals:

Was this an effectual blockade? The Prize Court alone could decide. Was there an actual or attempted breach of blockade? The Court decided. Were these enemy goods? The Court alone decided. Was this a duly commissioned public vessel of war? The Court pronounced. Was that act a breach of neutrality? The Court declared. Was this enemy merchant ship duly transferred by a valid assignment to a neutral? Was this or that thing contraband of war? Again it was for the Court.

Has even the American realized what the effect of the public discussion of this situation in the heated atmosphere of war-



time is likely to be? And of course the American will discuss it more and more during the next few months, and that discussion will bring out with growing clearness the fact that he has not the slightest right of protest, since all this takes place as part of a condition of things to which he has agreed! He will realize increasingly that in the present condition of international law it is an inevitable concomitant of sea power; that as the sea, unlike the land, is "one," supremacy cannot be divided; that the dominant navy of the world dominates not merely the territory of the nation to which it belongs, but the approaches to and the highways between all territories and all nations; that it controls and dominates the traffic of mankind; that the executive power in the administration of this law which stretches over the whole planet and affects the commerce of every country in it is simply and purely a matter of might. For if we could imagine the German navy destroying the British, it is Germany that would exercise this power over the world's movements at sea; in other circumstances it might be Japan or Russia. The American—always sentimental in the mass—may find also that such things as contraband, absolute and conditional, can be interpreted by the nation which thus happens to be momentarily triumphant at sea in so wide a fashion as to touch the deeper human intentions of all international conventions and the attempt to humanize the waging of war. After all, blockade means treating a country like a beleaguered fortress. You might conceivably get a condition in which a whole nation was reduced to absolute starvation, including the women and children, by the direct action of some foreign government preventing the despatch of American food thereto. Thus America, having subscribed to the general rule that war shall not be carried on by means of pressure on the non-combatant population, might find the law to which she had assented sanctioning that very thing.

And as the discussion of recent incidents proceeds it will be made plain that though today these great powers are exercised by a country to which America is bound by sympathy and by a government which she keenly desires to see victorious, they may tomorrow be exercised by a Power with which she has very much less sympathy and which she might not desire to see victorious. A Japan at grips in some future Russo-Japanese war or Chino-Japanese war might, as part of the blockade of Russian or Chinese coasts, paralyze the whole of

American trade in the Pacific and allege that the Philippines were being made the center for contraband smuggling, and demand the right of search, the indefinite holding up of cargoes, just as Great Britain is now doing. An American ship moving between two American ports might be searched, detained, and its cargo confiscated on the ground that its manifest was fraudulent. And such judgment of a Japanese court could only be challenged by a defiance of international law!

Does any one who knows anything of the American temper suppose for a moment that, as the situation develops and as a few incidents of the present conflict bring home a more vivid realization of it, America will accept this as the last word concerning her place in the world and her relation to the rest of civilization? She will probably not raise this very profound question during the present war, but as soon as the Allies are definitely victorious and the whole problem of international relationship of the future is in the melting-pot—as to some extent at the new Congress of Vienna it is certain to be—America will have a good deal to say as to how this mysteriously pregnant force of sea power is to be exercised in the future. And to those who are fond of historical parallels it may be pointed out that the United States, with all her defects of diplomacy, has shown in her past history a quite remarkable capacity for biding her time, of not jeopardizing one interest by prosecuting it at a time when it was necessary to attend to another. Thus one historian tells us that the United States took no effective action, nor indeed made anything but a most perfunctory protest, at the landing of French troops in Mexico, because just at that juncture "the United States had other matters to attend to." But as soon as those other matters were settled America raised very effectively the question of French intentions in Mexico. So with questions like the sailing of the *Alabama*. More than ten years elapsed between the first protest on that matter and the final settlement of American claims. All the motives that are strongest in the political thought and feeling of the average American are centered in the questions that arise out of this conflict of sea power. There are not many things in international politics concerning which one can be certain and dogmatic, but there is one: and that is that America's situation under the existing condition of sea law will not be left by the Americans where the present incidents leave it.

To put it briefly, America will not continue to accept the extraordinary autocratic powers—the powers of controlling the highways of the world—contained in sea supremacy unless she herself is in the last resort its holder, or unless it is subject to an international control which will assure the terms of its exercise to western powers as a whole, among whom she will bulk largely.

The alternatives I have indicated are clear. Great Britain at the close of the war must be prepared either to accept a more thorough and systematic internationalization of sea law both in its making and its administration and its amendment in the interest of neutrals, or must be prepared to find America instead of Germany her competitor for sea supremacy. The exercise of such of its powers as gravely affect the interests of neutrals must be contingent on international consent, and the courts which render decisions so profoundly affecting neutral interests must probably also be international in their composition.

Indeed, one may say that America has already taken the first step to raise the fundamental question of sea power. The demand for an enormously increased American fleet, a fleet which will be larger than the British, has already influential backing, and if the German fleet at the end of this war is reduced or destroyed and definitely put out of reckoning, Britain's real naval competitor will then become the United States.

Now it is very much in the interest of civilization that the real nature of the conflict should be made plain by Americans to the British public as soon as possible. It is important to disabuse the English mind of the belief that the discussion is about small points of contraband or the purchase of ships. It will help to a better understanding of some of the issues which must be settled at the peace—and to know what it is fighting for is one of Europe's great needs just now—if America makes it plain that she must in the end stand for the neutralization of the sea and the more thorough internationalization of sea law; that that is one of stones which she is to contribute to the foundations of a real society of nations. That will mean for England in some measure the recasting of her whole national policy, a relaying in some measure of the foundations of her national security. This only makes it the more important that she should not come to the task unprepared by any real understanding of America's position. America should make it very plain that in this effort she wants England's cooperation; that if such cooperation is freely and cordially given England may

still perhaps be able to hold her sea power as a great international trust.

If this is not done, if America's position is not made clear, we may toward the end of the war be confronted by a conflict which certainly no one who wishes well to the two countries—and to post-bellum civilization generally—would care to contemplate.

## THE RIGHTS OF NEUTRALS<sup>1</sup>

In the Declaration of London the articles classed as *absolute contraband* of war—that is, articles which Great Britain might properly shut out of Germany altogether—were restricted to the actual tools and equipment of fighting nations. *Conditional contraband* was a more comprehensive list, including such merchandise as food, clothing, coal, harness and saddlery, horse-shoes and barbed wire. These articles, capable of direct use by the armed forces of the enemy, might be stopped only if the interfering belligerent could prove that they were destined for those forces. Finally, the declaration specified a list of *free goods*, articles which might not be molested because only distantly related to warfare, necessary to the civilian population, and contributing a very important portion of the commerce of peaceful neutrals. Such articles were cotton, wool, hides and skins, and rubber.

This was law as codified in the Declaration of London. The British Order in Council of August 20 had the effect of adding the conditional contraband list (food, clothing, etc.) to the absolute list, by decreeing that conditional contraband would be presumed to be moving to the German military, and hence subject to capture, if the goods were "consigned to or for an agent of the enemy state or to or for a merchant or other person under control of the authorities of the enemy state." That is, goods could be consigned to no one in Germany; they could not be shipped to Germany at all. It is obvious that after this action any addition to the British conditional contraband list was as complete a ban on commerce as an addition to the absolute contraband list. The two henceforth were identical.

<sup>1</sup> From "Economic Aspects of the War," by Edwin J. Clapp. Copyright, 1915, by the Yale University Press, and reprinted here by permission of the publishers.

This action stopped our direct trade with Germany. It might appear that goods on the free list could still move. Some of them did move, from free to contraband. People feared to ship the others lest they should be so listed while ships were on the ocean, and the goods made subject to seizure. Practically nothing has been shipped to Germany from this country but cotton, and it was not shipped until December. In belated response to the insistence of Southern senators and of American business interests which had found themselves gravely embarrassed by the cessation of cotton shipments, Great Britain finally made a clear statement that this particular commodity would not be considered contraband.

So much for direct trade with Germany. There was still a method by which we should have been able to export our goods and discharge our neutral obligations to trade with Germany as with England. We might have carried on this trade via neutral ports like Rotterdam or Copenhagen, from which the goods might have been shipped to Germany. The Declaration of London allows a belligerent to interfere with a shipment between two neutral ports only when it consists of absolute contraband for enemy territory. Conditional contraband so moving may not even be suspected. The Order in Council changed this. It extended the new intention of capturing conditional contraband to goods moving to Germany even through a neutral port. And, as explained, conditional contraband was seizable if destined to anyone in Germany; it was not conditional but absolute.

The British action, besides stopping our trade with Germany, barring only a certain amount of indirect trade carried on with much difficulty and danger, subjected to grave peril our commerce with other neutrals. The British contraband lists were extended so rapidly that soon almost no important article of commerce with neutrals was free from seizure by England, who suspected everything on these lists as being of possible German destination. The shipper to a neutral country then had the prospect of a British prize court passing judgment as to whether shipments were destined for Germany and, in the case of an affirmative judgment, whether any compensation should be paid the shipper, or his cargo simply confiscated. The uncertainty was a risk against which no one could insure.

As for the British contraband lists, a few instances will illus-

trate how they grew. On September 21, copper, lead, rubber, hides and skins were added; on October 29, motor vehicles, motor tires, mineral oil and leather. On December 23, naval stores and cottonseed oil went on the list. On March 11, raw wool was banned. The Germans have retaliated and published a contraband list containing articles that have nothing to do with war, like lumber and flax.

Our protests against the British August 20 Order in Council resulted in the substitution of an order dated October 29. But when we came to observe the operation of the October 29 order, we found that it did not lift the ban on our trade with Germany either direct or via neutrals, and that it added to the existing difficulties of our trade with neutrals a prohibition of shipments "to order." This prohibition dislocated the ordinary methods of foreign trade. Our protest to England of December 26 against interference with our trade with Europe failed to secure any modification of that interference.

At last a real test was made of the possibility of provisioning Germany. In January a St. Louis firm tried to get a cargo of foodstuffs to Germany on the American steamer *Wilhelmina*. The provisions were consigned to no one in Germany, but to a member of the American firm who went to Hamburg to receive the cargo and distribute it to the civilian population. The British stopped the vessel. Unable to find any law for continuing the detention, they made law through a new Order in Council, enabling England to requisition, without trial, the cargo of any neutral ship brought into port. The *Wilhelmina's* cargo was so requisitioned.

On February 4 Germany, claiming that its act was a reprisal against an unlawful British attempt to starve a civilian population, declared the waters around the British Isles a war zone where British merchant ships would be destroyed by German submarines—if necessary, without search—and where the submarines might endanger neutral vessels by mistake. Neutrals were warned to keep away. It was stated that it might be impossible to provide for the safety of passengers or crews of the British steamers destroyed.

When the war zone was announced, our government recognized the danger, and addressed a sharp note to Germany, warning that country to be careful not to strike at American vessels or American lives. At the same time, we seemed to

recognize in a degree the German point of view; so we sent a joint note to Britain and Germany suggesting that Britain give up its policy of stopping foodstuffs for German civilians, that Germany abandon its submarine warfare, and that both belligerents desist from mining the high seas.

With certain reservations Germany accepted the proposal. Great Britain rejected it and, indeed, instead of accepting, proceeded to more radical measures than before. On March 1, stating its action to be a retaliation against the submarine war and other alleged breaches of international law by the Germans, England instituted a "blockade" of Germany. The authorities at London announced that all vessels carrying cargoes to or from Germany, whether direct or via neutral ports, would be subject to seizure. This was the culmination of the British lawlessness. The culmination of the German lawlessness was the Lusitania horror.

The British "blockade" terminated our cotton trade with Germany, virtually the only trade that had moved. Whatever even of cotton thereafter found its way to Germany was involved in a smuggling operation. The third largest buyer from America became as distant from us as another world, barring some dangerous, indirect trade. Moreover, all our shipments to European neutrals adjacent to Germany now became tainted with suspicion and detention. Scores of cotton cargoes bound for neutrals have been held up in British ports.

For the first time American importers of German goods saw their supplies endangered; until March 1 the flow of commerce from Germany had been unhindered. Our federal government faced a loss of \$20,000,000 per year in customs revenues levied on German goods.

The most striking circumstance in this extraordinary situation is the fact that Great Britain has at no time maintained a genuine blockade. British warships, fearing submarines, dare not undertake a close blockade of German ports. The Admiralty merely intercepts all traffic passing by Scotland or through the English Channel. Thus the blockade does not bear equally on all neutrals, for Scandinavian countries ship undisturbed to German Baltic ports, from which American products are barred.

This whole process of gradually damming the currents of trade to and from one of the members of the comity of nations has been attended with huge financial loss to the neutrals.

More important than this, these neutrals, because the British operations have been contrary to the accepted interpretations of international law, have been put in a position where they ask themselves seriously whether, without violating their neutrality, they may lawfully continue to trade with one belligerent which unlawfully prevents them from trading with another. Above all, they question the possibility of silent acquiescence in the policy of both belligerents in abandoning decent restraints in their treatment of the lives and property of neutrals.

The time has arrived to revive the restraints and reassert international law and morals.

The lifting of the British "blockade" will not suffice, for we neutrals should then find many of the products of peaceful industry each burdened with an individual blockade. That is, these products would be found included in the British contraband lists, with all that that means in the hindrance of trade between neutrals as well as between a neutral and a belligerent. If the "blockade" were lifted and the October 29 Order in Council and the British contraband lists kept in force, the relief to neutrals would be small.

What we need is a code of law and morals so simple in its terms that the self-interest of neither belligerent can evolve a quibbling interpretation of it different from that which neutrals hold. In this code must be determined what may be contraband and what may not; and it must define the entire method of procedure against merchant ships at sea.

There is no time now, in the midst of the war, for neutral nations to meet and devise such a code. The best we can do is to point to one already in existence: the Declaration of London. Formed by the best legal talent of all nations, it is fair and it is clear.

Along with the removal of England's illegal practices against the goods of neutrals must go the removal of Germany's illegal practices against their goods and lives. Germany must restrict her swollen contraband list and likewise return to the Declaration of London. She must not use submarines against unresisting merchant vessels except to stop and search them in the approved legal way. Nor may English merchant vessels under any conditions be sunk until the safety of crew and passengers has been provided for.

Floating mine fields must be removed by those who laid them.



# THE WAR AND COMMERCE

## THE EUROPEAN WAR CRISIS<sup>1</sup>

The outbreak of the European war precipitated many grave problems. International credits and exchanges were completely disorganized, ocean transportation was for a time partially paralyzed, the entire business and economic structure in this country was shaken to its foundations, and a catastrophe of calamitous proportions was narrowly averted. It is a tribute to the economic strength and soundness of the country and to the patriotism of its people in every class and walk of life that the shock has been so admirably withstood. A panic of cataclysmic proportions might easily have resulted, and if it had the injury to the country would have been incalculable and many years would have been required to overcome its effects. Through the prompt and effective action of the Treasury Department, and with the cordial and intelligent cooperation of the banking and business interests of the country, the danger has been averted. Confidence has been restored and specie payments have been maintained in the face of the world. At no time since the war broke out has there been, to the knowledge of this department, with the exception of a few isolated cases, a failure on the part of any solvent national bank to honor its checks in currency or money or to meet its obligations. The general revival of business throughout the country is the best evidence that confidence has been restored. Interest rates have come down from the high level to which apprehension had lifted them, restriction of credits has disappeared, foreign exchange has reached a normal basis, and a feeling of optimism pervades the business world. There is every reason why the country should look to the future with confidence so far as its trade, commerce, and industry are concerned.

<sup>1</sup> By William G. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, from his Annual Report for the Fiscal Year Ended June 1914.

EFFECT ON AMERICAN BUSINESS<sup>1</sup>

The question uppermost in the minds, not only of the bankers but of the business people of this country today is, just how will the European war effect American finance, American business. The subject is so broad and there are so many elements still undetermined that any opinion must be given with great reserve. My thought is that the points best settled today are:

First. For a long term of years Americans will not be able to finance new improvements or developments in the railway or commercial world through funds obtained from Europe. We must finance ourselves.

Second. As affairs become more stable, the rate of investments, at least upon government obligations in Europe, will so nearly approach the investments held from this country, that there will be a continuing return of bonds and stocks now held in Europe. This will result in a partial extinction of the indebtedness of our industries to Europe.

Third. During the continuance of the war and probably for a year or two afterward, all of the countries who have been at war will be practically upon a paper basis. Gold will be principally used for exchange between countries, and as long as this continues, money should remain cheap for short terms and the real pinch will not come until an effort is made to get back to a gold basis.

Fourth. In spite of the best credit facilities, after the war it will be extremely difficult for the European countries to finance their oversea trade for long periods and on such liberal terms as they have done in the past. This should enable American merchants and manufacturers to obtain a very much better hold upon the South American and Far Eastern business. At the close of the war and the return of the men now in the armies, a very large output of manufacturing products will be pushed forward with almost unheard of haste because of the needs of these various countries to supply goods for export, and I believe that our American manufacturers must face a very strong competition.

Fifth. Out of these different currents of business and trade

<sup>1</sup> By A. B. Leach, President of the Investment Bankers Association. Reprinted from the *Annals of the American Academy*, July 1915, p. 143-4.

brought on by the war, I believe that America is practically the only country in this world that will be benefited and I believe that we will be very substantially benefited. We are not equipped perhaps today to assume the first position in business, in trade world-wide, but backed by the enormous home consumption and home trade, I believe that the future for this country is brighter today than it has ever been.

## HOW COMMERCE WILL BE AFFECTED<sup>1</sup>

Perhaps it is well before considering the future effects of the war upon our commerce to recall what they have already been. Less than a year ago many business conditions existed to which we had so long been accustomed that they seemed to many to be normal and to contain no elements which should cause anxiety. We were using, for example, dyestuffs, over the production and transportation of which we had no control whatever. They were purchased almost exclusively from one country whose necessities might at any time normally conflict with our own. Anyone who thought carefully about this knew that we might be deprived at any time by conditions of which examples are familiar enough in history both of the source of supply for these necessary goods and the means of transporting them. The things, however, which had happened in the times of our fathers and grandfathers did not seem likely to happen to us and we were quite content with our dependent position. Seeing no clouds, we acted as if confident of permanent clear weather. It was so in potash and in other things. It was a comfortable enough position while nothing happened and most men busy in commerce did not see that anything was likely to happen, and so it went on until the explosion came.

There were, however, some men who had foreseen the explosion. Any close examination of international finance and trade during the two years prior to 1914 will show that a gradual process of drawing funds from all over the world had been going on. European bourses supply most of the world with money. During these years they were on the whole not ex-

<sup>1</sup> By William C. Redfield, Secretary of Commerce. Reprinted from *Harper's Weekly*, June 26, 1915, p. 615-16, with corrections and emendations by Mr. Redfield.

panding their operations; they were contracting. The life-blood of finance was not flowing so much outward into the currents of trade as inward into the stock of gold reserved against a rainy day. The prescient eye of finance had seen something in what was then thought to be the not distant future and bankers began to get ready. When the expected crisis took the form of war they were more or less prepared. We were not so well placed. Our financial antennæ did not reach out so far into the world. The instinct of self-preservation did not act upon us quite so soon. Therefore, though we were not as directly involved in the war as the other great centers of the world, we were struck a sharp and unexpected blow at a time when we were unprepared to meet it. It found us borrowers with a large funded debt abroad and a considerable floating one. The former was in shape where it could be offered in our exchanges for sale at whatever the securities would under the circumstances bring. The latter could be called for in cash. Both processes were tried and both, perhaps either, if carried to an extreme might have meant disaster.

It does not detract from the great credit due to our men of light and leading in business and finance for their effective cooperation with the government in meeting the crisis of August, 1914, to say that every instinct of self-preservation called to both to act in their own defense. The record of what was then done to absorb the shock which fell upon us at a time when the usual sources of financial aid were wanting, when it shall be written at a time sufficiently distant to get true perspective, will prove one of the bright passages in our history. It should go far to offset the damage done us all by petty preachers of low motives and by the apostles of distrust to recall that in this time of shock and stress the business and financial world did its full and honorable share in the essential service of keeping our commercial and fiscal system intact, providing for it not merely the means of safety but those of honorably discharging the heavy existing obligations. Through the joint efforts of men of all parties and views we kept our faith, sustained our credit, paid our debts, and on this foundation in whose solidity we take just pride, have built an amazing structure. The nation which only a few months ago was mobilizing its business resources to save its commercial honor at a time when its older sisters were gathering their sons for slaughter, is today

the one nation above all others to whom the whole world turns for money and for goods. It is not for the payment of debts due them that they turn to us. It is for the creation of debts due us. It is not for selling goods to us that they come hither; it is that they may buy goods from us. Truly "the former things have passed away and all things have become new." Had one a year ago prophesied that side by side in an American newspaper would be printed advertisements placing in this market loans on the same day to both Germany and France he would have been thought to be indulging in a fanciful dream. Yet not only has this happened but many if not most of the nations in Europe have already called upon us for funds and we have in one or another form supplied credits to people in other continents. Buying commissions have come hither from both neutral and belligerent countries vying with one another in securing the needed supplies until the ocean transportation system of the world, reduced by the withdrawal of all vessels of some belligerents and by those needed by others for purposes of war, has proven insufficient for the unwonted task suddenly imposed upon it.

Coincident, therefore, with the war have been these results upon American commerce: We have paid in goods and not in gold the floating debt we owed a year ago. We have absorbed a considerable part of the funded debt we owed abroad by purchasing it from its former owners. To the extent to which this process has gone it has resulted in our paying interest on this debt to ourselves instead of to others. We have ceased for the time to spend abroad many scores of millions for travelers' expenses and purchases. We have paid a larger share than usual of late to American vessels for ocean transportation, though this must be offset against the larger sums we have been obliged to pay for freight to the foreign lines remaining in operation upon whom we have been and are still obliged to depend to keep our commerce moving. Being the one great industrial, agricultural and mineral producing nation free from war's alarms, those have turned to us whose product was insufficient for their own needs or whose source of supply was cut off by the war. Two of our leading competitors in the world's markets have long been out of business. Two others have by their necessities been obliged to give such intense care to their internal needs that they cannot devote to foreign markets the

normal share of their attention. The banking facilities provided by some of our international competitors have more or less broken down. Their mail and telegraph facilities have been interrupted. Their cooperating system of transportation has ceased to move. It has been as if in a great competitive market certain competitors had left it and their elaborate and effective systems of working therein had ceased to function; other competitors, though nominally remaining, were to a greater or less extent inhibited from normal activity, and we, to whom the world now turns, we have had put before us the commercial opportunity of our whole history.

It is not too much to say that the opportunity that recent months have offered to American business is at least as great as the emergency against which we so vigorously and successfully fought in August. Would that we might show the same grasp of the situation and like effectiveness in dealing with it. It is true that the government has in many departments dealt aggressively with this opportunity and that it has been seconded ably by private enterprise. The appropriations for promoting our foreign commerce on the part of the national government are four times as large as they were two years ago a fact which taken by itself should shame some who talk of the government's hostility to business. A force of trained commercial attaches is doing effective service in great foreign centers. This is a new service barely a year old but already having abundantly justified itself. The State Department through its foreign trade advisers and its diplomatic staff has been constantly active in the favoring of American trade, and too much can hardly be said in praise of the real and growing effectiveness of our consular service.

It would be easy to give many individual examples of manufacturers and merchants who in person and by letter have testified to the efficiency of the government service in their behalf.

Side by side with this has occurred the beginning and the growth of American banks abroad, and praise is due those who have thus extended the helpful hand of finance into the foreign fields where it has been so much wanted and so conspicuously wanting.

Yet, though much has been done both by public and private means it is doubtless true that on the whole our nation was as

unprepared for this peaceful opportunity as it is for the emergencies of war. To my thought this unpreparedness is the normal outcome of a teaching which has for many years proclaimed America's inability to take an equal place in the markets of the world with others. When one has been taught in private conference and by public statement his inability to contend successfully against the competition of Europe on our own soil on equal terms, it seems not only normal but necessary that he should be slow to believe he can compete successfully with Europe on her own ground or in other lands where we can have no preference. Be this as it may, we, who alone among the nations of the world are the envy of all the rest, who by comparison with others barely know what taxes mean, who have few of the burdens relatively to our strength which our sister nations bear, who are paying instead of accumulating debt, who are saving money on a scale which the world has hitherto never known, we, to whom the door of opportunity stands open as never before, have preferred to some degree rather to worry over the lesser evils that we have than to think with gratitude and courage of such as we know not of.

One does not forget or minimize the vigor with which strong men of affairs have grasped the hands reached out to us from all the world in saying at the same time that those who have been eager to urge America to forward steps in the world's markets during recent months have often encountered a spirit of indifference, a tendency to growl over this, that, or the other alleged difficulty, a habit of fearing ghosts, an almost unreasoning dread of the dark which is at times discouraging.

Yet the country is finding itself. It is becoming conscious of its own power and is relegating the calamity howler to the scrap heap whither long since the muck-raker went. The rising spirit of confidence and courage is lighting the dark places and sweeping away the little men and little thought that would hold back the tide. Men are thinking it more square as well as more profitable to get their equipment and methods right than to look for the public to be taxed to sustain them in ineffectiveness. A more manly spirit is in the air, a determination to do one's best for himself, for his business and for his country. For one growler there are hundreds busy improving and developing. Doubtless there are those who yearn for the fleshpots of Egypt in what they think the good old way, but doubtless

too the minds of most of us are intent on other matters. We are facing the other way and are looking for better things.

What the future effects of the war upon American commerce shall be is as yet in the lap of the gods. When it shall close it will find our former competitors handicapped by heavier debts, greater taxes, disrupted organizations, loss of current business, and in many other ways. We shall have to pay our share of the loss caused by the war when through the normal balancing of economic forces they come to bear upon us. People to whom we would sell will have less with which to buy. People from whom we would buy may of necessity have to charge us more. The whole world must absorb in time the costs and losses of war and we must do our share of the absorbing. This does not mean that we may not, if we will, take a position relative to others who must perhaps absorb more than we of these losses that is different from that relation in which we stood to them before. It may easily be that from the third position in the world's great markets we may take the second. What our relation in that position to others will be depends largely on ourselves. America was never so free to take any place she chooses in the world as she is today. There has never been a time when others were so little able to resist any advance we choose to make. It is only the narrow vision that sees the competition of commerce as a minor type of war. A larger outlook sees it rather as one of the athletic exercises by which the world struggles upward.

## THE PRESENT FINANCIAL SITUATION<sup>1</sup>

It seems to me that it takes a great deal of courage to tell you what the effects of this war on the finances of America are to be. I know, however, that most of us do not appreciate the gravity of the war. We do not fully appreciate the tremendous forces that have been set in motion, nor do we well apprehend the direction in which we are moving.

Let us take a broad view of the facts which we do all know. We all know that ten billions of war bonds have been issued.

<sup>1</sup> Remarks of Frank A. Vanderlip, President, National City Bank, New York, as presiding officer at the fifth session of the Annual Meeting of the American Academy held in Philadelphia on April 30 and May 1, 1915.



Those figures are so large that it is impossible really to comprehend what they mean except by comparison with the indebtedness that has been issued before by these nations or by their total wealth. I happened to note in a newspaper clipping today an estimate of the wealth of different nations and I was struck by the fact that the amount of war bonds already issued is about equal to the total wealth of Spain and the Netherlands. This is a striking comparison. We have suggestive figures, but we do not really know what the cost of this war is for a year—not the cost in the creation of securities alone—but in the capitalized value of the lives lost and in the effect of industry impeded. I do not know how accurate the statement may be, but an eminent English economist has suggested that the cost might reach forty-six billion dollars. That is half the wealth of Great Britain.

This is a destruction that our minds have not attempted really to comprehend. We can hardly take it in. Now, if this great destruction has been going on, why have we not felt it more? Why is it that the world is still fairly cheerful? We have rising stock markets, not only here but abroad, rather an industrial boom in the stock market of Germany, and surprisingly easy money everywhere. Can we stand that sort of destruction of wealth and have nothing serious follow? It might seem so from the facts as we see them now, and as they concern us now, but I believe the effect has not yet been really felt. There have been an inflation of note issues and an inflation of credit which have prevented the world from feeling this shock, but my own opinion is that a shock is eventually going to be felt more severely than our rather superficial consideration has yet given us cause to anticipate. I can however only call attention to what seems to me the seriousness of the situation and cannot attempt at this time to go into any real analysis of it.

## EFFECTS ON LITERATURE

### THE WAR AND LITERATURE<sup>1</sup>

The effect of war on all imaginative literature is immediately adverse and ultimately incalculable. It is immediately adverse in the sense that it instantly devastates the writer, whose imagination, quicker than that of most men to see the horror and ruin of war, becomes distorted and inflamed so that he is made incapable of writing either forcefully or nobly about it. The artist, indeed, is the first man to suffer from war, and the last man to recover from it, not merely in the matter of finance, but also, and more importantly, in the matter of his art. Many men mocked at the English poets in the first months of the war because they wrought rhymes of incredible paltriness about the European disaster. These critics were ignorant, perhaps of the fact that the poets were so conscious of the misery that had been let loose by the outbreak of hostilities that their art was overwhelmed by their feelings. Poets will not be able to write of this war with any artistry until the memories of it have been dimmed and blurred, and the sharp antagonisms have lost their edge, and the bitterness and hate have been dissolved by the chemicals of time. Thomas Hardy, writing *The Dynasts* a hundred years after the Napoleonic Wars, is able to make a great poem; he is sufficiently removed from them to be able to write without personal passion; but Thomas Hardy, writing in the midst of a greater disaster to the comity of the world than the Napoleonic Wars, makes a poem which, although it is better than that of any of his contemporaries on the same subject, is inadequate to its theme. No one, least of all a poet, can express his sensations properly at the moment that he is feeling them: passion passes into hysteria and windy rhetoric, or is held down and stifled, and the product of it is a dead thing. Poetry is "emotion remembered in tranquility." The poet who will write superbly of this war will not begin to do so

<sup>1</sup> By St. John G. Ervine. Reprinted from the *North American Review*, July 1915, p. 92-9.

until the war has been at an end for a long time. It may be that the poet is not yet born.

It is when we come to consider the effect of the war on the literature of the future that we find calculation almost impossible. We can say with some certainty that it will be difficult, even if possible, to write about the people of this time—particularly if the writer be a realist—without taking the war into account; for no other war in the history of the world has so intimately affected the lives of all men in Europe as this one has. Jane Austen was able to write six novels, intimately concerned with the lives of her contemporaries, without making any reference to the Napoleonic Wars, although they must have affected her personally, since two of her brothers were officers in the English navy. Large sections of the people were able to conduct their lives in those days with as little disturbance as their descendants suffered during the Boer War.

But it is not possible for any one to live in England now, and not be touched in some way, in most cases very closely, by the war. And what is true of England, must be more true of France and Belgium and Germany and Russia and Serbia and Austria. Each one of us in Europe, broadly speaking, is connected with the battle-front by bonds that are not easily broken or forgotten. If we are not mourning for the dead or weeping with the maimed, or enduring anxieties for those who are still in the trenches or fearful for those who will soon be there, we are suffering from the sharp alarms of diminished fortune or the prospect of irretrievable ruin. War is the Great Interrupter; and this war has brought us all to a terrible standstill; it has caused us to cease from doing old, accustomed things. Even now, many months after the beginning of war when we have resumed as many of our normal habits as we possibly can, we still wonder stupidly what the end of the war will mean to all of us. It may be that we shall have to make a new routine for ourselves. It may be that the world into which we were born came to an abrupt end on that dreadful day in August when Death spread his bloody mesh over the fields where harvesters should soon have been reaping corn. It may be that we are living now in a nebulous state, and that presently God will say a second time, "Let there be Light!" and a new world will then be created. Whatever may be the result of this upheaval in the carefully conserved life of Europe, this is

certain: that so strong and deep an intrusion into the life of these times will fundamentally affect every work of imagination that may be written in the next fifty years. The war will be the pivot on which the destinies of imaginary men will revolve during at least two generations. It can no more be ignored in literature than the Flood could be ignored in any account of the time of Noah. Books will begin in all sorts of ways, romantically and realistically, but somewhere in the middle of them, the war will relentlessly thrust itself, diverting the characters from the normal course of their lives.

The incidents of stories and plays will, inevitably, be related to the war. Authors will have to send their men to the front or account of their absence from it; their women will have love affairs interrupted and their marriages precipitated or altogether prevented by the war; their character may find themselves suddenly enriched or suddenly ruined by it; and in countless ways the people of the imagination will be caught up and thrown about as violently as a man is caught up in a machine and flung, broken and stunned, in this direction and in that. In France and Belgium, too, what tragedies will be woven round the terrible figures of women who have been debauched by war-maddened men! In Germany and Russia, there will surely come into literature some sorrow that was first conceived near the Mazurian Lakes and the swampy lands that separate Prussia from Poland; and a heavy tread will succeed the light dancing of Austria and Hungary when men tell the tale of the dead, "horse, rider, friend, foe, in one red burial blent," filling the Carpathian Passes with their bones and drenching the Serbian Hills with their blood.

More important, however, than the influence of the war on the incidents of stories and plays, will be its influence on the authors themselves. What will be the tone, the philosophy, if you will, of English literature or, indeed, world literature, during the next two or three generations? What will be the general tone of English writing now and onwards? Will there be a deepening of spirit and a strengthening of quality? What sort of life, in short, will the imaginative writers reveal in their works?

It depends upon the spirit shown by the people to whom they belong. Every experience that a nation undergoes makes a deep mark on its literature. The failure of the revolution in

Russia sent a mood of pessimism spreading through the hearts and minds of the Russian people and the Russian writers of that time, and the literature that was created then was full of an insane despair and a desperate preoccupation with sex, not as an adventure, but as an anodyne. Such a book as Artsibashef's "Sanine," lately published in English, is representative of the mood of mind in Russia in the years of dashed hopes that succeeded the failure of the revolutionaries. Sometimes the experience of a nation is inversely reflected in its literature, just as the desires of a man are sometimes the opposite of his potentialities. Professor Walter Raleigh, in his book on "The English Novel," writes:

Literature has constantly the double tendency to negative the life around it, as it were, as well as to reproduce it; the lawlessness and unrest of medieval society are echoed, with the direction reversed, in the monkish hymns of rest and visions of endless Sabbath, while Browning's strenuous Epilogue and Stevenson's thrilling tales of adventure belong, it is no great cynicism to aver, to an age of sedentary occupations. Literature, that is to say, is an escape from life, its monotony or its distractions, as well as a grappling with life and its problems.

The most joyful nations have sometimes produced the most tragic literature. There can have been few richer, heartier periods in English history than the Elizabethan era; yet the literature of that time dealt mostly in death and disaster, in madness and disease and the violent end of kings. A natural literature came out of the artificial life of England in the eighteenth century. The brutal, commercialized people who inhabited England in the first fifty years of the nineteenth century produced a literature that began in gentleness and pity and ended in intolerable sentimentality. A saddened, disrupted race like the Irish prior to the enactment of the Land Laws, produces little literature, indeed, but such as it does produce is full of laughter and the Comic Spirit.

It is very difficult to prophesy what sort of literature will be produced from now onwards. It may be that literature will "negative the life around it," as Professor Raleigh puts it, rather than "reproduce it." The war will bring humiliation, perhaps disgrace, to some of the nations of Europe. To others it will bring relief, possibly exultation. To all of them, it will bring heavy sorrow and a great mourning for the dead.

It is easier, perhaps, to prophesy what will be the temper of the literature that will come from Germany and Austria if

the war should end in a decisive victory for those countries than it is to prophesy what the temper will be if the war should end in their defeat. It is likely, I think, that victory may bring into German literature a more insistent note of harshness, for harshness would have been justified of its children. It would be natural, in those circumstances, for authors to make heroes of men who trample carelessly toward whatever goal they desire, indifferent to the suffering they inflict on the way. The spirit of the militarist, exhilarated and strengthened by victory, would probably become the dominant spirit, and men would go without saying, "He who is not ruthless, is effete!" And with that joy in hard living and smashed principles would come two literatures: one boasting of lust, and one preaching repentance; each of them hard and sterile. A plague of preachers, resembling Tolstoy in tortured austerity, but having none of the simple humanity of Bunyan, would devour what was left by the lechers of literature; and the empires would be divided into men who cannot control their vices and men who cannot control their virtues. There could be no health in such a literature as that.

If the war ends in defeat for the Dual Alliance, there may be a disruption of organized society, similar to the disruption of France at the time of the Revolution, though not, probably, so bloody as that. In that event, we may expect to find German literature full of self-examination, bitter and deep-searching. It may be that pessimism will brood over German life, and that self-suppression will be replaced by self-contempt. German literature would then be full of morbid, introspective people, posing continually and deeply interested, in a neurotic fashion, in the most trivial facts of their lives.

Or it may be that defeat will lead, through self-examination, to a prouder, because humbler, mood of hopefulness and determination and indomitable resolve. The purge may purify and not exhaust. In the ruins of one life may be discovered the foundations of another and finer life; and out of that new life may come something Miltonic or something after the fashion of Hugo. Or, if the two empires are fundamentally unsound, it may be that they will sink to trifling and flippancy and utter bankruptcy of spirit. Germany, in defeat, may give birth to a Jeremiah who will scourge her soul, or to a sweet singer of Israel who will fill her heart with hope; or she may be delivered

to the little men, paltry and irresolute, who will make her sourness more sour and send her soul spinning into a dingy hell.

How will it be for the Allies in victory or defeat?

I do not doubt that defeat for Russia and France would mean the instant development of a despondent literature, a certain nervelessness of attitude towards life, a craving for annihilation. "We are alive," they would say; "let us pray to be dead!" In that mood of decay, there would be no more Russia, no more France; but a heap of scattered tombs and endless funeral processions. Men would turn—not joyfully, but morbidly—to religion; and slowly, perhaps, but certainly, literature would disappear. It would not, I imagine, be with England in defeat as it would be with Russia and France, because ideas mean less to Englishmen than they mean to Russians and Frenchmen, and also because Englishmen are so afraid of despair and discomfort. "No one desires happiness except the English," Nietzsche wrote in his bitterness; and Englishmen, whatever their situation, will make desperate efforts to capture content, even if they lose position in doing so. Defeat for England may cause Englishmen to seek shelter from their memories in books that have no reality, that are full of a comfortable cheerfulness, that make great clumsy lunges at happy endings. It would always be Sunday afternoon in English books if the dreadful contingency of defeat were to come about. There would be a hushed literature in England, full of polite pages. The men of letters would, so to speak, go about with their fingers on their lips.

But if, as we hope and believe, victory rests with the Allies, it is very likely that a new note of ecstasy will be sounded in French and Russian literature. Russia talks too much, in literature, about second-rate metaphysics. Tolstoi was intolerably garrulous; Dostoevsky, less aimlessly garrulous than Tolstoi, still contrived to fill his pages with a great deal of gabble. Even Turgenev, the most economic and laconic of the Russian novelists, leaves the reader with the impression that Russians spend their days and nights in chattering rather naïvely about fundamentals. The war may correct this tendency to tattling. Victory may mean that the Russians will cease to lounge through life and become men of sharp actions. If that should happen, there will be a very distinct cleavage between the post-war and the ante-war Russian literature.

The books will be shorter, crisper, less inactive, less pensive and moody, more hearty and brisk, full of vigor and open air. And in France, too, there will be a great change. France and Russia, unlike England, have had the invader on their soil. France, moreover, has a bitter memory to obliterate and lost provinces to recover. A victory for her would mean such a restoration of rapture to her people, and consequently to her literature, as can barely be imagined. Artifice would instantly disappear from the French novels and French drama. There might almost be a revival of Dumas and the healthy romantics, loud laughs and generous natures. The Franco-German War of 1870 brought greed into France: the European War of today may drive it out again.

And it may very well be that out of Belgium, ravished and mangled, victory will bring a swifter spirit than the world has yet seen; for there is a point in human trouble beneath which it is impossible to fall, and when that point is reached, the spirit either expires or recovers and changes its direction, leaping eagerly towards life and quick pleasure. Belgium may turn away from Maeterlinck and the introspection and social self-consciousness of Verhaeren and Cammaerts, and give the world a new Chaucer, full of animal delight in existence and the bright look of things.

That note of ecstasy, however, will hardly be sounded in English literature, because we in England shall not have the same recoil from misery and outrage that the French and the Belgians will have when victory comes. The sea is our defender and we are unlikely to come so nearly to the desolations of war as they have done. The joy of driving the invader from their soil and the recovery of lost lands will help Belgium and France to forget the griefs and bereavements they have suffered; but we in England shall have none of that satisfaction. When victory comes to us, we shall not shout for joy: we shall sigh with relief. We shall have long, lonely memories of undiscoverable graves in France and Flanders wherein our dead sons are laid; and where we were wont to go for pleasure, we shall for many years go on sorrowful pilgrimages. It may be that melancholy will settle on our literature, melancholy and thwarted desire and a solemn preoccupation with destinies. There will, indeed, be a greater sense of purpose discernible in our life and letters, and there will be an end of that aimless toying with



incoherent ideas which culminated before the war began in the fatuities of the Futurists.

Whatever turn the wheel of English life may take, whatever be the mood of English letters now and onwards; this is certain: that we shall hear no more of the pretty-pretty babblers, with their Bond Street barbarism and their rococo recklessness. The Vorticists and the Imagists and the Futurists and the rest of the rabble of literary and artistic lunatics provided slender entertainment for empty days; but our minds are empty no longer; and we have no time to waste on monkeys on sticks. Our writers may turn Hamlets, questioning this and questioning that, or they may take to the road like Tom Jones, developing a love of rough living and a hearty lust that is natural in strong, clean men, or they may turn to self-mortification and preach the discipline of the flesh, as Tolstoi did; or they may become as nationalistic and religious as Dostoevsky; or as cosmopolitan as Turgenev; or as imperialistic as Kipling; or as de-nationalized as Henry James; but whatever they may become, this also will be added to them, that they shall be fully sincere. It may be that men who have nothing whatever to say will realize that their tongues are empty, and will cease to make books in order that they may dig the earth. Mr. Wells, in "The Days of the Comet," told a tale of a vapor which enveloped the world, and when it was dispelled, left men with fresh and wholesome minds. Perhaps the war, abominable and utterly senseless as it seems to be, will serve the function of Mr. Wells's vapor, and when it is over, there will be a renascence of fine spirit in Europe and America. We may yet see a greater and lovelier literature than our fathers ever dreamt of.

## PEACE MOVEMENTS

### INTERNATIONAL PEACE COURT<sup>1</sup>

My fellow-seekers after peace, we thank you for your cordial greeting. In calling this meeting my associates and I have not been unaware that we might be likened to the tailors of Tooley street, who mistook themselves for the people of England. We wish first to say that we do not represent anybody but ourselves. We are not national legislators, nor do we control the foreign policy of this government. A number of us were invited to dinner at the Century Club (New York) by four generous hosts, who were deeply interested in devising a plan for an international agreement by which, when this present war shall cease, a recurrence of such a war will be made less probable.

We are not here to suggest a means of bringing this war to an end; much as that is to be desired and much as we would be willing to do to obtain peace, that is not within the project of the present meeting.

We hope and pray for peace, and our hope of its coming in the near future is sufficient to make us think that the present is a good time to discuss and formulate a series of proposals to which the assent of a number of the great powers could be secured. We think that a league of peace could be formed that would enable nations to avoid war by furnishing a practical means of settling international quarrels, or suspending them until the blinding heat of passion had cooled.

When the world conference is held our country will have its official representatives to speak for us. "We, Tailors of Tooley Street," will not be there, but if, in our sartorial leisure, we shall have discussed and framed a practical plan for a league of peace, our official representatives will be aided and may in their discretion accept it and present it to the conference as their own.

<sup>1</sup> Address by William Howard Taft, at a meeting held in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, June 17, 1915, to form an American branch of the League to Enforce Peace.

There are Tooley Streets in every nation today and the minds of earnest men are being stirred with the same thought and the same purpose. We have heard from them through various channels. The denizens of those Tooley Streets will have their influence upon their respective official representatives. No man can measure the effect upon the peoples of the belligerent countries and upon the peoples of the neutral countries—the horrors and exhaustion that this unprecedented war is going to have. It is certain they all will look with much more favorable eye to leagues for the preservation of peace than ever before.

In no war has the direct interest that neutrals have in preventing a war between neighbors been so closely made known.

This interest of neutrals has been so forced upon them that it would require only a slight development and growth in the law of international relations to develop that interest into a right to be consulted before such a war among neighbors can be begun. This step we hope to have taken by the formation of a peace league of the great powers, whose primary and fundamental principle shall be that no war can take place between any two members of the league until they have resorted to the machinery that the league proposes to furnish to settle the controversy likely to lead to war.

If any member refuses to use this machinery and attacks another member of the league in breach of his league obligation, all members of the league agree to defend the members attacked by force.

We do not think the ultimate resort to force can be safely omitted from an effective league of peace. We sincerely hope that it may never become necessary, and that the deterrent effect of its inevitable use in case of a breach of the league obligation will help materially to give sanction to the laws of the league and to render a resort to force avoidable.

We are not peace-at-any-price men, because we do not think we have reached the time when a plan based on the complete abolition of war is impracticable. So long as nations partake of the frailties of men who compose them, war is a possibility, and that possibility should not be ignored in any league of peace that is to be useful. We do not think it necessary to call peace-at-any-price men cowards or apply other epithets to them. We have known in history the most noble characters who adhered to such a view and yet whose physical and moral courage is a heritage of mankind.

To those who differ with us in our view of the necessity for this feature of possible force in our plan, we say we respect your attitude. We admit your claim to sincere patriotism to be as just as ours. We do not ascribe your desire to avoid war to be a fear of death to yourselves or your sons; but rather to your sense of the horrors, injustice, and ineffectiveness of settling any international issue by such a brutal arbitrament. Nevertheless, we differ with you in judgment that, in the world of nations as they are, war can be completely avoided.

We believe it is still necessary to use a threat of overwhelming force of a great league with a willingness to make the threat good in order to frighten nations into a use of rational and peaceful means to settle their issues with their associates of the league. Nor are we militarists or jingoes. We are trying to follow a middle path.

Now what is the machinery a resort to which we wish to force an intending belligerent of the league—it consists of two tribunals, to one of which every issue must be submitted. Issues between nations are of two classes:

First—Issues that can be decided on principles of international law and equity, called justiciable.

Second—Issues that cannot be decided on such principles of law and equity, but which might be quite as irritating and provocative of war, called non-justiciable.

The questions of the Alaskan boundary, of the Bering Sea seal fishing, and of the Alabama claims were justiciable issues that could be settled by a court, exactly as the Supreme Court would settle claims between states. The questions whether the Japanese should be naturalized, whether all American citizens should be admitted to Russia as merchants without regard to religious faith, are capable of causing great irritation against the nation denying the privilege, and yet such nations, in the absence of a treaty on the subject, are completely within their international right, and the real essence of the trouble cannot be aided by a resort to a court. The trouble is non-justiciable.

We propose that for justiciable questions we shall have an impartial court to which all questions arising between members of the league shall be submitted. If the court finds the question justiciable, it shall decide it. If it does not, it shall refer it to a commission of conciliation to investigate, confer, hear argument, and recommend a compromise.

We do not propose to enforce compliance either with the

court's judgment or the conciliation commission's recommendations. We feel that we ought not to attempt too much—we believe that the forced submission and the truce taken to investigate the judicial decision or the conciliatory compromise recommended will form a material inducement to peace. It will cool the heat of passion, and will give the men of peace in each nation time to still the jingoes.

The league of peace will furnish a great opportunity for more definite formulation of the principles of international law. The arbitral court will amplify it and enrich it in their application of its general principles to particular cases. They will create a body of judge-made law of the highest value. Then the existence of the league will lead to ever-recurring congresses of the league, which, acting in a quasi-legislative capacity, may widen the scope of international law in a way that a court may not feel able or competent to do.

This is our plan. It is not so complicated—at least, in statement. In its practical application difficulties now unforeseen may arise, but we believe it offers a working hypothesis upon which a successful arrangement can be made.

We are greeted first by the objection that no treaties can prevent war. We are not called upon to deny this in order to justify or vindicate our proposals as useful. We realize that nations sometimes are utterly immoral in breaking treaties and shamelessly bold in avowing their right to do so on the ground of necessity; but this is not always the case. We cannot give up treaties because sometimes they are broken any more than we can give up commercial contracts because men sometimes dishonor themselves in breaking them. We decline to assume that all nations always are dishonorable, or that a solemn treaty obligation will not have some deterrent effect upon a nation that has plighted its faith to prevent its breach. When we add to this the sanction of an agreement by a number of powerful nations to enforce the obligation of the recalcitrant and faithless member, we think we have a treaty that is much more than a "scrap of paper"—and we base our faith in this on a common-sense view of human nature.

It is objected that we propose only to include the more powerful nations. We'll gladly include them all. But we don't propose to have the constitution of our court complicated by a demand for equal representation of the many smaller

nations. We believe that when we have a league of larger powers the smaller powers will be glad to come in and enjoy the protection that the league will afford against the unjust aggression of the strong against the weak.

It is suggested that we invite a conference of neutral nations to bring about measures for present peace and to formulate demands as to the protection of neutral rights. This may be a good plan, but, as Kipling says, that is another story.

### A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE<sup>1</sup>

In spite of its ominous sound, the suggestion of a league of nations to enforce peace has no connection with any effort to stop the present war. It is aimed solely at preventing future conflicts after the terrific struggle now raging has come to an end; and yet this is not a bad time for people in private life to bring forward proposals of such a nature. Owing to the vast number of soldiers under arms, to the proportion of men and women in the warring countries who suffer acutely, to the extent of the devastation and misery, it is probable that, whatever the result may be, the people of all nations will be more anxious to prevent the outbreak of another war than ever before in the history of the world. The time is not yet ripe for governments to take action, but it is ripe for public discussion of practicable means to reduce the danger of future breaches of international peace.

The nations of the world today are in much the position of frontier settlements in America half a century ago, before orderly government was set up. The men there were in the main well disposed, but in the absence of an authority that could enforce order, each man, feeling no other security from attack, carried arms which he was prepared to use if danger threatened. The first step, when affrays became unbearable, was the formation of a vigilance committee, supported by the enrolment of all good citizens, to prevent men from shooting one another and to punish offenders. People did not wait for a gradual improvement by the preaching of higher ethics and a better civilization.

<sup>1</sup> By A. Lawrence Lowell. From the *Atlantic Monthly*, September 1915, p. 392-400.

They felt that violence must be met by force, and when the show of force was strong enough violence ceased. In time the vigilance committee was replaced by the policeman and by the sheriff with the *posse comitatus*. The policeman and the sheriff maintain order because they have the bulk of the community behind them, and no country has yet reached, or is likely for an indefinite period to reach, such a state of civilization that it can wholly dispense with the police.

Treaties for the arbitration of international disputes are good. They have proved an effective method of settling questions that would otherwise have bred ill-feeling without directly causing war; but when passion runs high, and deep-rooted interests or sentiments are at stake, there is need of the sheriff with his posse to enforce the obligation.

There are, no doubt, differences in the conception of justice and right, divergencies of civilization, so profound that people will fight over them, and face even the prospect of disaster in war rather than submit. Yet even in such cases it is worth while to postpone the conflict, to have a public discussion of the question at issue before an impartial tribunal, and thus give to the people of the countries involved a chance to consider, before hostilities begin, whether the risk and suffering of war are really worth while. No sensible man expects to abolish wars altogether, but we ought to seek to reduce the probability of war as much as possible. It is on these grounds that the suggestion has been put forth of a league of nations to enforce peace.

Without attempting to cover details of operation (which are, indeed, of vital importance and will require careful study by experts in international law and diplomacy), the proposal contains four points stated as general objects. The first is that before resorting to arms the members of the league shall submit disputes with one another, if justiciable, to an international tribunal; second, that in like manner they shall submit non-justiciable questions—that is, such as cannot be decided on the basis of strict international law—to an international council of conciliation, which shall recommend a fair and amicable solution; third, that if any member of the league wages war against another before submitting the question in dispute to the tribunal or council, all the other members shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against the state that so breaks the peace; and fourth, that the signatory powers shall endeavor to codify and improve the rules of international law.

The kernel of the proposal, the feature in which it differs from other plans, lies in the third point, obliging all the members of the league to declare war on any member violating the pact of peace. This is the provision that provokes both adherence and opposition; and at first it certainly gives one a shock that a people should be asked to pledge itself to go to war over a quarrel which is not of its making, in which it has no interest, and in which it may believe that substantial justice lies on the other side. If, indeed, the nations of the earth could maintain complete isolation, could pursue each its own destiny without regard to the rest; if they were not affected by a war between two others or liable to be drawn into it; if, in short, there were no overwhelming common interest in securing universal peace, the provision would be intolerable. It would be as bad as the liability of an individual to take part in the *posse comitatus* of a community with which he had nothing in common. But in every civilized country the public force is employed to prevent any man, however just his claim, from vindicating his own right with his own hand instead of going to law, and every citizen is bound when needed to assist in preventing him, because that is the only way to restrain private war, and the maintenance of order is of paramount importance for every one. Surely the family of nations has a like interest in restraining war between states.

It will be observed that the members of the league are not to bind themselves to enforce the decision of the tribunal or the award of the council of conciliation. That may come in the remote future, but it is no part of this proposal. It would be imposing obligations far greater than the nations can reasonably be expected to assume at the present day; for the conceptions of international morality and fair play are still so vague and divergent that a nation can hardly bind itself to wage war on another, with which it has no quarrel, to enforce a decision or a recommendation of whose justice or wisdom it may not be itself heartily convinced. The proposal goes no further than obliging all the members to prevent, by a threat of immediate war, any breach of the public peace before the matter in dispute has been submitted to arbitration; and this is neither unreasonable nor impracticable. There are many questions, especially of a non-justiciable nature, on which we should not be willing to bind ourselves to accept the decision of an arbitration, and where we should regard compulsion by armed intervention of



the rest of the world as outrageous. Take, for example, the question of Asiatic immigration, or a claim that the Panama Canal ought to be an unfortified neutral highway, or the desire by a European power to take possession of Colombia. But we ought not, in the interest of universal peace, to object to making a public statement of our position in these matters at a court or council before resorting to arms; and in fact the treaty between the United States and England, ratified on November 14, 1914, provides that all disputes between the high contracting parties, of every nature whatsoever, shall, failing other methods of adjustment, be referred for investigation and report to a permanent international commission, with a stipulation that neither country shall declare war or begin hostilities during such investigation and before the report is submitted.

What is true of this country is true of others. To agree to abide by the result of an arbitration, on every non-justiciable question of every nature whatsoever, on pain of compulsion in any form by the whole world, would involve a greater cession of sovereignty than nations would now be willing to concede. This appears, indeed, perfectly clearly from the discussions at the Hague Conference of 1907. But to exclude differences that do not turn on questions of international law from the cases in which a state must present the matter to a tribunal or council of conciliation before beginning hostilities, would leave very little check upon the outbreak of war. Almost every conflict between European nations for more than half a century has been based upon some dissension which could not be decided by strict rules of law, and in which a violation of international law or of treaty rights has usually not even been used as an excuse. This was true of the war between France and Austria in 1859, and, in substance, of the war between Prussia and Austria in 1866. It was true of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, of the Russo-Turkish War in 1876, of the Balkan War against Turkey in 1912, and of the present war.

No one will claim that a league to enforce peace, such as is proposed, would wholly prevent war, but it would greatly reduce the probabilities of hostilities. It would take away the advantage of surprise, of catching the enemy unprepared for a sudden attack. It would give a chance for public opinion on the nature of the controversy to be formed throughout the world and in the militant country. The latter is of great importance, for the moment war is declared argument about its merit is at once

stified. Passion runs too high for calm debate, and patriotism forces people to support their government. But a trial before an international tribunal would give time for discussion while emotion is not yet highly inflamed. Men opposed to war would be able to urge its injustice, to ask whether, after all, the object is worth the sacrifice, and they would get a hearing from their fellow citizens which they cannot get after war begins. The mere delay, the interval for consideration, would be an immense gain for the prospect of a peaceful settlement.

In this connection it may be of interest to recall the way in which the medieval custom of private war was abolished in England. It was not done at one step, but gradually, by preventing men from avenging their own wrongs before going to court. The trial by battle long remained a recognized part of judicial procedure, but only after the case had been presented to the court, and only in accordance with judicial forms. This had the effect of making the practice far less common, and of limiting it to the principals in the quarrel instead of involving a general breach of the peace in which their retainers and friends took part. Civilization was still too crude to give up private war, but the arm of the law and the force in the hands of the crown were strong enough to delay a personal conflict until the case had been presented to court. Without such a force the result could not have been attained.

Every one will admit this in the case of private citizens, but many people shrink from the use of international force to restrain war; some of them on the principle of strict non-resistance, that any taking of life in war cannot be justified, no matter what its purpose or effect. Such people have the most lofty moral ideals, but these are not a part of true statesmanship, unless they aim at the total welfare which may require the attacking of evils even by forcible means. Many years ago when an Atlantic steamship was wrecked it was said that some of the crew made a rush for the boats, beating the passengers off, and that the captain, who was urged to restore order by shooting a mutineer, replied that he was too near eternity to take life. The result was a far greater loss of life than would have been suffered had he restored order by force. Probably no man with the instincts of a statesman would defend his conduct today. He was not a coward, but his sentiments unfitted him for a responsible post in an emergency.

Most people who have been thinking seriously about the

maintenance of peace are tending to the opinion that a sanction of some kind is needed to enforce the observance of treaties and of agreements for arbitration. Among the measures proposed has been that of an international police force, under the control of a central council which could use it to preserve order throughout the world. At present such a plan seems visionary. The force would have to be at least large enough to cope with the army that any single nation could put into the field—under existing conditions let us say five millions of men fully equipped and supplied with artillery and ammunition for a campaign of several months. These troops need not be under arms, or quartered near The Hague, but they must be thoroughly trained and ready to be called out at short notice. Practically that would entail yearly votes of the legislative bodies of each of the nations supplying a quota; and if any of them failed to make the necessary appropriation there would be great difficulty in preventing others from following its example. The whole organization would, therefore, be in constant danger of going to pieces.

But quite apart from the practical difficulties in the permanent execution of such a plan, let us see how it would affect the United States. The amount of the contingents of the various countries would be apportioned with some regard to population, wealth, and economic resources; and if the total were five million men, our quota on a moderate estimate might be five hundred thousand men. Is it conceivable that the United States would agree to keep anything like that number drilled, equipped, and ready to take the field on the order of an international council composed mainly of foreign nations? Of course it will be answered that these figures are exaggerated, because any such plan will be accompanied by a reduction in armaments. But that is an easier thing to talk about than to effect, and especially to maintain. One must not forget that the existing system of universal compulsory military service on the continent of Europe arose from Napoleon's attempt to limit the size of the Prussian army. He would be a bold or sanguine man who should assert that any treaty to limit armaments could not in like manner be evaded; and however much they were limited, the quantity of troops to be held at the disposal of a foreign council would of necessity be large, while no nation would be willing to pledge for the purpose the whole of its military force. Such a plan may be practicable in some remote future when the whole world is a vast federation under a central government,

but that would seem to be a matter for coming generations, not for the men of our day.

Moreover, the nations whose troops were engaged in fighting any country would inevitably find themselves at war with that country.

One cannot imagine saying to some foreign state, "Our troops are killing yours, they are invading your land, we are supplying them with recruits and munitions of war, but otherwise we are at peace with you. You must treat us as a neutral, and accord to our citizens, to their commerce and property, all the rights of neutrality." In short the plan of an international police force involves all the consequences of the proposal of a league to enforce peace, with other complex provisions extremely hard to execute.

A suggestion more commonly made is that the members of the league of nations, instead of pledging themselves explicitly to declare war forthwith against any of their number that commits a breach of the peace, should agree to hold at once a conference, and take such measures—diplomatic, economic, or military—as may be necessary to prevent war. The objection to this is that it weakens very seriously the sanction. Conferences are apt to shrink from decisive action. Some of the members are timid, others want delay, and much time is consumed in calling the body together and in discussions after it meets. Meanwhile the war may have broken out, and be beyond control. It is much easier to prevent a fire than to put it out. The country that is planning war is likely to think it has friends in the conference, or neighbors that it can intimidate, who will prevent any positive decision until the fire is burning. Even if the majority decides on immediate action, the minority is not bound thereby. One great power refuses to take part; a second will not do so without her; the rest hesitate, and nothing is done to prevent the war.

A conference is an excellent thing. The proposal of a league to enforce peace by no means excludes it; but the important matter, the effective principle, is that every member of the league should know that whether a conference meets or not, or whatever action it may take or fail to take, all the members of the league have pledged themselves to declare war forthwith on any member that commits a breach of the peace before submitting its case to the international tribunal or council of conciliation. Such a pledge, and such a pledge alone, can have the strong

deterrent influence, and thus furnish the sanction, that is needed. Of course the pledge may not be kept. Like other treaties it may be broken by the parties to it. Nations are composed of human beings with human weaknesses, and one of these is a disinclination to perform an agreement when it involves a sacrifice. Nevertheless, nations, like men, often do have enough sense of honor, of duty, or of ultimate self-interest, to carry out their contracts at no little immediate sacrifice. They are certainly more likely to do a thing if they have pledged themselves to it than if they have not; and any nation would be running a terrible risk that went to war in the hope that the other members of the league would break their pledges.

The same objective applies to another alternative proposed in place of an immediate resort to military force: that is the use of economic pressure, by a universal agreement for example, to have no commercial intercourse with the nation breaking the peace. A threat of universal boycott is, no doubt, formidable, but by no means so formidable as a threat of universal war. A large country with great natural resources which has determined to make war, might be willing to face commercial non-intercourse with the other members of the league during hostilities, when it would not for a moment contemplate the risk of fighting them. A threat, for example, by England, France, and Germany to stop all trade with the United States might or might not have prevented our going to war with Spain; but a declaration that they would take part with all their armies and navies against us would certainly have done so.

It has often been pointed out that the threat of general non-intercourse would bear much more hardly on some countries than on others. That may not in itself be a fatal objection, but a very serious consideration arises from the fact that there would be a premium on preparation for war. A nation which had accumulated vast quantities of munitions, food, and supplies of all kinds, might afford to disregard it; while another less fully prepared could not.

Moreover, economic pressure, although urged as a milder measure, is in fact more difficult to apply and maintain. A declaration of war is a single act, and when made sustains itself by the passion it inflames; while commercial non-intercourse is a continuous matter, subject to constant opposition exerted in an atmosphere relatively cool. Our manufacturers would complain bitterly at being deprived of dyestuffs and other chemical prod-

ucts on account of a quarrel in which we had no interest; the South would suffer severely by the loss of a market for cotton; the shipping firms and the exporters and importers of all kinds would be gravely injured; and all these interests would bring to bear upon Congress a pressure well-nigh irresistible. The same would be true of every other neutral country, a fact that would be perfectly well known to the intending belligerent and reduce its fear of a boycott.

But, it is said, why not try economic pressure first, and, if that fails, resort to military force, instead of inflicting at once on unoffending members of the league the terrible calamity of war? What do we mean by "if that fails"? Do we mean, if, in spite of the economic pressure, the war breaks out? But then the harm is done, the fire is ablaze and can be put out only by blood. The object of the league is not to chastise a country guilty of breaking the peace, but to prevent the outbreak of war, and to prevent it by the immediate prospect of such appalling consequences to the offender that he will not venture to run the risk. If a number of great powers were to pledge themselves, with serious intent, to wage war jointly and severally on any one of their members that attacked another before submitting the case to arbitration, it is in the highest degree improbable that the *casus foederis* would ever occur, while any less drastic provision would be far less effective.

An objection has been raised to the proposal for a league to enforce peace on the ground that it has in the past often proved difficult, if not impossible, to determine which of two belligerents began a war. This criticism is serious, and presents a practical difficulty, grave but probably not insurmountable. The proposal merely lays down a general principle, and if adopted the details would have to be worked out very fully and carefully in a treaty, which would specify the acts that would constitute the waging of war by one member upon another. These would naturally be, not the mere creating of apprehension, but specific acts, such as a declaration of war, invasion of territory, the use of force at sea not disowned within forty-eight hours, or an advance into a region in dispute. This last is an especially difficult point, but those portions of the earth's surface in which different nations have conflicting claims are growing less decade by decade.

It must be remembered that the cases which would arise under a league of peace are not like those which have arisen in the past, where one nation is determined to go to war and merely

seeks to throw the moral responsibility on the other while getting the advantage of actually beginning hostilities. It is a case where each will strive to avoid the specific acts of war that may involve the penalty. The reader may have seen, in a country where personal violence is severely punished, two men shaking their fists in each other's faces, each trying to provoke the other to strike the first blow; and no fight after all.

There are many agreements in private business which are not easy to embody in formal contracts; agreements where, as in this case, the execution of the terms calls for immediate action, and where redress after an elaborate trial of the facts affords no real reparation. But if the object sought is good, men do not condemn it on account of the difficulty in devising provisions that will accomplish the result desired; certainly not until they have tried to devise them. It may, indeed, prove impossible to draft a code of specific acts that will cover the ground; it may be impracticable to draft it so as to avoid issues of fact that can be determined only after a long sifting of evidence, which would come too late; but surely that is no reason for failure to make the attempt. We are not making a treaty among nations. We are merely putting forward a suggestion for reducing war, which seems to merit consideration.

A second difficulty that will sometimes arise is the rule of conduct to be followed pending the presentation of the question to the international tribunal. The continuance or cessation of the acts complained of may appear to be, and may even be in fact, more important than the final decision. This has been brought to our attention forcibly by the sinking of the *Lusitania*. We should have done very wisely to submit to arbitration the question of the right of submarines to torpedo merchant ships without warning, provided Germany abandoned the practice pending the arbitration; and Germany would probably not have refused to submit the question to a tribunal on the understanding that the practice was to continue until the decision was rendered, because by that time the war would be over. This difficulty is inherent in every plan for the arbitration of international disputes, although more serious in a league whose members bind themselves to prevent by force the outbreak of war. It would be necessary to give the tribunal summary authority to decree a *modus vivendi*, to empower it, like a court of equity, to issue a temporary injunction.

In short, the proposal for a league to enforce peace cannot meet all possible contingencies. It cannot prevent all future wars, nor does any sensible person believe that any plan can do so in the present state of civilization. But it can prevent some wars that would otherwise take place, and if it does that it will have done much good.

People have asked how such a league would differ from the Triple Alliance or Triple Entente—whether it would not be nominally a combination for peace which might in practice have quite a different effect. But in fact its object is quite contrary to those alliances. They are designed to protect their members against outside powers. This is intended to insure peace among the members themselves. If it grew strong enough, by including all the great powers, it might well insist on universal peace by compelling the outsiders to come in. But that is not its primary object, which is simply to prevent its members from going to war with one another. No doubt if several great nations, and some of the smaller ones, joined it, and if it succeeded in preserving constant friendly relations among its members, there would grow up among them a sense of solidarity which would make any outside power chary of attacking one of them; and, what is more valuable, would make outsiders want to join it. But there is little use in speculating about probabilities. It is enough if such a league were a source of enduring peace among its own members.

How about our own position in the United States? The proposal is a radical and subversive departure from the traditional policy of our country. Would it be wise for us to be parties to such an agreement? At the threshold of such a discussion one thing is clear. If we are not willing to urge our own government to joint a movement for peace, we have no business to discuss any plan for the purpose. It is worse than futile, it is an impertinence, for Americans to advise the people of Europe how they ought to conduct their affairs if we have nothing in common with them; to suggest to them conventions with burdens which are well enough for them, but which we are not willing to share. If our peace organizations are not prepared to have us take part in the plans they devise, they had better disband, or confine their discussions to Pan-American questions.

To return to the question: would it be wise for the United



States to make so great a departure from its traditional policy? The wisdom of consistency lies in adherence to a principle so long as the conditions upon which it is based remain unchanged. But the conditions that affect the relations of America to Europe have changed greatly in the last hundred and twenty years. At that time it took about a month to cross the ocean to our shores. Ships were small and could carry few troops. Their guns had a short range. No country had what would now be called more than a very small army; and it was virtually impossible for any foreign nation to make more than a raid upon our territory before we could organize and equip a sufficient force to resist, however unprepared we might be at the outset. But now, by the improvements in machinery, the Atlantic has shrunk to a lake, and before long will shrink to a river. Except for the protection of the navy, and perhaps in spite of it, a foreign nation could land on our coast an army of such a size, and armed with such weapons, that unless we maintain forces several times larger than at present, we should be quite unable to oppose an attack before we had suffered incalculable damage.

It is all very well to assert that we have no desire to quarrel with any one, or any one with us; but good intentions in the abstract, even if accompanied by long-suffering and a disposition to overlook affronts, will not always keep us out of strife. When a number of great nations are locked in a death-grapple, they are a trifle careless of the rights of the bystander. Within fifteen years of "Washington's Farewell Address" we were drawn into the wars of Napoleon, and a sorry figure we made for the most part of the fighting on land. A hundred years later our relations with the rest of the world are far closer, our ability to maintain a complete isolation far less. Except by colossal self-deception we cannot believe that the convulsions of Europe do not affect us profoundly, that wars there need not disturb us, that we are not in danger of being drawn into them; or even that we may not some day find ourselves in the direct path of the storm. If our interest in the maintenance of peace is not quite so strong as that of some other nations, it is certainly strong enough to warrant our taking steps to preserve it, even to the point of joining a league to enforce it. The cost of the insurance is well worth the security to us.

If mere material self-interest would indicate such a course, there are other reasons to confirm it. Civilization is to some extent a common heritage which it is worth while for all nations to defend, and war is a scourge which all peoples should use every rational means to reduce. If the family of nations can by standing together make wars less frequent, it is clearly their duty to do so, and in such a body we do not want the place of our own country to be vacant.

To join such a league would mean, no doubt, a larger force of men trained for arms in this country, more munitions of war on hand, and better means of producing them rapidly; for although it may be assumed that the members of the league would never be actually called upon to carry out their promise to fight, they ought to have a potential force for the purpose. But in any case this country ought not to be so little prepared for an emergency as it is today; and it would require to be less fully armed if it joined a league pledged to protect its members against attack, than if it stood alone and unprotected. In fact the tendency of such a league, by procuring at least delay before the outbreak of hostilities, would be to lessen the need of preparation for immediate war, and thus it would have a more potent effect in reducing armaments than any formal treaties could have, whether made voluntarily or under compulsion.

The proposal for a league to enforce peace does not conflict with plans to go further, to enforce justice among nations by compelling compliance with the decisions of a tribunal by diplomatic, economic, or military pressure. Nor, on the other hand, does it imply any such action, or interfere with the independence or sovereignty of states except in this one respect, that it would prohibit any member, before submitting its claims to arbitration, from making war upon another on pain of finding itself at war with all the rest. The proposal is only a suggestion, defective probably, crude certainly; but if, in spite of that, it is the most promising plan for maintaining peace now brought forward, it merits sympathetic consideration both here and abroad.

PEACE LEAGUE INEFFECTIVE<sup>1</sup>

Clifton, Mass., June 9, 1915.

Dear Sir: I beg to express my thanks for the courtesy of the invitation to attend the conference of the League of Peace in Independence Hall under the presidency of the Hon. W. H. Taft. I feel myself, of course, in deepest sympathy with the spirit of justice and peacefulness which has suggested the foundation of such a league. Nevertheless, I beg to be excused from attendance, as I am convinced that this time of international excitement and prejudice is unfit for the crystallization of new forms for the common life of the nations.

I venture, however, to add that I feel in any case grave doubts of the value of any plans which aim to secure future peace by the traditional type of agreements and treaties. We live in the midst of a war in which one belligerent nation after another has felt obliged to disregard treaties and to interpret agreements in a one-sided way. Only yesterday Italy, without any reason of vital necessity, annulled an agreement and a treaty which had appeared the firmest in European politics, and which yet failed in the first hour of clashing interests. A psychologist has no right to expect that the national temper of the future will be different.

Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States has sanctioned the idea, which is shared practically by all nations, that treaties are no longer binding when a situation has changed so that the fulfilment of the agreement would be against the vital interests of the nation. We have learned during the last ten months how easily such disburdening changes can be discovered as soon as the national passions are awakened.

The new plan depends upon only one new feature by which the mutual agreement is to be fortified against the demands of national excitement. The plan of the League of Peace promises the joint use of military forces in case that one nation is unwilling to yield. But the world witnesses today the clear proof that even the greatest combination of fighting forces may

<sup>1</sup> Letter from Hugo Münsterberg to Augustus J. Cadwalader, Secretary of the National Provisional Committee for the League to Enforce Peace, expressing his disapproval of the objects of the league.

be unable to subdue by mere numbers a nation which is ready to make any sacrifice for its convictions. One hundred and fifty millions are attacked by eight hundred and fifty millions, by joint forces from five continents, which moreover are backed by the economic forces of the richest country in the world; and yet after ten months of fighting one million prisoners, but no other hostile soldiers, stand on German soil. After this practical example the plan merely to join the military forces will less than ever appear a convincing argument in an hour in which a nation feels its existence or its honor threatened. For a long time we heard the claim that the Socialists and the bankers would now make great wars impossible; both prophecies have failed. The threat that the warring nation will have to face the world in arms will be no less futile. But the failure in this case will be disastrous, as the terms of such an agreement would draw many nations into the whirlpool which would have no reason of their own for entering the war.

The interests of strong growing nations will lead in the future as in the past to conflicts in which both sides are morally in the right and in which one must yield. We have no right to hope that after this war the nations will be more willing to give up their chances in such conflicts without having appealed to force. On the contrary, the world has now become accustomed to war and will therefore more easily return to the trenches. The break between England and Russia and finally the threatening cloud of world conflict between Occident and Orient can already be seen on the horizon; the battles of today may be only the preamble. In such tremendous hours the new-fashioned agreements would be cobwebs which surely could not bind the arms of any energetic nation.

But, worst of all, they would not only be ineffective—they would awake a treacherous confidence. The nations would deceive themselves with a feeling of safety, while all true protection would be lacking. The first step forward toward our common goal must be to learn the two lessons of the war of today and to face them unflinchingly; mere agreements do not and cannot bind any nation on the globe in an hour of vital need, and the mere joining of forces widens and protracts a war, but does not hinder it. We must learn that success for peace endeavors can be secured only from efforts to avert war

which are fundamentally different from the old patterns of pledges and threats. These old means were negative; we need positive ones.

If a psychologist can contribute anything to the progress of mankind, he must, first of all, offer the advice not to rely on plans by which the attention is focused on the disasters which are to be avoided. Education by forbidding the wrong action instead of awaking the impulses toward the right one is as unpromising for peoples as it is for individuals. We must truly build up from within. But a time in which the war news of every hour appeals to sympathies and antipathies is hardly the time to begin this sacred work, which alone could bring us the blessed age of our vision, the United States of the World.

A PRAYER FOR PEACE<sup>1</sup>

Now these were visions in the night of war:  
I prayed for peace; God, answering my prayer,  
Sent down a grievous plague on humankind,  
A black and tumorous plague that softly slew  
Till nations and their armies were no more—

And there was perfect peace . . .  
But I awoke, wroth with high God and prayer.

I prayed for peace; God, answering my prayer,  
Decreed the Truce of Life:—Wings in the sky  
Fluttered and fell; the quick, bright ocean things  
Sank to the ooze; the footprints in the woods  
Vanished; the freed brute from the abattoir  
Starved on green pastures; and within the blood  
The death-work at the root of living ceased;  
And men gnawed clods and stones, blasphemed and died—

And there was perfect peace . . .  
But I awoke, wroth with high God and prayer.

I prayed for peace; God, answering my prayer,  
Bowed the free neck beneath a yoke of steel,  
Dumbed the free voice that springs in lyric speech,  
Killed the free art that glows on all mankind,  
And made one iron nation lord of earth,  
Which in the monstrous matrix of its will  
Moulded a spawn of slaves. There was One Might

And there was perfect peace . . .  
But I awoke, wroth with high God and prayer.

<sup>1</sup> This poem, reproduced here by permission of the author, William Samuel Johnson, and the publisher, Mitchell Kennerley, first appeared in the Forum of December, 1914. It was afterward republished in book form, with other poems by the author, under the title "Prayer for Peace and Other Poems." In a letter to Mr. Johnson, under date December 29, 1914, Colonel Roosevelt says: "I think your Prayer for Peace is one of the most powerful poems I have read for many a long day. It has the ring in it that certain of Lowell's poems have. If you do not object I intend, if I yet have time to arrange it, to publish it in a little volume I am just getting out called, 'America and the World War.' I would like to use it as the introduction, because it gives exactly the position I think our people should take."

I prayed for peace; God, answering my prayer,  
Palsied all flesh with bitter fear of death.  
The shuddering slayers fled to town and field  
Beset with carrion visions, foul decay,  
And sickening taints of air that made the earth  
One charnel of the shrivelled lines of war.  
And through all flesh that omnipresent fear  
Became the strangling fingers of a hand  
That choked aspiring thought and brave belief  
And love of loveliness and selfless deed  
Till flesh was all, flesh wallowing, styed in fear  
In festering fear that stank beyond the stars—  
And there was perfect peace . . .  
But I awoke, wroth with high God and prayer.

I prayed for peace; God, answering my prayer,  
Spake very softly of forgotten things,  
Spake very softly old remembered words  
Sweet as young starlight. Rose to heaven again  
The mystic challenge of the Nazarene,  
The deathless affirmation:—Man in God  
And God in man willing the God to be . . .  
And there was war and peace, and peace and war,  
Full year and lean, joy, anguish, life and death,  
Doing their work on the evolving soul,  
The soul of man in God and God in man.  
For death is nothing in the sum of things,  
And life is nothing in the sum of things,  
And flesh is nothing in the sum of things,  
But man in God is all and God in man  
Will merged in will, love immanent in love,  
Moving through visioned vistas to one goal—  
The goal of man in God and God in man,  
And of all life in God and God in life—  
The far fruition of our earthly prayer,  
"Thy will be done!" . . . There is no other peace!

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